Duane Morris Takeaway: Keep your New Year’s whistles on deck for the DMCAR 2026 E-book Launch on Tuesday, January 6, 2026! Our 22nd annual study of the class action space will be the biggest and most comprehensive edition yet, at over 750 pages. The 2026 Review has more analysis than ever before, with discussion of over 1,759 class certification rulings from federal and state courts examining all categories of class action litigation.
We will host an in-depth discussion of the key trends analyzed over the past 12 months at the Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2026 Book Launch Event on Thursday, February 5, 2026, from 3:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. at the Northwestern University School of Law. Register here to reserve your in-person or virtual seat and join us for a 60-minute live panel with DMCAR editors Jerry Maatman and Jennifer Riley and guest speaker Hon. Wayne R. Andersen (Ret.). CLE, SHRM, and HRCI credit will be available.
We look forward to publishing the new edition of the Review and sharing our outlook for class action litigation in 2026. Stay tuned and Happy New Year!
Duane Morris Takeaway:This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Sean McConnell with their discussion a certification ruling issued in an antitrust class action brought by consumers alleging ticket seller Live Nation monopolized the live entertainment market following its merger with Ticketmaster.
Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal blog listeners and readers, for joining us for our next episode of our podcast series entitled The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman of Duane Morris, and joining me today is my partner, Sean McConnell, of our Philadelphia office, who is the chair of our antitrust practice group.
Sean McConnell: Great to be here, Jerry. Thanks for having me.
Jerry: Today, we’re here to discuss a recent ruling from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in which a federal judge certified a nationwide consumer class in antitrust litigation against Live Nation Entertainment and Ticketmaster. This past week, U.S. District Court Judge George Wu certified a class of consumers who had purchased primary concert tickets through Ticketmaster or other Live Nation platforms dating back to 2010. The ruling adopted a tentative decision the court had issued earlier this month. Sean, can you tell us a little bit of the context of the antitrust implications of this ruling?
Sean: Sure, Jerry. The plaintiffs allege that Live Nation used its market power following the transaction with Ticketmaster and that acquisition to suppress competition and inflate ticket prices for concertgoers. The court concluded that the plaintiff satisfied the requirements for class certification under Rule 23, including predominance. Live Nation’s opposition focused primarily on the absence of a nationwide market. The company argued that ticket purchasing is inherently local, and that consumers do not seek alternatives outside their geographic area in response to price increases. Judge Wu rejected that framing. He reasoned that the case centers on ticketing services rather than individual tickets for individual concerts. From the court’s perspective, those services operate at a national scale, supporting certification on a nationwide basis.
Jerry: I know that expert opinions are at the heart of class certification efforts by the plaintiff’s bar and antitrust cases, and here, the court rejected the defendant’s critiques of the plaintiff’s expert report. Stating that the plaintiffs had adequately addressed those challenges, and that Rule 23 does not require the court to resolve competing expert opinions or models at the class certification stage. In this instance, who’s actually included, then, in the certified class?
Sean: Great question, Jerry. The certified class includes only primary ticket sales and excludes secondary market resales. The case has been pending since 2022, and proceeds alongside enforcement actions brought by the Department of Justice and several state attorneys general, which have alleged similar anti-competitive conduct and violations of a prior consent decree when Live Nation and Ticketmaster first merged back in 2010.
Jerry: At a 100,000-foot level, what exactly are the implications of this decision? I know that class certification is the holy grail in these sorts of cases. Is this ruling significant for companies?
Sean: Yes, from a corporate perspective, the decision underscores the litigation risk associated with vertically integrated platforms that operate at a nationwide scale. Courts may look beyond localized consumer behavior and focus instead on centralized pricing, contracting, and service models. The ruling also illustrates the relatively modest evidentiary burden plaintiffs face at the class certification stage in complex antitrust cases. Companies should not assume that disputes over market definition or expert methodology will prevent certification.
Jerry: Well, that’s a great overview, Sean, of those implications. I know that when antitrust cases are certified as viable class action, exposure increases incrementally, if not significantly, and shifts the leverage to the plaintiffs, which in turn increases the pressure to settle and expands both the scope and the cost of discovery.
Sean: Exactly right, Jerry. For companies in highly concentrated or regulated markets, this case reinforces the importance of proactive antitrust risk assessment, careful compliance with merger-related obligations, and early litigation strategy focused on class certification.
Jerry: Well, thanks, Sean, for your detailed analysis of the implications of this ruling, and thanks so much for being here today. Happy holidays to all of our listeners, and we’re glad you were able to tune in to this final 2025 edition of the Class Action Weekly Wire.
Sean: Thank you, Jerry, and thank you, listeners. As always, it was a pleasure to be here, and happy holidays, everyone.
Duane Morris Takeaway:This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and associate Bernadette Coyle with their discussion of the 2025-2026 edition of the American Tort Reform Association’s (“ATRA”) “Judicial Hellholes Report,” which details the eight least favorable venues for corporate defendants across the country.
Jerry Maatman: Thank you for being here, loyal blog listeners and readers, for the next episode of our ongoing series entitled The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is my colleague, Bernadette Coyle. Welcome, and thanks for being on the podcast.
Bernadette Coyle: Thanks, Jerry, I’m very happy to be here.
