Class Action Defense – Page 4 – Class Action Defense

February 21, 2024February 23, 2024 by Class Action Defense

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 44: 2024 Preview: Wage & Hour Class Action Litigation

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Jennifer Riley and associate Greg Tsonis with their discussion of wage & hour class and collective action litigation over the past 12 months as detailed in the recently published Duane Morris Wage & Hour Class And Collective Action Review – 2024.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, the Samsung Podcasts app, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, YouTube or our RSS feed.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Welcome back, loyal podcast listeners. Thank you for being here for our kickoff 2024 podcast for our weekly series entitled The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman of Duane Morris, joining me today is my partner Jennifer Riley and our colleague Greg Tsonis. Thank you Jen and Greg for being on our kickoff podcast!

Jennifer Riley: Thank you, Jerry. Happy to be part of the first Weekly Wire podcast of 2024.

Greg Tsonis: Thanks, Jerry. I’m glad to be here.

Jerry: Today on our podcast we’re discussing the recent publication of this year’s edition of the Duane Morris Wage & Hour Class And Collective Action Review. Listeners can find this eBook publication on our blog, the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog. Jen, can you tell our listeners a little bit about this publication?

Jennifer: Absolutely, Jerry. The purpose of the Duane Morris Wage & Hour Class And Collective Action Review is really multi-faceted. We hope it will demystify some of the complexities of class and collective action litigation and keep corporate counsel updated on the ever evolving nuances of Rule 23 as well as FLSA collective action issues in this respect. We really hope that this book will provide our clients with an analysis of trends and significant rulings in the wage & hour space, and enable them to make informed decisions in dealing with complex litigation risks.

Jerry: Defense of wage & hour class and collective actions is really the hallmark of our defense group at Duane Morris, and on this call and the podcast today is over 65 years’ worth of collective experience in handling these types of cases. Greg, what are some of the collective experiences and sort of desk reference attributes of this publication in terms of what’s going on in the wage in our world for 2023 and 2024?

Greg: Well, Jerry, as you know, wage & hour litigation has long been a focus of the plaintiffs’ class action bar. The relatively low standard by which plaintiffs can achieve conditional certification under the FLSA, often paired with state law wage & hour class claims, offers a pretty potent combination by which plaintiffs can pursue alleged misclassification or unpaid overtime claims, for example. So this publication will definitely assist our clients by identifying developing trends in the case law and offering practical approaches for dealing with class and collective action litigation.

Jerry: Well, I know Greg and Jen – you’re the main contributors and authors of the book. Along with about 30 of our colleagues in our Class Action Defense Group. What are some of the takeaways from 2023, and what corporate counsel and employers can expect in 2024?

Greg: Great question. So in in 2023 courts once again issued more certification rulings and FLSA collective actions than in other types of cases. Plaintiffs historically have been able to obtain conditional certification of FLSA collective actions at a pretty high rate which definitely is contributed to the number of filings in this area.

Jennifer: Right, Greg – agreed. Despite the high number of certification motions decided, of the 167 rulings that were issued on motions for conditional certification – 125 rulings favored plaintiffs for a success rate of nearly 75%. Those numbers are actually lower than the numbers we observed in 2022, when plaintiffs had a success rate of nearly 82%. The decline in success rates in 2023 likely reflects the impact of rulings in the Fifth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit, which took a closer look at that so called two-step process of certification. The Review goes into this analysis, and what employers can expect moving into 2024.

Jerry: I’ve always thought in the wage & hour space that change is inevitable, and employers are struggling with keeping up with the changes. And what our clients tell me in particular, is that this book is an essential desk reference that they cite and look to at least once a week. And I think one of the key issues going on right now is the propensity of the plaintiffs’ bar to file lawsuits involving very highly compensated employees, those that bank over six figures a year. And intuitively, one would think those sorts of folks are not entitled to overtime. But one of the central focuses in this year’s book is the Supreme Court’s decision this past year in Helix v. Hewitt on the salary basis test and the exemption for highly compensated individuals that brings into focus another area that’s in the book, and that’s about settlements. How do plaintiffs do in terms of securing high level settlements over the past 12 months?

Greg: Well, plaintiffs did a very good job in securing high dollar settlements in 2023, particularly in the state of California. The top 10 wage & hour settlements in 2023 totaled $742.5 million dollars, and nine of those 10 settlements emanated from litigation in California. This total was a pretty significant increase over 2022, when the top 10 wage & hour settlements totaled almost $575 million dollars.

Jerry: Those numbers are rather stunning. My prognostication is for 2024 – I think for the first time ever – we’re going to see the top 10 wage & hour class and collective action settlements exceed $1 billion dollars.

