Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. – Page 7 – Class Action Defense

December 5, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

The Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2024 Is Coming Soon!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: Happy Holidays to our loyal readers of the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog! Our elves are busy at work this holiday season in wrapping up our start-of-the-year kick-off publication – the Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2024. We will go to press in early January, and launch the 2024 Review from our blog and our book launch website.

The 2024 Review builds on the success of last year’s edition. At over 500 pages, the 2024 Review has more analysis than ever before, with an analysis of over 1,100 class certification rulings from federal and state courts over this past year. The Review will be available for download as an E-Book too.

The Review is a one-of-its-kind publication analyzing class action trends, decisions, and settlements in all areas impacting Corporate America, including the substantive areas of antitrust, appeals, the Class Action Fairness Act, civil rights, consumer fraud, data breach, EEOC-Initiated and government enforcement litigation, employment discrimination, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, wage & hour class and collective actions, labor, privacy, procedural issues, product liability and mass torts, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, securities fraud, state court class actions, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. The Review also highlights key rulings on attorneys’ fee awards in class actions, motions granting and denying sanctions in class actions, and the top class action settlement in each area. Finally, the Review provides insight as to what companies and corporate counsel can expect to see in 2024.

We are humbled and honored by the recent review of the Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2023 by Employment Practices Liability Consultant Magazine (“EPLiC”) – the review is here. EPLiC said that “The Review must-have resource for in-depth analysis of class actions in general and workplace litigation in particular.” EPLiC continued that “The Duane Morris Class Action Review analyzes class action trends, decisions, and settlements in all areas impacting Corporate America. The Review also highlights key rulings on attorneys’ fee awards in class actions, motions granting and denying sanctions in class actions, and the top class action settlement in a myriad of substantive areas. Finally, the Review provides insight as to what companies and corporate counsel can expect to see in 2023 in terms of filings by the plaintiffs’ class action bar.”

We look forward to providing this year’s edition of the Review to all of our loyal readers in early January. Stay tuned and Happy Holidays!

November 24, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Report From Montreal: What A Comparative Analysis Of ESG Class Action Litigation May Teach USA-Based Companies

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: USA-based companies are experiencing a deluge of class action litigation. Part of the increase is related to ESG-related claims (“Environmental, Social, and Governance”) involving environmental justice, product advertising, employment and DEI, corporate social responsibility, and investment practices. At the National Conference on Class Actions 2023 by BLG and the Quebec Bar Association in Montreal, Jerry Maatman of the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Group provided commentary on the state of U.S. class action litigation and how Asian, European, and U.S.-based corporations should be “looking around the corner” to ready themselves for new class action theories advancing ESG-related claims..

The National Conference on Class Actions in Montreal – with a robust two day agenda and roster of speakers from Canada, Europe, and Asia – examined diverse issues on cutting-edge class actions on a global basis. Subjects included the phenomenon of the “continuous evolution” of class action theories; securities fraud class action theories; collective, opt-in and opt-out representative actions in Canada and Europe; cross-jurisdictional class actions; and the dawn of ESG class actions filed by NGO’s, consumers, workers, and advocacy groups.

I had the privilege of speaking in Montreal on the current state of U.S. class action litigation, its impact on the global economy and litigation in non-U.S. jurisdictions, and the future of ESG-related class-wide litigation in America.

The plaintiffs’ class action bar in the United States is exceedingly innovative and in constant pursuit of “the next big then” insofar as potential liability is concerned for acts and omissions of Corporate America. Environmental, Social, and Governance issues – known as “ESG” – each of the verticals within ESG are topics on the mind of leading plaintiffs’ class action litigators. As ESG-related issues evolve and become increasingly more important to corporate stakeholders, class action litigation against companies is inevitable and has already begun to take shape. Factors driving these class actions include the new “social inflation” concepts coming out to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as social movements coalescing around climate change, technological disruptions, and social justice.