Jerry: Today, we’re discussing the annual report prepared by the American Tort Reform Association, known by the acronym ATRA, which is called the “Judicial Hellholes Report.” It focuses on litigation issues and identification of jurisdictions likely to have unfair or biased administration of justice that, in essence, are very difficult places in which corporate defendants are sued. This is an important read for corporate counsel facing class action litigation, because it identifies the who, what, when, where, and how of what jurisdictions are most difficult in which to defend class action litigation.
Bernadette: That’s right, Jerry. The report defines a “judicial hellhole” as a jurisdiction where judges in civil cases systematically apply laws and procedures in an unfair and unbalanced manner, which generally is to the disadvantage of defendants.
Jerry: This year’s report identified eight total jurisdictions in its list, down from 10 that were identified last year. I’m sure our loyal blog listeners are anxious to hear what jurisdiction came out on top of the list as the most unfavorable jurisdiction in which to be sued.
Bernadette: Jerry, topping the list this year is Los Angeles. Although California has long been considered a plaintiff-friendly state, this year in particular, lawsuit abuse and judicial bias in Los Angeles have set it apart and pushed it to the top of the list. The report points to a $1 billion nuclear verdict, allegations of litigation abuse, and courts leaning into novel liability theories that broaden exposure for defendants. And small businesses are targeted in particular, being hit with ADA and no injury suits, while arbitration continues to face judicial resistance in California.
Jerry: Well, speaking from my own personal experience, I would agree it’s a very difficult place to practice law and defend cases, and its inclusion and placement at the top of the list comes as no surprise. Moving to number two is New York Metro, New York City. What’s happening there on the list?
Bernadette: New York City remained at number two this year, and the ATRF calls it a “fraudemic.” The city continues to produce nuclear verdicts, courts are expanding product liability theories, especially against tech companies, and both no-injury filings and asbestos cases remain heavy in New York City.
Jerry: Number three came in with South Carolina. It’s been on the radar for years of the American Tort Reform Association.
Bernadette: Exactly. The ATRF criticizes the relaxed causation standard, frequent sanctions, and even notes instances where courts increased jury awards because it believed that the jury did not go far enough.
Jerry: Let’s hit the rest of the list of eight. Louisiana, I believe, comes in fourth.
Bernadette: Yes, the first coastal litigation case finally went to trial, and it ended in a nine-figure verdict. Interestingly, the ATRF also points to political connections between plaintiffs’ lawyers and state leadership.
Jerry: Fifth is Philadelphia jurisdiction, where we’re handling many class actions.
Bernadette: Right, and also last year’s defending champion. A RICO lawsuit has raised allegations of fraud in the court system, and the complex litigation Center continues to attract mass tort filings, and historic nuclear verdicts are becoming more common.
Jerry: Sixth is Missouri in general, and St. Louis in particular. What are you seeing there?
Bernadette: Yes, the ATRF says courts there continue to allow junk science, and out-of-state plaintiffs are targeting St. Louis small businesses with ADA lawsuits. Judges have even overturned jury verdicts that they disagreed with.
Jerry: Seventh is a familiar Illinois trio, the counties of Cook, Madison, and St. Clair, the latter two of which were the motivating factors for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 that President Bush signed into law to allow for easier removal from state court to federal court. What’s happening on the Illinois front?
Bernadette: They are described as ground zero for baby formula litigation supported by questionable science. Also, litigation tourism persists, asbestos filings are high, and nuclear verdicts continue.
Jerry: And rounding out the list, at number eight is the state of Washington in general, and King County, in particular, where we’re seeing a rise of many employment-related class actions.
Bernadette: Correct. The report highlights the reinstatement of a nuclear verdict, expanded asbestos liability, and King County’s role in pioneering climate change litigation against energy companies. And as we’ve seen, there’s also been a sharp increase in class actions brought under the EPOA this year in Washington.
Jerry: Let’s shift now to the ATRA’s watch list. It highlights six jurisdictions that are not full judicial hellholes, but have been trending in that direction. What should our listeners know about the watchlist?
Bernadette: Three Georgia counties, Gwinnett, Fulton, and Cobb, are under scrutiny despite statewide reforms. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did have a quieter year this year, but remains influential, especially in forum shopping and arbitration filings. Texas is seeing a rise in pro-plaintiff leanings and state-sponsored lawsuits. Michigan has major decisions pending, Louisiana still faces fallout from fraud schemes, and Kentucky continues to produce nuclear verdicts.
Jerry: The report also calls out what it calls dishonorable mentions. What stands out to you in terms of that list?
Bernadette: There are three main concerns noted in the report. First, the Fourth Circuit’s broad approach to public nuisance, a Colorado evidentiary ruling that the ATRF finds troubling, and Ohio appellate courts that are permitting unlimited non-economic damages.
Jerry: Well, it’s not all doom and gloom. There is a little bit of positive light. What does the report, refer to in terms of what it characterizes as “points of light”?
Bernadette: Yes, and there are some significant ones. Colorado rejected medical monitoring damages, Delaware and Maine pushed back on junk science and public nuisance expansion, North Carolina reaffirmed caps on non-economic damages, and the Utah Supreme Court eliminated phantom damages.