Well, thanks, Jen and thanks, Greg for being here today on our kicked off podcast for 2024. Listeners, please stop by our Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog to obtain a free copy of the Duane Morris Wage & Hour Class And Collective Action Review eBook.

Greg: Thank you for having me, Jerry, and thank you, listeners.

Jennifer: Thanks so much, everyone.

February 20, 2024February 21, 2024 by Class Action Defense

Eleventh Circuit Holds Nissan Is Not Joint Employer Of Florida Dealership Technicians In Wage & Hour Class And Collective Action

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Alex W. Karasik, and Nicolette J. Zulli

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Ayala v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 23-11027, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2965 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024), the Eleventh Circuit unanimously upheld a District Court’s decision granting Nissan’s motion for summary judgment in a wage & hour class and collective action. It held that none of the eight factors for determining joint employment weighed in favor of the company. The Eleventh Circuit further affirmed the District Court’s denial of both Rule 23 class action certification and conditional certification of the collective action under the FLSA.

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion offers a treasure trove of insights regarding the crucial joint employer issue — particularly for employers who operate in a business-partnership dynamic where one entity (e.g., a manufacturer or staffing company) maintains oversight and/or indirect influence over the employees of the other entity (e.g., a car dealership or contractor) that handles payroll and/or hiring and firing processes.

Case Background

Two automotive service employees (“Technicians”) working at Florida Nissan dealerships filed suit against Nissan, alleging violations of the FLSA and the Florida Minimum Wage Act (“FMWA”), for failure to pay wages as required by law. Id. at *3. They also sought conditional certification as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as well as certification of a class action under Rule 23.

The Technicians alleged they performed vehicle repair and maintenance on behalf of Nissan at the dealerships but were not compensated as required by law. Id. Specifically, they pointed to Nissan’s Assurance Products Resource Manual (“APRM”) and Dealership Agreements, which determined how much Nissan paid dealerships for warranty work conducted by technicians, regardless of how long the work took. Pursuant to the APRM and the Dealership Agreements, Nissan agreed with each dealership to reimburse the dealership according to the “flat-rate” system. Id. at *3.

The Technicians argued that — when the warranty work took longer than the “flat-rate time” determined by Nissan, thus limiting Nissan’s reimbursement to the dealership — the result is that they were underpaid by the dealership. Id. at *4. As a result, the Technicians asserted that Nissan was a joint employer, which Nissan opposed. The District Court agreed with Nissan and granted its motion for summary judgment. The Technicians appealed. Id. at *2.

The Eleventh’s Circuit’s Decision

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order granting summary judgment and denying class certification under Rule 23 and conditional certification of a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Id. at *20.

On appeal, the Technicians argued that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment, because it failed to consider all admissible record evidence that they presented. Id. at *2. They further argued that the District Court erred in denying their motions for certification. First, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Technicians’ argument that summary judgment was improper, after applying the eight-factor test under Layton v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 686 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 2012), which is guided by five principles that are focused on indicators of “economic dependence,” for evaluating whether an employment relationship exists under the FLSA. These factors include: (1) The nature and degree of control of the workers; (2) The degree of supervision, direct or indirect, of the work; (3) The power to determine the pay rates or the methods of payment of the workers; (4) The right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify the employment conditions of the workers; (5) Preparation of the payroll and payment of wages; (6) Ownership of the facilities where work occurred; (7) Performance of a specialty job integral to the asserted joint employer’s business; (8) The relative investments of the asserted joint employer in equipment and facilities used by the workers. Id. at *6-7.

The Eleventh Circuit held that none of these factors weighed in favor of a finding that Nissan was a joint employer of the Technicians. Id. at *22. Its analysis greatly emphasized the Technicians’ (i) failure to identify any specific, substantive content in Nissan’s 233-page APRM or its Anomalous Repair Control Program, and (ii) their reliance on conclusory and uncorroborated allegations in declarations and affidavits. The Eleventh Circuit opined that this was insufficient to show the District Court failed to consider relevant evidence. Id. at *8, *16. The Eleventh Circuit relied primarily upon a comparison to its prior decisions in Layton, Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (11th Cir. 1994), and Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int’l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2003), ultimately concluding that the relevant factors in this case weigh more heavily against joint employment. Id. at *18.