The Class Action Context

In 2022, the plaintiffs’ class action bar filed, litigated, and settled class actions at a breathtaking pace. The aggregate totals of the top ten class action settlements – in areas as diverse as mass torts, consumer fraud, antitrust, civil rights, securities fraud, privacy, and employment-related claims – reached the highest historical totals in the history of American jurisprudence. Class actions and government enforcement litigation spiked to over $63 billion in settlement totals. As analyzed in our Duane Morris Class Action Review, the totals included $50.32 billion for products liability and mass tort, $8.5 billion for consumer fraud, $3.7 billion for antitrust, $3.25 billion for securities fraud, and $1.3 billion for civil rights. While the exact totals are not in yet for 2023, aggregate settlement numbers are nearly as high over the past 11 months.

As “success begets success’ in this litigation space, the plaintiffs’ bar is focused on areas of opportunity for litigation targets. ESG-related areas are a prime area of risk.

The ESG Context

Corporate ESG programs is in a state of constant evolution. Early iterations were heavily focused on corporate social responsibility (or “CSR”), with companies sponsoring initiatives that were intended to benefit their communities. They entailed things like employee volunteering, youth training, and charitable contributions as well as internal programs like recycling and employee affinity groups. These efforts were not particularly controversial.

In recent years, ESG programs have become more extensive and more deeply integrated with companies’ core business strategies, including strategies for avoiding risks, such as those presented by employment discrimination claims, the impacts of climate change, supply chain accountability, and cybersecurity and privacy. Companies and studies have increasingly framed ESG programs as contributing to shareholder value.

As ESG programs become larger and more integrated into a company’s business, so do the risks of attracting attention from regulators and private litigants.

Class Actions Are Coming From Multiple Quarters

While class action litigation can emanate from many sources, four areas in particular are of importance in the ESG space.

Shareholders: Lawsuits by shareholders regarding ESG matters are accelerating. Examples include claims that their stock holdings have lost value as a result of false disclosures about issues like sexual harassment allegations involving key executives, cybersecurity incidents, or environmental disasters. Even absent a stock drop, some shareholders have brought successful derivative suits focused on ESG issues. Of recent note, employees of corporations incorporated in Delaware who serve in officer roles may be sued for breach of the duty of oversight in the particular area over which they have responsibility, including oversight over workplace harassment policies. In its ruling in In Re McDonald’s Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litigation, No. 2021-CV-324 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2023), the Delaware Court of Chancery determined that like directors, officers are subject to oversight claims. The ruling expands the scope of the rule established in the case of In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), which recognized the duty of oversight for directors. The decision will likely result in a flurry of litigation activity by the plaintiffs’ bar, as new cases will be filed alleging that officers in corporations who were responsible for overseeing human resource functions can be held liable for failing to properly oversee investigations of workplace misconduct such as sexual harassment.

Vendors and Business Partners: As companies face increasing demands to address ESG issues in their operations and throughout their supply chains, ESG requirements in commercial contracts are increasing in prevalence. Requirements imposed on vendors, suppliers, and partners – to ensure their operations do not introduce ESG risks (e.g., by using forced or child labor or employing unsustainable environmental practices) are becoming regular staples in a commercial context. In addition, as more companies report greenhouse gas emissions – and may soon be required by the SEC to report on them – they increasingly require companies in their supply chain to provide information about their own emissions. Furthermore, if the SEC’s proposed cybersecurity disclosure rules are enacted, companies also may require increased reporting regarding cybersecurity from vendors and others. These actions – and disclosures – provide fodder for “greenwashing” claims, where consumers claim that company statements about environmental or social aspects of their products are false and misleading. The theories in these class actions are expanding by encompassing allegations involving product statements as well as a company’s general statements about its commitment to sustainability.