Jerry: Well, Bernadette, thanks so much for guiding us through the tour of the 2025-2026 Judicial Hellholes Report. It’s essential reading for corporate counsel, and certainly any company involved in high-stakes litigation or defending class action litigation. The report certainly manifests what we see on a daily basis in terms of the epicenters of class action litigation, and where the plaintiffs’ bar tends to file their cases in terms of trying to gain an advantage over corporate defenses.
Well, thanks so much for being here, Bernadette, and providing us with your thought leadership in this space.
Bernadette: Thank you for having me, Jerry, and thank you, listeners.
Duane Morris Takeaway:This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Alex Karasik with their discussion of a North Carolina federal court decision adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny a motion for decertification of FLSA claims and grant the certification motion for state law claims.
Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal blog readers and listeners, for joining us again this week for the next episode of our weekly podcast series entitled The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is my colleague and partner Alex Karasik. Welcome so much, Alex, for being on the podcast.
Alex Karasik: Great to be here, Jerry. Thank you for having me.
Jerry: Today, we’re going to discuss an important ruling that emanated from North Carolina. It’s in a case called Landis v. The Elevance Health Cos., and it involves a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) case and a North Carolina wage and hour law case. It involves a recommendation made by a magistrate judge to not decertify a FLSA conditionally certified collective action, and then on top of it, to certify a Rule 23 class under state law. From your perspective, Alex, in terms of following these sorts of rulings, what stands out to you, and what should employers take away from this ruling?
Alex: What stands out is the court’s straightforward endorsement. By finding no clear error, Judge Boyle confirmed that both the FLSA collective action and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act class claims should remain intact. That was certainly a unique ruling to me.
Jerry: Well, these are misclassification claims by the plaintiff, Kathy Landis. Could you give our listeners a quick recap of what this lawsuit was all about?
Alex: Yeah, certainly, Jerry. Landis alleged that Elevance, formerly the Anthem Companies and its subsidiary, Amerigroup, misclassified utilization reviewers in the Nurse Medical Management (NMM) job titles as exempt employees. Landis and the other plaintiffs alleged that they were salaried, classified as exempt, and routinely worked more than 40 hours in a work week, and therefore did not receive overtime compensation for the hours worked beyond 40. Their primary job duty was utilization review, which is essentially assessing whether requested healthcare services are medically necessary using objective clinical criteria.
Jerry: The study we do each year in the Duane Morris Class Action Review gathers statistics on decertification motions, and in past years, basically a jump ball, 50-50 between plaintiffs and defendants. In this particular case, what were the factors that led the court to deny decertification of the collective action?
Alex: In this instance, the magistrate judge found that similarities across all NMM rules outweighed the differences. All NMMs used the same software systems, they reported with a common supervisory structure, they performed standardized utilization review, they followed similar approval and escalation procedures. So even though sometimes there were different guidelines, the main functions remained the same. The magistrate judge stated that the differences were not meaningful to the core question of exempt status and whether or not they were misclassified. In other words, even if the day-to-day details varied among the people in the case, the variations did not alter the legal inquiry under the FLSA.
Jerry: One way to think about decertification is the concept of chaos. You can’t put one person on the stand, they tell their story, and it transposes to everyone else. What was the court’s take on the defendant’s argument about the individualized nature of the duties, the jobs, the tasks at issue here?
Alex: Yeah, the court didn’t find that persuasive in this case. Judge Swank found that the defendants overstated the amount of individualized analysis that would be required. She concluded that the collective could be analyzed efficiently and because the exemption issue was common across the group. The court opined that the central question was whether the utilization reviewers were exempt, or were they performing exempt or non-exempt work, and minor variations among the work performed wouldn’t alter that inquiry. The magistrate judge also found that collective treatment would be a more efficient method in terms of adjudicating these claims as opposed to an individual case. The magistrate judge concluded that all factors weighed against decertification.
Jerry: Many believe that obtaining conditional certification of a collective action is easier than obtaining Rule 23 certification of a class action. How did the court treat theories that the plaintiffs offered here for Rule 23 certification of their state law wage and hour claims?
Alex: Yeah, the court here essentially rejected the defendant’s arguments in terms of what they disputed in the case of the Rule 23 factors. She stated that the class shared a central question of whether individuals in these roles whose primary job was utilization review. We’re properly classified as exempt. The court held that the variations in hours worked or guidelines used did not defeat commonality, because the exemption question could be answered with common evidence.
Jerry: Commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) is one thing, but predominance under Rule 23 is another, and a very exacting, difficult test. How did the court react to the defenses of predominance and superiority in this context?
Alex: Judge Swank found that common issues predominated because the exemption question was common across the class, and it could be resolved using largely uniform evidence, such as their job descriptions, the deposition testimony about the review process, and Elevance’s uniform exemption policy. In other words, the judge concluded that a class action would be the superior method for adjudicating these claims.
Jerry: Well, thanks so much, Alex, for your overview and thought leadership in this area. The Duane Morris Class Action Review is about a month out from being launched. Chapter 23 is the wage and hour chapter, probably the meatiest chapter in the entire book in terms of the volume of rulings, and this certainly is a good case study of how plaintiffs have succeeded, at least in North Carolina, in certifying their cases. So, thanks so much for being here today, and being our guest speaker on this week’s podcast.
Alex: Well, thank you, Jerry. I’m grateful for the opportunity to be here, and thank you to our listeners.
Duane Morris Takeaway: Duane Morris proudly invites you to the Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2026 Book Launch Event on Thursday, February 5, 2026, from 3:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Click here to register and attend! In-person and virtual options available.