The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the Technicians’ argument that the District Court erred in denying both certification of a class action under Rule 23 and conditional certification of a collective action under § 216(b). The Eleventh Circuit opined that the putative class members would be employed by different dealers, making the inquiries about their pay “highly individualized and unwieldy.” Id. at *23. This, in turn, meant that the employees would not be similarly situated (as required for a collective action under the FLSA) and that there would not be sufficient common facts (as required for a class action under Rule 23). Id.

Implications For Employers

The Ayala decision is notable in that it offers a novel glimpse into the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to construing the language of employer policies to determine joint-employer status. To that end, the decision not only calls for employers to assess their business relationships to those it considers employees versus contractors, but also highlights the importance of constructing written policies and procedures with an eye toward the eight factors used to determine joint employer status.

February 14, 2024 by Class Action Defense

Dentists Seek Class Certification In Billion Dollar Antitrust Dispute With Delta Dental

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Sean P. McConnell

Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 6, 2024, in In Re Delta Dental Antitrust Litigation, No. 1:19-CV-06734, MDL No. 2931 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2024). roughly 240,000 dentists and dental practices sought class certification in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Delta Dental, the largest dental insurance system in the United States, on grounds that Delta Dental and its related entities artificially lowered the reimbursement rates paid for dental goods and services to Plaintiffs in violation of the federal antitrust laws. Plaintiffs moved for class certification under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) on the grounds that all class members have been harmed substantially by the alleged conspiracy between Defendants and that evidence common to the class confirms the existence of the conspiracy to suppress reimbursement rates in violation of Sherman Act Section 1.

Corporate counsel should follow In Re Delta Dental Antitrust Litigation as the ruling on class certification could have a significant impact class action law, generally, and on trade and professional associations facing antitrust issues, specifically.

Case Background

Plaintiffs are dentist and dental practices who participate pursuant to provider agreements in Delta Dental’s Premier or PPO networks. Defendants are the largest dental insurance system in the United States and are comprised of Delta Dental, its 39 state-level member companies and their national coordinating entities, Delta Dental plans Association and DeltaUSA. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants formed a cartel and committed per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing to reduce reimbursements to Plaintiffs through territorial restrictions, agreeing to fix the prices for specific dental goods and services, and agreeing to restrict competition from other competitors.

Rule 23 Contentions

Plaintiffs argue that class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) because evidence common to the class can prove the existence of the conspiracy and harm to the class in the form of lower reimbursement rates. Plaintiffs claim that written agreements imposed territorial restrictions on competition and required adherence to uniform, or fixed, prices for dental goods and services. The agreements also restricted efforts to sell dental insurance under different brands. According to the model advanced by Plaintiffs’ economic expert, Plaintiffs will be able to establish both class-wide impact and class-wide damages on behalf of more than 97 percent of the proposed class. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants’ procompetitive justifications for the restrictions are irrelevant in a per se antitrust case, but, in any event, are without merit because premiums paid by dental patients increased substantially during the class period and Delta Dental passed on the increased premiums to executives in the form of generous salaries.

Implications For Corporate Defendants

In Re Delta Dental Antitrust Litigation is another example of a federal court class certification decision that will turn whether evidence of common, injury-producing conduct exists. It will be interesting to follow whether the Court credits evidence as capable of showing the impact of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct across all class members at trial.

February 9, 2024 by Class Action Defense

Third Circuit Breathes New Life Into EEOC Enforcement Lawsuit

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Elisabeth Bassani, and Danielle Dwyer

Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 1, 2024, in EEOC v. Center One, LLC, Nos. 22-2943 & 22-2944 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024), the Third Circuit held that a District Court erred when it granted summary judgment for an employer and dismissed a case brought by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of a Jewish employee who claimed he was forced to quit after his employer denied him time off for religious holidays. The decision is a reminder of employers’ obligations to reasonably accommodate employees’ sincerely held religious beliefs, practices or observances.

Background Of The Case

The EEOC, on behalf of Demetrius Ford, alleged that Ford’s employer, Center One, discriminated against him based on his religion and constructively discharged him in violation of Title VII because it refused to accommodate his request for time off for high holidays. Specifically, the EEOC asserted that Center One assigned Ford “demeritorious attendance points” because he missed work to observe Rosh Hashanah and subsequently refused to permit him time off for future high holidays without an “official” letter from his congregation attesting to his need to be absent. Id. at 5. Center One also scheduled a meeting with Ford to discuss his attendance issues on Yom Kippur, despite acknowledging it knew it was a high holy day in Judaism. Ford submitted an email exchange with a leader from a congregation in response to Center One’s request for documentation, but Center One told Ford that it needed something more “official.” Id. Ford eventually tendered his resignation, explaining that he was not able to obtain an “official clergy letter.” Id. at 6.