State Consumer Protection and Employment Laws: The patchwork quilt of state laws create myriad causes of action for alleged false product advertising and other misleading marketing statements. The plaintiffs’ bar also has invoked statutes like the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act to bring claims against companies for alleged failures to stop alleged human rights violations in their supply chains. These claims typically allege that the existence of company policies and programs aimed at helping end human rights violations are themselves a basis for liability. In making human capital management disclosures a part of ESG efforts (including whether to disclose numeric metrics or targets based on race or gender), companies may find themselves in a difficult place with respect to potential liability stemming from stated commitments to diversity and inclusion. On the one hand, companies that fail to achieve numeric targets they articulate (e.g., a certain percent or increase in diversity among management) may subject themselves to claims of having overpromised when discussing their future plans. Conversely, employers that achieve such targets may face “reverse discrimination” claims alleging that they abandoned race-based or gender-neutral employment practices to hit numbers set forth in their public statements.

Government Enforcement Litigation: Federal, state and local government regulators have taken multiple actions against companies based on their alleged participation in climate change, investments inconsistent with ESG goals, or alleged illegal activities. For instance, in 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice investigated auto companies for possible antitrust violations for agreeing with California to adopt emissions standards more restrictive than those established by federal law. While the investigation did not reveal wrongdoing, it underscores the creativity that proponents and opponents of ESG efforts can employ.

Implications For Corporate Decision-Makers

The creation, content, and implementation of ESG programs carries increasing litigation risks for corporations but it is unlikely that ESG programs will diminish is size or scale in the coming years given increased focus by Fortune 100s and 500s and increased regulation at the federal and state levels.

Sound planning, comprehensive legal compliance, and systematic auditing of ESG programs should be a key focus and process of all entities beginning or continuing their ESG journey. As more and more companies adopt some level of corporative ESG strategy planning, compliance and auditing are some of the key imperatives in this new world of exposure to diminish and limit one’s exposure.

November 15, 2023November 15, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Appellate Court Denies Cell Phone Retailer’s Second Attempt To Arbitrate Class Action Privacy Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Tyler Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Ipina v. TCC Wireless, 2023 IL App (1st) 220547-U (Nov. 9, 2023), the First District of the Illinois Appellate Court held that T-Mobile retailer TCC Wireless was barred from enforcing an arbitration clause in the plaintiff’s employment agreement based on TCC’s actions in an earlier-filed privacy class action it settled. The Court determined that TCC was collaterally estopped from compelling the plaintiff’s claims to arbitration because TCC had unsuccessfully moved to send nearly identical claims to arbitration in the earlier-filed case. In doing so, the Illinois Appellate Court embraced a broad view of the circumstances in which “offensive” collateral estoppel is warranted in the class action context – that is, when a party may be prohibited from making an argument that was already raised and rejected in an earlier case.

Background

Plaintiff Stephanie Ipina alleged that while employed by Defendant TCC Wireless, she used a fingerprint-based timekeeping device to clock in and out of work. According to Plaintiff, her use of the timekeeping device resulted in TCC collecting her biometric data. Plaintiff claimed that TCC did not give her prior notice that it would be collecting her biometric data or obtain her prior written consent, and that TCC disclosed her data to TCC’s “payroll provider” without Plaintiff’s consent. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserted that TCC violated §§ 15(b) and 15(d) of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (the “BIPA”).

Plaintiff’s complaint also described a prior BIPA class action entitled Garcia v. TCC Wireless, which had been brought against TCC based on the same timekeeping device used by the Plaintiff in Ipina. In Garcia, TCC responded to the complaint by moving to compel arbitration pursuant to the plaintiff’s employment agreement, which stated that “[a]ny dispute arising out of or relating in any [way] to Employee’s employment with [TCC] . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration . . . . except for (i) the institution of a civil action seeking equitable relief, or (ii) the institution of a civil action of a summary nature where the relief sought is predicated on there being no dispute with respect to any fact.” Id. ¶ 7.

The trial court in Garcia denied TCC’s motion to compel because TCC did not dispute that it collected employees’ biometric data without consent, and therefore the plaintiff’s claims were subject to the arbitration clause’s “carve-out” for claims “of a summary nature where no facts are in dispute.” Id. ¶ 23. The parties in Garcia later reached a class-wide settlement, after which TCC produced a list of 899 employees to include in the settlement class. Due to TCC “compil[ing] the class incorrectly,” however, Plaintiff Stephanie Ipina and other TCC employees were omitted from the list of class members eligible to receive payments in connection with the Garcia settlement.