About the Program
Featuring authors Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley with Hon. Wayne R. Andersen (Ret.), JAMS Neutral and former U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, in a discussion of the key class action trends and rulings in 2025 and what companies can expect in 2026.
Duane Morris Takeaway:This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and senior associates Hayley Ryan and Tyler Zmick with their analysis of an Illinois federal court decision granting class certification in a BIPA suit alleging unlawful collection of biometric voice data.
Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal blog readers and listeners, for joining us again for this week’s edition of the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner with Duane Morris, and joining me today are my colleagues Hayley Ryan and Tyler Zmick. Thanks so much for being here.
Tyler Zmick: Great to be here, Jerry. Thank you for having me.
Hayley Ryan: Glad to be here, Jerry. Thanks so much.
Jerry: Today, we’re diving into a major ruling from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, entitled Gundersen v. Amazon.com. It’s a lawsuit against Amazon regarding the Alexa Voice ID feature and alleges violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, known by the acronym BIPA. Let’s start with the basics. Hayley, what exactly is Voice ID?
Hayley: Sure. Amazon’s Alexa has been around for a while, but since October 2017, it’s included a feature called Voice ID. This feature essentially trains Alexa to recognize a specific user’s voice. Users go through an enrollment process in the Alexa app, where they read several prompted phrases, which are called “utterances,” so Alexa can “learn” their voice and later personalize responses. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that this process creates a “voiceprint,” which counts as a biometric identifier under the BIPA. And the BIPA strictly regulates the collection, storage, sale, and disclosure of biometric data.
Jerry: As I understand it, the plaintiffs in the case allege that Amazon never told users of Alexa that the system would be creating or storing biometric “voiceprints.” Was that the gravamen of the claim?
Tyler: Exactly right. So, the prompts that were presented to the plaintiffs mentioned “Voice ID,” and the prompts also authorized Amazon to “create, use, improve, and store your Voice ID,” but the plaintiffs, who had all enrolled in Voice ID, alleged that those prompts failed to satisfy BIPA because they never used the specific statutory terms “voiceprint,” “biometric identifier,” or “biometric information.”
Jerry: Thanks for that explanation, Tyler. Can you walk our listeners through the exact allegations at issue in the lawsuit under BIPA, and what the plaintiffs claimed were violations?
Tyler: Sure. So, plaintiff sued Amazon under three sections of BIPA. The first one is Section 15(b) of BIPA for alleged collection of biometric data, specifically voiceprints, without providing the required written disclosures and obtaining the plaintiffs’ informed written consent. Number two, plaintiffs allege that Amazon violated Section 15(c) for allegedly profiting from the biometric data. And finally, plaintiffs alleged a violation of Section 15(d) for allegedly disclosing biometric data without the plaintiff’s consent. And, as I’m sure many people know, BIPA also gives plaintiffs a private right of action where they can recover $1,000 in statutory damages per negligent violation, or $5,000 in statutory damages per reckless or intentional violation. When you have potentially more than one million Illinois Voice ID users, which is the size of the class in this case, the damages can add up pretty quickly.
Jerry: As I read the opinion, the plaintiffs sought certification of a class defined as “all natural persons in Illinois for whom Amazon created a voiceprint on or after June 27, 2014,” and in terms of $5,000 per class member and over a million – obviously a whopper of a class. Let’s talk about how the court handled the Rule 23 analysis with respect to the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.
Hayley: Sure, Jerry. Well, the court first found that the proposed class easily met the numerosity requirement, since Amazon admitted that about 1.18 million Alexa users with Illinois billing addresses enrolled in Voice ID between 2017 and 2023. And the court also determined that the plaintiffs’ proposed class met the commonality requirement of Rule 23, because everyone went through the same enrollment process, got the same disclosures, and the questions, such as whether Voice ID creates a biometric identifier, applied across the board.
Jerry: Rule 23(a)(3), of course, deals with typicality, and that seemed to me where the opinion got very interesting in terms of the court’s analysis.
Hayley: Yes, definitely, Jerry. The court actually rejected the named plaintiff Gunderson as a class representative, because he enrolled in Voice ID years after the lawsuit had already been filed, meaning that being a named plaintiff, he knew, or should have known, that enrollment would create a voiceprint. That opened him up to unique defenses like waiver or ratification. And the court said that those unique defenses could become a “major focus” of litigation, making him an atypical class representative.
Tyler: That said, the court did accept plaintiffs Block and Stebbins as typical representatives. So, Mr. Block enrolled in Voice ID before he was ever involved in the case, and the court said that Amazon’s arguments about his professional relationship in prior cases with plaintiffs’ counsel were too speculative. The court also found that Mr. Stebbins’ claims were typical to those of the class, even though Amazon attacked his credibility based on inconsistencies in his deposition testimony. The court said that nothing in the testimony rose to the level that would harm the class.
Jerry: Seemed to me the discussion and analysis of typicality bled into the discussion of adequacy, and here the court ran through usual topics of concern, including conflicts of interest, relationships with class counsel, and the credibility of the named plaintiff.
Hayley: Right, Jerry. And ultimately, the court found Mr. Block and Mr. Stebbins adequate class representatives, but not Mr. Gunderson. The court also noted that continuing to use Voice ID or not deleting it did not make the plaintiffs inadequate class representatives. That applied uniformly across users.