The District Court granted summary judgment to Center One, holding that a mere accrual of attendance points for missing work did not constitute an adverse employment action, and that Ford was not constructively discharged.

The Third Circuit’s Ruling

On appeal, the Third Circuit unanimously vacated the District Court’s ruling and remanded for further proceedings. It held that the EEOC and Ford presented enough evidence for a jury to decide if Ford was constructively discharged. Notably, the Third Circuit agreed with the District Court in finding that accruing attendance points — without any other changes to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment — did not constitute an adverse employment action.

But, because there was no dispute that Center One required Ford to work on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur and that Center One asked Ford for an “official” letter from his congregation attesting to his need to take off on high holidays, the Third Circuit opined that a jury could find that Center One’s conduct created an intolerable work environment. It specifically noted that a requirement for “official clergy verification was at odds with the EEOC’s Guidance on religious discrimination, as well as our precedent.” Id. at 8. The Third Circuit also cautioned that “[t]he doctrine of constructive discharge does not require an employee who is seeking religious accommodation to either violate the tenets of his faith or suffer the indignity and emotional discomfort of awaiting his inevitable termination.” Id.

Implications For Employers

The ruling in EEOC v. Center One LLC reminds employers that they need to reasonably accommodate an employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs, practices, or observances. Such accommodations are required unless an employer can show that the accommodation would create an undue hardship. The decison also cautions employers that while they can request documentation in support of an accommodation, they cannot require an official letter from a clergy member, spiritual leader, or other congregant.

February 8, 2024February 8, 2024 by Class Action Defense

Thank You For A Successful Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2024 Book Launch Event!

Thank you to all our clients who attended the in-person book launch of the Duane Morris Class Action Review in Philadelphia last week, as well as our nationwide audience who participated via Zoom.

In case you missed it, watch a video of the live presentation below, featuring Duane Morris partners and editors of the Review, Jerry Maatman and Jennifer Riley, with Equal Employment Opportunity Commissioner Keith Sonderling.

Please also view pictures from the in person Book Launch event below. We would love to see you at the event in 2025!

Duane Morris Chairman and CEO Matt Taylor delivers opening remarks.

Duane Morris Vice Chairman Tom Servodidio introduces the panel.

Introducing the Duane Morris Class Action Review - 2024. — Introducing the Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2024.

Review editors and authors Jerry Maatman and Jennifer Riley, guest speaker Commissioner Keith Sonderling of the EEOC.

Commissioner Keith Sonderling of the EEOC.

February 5, 2024 by Class Action Defense

California Federal Court Grants Class Certification To iPhone App Purchasers

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Sean P. McConnell

Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 2, 2024, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the District of Northern California granted Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class of purchasers of one or more iOS applications or application licenses from Defendant Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) or who paid for one or more in-app purchases since July 10, 2008 in In Re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, No. 4:11-CV-06714 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2024). The Court rejected defense arguments that class certification should be denied on the grounds that the model of Plaintiffs’ expert revealed millions of uninjured class members and that individual issues would predominate. Instead, the Court found that the model showed an estimated 7.9% of the class is uninjured and that with more complete data the model will be capable of showing antitrust impact on a class-wide basis.

In Re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation is required reading for any corporate counsel handling antitrust class action litigation involving claims by end consumers.

Case Background

Plaintiffs are purchasers of iPhone applications (apps), app subscriptions, and/or in-app content via the iPhone App Store. Defendant sells iPhones and requires app purchases to be made via the App Store. Plaintiffs claim that Apple charges App Store developers supracompetitive commissions that are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for app downloads, subscriptions, and in-app purchases. Plaintiffs assert claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act for unlawful monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone applications aftermarket.

In a prior ruling, the Court denied class certification. It had concluded that Plaintiffs could not establish the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3) because they had not demonstrated that damages from Apple’s alleged anticompetitive conduct could be proven on a class-wide basis. According to the Court, the methodology of Plaintiffs’ expert failed to reasonably ascertain how many class members were unharmed by the alleged conduct and individual questions would predominate.

The Court’s Class Certification Ruling

In response to the Court’s ruling, Plaintiffs narrowed their class definition to only include Apple account holders who have spent $10 or more on app or in-app content.

Using that new definition, Plaintiffs submitted revised and new expert reports estimating that the proposed class includes only 7.9% unharmed members and again moved for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Since the Court’s prior ruling, the Ninth Circuit also rejected the argument that “Rule 23 does not permit the certification of a class that potentially includes more than a de minimis number of uninjured class members.” Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F. 4th 651, 669 (9th Cir. 2022). According to the Court, the revised model can show the impact of Apple’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct across all class members, and once Apple produces the rest of its app transactional data, the model will be able to calculate the exact extent of injury suffered by each class member. Under Olean, the Court opined that Plaintiffs meet the predominance requirement.