In response to the complaint filed in the Ipina case (on behalf of Plaintiff and other individuals who should not have been omitted from the settlement class in Garcia), TCC moved to compel Plaintiff’s BIPA claims to arbitration based on the same employment agreement provision at issue in Garcia. In opposing the motion, Plaintiff argued that TCC was collaterally estopped from compelling arbitration based on TCC’s motion to compel arbitration having been denied in the Garcia action. The trial court granted TCC’s motion, however, reasoning that collateral estoppel did not apply because unlike in Garcia, in the present case TCC denied the factual allegations set forth in the complaint.

The Illinois Appellate Court’s Decision

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court and held that TCC was collaterally estopped from enforcing the arbitration provision in Plaintiff’s employment agreement.

The Court noted that collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine that “promotes fairness and judicial economy by preventing the relitigation of issues that have already been resolved in earlier actions.” Id. ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A party seeking to collaterally estop its opponent from raising a particular argument must show that (i) the current issue is identical to one that was resolved in a prior action; (ii) the court in the previous matter entered a final judgment on the merits; and (iii) the party against whom estoppel is being asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior litigation.

The Appellate Court summarized TCC’s litigation conduct in Garcia by noting that in that case, TCC did not dispute that it collected employees’ biometric data without consent; in light of that fact, the court in Garcia denied TCC’s motion to compel arbitration because of the arbitration provision’s exception for claims of a summary nature where no facts are in dispute; the court also denied TCC’s motion to reconsider the order denying TCC’s motion to compel arbitration, which denial TCC did not appeal; and the parties subsequently settled the case on a class-wide basis.

Based on these facts, and contrary to the trial court’s order, the Appellate Court ruled that Plaintiff had shown that the collateral estoppel elements were established, and that the trial court erred in not applying the doctrine.

First, the Appellate Court rejected TCC’s attempt to distinguish the present case from Garcia on the basis that unlike Garcia, in this case TCC had denied the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint. According to the Appellate Court, this argument was contradicted by the position TCC had taken throughout the litigation, which is that Plaintiff should have been included in the Garcia settlement because TCC collected her biometric data before she signed a consent form. Because “TCC is bound by these admissions,” the Appellate Court ruled that the issue in the present case was identical to the issue resolved in Garcia because TCC had effectively conceded the plaintiffs’ factual allegations in both cases. Id. ¶ 25.

Second, the Appellate Court found that the trial court in Garcia entered a “final judgment on the merits” when it issued an order granting final settlement approval and dismissing the case with prejudice. Acknowledging the split in authority as to whether a settlement agreement qualifies as a “final order on the merits,” the Appellate Court sided with those decisions reflecting the proposition that “policy reasons counsel in favor of applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to interlocutory judgments after settlement and dismissal with prejudice.” Id. ¶ 28 (citation omitted). As stated by the Appellate Court, “[c]ollateral estoppel exists to prevent litigants from doing exactly what TCC attempts. The doctrine’s purpose is to prevent a party from losing an issue on the merits, but then relitigating it before a different judge to procure the desired result.” Id. ¶ 29. Thus, the Appellate Court found that Plaintiff satisfied the second element.

Third, the Appellate Court held that the last collateral estoppel element was satisfied because TCC was the defendant in Garcia and was the same party against whom estoppel was being asserted in the present case. See id. ¶ 30 (“TCC was a party in Garcia, where it had the same incentive to fully litigate the enforcement of the arbitration clause (and in fact did so).”). However, the Appellate Court also noted that while both parties argued on appeal the issue of Plaintiff’s privity, that was is “irrelevant” because “the privity requirement only applies to the party against whom estoppel is asserted.” Id.

Implications For Corporations

Ipina is an important reminder that a litigation decision made in one case can have potentially significant consequences for that party in an entirely separate action. As illustrated in the Ipina case, a party’s position in one matter (e.g., a defendant conceding the truth of certain factual allegations in a complaint) can be used to limit (or entirely foreclose) that party’s ability to raise a defense in another matter – regardless of how strong the defense might be on the merits.