Jerry: Let’s move on to the Rule 23(b) requirements. Inasmuch as predominance is usually the make-or-break-it issue for certification in BIPA cases, how did the court rule on 23(b)(2)?
Tyler: That’s a great question, Jerry. The court found predominance satisfied for all three of the BIPA claims. The court stated that whether Voice ID creates a “voiceprint” was a common question that applied to all class members and also whether Amazon’s disclosures satisfied BIPA’s notice requirements also involved a common question, because the disclosures were identical for everyone in the class. Regarding the Section 15(c) and Section 15(d) claims, the plaintiffs said that they would prove that Amazon’s data sharing practices violated BIPA through common evidence, which the court accepted at this stage. Interestingly, Amazon also tried to argue that the class was not ascertainable, because BIPA does not apply to Voice ID users who were not physically in Illinois during enrollment and Amazon noted that the evidence did not definitively show whether a user was, in fact, in Illinois at that time. But the court ruled that plaintiffs presented enough evidence that Amazon’s internal records can determine the state that a user was in at the time of enrollment. So, ultimately, the court rejected Amazon’s extraterritoriality argument against class certification.
Hayley: And as to the superiority requirement of Rule 23 , the court ruled that with 1.2 million potential class members, a class action would be a far more efficient method of adjudication, as opposed to millions of individual lawsuits.
Jerry: Well, this certainly constitutes a major development in biometric privacy class action litigation, insofar as it is an order that certifies perhaps the largest class in the state of Illinois, and even in the United States, over the past year. Our Duane Morris Class Action Review of 2026, due out in the first week of January, will analyze all the opinions throughout the United States, and has a special BIPA appendix chapter that will talk about this ruling and others. Before we wrap up today, any predictions as to this case and what we will see in terms of ongoing BIPA litigation in Illinois?
Tyler: So, I think for one, in this case, Amazon will likely lean heavily into the argument that Voice ID does not create a voiceprint under BIPA, especially at summary judgment, so that is very much a merits argument that Amazon tried to raise at class certification. But the court declined to hear that argument because it went to the merits rather than class certification-related issues. I think Amazon will likely also seek to appeal the class certification order up to the Seventh Circuit.
Hayley: Yeah, I agree with you, Tyler, and I also expect more litigation in other jurisdictions, given the rise of voice-activated technology, such as cars, appliances, smart TVs – you name it. BIPA is still the strictest law, but it’s not the only one anymore.
Jerry: Well, thanks so much, and great insights and thought leadership from you both, Hayley and Tyler. And thank you, listeners, for joining us for today’s discussion about the largest BIPA class certification order of 2025. We’ll be sure to keep you up to date and informed of all developments involving this and other BIPA and privacy class actions. Happy Thanksgiving, everyone, and thanks for being here.
Hayley: Thanks for having me on the podcast, Jerry, and thanks to the listeners for being here.
Duane Morris Takeaway:This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and special counsel Samson Huang with their analysis of recent developments in the $2.78 billion settlement between the NCAA and college athletes to resolve name, image, likeness (“NIL”) compensation claims.
Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal blog listeners, for joining us again for this week’s edition of the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today from Los Angeles is my colleague, Samson Huang. Thanks very much for being on the podcast.
Samson Huang: Great to be here, Jerry. Thanks for having me.
Jerry: Today, we’re here to discuss a recent court ruling relating to settlement approval of a ginormous class action involving the NCAA and the Power Five conference members, requiring them to pay $2.8 billion worth of damages, characterized as “back pay,” to compensate student-athletes for the denial of name, image, and likeness – known as NIL – opportunities under prior NCAA eligibility rules. The settlement class, subject to certain exclusions, includes all D1 student-athletes who competed from 2016 to the present. Compensation will be distributed to account for the lost NIL, video game, and broadcast-related opportunities that were previously restricted under the NCAA rules.
The new compensation model will mirror elements, I believe, of professional sports leagues – perhaps marking the end of the era of “amateurs” in college athletics. But the settlement faced some legal impediments and challenges for objectors. Samson, what’s the latest from the courthouse as to what’s going on with this particular settlement approval process?
Samson: Sure, thanks, Jerry. The court’s recent order addressed seven separate objections filed by incoming members of the Injunctive Relief Settlement Class following the July 23, 2025, notice. Under the Settlement Agreement, these class members could object within 60 days of receiving notice. The objections were heard on November 6, 2025, and the court ultimately rejected every objection.
Jerry: Let’s, unpack that a little bit and talk about some of the specific objections, beginning with Katherine Ernst of Vanderbilt University. As I understand it, she had asserted some objections challenging the treatment of various benefits in the revenue-sharing pool cap, and objecting to the release of claims subject to the distribution in the Gross Settlement Fund.
Samson: That’s right, and the court ultimately rejected the arguments as duplicative of issues already addressed by the court in the final approval order. Ernst also raised new objections related to Title IX compliance and her school’s distribution of revenue-sharing payments, requesting court-imposed modifications to the Injunctive Relief Settlement.