Implications For Defendants

In Re iPhone Antitrust Litigation is another example of a federal court class certification decision turning on the existence of common, injury-producing conduct. The Court credited evidence that may be over inclusive at class certification stage of the proceedings, but is nonetheless capable of showing the impact of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct across all class members at trial.

February 5, 2024 by Class Action Defense

Texas Federal Court Dismisses Video Privacy Protection Act Class Action Concerning Email Newsletter From University Of Texas

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Emilee N. Crowther

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Brown v. Learfield Communications, LLC, et al., No. 1:23-CV-00374, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15587 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2024), Judge David A. Ezra of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted Defendants Learfield Communications, LLC and Sidearm Sports, LLC’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) class claim. The Court held that Plaintiff failed to plead facts to support his claim under the VPPA because he did not allege that he was a subscriber to audio-visual goods or services themselves, just a newsletter that contained links to publicly-available content on The University of Texas’s website. Defendants in VPPA class actions can utilize this decision as a roadmap when preparing motions to dismiss.

Case Background

Defendants Learfield Communications, LLC and Sidearm Sports, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) operated the University of Texas at Austin’s (“UT”) website (the “UT Website”). Id. at 2. The UT Website contains software that enables Facebook to track the activity of UT Website users on other websites. Id. Defendants invite UT Website visitors to subscribe to emailed newsletters. Id. at 3. The newsletters provide links to various videos, clips, and other content on the UT Website related to UT Athletics. Id. Plaintiff Adam Brown subscribes to UT’s emailed newsletter. Id.

In April 2023, Plaintiff filed a class action against Defendants UT, UT Athletics, Learfield, and Sidearm alleging that they violated the VPPA by purportedly exposing the subscribers’ personal identification information and gathering marketing data without consent. Id. at 4. In June 2023, UT and UT Athletics filed a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. Id. at 2. The motion was granted in July. Id. In September, Defendants Learfield and Sidearm filed a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7). Id.

The Court’s Decision

The Court denied Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7) motions to dismiss. It held that neither Learfield or Sidearm was entitled to immunity as an “arm of the state,” and that neither UT or UT Athletics were indispensable parties to the lawsuit. Id. at 7-10.

The Court, however, granted Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff was not a “consumer” under the VPPA because he failed to allege a factual nexus between the subscription and Defendants’ allegedly actionable video content. Id. at 2, 19, 26.

To state a claim under the VPPA, the Court noted that a plaintiff must allege that a defendant “(1) is a video tape service provider; (2) who knowingly disclosed to any person; (3) personally identifiable information; (4) concerning any consumer.” Id. at 10-11; 18 U.S.C. 2710(b)(1). Under the VPPA, a “consumer” is “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).

The Court reasoned that the VPPA “only applies to consumers (including subscribers) of audio video services” because, when reading the term “consumer” in the full context of the VPPA, “a reasonable reader would understand the definition of ‘consumer’ to apply to a renter, purchaser or subscriber of audio-visual goods or services, and not goods or services writ large.” Id. at * 19 (emphasis original) (quoting Carter v. Scripps Networks, LLC, 2023 WL 3061858, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2023)).

The Court concluded that Plaintiff was not a “consumer” under the VPPA because (i) the newsletter did not contain videos, just links to videos on the UT Website; and (ii) the linked videos were available for any member of the public to see on the UT Website, not just those who subscribed to the newsletter. Id. at 26-28. Accordingly, the Court ruled that Plaintiff was not a subscriber to audio-visual goods or services, just a newsletter. Id. at 28-29. Ultimately, because Plaintiff failed to allege facts to support a claim under the VPPA, the Court granted Defendants 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 29.

Implications For Companies

The decision in Brown v. Learfield serves as a roadmap for defendants in VPPA class actions to utilize when preparing motions to dismiss. This case is also important as it adds the Western District of Texas to a growing number of federal courts that strictly construe the VPPA to audio-visual materials, not links to publically-available videos in newsletters. See, e.g., Carter v. Scripps Networks, LLC, No. 22-CV-2031, 2023 WL 3061858, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2023); Jefferson v. Healthline Media, Inc., No. 3:22-CV-05059, 2023 WL 3668522, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2023); Gardener v. MeTV, No. 22-CV-5963, 2023 WL 4365901, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2023).