Thus, corporate defendants should always think about the “big picture” when deciding on a course of action to take in defending a lawsuit. They should consider not only how a defense position may impact that particular litigation, but also how the position could affect separate and seemingly unrelated actions involving the same (or a related) party, whether in cases that are currently pending or that may be filed in the future.

November 12, 2023November 12, 2023 by Eden Anderson

California Supreme Court Expresses Concern At Estrada Oral Argument About Manageability Of PAGA Claims

By Eden E. Anderson, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: In a case with significant consequences for employers, the California Supreme Court heard oral argument in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, No. S274340, on November 8, 2023. In Estrada, the Supreme Court will decide whether trial courts have inherent authority to ensure that PAGA claims will be manageable at trial, and to strike or narrow such claims if they cannot be managed appropriately. The Supreme Court signaled during oral argument its concerns with unwieldy PAGA claims that, if tried, would require a series of mini-trials over the course of years. The Supreme Court further expressed concern with ensuring that employers’ due process rights to present affirmative defenses are protected, potentially signaling the issuance of an employer-friendly decision. A decision is expected in the next three months, and has the potential to transform the prosecution and defense of PAGA litigation.

Case Background

Jorge Estrada filed a putative class action and PAGA action against his former employer asserting meal period violations. After two classes comprised of 157 individuals were certified, the parties tried the claims before a judge in a bench trial. The trial court ultimately decertified the classes, finding there were too many individualized issues to support class treatment. Although the trial court awarded relief to four individual plaintiffs, it dismissed the non-individual PAGA claim, concluding it was not manageable.

On appeal, Estrada argued that PAGA claims have no manageability requirement, and the Court of Appeal agreed in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc., 76 Cal.App.5th 685 (2022). The Court of Appeal reasoned that class action requirements do not apply in PAGA actions and, therefore, the manageability requirement rooted in class action procedure was inapplicable. Further, the Court of Appeal opined that “[a]llowing courts to dismiss PAGA claims based on manageability would interfere with PAGA’s express design as a law enforcement mechanism.” Id. at 712. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the difficulty that employers and trial courts face with PAGA claims involving thousands of allegedly aggrieved employees, each with unique factual circumstances, but concluded that dismissal for lack of manageability was not an available tool for a trial court to utilize.

Estrada is contrary to the holding in Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 68 Cal.App.5th 746 (2021), and created a split in authority. In Wesson, the trial court struck a PAGA claim as unmanageable, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The claims at issue in Wesson involved the alleged misclassification of 345 store managers. The employer’s exemption affirmative defense turned on individualized issues as to each manager’s performance of exempt versus non-exempt tasks, which varied based on a number of factors including store size, sales volume, staffing levels, labor budgets, store hours, customer traffic, all of which varied across the stores. The split in authority prompted the California Supreme Court to grant review in Estrada, but not Wesson.

Oral Argument At The California Supreme Court

During oral argument on November 8, 2023, several Justices, most prominently Justices Liu and Jenkins, expressed skepticism that a trial court’s inherent powers include the ability to outright strike or dismiss an entire PAGA action for lack of manageability. As Justice Liu commented, permitting trial courts such wide ranging power would shortchange the PAGA statute unless there is an overriding constitutional interest.

Several Justices also acknowledged that an employer has a due process right to present evidence to support its affirmative defenses and that, in certain cases, such evidence presentation might require a series of mini-trials over a period of years and wholly consume a trial court’s resources. Justice Kruger asked questions of Estrada’s counsel that suggested the illogical nature of these issues telling trial courts as to what to do in terms of mini-trials, and how unwieldy such PAGA-related problems would evolve under such a set of principles.

Justice Groban also expressed concern about a PAGA case where multiple Labor Code violations are alleged, hundreds or thousands of employees are at issue, and different work sites and different types of employees ranging from janitors to accountants are implicated. Justice Groban asked why, in that case, a trial court could not just limit the case to the accountants only. Other justices raised similar concerns, with Chief Justice Guerrero asking Estrada’s counsel why the answer is that this is all subject to appellate review.