Jerry: I thought it was interesting because the judge emphasized that it lacked authority to, in essence, rewrite the settlement agreement, which is what the Vanderbilt student issued. It cited a chestnut of Ninth Circuit caselaw, Hanlon v. Chrysler Corporation, in terms of the ability of a district court to review and approve or reject a class action settlement. So, in this particular situation, the Title IX claims were not released, and athletes may bring those claims independently, as I understand it.
Samson: Yes, that’s right, Jerry. And also, Ernst additionally asserted that adequacy of representation was lacking, because none of the named plaintiffs are actually current student-athletes. However, the court reiterated its prior holding that the named plaintiffs share the same overarching interest as all class members of securing a more competitive labor market for college athletes. Moreover, the court has since appointed Miller Moss, who is an active D1 athlete, as an additional class representative, so the concern wasn’t really a concern for the court.
Jerry: Another objection I found interesting was from a student-athlete from Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia, Gracelyn Laudermilch, and she had argued that class counsel, in essence, was asleep at the wheel, refused to assist her in filing objections and, thereby, that rendered class counsel inadequate. How did the court react to that particular challenge?
Samson: Well, the court rejected the theory. The court explained that class counsel do not represent objectors, and objectors may appear pro se representing themselves, or they may hire independent counsel. But that does not implicate the adequacy of Class Counsel’s representation during settlement negotiations. Laudermilch also argued that the roster-limits provisions were adopted without adequate input from the named plaintiffs. However, the court found no support for that contention in the record. Named plaintiff Grant House provided a declaration confirming regular consultation with Class Counsel during negotiations. And statements attributed to him on a podcast were not actually before the court. Laudermilch further challenged the adequacy of the notice program, asserting that children as young as eight years old should receive notice of the settlement because they may one day participate in D1 athletics. The court rejected that position as well, finding that Rule 23 and due-process standards require notice that is reasonable and practical, and it is not feasible to identify future athletes who have not yet been recruited. The approved notice program, in which incoming D1 athletes receive notice upon joining their teams, was found by the court to be fully adequate.
Jerry: Well, I teach youngsters and coach them in Little League baseball, and that would be something for an 8-year-old to walk up to me and say, ‘Mr. Maatman, I just got a notice from the court,’ so we’ll see how that works. I also thought that this particular athlete had challenged the roster-limit provisions on the grounds that athletes with DSA status were being cut, and the court held that she lacked standing because she herself had not been cut. And additionally, the DSA status had been intended to guarantee roster spots, but actually all it did is exempt affected athletes from roster limits when transferring to other D1 programs, and that raised another objector, and that was Reid Macdonald of Long Island University, who argued he was cut from the lacrosse team at his university, but not granted DSA status. How did the court react to that particular challenge?
Samson: Well, the court found that even assuming that his factual claims were accurate, that actually reflected a school-specific issue, and did not justify halting the nationwide settlement. The settlement required schools to identify DSAs in good faith, and to submit those lists to class counsel, who may address any inaccuracies.
Jerry: I know the final four objectors were from Cal Poly State University, and they were on the diving and swimming team, and their programs were eliminated after the university opted in. How did the court treat their objections?
Samson: Well, each objector argued that the Injunctive Relief Settlement caused or incentivized the program cuts, thereby harming their athletic opportunities and, in one case, the student’s athletic scholarship. Several objectors also raised concerns about Title IX compliance. Again, the court rejected each objection on the same basis. Essentially, D1 schools have always retained discretion to allocate financial resources and eliminate sports programs, and nothing in the injunctive relief settlement requires or encourages team cuts. Therefore, any injury resulting from program elimination stems from each institution’s own choice, not from the settlement. The court also reiterated that it cannot and does not have the power to modify the settlement to impose Title IX compliance mechanisms. And, because Title IX claims were not being released under the settlement, any affected athletes may pursue those claims separately.
Jerry: Pretty remarkable that a $2.8 billion settlement with extensive, injunctive relief was approved. Judge left it in place, it certainly represents a seismic shift in the regulation of college athletics and formalizes a compensation model for student athletes and introduces robust oversight with NIL activity. Remains to be seen if eighth graders on Little League baseball teams get a notice and what they do with it, but certainly quite a ruling when it comes to settlement approval orders in 2025.
Samson: Absolutely, Jerry, and colleges, collectives, and student-athletes must now carefully navigate this evolving regulatory environment. Institutions should consult with counsel to address these considerations and develop strategies, including draft template agreements, that adequately address all of these considerations to optimally position institutions to comply with and profit from this new opportunity.
Jerry: Well, thanks so much, Samson, for joining us on this week’s Class Action Weekly Wire, and breaking down a very complex yet important settlement. As our readers know, Chapter 20 of the Duane Morris Class Action Review contains an analysis of settlement approval rulings throughout federal and state courts and class actions over the past year. And by far and away, this one is one of the most complex and most significant in terms of what we’re going to discuss in that chapter – our book being launched in the first week of January of 2026. So, thank you, Samson, and thank you, all our listeners, for joining us this week.
Duane Morris Takeaway:This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Daniel Spencer with their analysis of a California federal judge’s decision to reject a $28 million attorney fee request as part of a $150 million securities fraud class action settlement.
Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal blog listeners and readers, for being here again with us for the next episode of our weekly podcast, The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman of Duane Morris, and joining us today is Daniel Spencer, my colleague and partner from Duane Morris’ Los Angeles office. Welcome, Daniel.
Daniel Spencer: Thanks, Jerry. Great to be here.