February 2, 2024 by Class Action Defense

New York State Court Refuses To Dismiss Claims Alleging The NYDOL Closed Unpaid Wage Investigations Due To Improper Agency Rulemaking

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Katelynn Gray, and Gregory S. Slotnick

Duane Morris Takeaways: On January 23, 2024, in Chen et al. v. Reardon, Index No. 908146-23, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York (Albany County), a judge denied a motion to dismiss filed by the New York Department of Labor (NYDOL) seeking dismissal of a lawsuit claiming the agency improperly closed wage theft investigations for home care aides by way of inappropriate rulemaking under New York’s State Administrative Procedures Act (NYSAPA). Specifically, in evaluating the NYDOL’s motion and giving the workers the benefit of every possible inference, the court held the NYDOL may have improperly engaged in formal rulemaking without abiding by all required prerequisites (such as public notice) in shutting down its investigations of the workers’ unpaid wage claims due to collective bargaining agreements that included mandatory arbitration. The judge concluded that a “reasonable view of the facts stated” describes the NYDOL’s application of a “fixed, general principle” of dismissing every complaint that was subject to mandatory arbitration (i.e., a NYDOL rule), rather than “ad hoc decisions” evaluating the individual facts and circumstances of each claim. Id. at 9.

The decision highlights a state court’s willingness to scrutinize a state agency’s “informal” broad interpretations of its own investigation procedures under state law, and ultimately provides allegedly aggrieved employees with reasonable means to challenge the agency’s actions.

Case Background

Five home care aides who provided live-in services to elderly and disabled patients claim they typically worked 24-hour shifts without ever receiving five hours of uninterrupted sleep or three hours of meal breaks. Id. at 2. The workers alleged that they were never paid for more than 13 hours of work for any such 24-hour shifts despite not receiving the required sleeping and meal break periods in alleged violation of the New York Labor Law (NYLL) and its “13-hour rule.” Id. After working these shifts for some time, the workers each filed their own complaint with the NYDOL, claiming their compensation structure violated the NYLL.

The NYDOL initially accepted the complaints and began investigating. However, when the NYDOL determined that the workers were all subject to mandatory arbitration through a collective bargaining agreement with their respective unions, who had filed grievances on their behalf, the NYDOL terminated each investigation. The NYDOL sent each worker a complaint closing letter stating “we understand other means are available for a resolution of your claims.” One NYDOL investigator explained to a worker that the DOL closed the case “following the advice of our counsel’s office. The [CBA] supersedes our authority in this case. There is no getting around it. The same is true in each case we have closed on this basis.” The NYDOL also issued a press release around the same time stating that it “may accept…cases [involving alleged violations of the 13-hour rule] if an employee is not covered by an arbitration clause.” Id.

In August 2023, the workers filed an Article 78 petition against the NYDOL, seeking that the NYDOL reopen the closed investigations of their claims. Id. at 2-3. The workers argued the NYDOL’s policy of closing the investigations was pursuant to a “rule” within the meaning of the NYSAPA and that the NYDOL failed to submit a notice of proposed rulemaking as required before adopting such a rule. They also claimed the NYDOL’s reliance on that rule before closing their cases was an error of law, that the NYDOL’s jurisdiction is not limited by private arbitration agreements such that termination of their investigations was an abuse of the NYDOL’s discretion. Id.

The NYDOL moved to dismiss the petition and claimed it must be dismissed because it fails to establish a right of mandamus relief and fails to state a claim under the NYSAPA. Id.

The Court’s Decision

The Court determined that in considering a motion to dismiss, the petition must be given a liberal construction, the petitioners must be afforded every possible favorable inference, and the motion should only be granted if there is no “reasonable view of the facts” that could entitle petitioners to relief. Id. at 4.

The NYDOL argued that it has discretionary authority to investigate employer-employee controversies, and that the Article 78 petition could not be used to compel it to engage in a discretionary act. Id. In addressing these positions, the Court found that if a petitioner prevails under either a mandamus to compel or a mandamus to review under New York law, the Court “may grant the petitioner the relief to which he is entitled.” Id. at 5. The Court further found that under appropriate circumstances, such relief could include an order that directs specified action by the respondent. Id. It then held that because the workers asserted various causes of action under state law and alleged that the NYDOL’s decisions to close their complaints were arbitrary and capricious, affected by errors of law, and abuses of discretion, a judgment in favor of the workers could appropriately require the NYDOL to revisit their complaints. Id. at 6-7.