Implications For Employers

The constellation of the comments from the justices seemingly signals that the California Court may hold that trial courts possess inherent authority to ensure an employer’s right to due process is safeguarded, which necessarily encompasses the right to gauge the manageability of PAGA claims and to narrow them as appropriate. As to whether such authority could include outright dismissal of an entire PAGA case, employers will have to wait and see.

November 10, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Implementation Of Equal Pay And Benefits Requirement Of The Illinois Day & Temporary Labor Services Act Likely Postponed Until April 2024

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Gregory Tsonis

Duane Morris Takeaways – In a significant development impacting both staffing agencies and their customers, recent legislative changes in Illinois propose to delay implementation of the equal pay provision of the Illinois Day and Temporary Labor Services Act (IDTLSA) until April 1, 2024. Further, recent guidance from the Illinois Department of Labor clarifies that the 90-day period which triggers the equal pay and benefit provision requires a temporary laborer to actually work 90 days for a client employer. A comprehensive breakdown of the 2023 amendments to the IDTLSA and the law’s significant new requirements can be found here.

Proposed Amendment And Recent Clarification To Equal Pay And Benefit Provision

On November 9, 2023, both houses of the Illinois General Assembly passed legislation that further amends Section 42 of the IDTLSA. The original IDTLSA amendments, passed on August 4, 2023, required staffing firms to provide day and temporary laborers with equal pay and benefits as workers employed directly by the client employer after 90 days of work. The new bill passed by the Illinois legislature, HB 3641, proposes to delay the start of the 90-day calculation period. Specifically, the approved bill adds language to the IDTLSA stating that “[t]he calculation of the 90 calendar days may not begin until April 1, 2024.” This proposed delay would provide employers and staffing agencies with additional time to ensure compliance with the IDTLSA’s equal pay requirements.

It is important to note that this amendment, if signed into law by Governor J. B. Pritzker, extends the timeline for compliance with the IDTLSA’s equal pay and benefits provision only. It does not, however, exempt employers and staffing agencies from adhering to other mandates of the IDTLSA, which took effect on August 4, 2023. These mandates include but are not limited to placement fee restrictions, required safety training, labor issue disclosures, and stringent recordkeeping requirements.

Further clarifying the scope of these requirements, the Illinois Department of Labor published a list of frequently asked questions following the amendments’ passage on August 4, 2023. One frequent question raised by employers and staffing agencies alike is whether the 90 days which entitle a temporary employee to equal pay and benefits is 90 days assigned at a client or 90 days actually worked. The IDOL’s recently published Day and Temporary Labor Service Agency FAQ (which can be found here) clarifies that the 90-day count “includes only days worked by a day or temporary laborer for the third-party client within a 12-month period, not simply the total duration of the contract or assignment.” Notably, even a minimal amount of time worked on any given day will count towards the 90-day total.

Implications for Employers and Staffing Agencies

This legislative update and further guidance from the Illinois Department of Labor underscore the dynamic nature of labor laws and the importance of staying informed. Given the IDTLSA’s extensive requirements and private right of action as an enforcement mechanism, employers and staffing agencies must remain vigilant in understanding and complying with the law’s evolving requirements to avoid potential legal complications.

November 4, 2023November 4, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Federal Court Allows Amazon “Alexa” Privacy Class Action To Proceed

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Tyler Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Wilcosky, et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., et al., No. 19-CV-5061 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2023), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a decision embracing a strict interpretation of the notice a private entity must provide before collecting a person’s biometric data in compliance with the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”). The decision underscores the importance of not only obtaining written consent before collecting a person’s biometric data, but also of the need to be as specific as possible in drafting privacy notices to inform end users that the company is collecting biometric data and to describe the “specific purpose and length of term for which” biometric data is being collected.

In light of the potentially monumental exposure faced by companies defending putative BIPA class actions, companies that operate in Illinois and collect data that could potentially be characterized as “biometric” should review and, if necessary, update their public-facing privacy notices to ensure compliance with the BIPA.