Jerry: Today we’re talking about a pretty seminal ruling of a settlement and an attorneys’ fee award in litigation entitled In Re Zoom Securities Litigation in the Northern District of California. This was a case where the court gave preliminary approval to a $150 million settlement, but then during the final approval hearing took a hard look at a very hefty attorneys’ fees request from class counsel, whereby they asked for $28 million, or roughly 18.75% of the settlement fund. This would have translated into a multiplier under pertinent case law of over 10 times the amount of time actually spent. The court called this problematic. What’s your take on this, Daniel, from your viewpoint in practicing law in California?
Daniel: I’ll tell you, Judge Donato did not mince words on this one. He described the hourly rate of roughly $7,900 an hour as an “eye-watering figure”, commenting that it had no place in a straightforward securities class action. Instead, he went with the lodestar method, applied a multiplier of four, which is still pretty generous, and awarded $10.4 million in fees, plus an additional $262,000 in costs.
Jerry: So, this was a securities fraud class action brought under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 of the SEC about Zoom allegedly misleading investors about its security practices. But the judge emphasized when considering the fee petition, that as class actions go, this one settled fairly quickly with a minimum of risk and toil, and that discovery was limited and actually no depositions had been taken, no motion for class certification was filed, no expert reports were produced, and there was no summary judgment practice.
Daniel: Yeah, that’s exactly right. And class counsel had reported approximately 3,500 hours of work, which is not insignificant, but the judge compared it to other work wherein the same firm had invested over 43,000 hours handling complex motions, depositions, and trial prep, and still received a 2.5 multiplier on its lodestar. So, here they wanted four times that multiplier for a much lighter workload.
Jerry: The judge made a very important statement about a principle that I think is key to class action jurisprudence, and that is that the court, when reviewing a settlement or reviewing a petition for attorneys’ fees, has in essence a fiduciary obligation to the class to protect them, especially where a defendant makes no objection to the plaintiffs’ application for an award of attorneys’ fees. As the judge put it, there’s a “heightened duty to peer into the provision and scrutinize it closely.” Was this an aberrational ruling, or is this something front and center in class actions in California?
Daniel: It’s absolutely front and center, and I’ll tell you that the judge reminded everyone that the courts have a duty to guard against these type of windfall profits in these megafund cases or those with settlements exceeding $100 million. In doing so, he stressed that the 25% benchmark that they’re used to seeing is simply not appropriate for those types of situations. 18.75% of $150 million, he said, would produce exactly the kind of disproportionate result the Ninth Circuit had warned against in similar settlements.
Jerry: The judge also touched upon something known in the law as the percentage of recovery factors that analyzes the results achieved, the risks to the lawyers, the non-monetary benefits accorded to the class, and the contingency nature of the case. And the judge said while this was a solid outcome, it wasn’t exceptional. The case didn’t break new legal ground or face unusual challenges, and the benefit to the class was entirely monetary and the risks were fairly routine for this sort of case.
Daniel: And that’s exactly right. The judge also pointed out that plaintiffs’ counsel’s own billing showed barely five hours spent on the class certification and notice, which is pretty extraordinary for a securities case. His takeaway was that 18.75%, which was requested, was a formulaic application of the benchmark. In megafund settlements, the court’s got to guard against that mechanical percentage that yield windfalls. The judge used the lodestar method and applied a generous multiplier of four, set the fee at $10,419,000, and also directed that 75% or about $7.8 million could be paid immediately with the remaining 25% to be held pending the post-distribution accounting. So even with a multiplier of four, every timekeeper down the line was effectively being compensated at $2,900 per hour, which is more than a healthy rate by any measure.
Jerry: In this case, class counsel also sought a service award for the lead plaintiff of $48,750. Most of the class action settlements we see, the service awards are around $5,000 to $12,000. How did the court come out on the request for the service award here?
Daniel: Yeah, so in this one, he relied directly on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which prohibits incentive awards for lead plaintiffs in securities cases. A lead plaintiff can only recover reasonable costs and expenses, including lost wages. The declaration that plaintiff filed in support of that said he spent about 75 hours on the case and valued that at about $650 an hour. The court found no evidence tying that number to any actual costs or outcome.
Jerry: So, Daniel, what’s the big picture here for corporate practitioners when they’re looking at class action settlements or at the mediation table negotiating a class action resolution?
Daniel: So, really two lessons that you can take away from this case. First, don’t treat the 25% benchmark as a given, especially in these megafund settlements. And second, expect the judges to go through a rigorous lodestar cross-check, even in cases that are resolved efficiently. Judges are going to expect to see a clear correlation between the hours worked, complexity handled, and the fees requested by plaintiffs’ counsel.
Jerry: Well said, and thank you for your take on this case, Daniel. And thanks to our listeners for being here today. We’ll be breaking down this settlement and others in our upcoming Duane Morris Class Action Review scheduled for publication in the first week of January of 2026. So, thank you, Daniel, and thanks for all our listeners being with us today on our podcast.
Daniel: Thanks, Jerry. It’s a pleasure to be here.