As for the workers’ claims under the NYSAPA and the NYDOL’s potentially improper rulemaking, the NYDOL argued that its determination to decline to investigate the individual petitioners’ claims was specific to the facts and circumstances of the complaints and subsequent investigations, and not of “general applicability that implements or applies law.” Id. The Court opined that the NYSAPA requires the NYDOL to comply with certain procedural requirements before adopting any “rule” and that if the NYDOL engaged in formal rulemaking but did not comply with the procedural requirements of the NYSAPA, that regulatory action must be annulled. Id. at 6-7.

The NYDOL conceded that it did not follow the rulemaking procedures laid out in the NYSAPA, and the only question the Court needed to decide was whether the workers adequately pled that NYDOL’s decision to terminate its investigations was pursuant to a rule within the meaning of the NYSAPA. Id. at 7. It noted that a “rule” under the NYSAPA is a fixed, general principle applied without consideration of other relevant facts and circumstances, as distinguished from ad hoc decision-making based on individual facts and circumstances. Id.

The Court reasoned that “rules” direct what action should be taken regardless of individual circumstances and apply to future courses of conduct. It held that a “policy” dictating specific results without regards to other relevant circumstances is subject to the NYSAPA’s rulemaking requirements. Id. at 8.

In this case, the Court found that the workers had alleged that the NYDOL dismissed each of their complaints because their unions had entered into collective bargaining agreements with their employers that called for mandatory arbitration of their claims. Id. at 8-9. The workers also alleged that the NYDOL’s practice or policy of dismissing complaints on this basis was rigidly applied without regard to aides’ individualized circumstances or any mitigating factors. Id. The NYDOL investigator’s statement to one worker that the NYDOL was required to terminate all investigations of the workers due the collective bargaining agreements and that “there is no getting around it” was further evidence in support of the workers’ petition that the NYDOL engaged in improper rulemaking. Id. at 9.

The Court ultimately gave the workers’ petition a liberal construction, accepted its pleaded facts as true, and gave them the benefit of every possible inference, denying the NYDOL’s motion to dismiss the petition. Id. The Court determined that the workers’ petition sufficiently alleged the NYDOL’s application of a fixed, general principle of dismissing every complaint that was subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement as opposed to an “ad hoc decision” based on individual facts and circumstances. Id.

Implications For Businesses

The Chen decision illustrates that under appropriate circumstances, judges will not hesitate to question broadly-applicable “policies” of state agencies akin to “rules” under state law. As evidenced in this case, such scrutiny includes denying state agency motions to dismiss claims brought by aggrieved workers who feel an agency failed to follow its own procedural requirements in closing investigations into their claims. It also serves as a timely reminder for all employers of the ever-present possibility that state agencies may still investigate workers’ claims despite the existence and application of perfectly valid mandatory arbitration agreements. Employers should always remain cautious any time a state agency closes an investigation before completion due to the possibility such closure may later be found to have been improper by a court. Employer skepticism of broadly applicable state agency policies concerning workers’ claims that results in uniform outcomes is also warranted, especially when an agency confirms such position in press releases!

January 31, 2024January 31, 2024 by Class Action Defense

Report From New York City: U.S. Privacy Laws, A.I. Developments, And Bryan Cranston Take Center Stage At Legalweek 2024

By Alex W. Karasik

Duane Morris Takeaways: Privacy and data breach class action litigation are among the key issues that keep businesses and corporate counsel up at night. There was over $1 billion dollars procured in settlements and jury verdicts over the last year for these types of “bet-the-company” cases. At the ALM Law.com Legalweek 2024 conference in New York City, Partner Alex W. Karasik of the of the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Group was a panelist at the highly anticipated session, “Trends in US Data Privacy Laws and Enforcement.” The conference, which had over 6,000 attendees, produced excellent dialogues on how cutting-edge technologies can potentially lead to class action litigation. While A.I. took the main stage, along with an epic keynote speech from revered actor, Bryan Cranston, privacy and data-management issues were firmly on the radar of attendees.

Legalweek’s robust agenda covered a wide-range of global legal issues, with a prominent focus on the impact of technology and innovation. Some of the topics included artificial intelligence, data privacy, biometrics, automation, and cybersecurity. For businesses who deploy these technologies, or are thinking about doing so, this conference was informative in terms of both their utility and risk. The sessions provided valuable insight from a broad range of constituents, including in-house legal counsel, outside legal counsel, technology vendors, and other key players in the tech and legal industries.