Background

Plaintiffs’ BIPA claims in Wilcosky were premised on their respective interactions with Amazon’s “Alexa” device – a digital assistant that provides voice-based access to Amazon’s shopping application and other services. According to Plaintiffs, Alexa devices identify individuals who speak within the vicinity of an active device by collecting and analyzing the speaker’s “biometric identifiers” (specifically, “voiceprints”).

In their complaint, Plaintiffs claimed that Amazon identifies people from the sound of their voices after they enroll in Amazon’s “Voice ID” feature on the Alexa Application. To enroll in Voice ID, a user is taken to a screen notifying him or her that the Voice ID feature “enables Alexa to learn your voice, recognize you when you speak to any of your Alexa devices, and provide enhanced personalization.” Order at 3. A hyperlink to the Alexa Terms of Use is located at the bottom of the enrollment screen, which Terms state that Voice ID “uses recordings of your voice to create an acoustic model of your voice characteristics.” Id. at 8. Before completing the Voice ID enrollment process, a user must agree to the Alexa Terms of Use and authorize “the creation, use, improvement, and storage” of his or her Voice ID by tapping an “Agree and Continue” button. Id. at 3.

Among the four named Plaintiffs, three had enrolled in Voice ID using their respective Alexa devices (the “Voice ID Plaintiffs”). One Plaintiff, Julia Bloom Stebbins, did not enroll in Voice ID; rather, she alleged that she spoke in the vicinity of Plaintiff Jason Stebbins’s Alexa device, resulting in Alexa collecting her “voiceprint” to determine whether her voice “matched” the Voice ID of Plaintiff Jason Stebbins.

Based on their alleged interactions with Alexa, Plaintiffs claimed that Amazon violated Sections 15(b), 15(c), and 15(d) of the BIPA by (i) collecting their biometric data without providing them with the requisite notice and obtaining their written consent, (ii) impermissibly “profiting from” their biometric data, and (iii) disclosing their biometric data without consent.

Amazon moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complainton the basis that: (1) the Voice ID Plaintiffs received the required notice and provided their written consent by completing the Voice ID enrollment process; and (2) Plaintiff Bloom Stebbins never enrolled in Voice ID – meaning she was a “total stranger” to Amazon such that Amazon could not possibly identify her based on the sound of her voice.

The Court’s Decision

The Court denied Amazon’s motion to dismiss in a 15-page order, focused primarily on Amazon’s arguments relating to Plaintiffs’ Section 15(b) claim.

Sufficiency Of Notice Provided To Voice ID Plaintiffs

Regarding the requirements of Section 15(b), the Court noted that a company collecting biometric data must first: (1) inform the individual that biometric data is being collected or stored; (2) inform the individual of the specific purpose and length of term for which the biometric data is being collected, stored, and used; and (3) receive a written release signed by the individual.

In moving to dismiss the Voice ID Plaintiffs’ Section 15(b) claim, Amazon argued that those three Plaintiffs received all legally required notices during the Voice ID enrollment process. During that process, Amazon explained how Voice ID works and informed users that the technology creates an acoustic model of a user’s voice characteristics. Amazon maintained that notice language need not track the exact language set forth in Section 15(b) because the BIPA does not require that any particular statutory language be provided to obtain a person’s informed consent. Id. at 6 (noting Amazon’s argument that “Voice ID Plaintiffs’ voiceprints were collected in circumstances under which any reasonable consumer should have known that his or her biometric information was being collected”).

The Court adopted Plaintiffs’ stricter reading of Section 15(b). It held that the complaint plausibly alleged that Amazon’s disclosures did not fully satisfy Section 15(b)’s notice requirements. While Amazon may have informed users that Voice ID enables Alexa to learn their voices and recognize them when they speak, Amazon did not specifically inform users that it is “collecting and capturing the enrollee’s voiceprint, a biometric identifier.” Id.at 8. As a result, and acknowledging that it was “a close call,” the Court denied Amazon’s motion to dismiss the Section 15(b) claim asserted by the Voice ID Plaintiffs.