Duane Morris Takeaway: The Duane Morris Class Action Defense Group is pleased to announce that attorneys Ryan Garippo and George Schaller have been selected as honorees of the inaugural class of Class Action Updates’ Premier Class Action Leaders of Tomorrow Award, which recognizes 12 exceptional rising stars under the age 40 “who are redefining the frontiers of class action litigation through innovative strategies, landmark victories, and unwavering commitment to justice on both sides of the bar. Selected from a highly competitive pool of nominations, their groundbreaking work promises to inspire the next generation of litigators and fortify the pillars of the legal system.”
Kudos to Ryan and George on this well-deserved accomplishment!
Duane Morris Takeaway:This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and senior associate Hayley Ryan with their analysis of a California federal court’s dismissal of an advertising technology (“adtech”) class action alleging violations of the federal Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”), the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), and California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (“CDAFA”).
Jerry Maatman: Thank you for being here again. My name is Jerry Maatman, and welcome to the next episode of our podcast series entitled The Class Action Weekly Wire. Joining me today is Hayley Ryan. Thanks so much for joining the podcast.
Hayley Ryan: Great to be here, Jerry. Thanks for having me.
Jerry: Today, we’re going to dive into a very interesting decision, the dismissal of claims in a case entitled DellaSalla v. Samba TV. Can you give our listeners an overview of what this case was about?
Hayley: Absolutely, Jerry. The case was decided on October 30, 2025, by Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. In short, the plaintiffs were a group of smart TV owners who alleged that Samba TV’s advertising technology invaded their privacy and violated a handful of statutes, including the federal Video Privacy Protection Act, or the VPPA, and two California laws: the California Invasion of Privacy Act, or CIPA, and the Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, or CDAFA.
Jerry: Well, those of us in the class action space know that this is the new so-called “tort of the day,” with what are known as adtech privacy class actions, being filed across the United States with hundreds, if not thousands, of these sorts of lawsuits. To you, and I know you follow this area closely, what stood out about this particular ruling?
Hayley: Sure, what’s significant here is the court’s clear message. Privacy class actions can’t just rely on broad or vague allegations. The plaintiffs have to spell out exactly what information was allegedly disclosed, and why that disclosure would be considered highly offensive. That’s particularly important for the common law invasion of privacy claims that often accompany statutory ones.
Jerry: So, as I understand it, the gravamen of the claim was that the TV was intercepting viewing data, what you watched, when you watched it, and then tying that to some sort of ad targeting? Is that what this case was all about?
Hayley: Exactly, Jerry. They claimed that this kind of real-time data collection violated those privacy statutes and amounted to a common law invasion of privacy. But Samba TV pushed back, arguing that none of the California laws applied because the plaintiffs lived in North Carolina and Oklahoma, that the VPPA did not apply because Samba was not a videotaped service provider, and that there was nothing highly offensive about what was allegedly collected.
Jerry: As I read the opinion here, the court endorsed the defense positions and threw out the plaintiffs’ claims. Could you elaborate on the reasoning behind the court’s theories here?
Hayley: Sure. So, the court dismissed all claims. First, on the California statutes, the CIPA and CDAFA, the judge found that they simply do not apply extraterritorially. Because the alleged conduct occurred in North Carolina and Oklahoma, where the plaintiffs reside, and not in California, those claims were dismissed.
Jerry: That seems to be a very helpful gloss on those statutes, because almost all these companies operate in California, even though they may be headquartered in other states, and yet are hauled into court and sued over and over again in these California-based class actions.
Hayley: Yeah, it’s certainly a helpful clarification for companies in California who operate nationwide. And then on the VPPA claim, the court took a close look at the definition of a videotape service provider, which applies to entities engaged in the rental, sale, or delivery of pre-recorded video materials. The plaintiffs tried to stretch that definition, saying Samba TV’s software was part of the TV ecosystem that delivers videos.
Jerry: In essence, the court thought that was stretching the law too far and the parameters of the case just out of control.
Hayley: Right, so Judge Corley said Samba TV was not delivering video content, but that it was analyzing usage data. So, the VPPA did not apply, because collecting data about video watching is not the same as delivering video content itself.
Jerry: That, you know, actually makes good sense to me. What about the common law invasion of privacy claim? How did the judge interpret that and rule on that particular cause of action?
Hayley: Yeah, so this was probably the most interesting part of the opinion. The court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations were too vague because they failed to identify any specific shows or videos they watched. They did not describe what was supposedly private about the data, and they did not explain how tying it to an anonymized identifier was highly offensive. So, the court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a violation of privacy.
Jerry: That seems to be a very common sense reading of the law, because these cases come down to ‘my viewing data or my keystrokes were viewed, and therefore my privacy was violated.’ What do you think is the big takeaway from this decision for companies?
Hayley: So, I think that there are three main takeaways. First, plaintiffs can’t use state privacy laws like the CIPA and the CDAFA if they’re outside of California. Second, the VPPA doesn’t apply to analytics or adtech companies that merely collect viewing data. They have to actually deliver or sell video content. And third, for common law invasion of privacy claims, vague allegations just won’t cut it, and plaintiffs need specificity and a plausible showing of offensiveness.
Jerry: Seems to me that defendants are going to be citing this ruling in many of their briefs in the coming months in privacy and adtech-related class actions for the notion that tracking doesn’t equate to invasion or a viable cause of action.
Well, thanks for breaking down this decision and explaining it to our listeners, and thanks for your thought leadership in this area. Great to have you with us.
Hayley: Thanks, Jerry, and thanks, listeners. It was a pleasure to be here.