I had the privilege of speaking about how data privacy laws and biometric technology have impacted the class action litigation space. Joining me on the panel was Christopher Wall (Special Counsel for Global Privacy and Forensics, and Data Protection Officer, HaystackID); Sonia Zeledon (Associate General Counsel Compliance, Risk, Ethics, and Privacy, The Hershey Company); and Pallab Chakraborty (Director of Compliance & Privacy, Xilinx). My esteemed fellow panelists and I discussed how the emerging patchwork of data privacy laws – both in the U.S. and globally – create compliance challenges for businesses. I provided insight on how high-stakes biometric privacy class action litigation in Illinois can serve as a roadmap for companies, as similar state statutes are emerging across the country. In addition, I explored how artificial intelligence tools used in the employee recruitment and hiring processes can further create potential legal risks. Finally, I shared my prediction of how the intersection of ESG and privacy litigation will continue to emerge as a hot area for class action litigation into 2024 and beyond.

Finally, and probably the most important update to many of you, Bryan Cranston’s keynote address was awesome! Covering the whole gamut of the emotional spectrum, Bryan was fascinating, inspirational, and hilarious. Some of the topics he discussed included the importance of family, the future impact of A.I. on the film industry, his mescal brand, and a passionate kiss during his first acting scene at 19. Bryan was a tough act follow!

Thank you to ALM Law.com, the Legalweek team, my fellow panelists, the inquisitive attendees, the media personnel, and all others who helped make this week special

January 22, 2024 by Class Action Defense

Illinois Supreme Court Opens The Door For More Wage & Hour Antitrust Class Actions

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Sean P. McConnell

Duane Morris Takeaways: On January 19, 2024, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously held that the Illinois Antitrust Act does not allow staffing agencies to avoid allegations that they suppressed wages and agreed not to hire each other’s workers in The State of Illinois ex rel. Kwame Raoul v. Elite Staffing, Inc., et al., No. 2024 IL 128763 (Ill. Jan. 19, 2024). The Supreme Court rejected defense arguments that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the Illinois Antitrust Act provides that services otherwise subject to the Act “shall not be deemed to include labor which is performed by natural persons as employees of others.” Id. at 3. The Supreme Court concluded that reading the Illinois Antitrust Act so broadly would contradict the entire purpose of the Act, i.e., promoting and protecting free and fair competition; therefore it found that the Act does not exclude all agreements concerning labor services, including the conduct alleged.

Illinois v. Elite Staffing is an important reminder that businesses must be mindful of state antitrust and competition laws, in addition to the federal antitrust laws, and is required reading for any corporate counsel handling antitrust class action litigation under state antitrust and competition laws involving wage-suppression issues.

Case Background

In July 2020, the Illinois Attorney General sued Elite Staffing Inc., Metro Staff Inc., Midway Staffing Inc. and their common customer, Colony Inc., on grounds that Colony required the staffing agencies not to poach each other’s employees and to agree to below-market wages for temporary workers at Colony. The three staffing firms provided a Colony facility with temporary workers beginning in 2018 where between 200 and 1,000 temporary workers would work at any given time. According to the allegations in the Complaint, Colony required the staffing agencies not to offer better wages or other benefits to any of each other’s workers and precluded the workers from trying to switch between the agencies. The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that the alleged conduct was exempted from antitrust liability under the Illinois Antitrust Act. The circuit court denied the motion, and the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the exemption in the Act did not extend to services provided by staffing agencies. The Illinois Supreme Court thereafter granted Defendants’ petition for leave to appeal.

Illinois Antitrust Act Does Not Exclude All Agreements Concerning Labor

Section 4 of the Illinois Antitrust Act exempts from coverage “labor which is performed by natural persons as employees of others.” See 740 ILCS § 10/4. This section is important because, among other reasons, § 3 of the Illinois Antitrust Act, which is expressly modeled after § 1 of the Sherman Act and federal court interpretations thereof, would otherwise proscribe the conduct alleged in the Complaint. The Supreme Court noted that just as reading §1 of the Sherman Act to prohibit every restraint on competition would be absurd, so too would be reading § 4 of the Illinois Antitrust Act in isolation. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that “service” cannot be read so broadly as to exempt all agreements concerning wages and conditions of employment from antitrust scrutiny regardless of their anticompetitive effects, which would be contrary to the entire purposes of the Illinois Antitrust Act. Id at 19. The Supreme Court concluded that agreements between employers that concern wages or hiring may violate the Illinois Antitrust Act unless it is part of a collective bargaining process.

Implications For Employers

Illinois v. Elite Staffing opens to door for workers in Illinois to use state antitrust law to tilt labor market dynamics in their favor and to increase their bargaining leverage for greater compensation and benefits. It serves as an important reminder for employers to also be mindful of state antitrust and competition laws when making labor market decisions.