Application Of The BIPA To “Non-User” Plaintiff Julia Bloom Stebbins

The Court next turned to Plaintiff Bloom Stebbins, who did not create an Alexa Voice ID but alleged that Amazon collected her “voiceprint” when she spoke in the vicinity of Plaintiff Jason Stebbins’s Alexa device. Amazon argued that her Section 15(b) claim failed because the BIPA was not meant to apply to someone in her shoes – that is, a stranger to Amazon and “who Amazon has no means of identifying.” Id. at 11.

The Court rejected Amazon’s argument. In doing so, the Court refused to read Section 15(b)’s requirements as applying only where a company has some relationship with an individual. According to the Court, that interpretation would amount to “read[ing] a requirement into the statute that does not appear in the statute itself.” Id. at 12; see also id. (“[C]ourts in this Circuit have rejected the notion that to state a claim for a Section 15(b) violation, there must be a relationship between the collector of the biometric information and the individual.”).

Conclusion

Wilcosky is required reading for corporate counsel of companies that are facing privacy-related class actions and/or want to ensure their consumer or employee-facing privacy disclosures contain all notices required under applicable law.

The Wilcosky decision endorses a strict view regarding the notice a company must provide to individuals to fully comply with Section 15(b) of the BIPA. To ensure compliance, companies should provide end users with language that is as specific as possible regarding the type(s) of data being collected (including the fact that the data may be “biometric”), the purpose the data is being collected, and the time period during which the data will be stored. The notice should closely track the BIPA’s statutory text, and companies should also require individuals to affirmatively express that they have received the notice and agree to the collection of their biometric data. (Despite a footnote stating that the Court’s order in Wilcosky should not “be interpreted to mean that . . . a disclosure must parrot the exact language of BIPA in order to satisfy Section 15(b),” id. at 8 n.3, the Court does not explain how a disclosure could satisfy Section 15(b) without tracking the statute’s language verbatim.)

Moreover, Wilcosky raises the question whether a company should characterize data it collects as “biometric” data in its privacy notice – even if the company maintains (perhaps for good reason) that the data does not constitute biometric data subject to regulation under the BIPA. Further complicating this question is the fact that the precise contours of the types of data that qualify as “biometric” under the BIPA are unclear and are currently being litigated in many cases. Companies may wish to err on the “safe side” and refer to the data being collected as “biometric” data in their privacy notices.

November 1, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

The Brave New World: President Biden Signs Executive Order On Use Of Artificial Intelligence

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Alex W. Karasik, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 30, 2023, President Biden signed an Executive Order (the “EO”) providing guidance for employers on the emerging utilization of Artificial Intelligence in the workplace. The EO establishes industry standards for AI security, innovation, and safety across significant employment sectors. Spanning over 100 pages, the robust EO endeavors to set parameters for responsible AI use, seeking to harness AI for good while mitigating risks associated with AI usage.

For businesses who utilize AI software in their employment decisions processes, the EO signifies a shift in beneficial versus harmful AI use and promotes a principled plan on advancing beneficial AI use.

Security, Innovation, And Safety With AI

AI’s significant developments in such a short period has required policymakers to keep up with the ever-changing AI landscape. President Biden’s EO manifests the White House’s commitment to AI use in a safe and secure manner. The EO also signals a commitment to promoting responsible innovation, competition, and collaboration to propel the United States to lead in AI and unlock the technology’s potential. At the same time, the EO focuses on AI implications for workplaces and problematic AI usage.

AI And Employment Issues

In the White House’s continued dedication to advance equity and civil rights, the EO purports to commit to supporting American workers. As AI creates new jobs and industries, the EO maintains that all workers should be included in benefiting from AI opportunities. As to the workplace, the EO asserts that responsible AI use will improve workers’ lives, positively impact human work, and help all to gain from technological innovation. Nonetheless, the EO opines that irresponsible AI use could undermine workers’ rights.

Further, protections to Americans who increasingly interact with AI are contemplated in the EO and signals that organizations will not be excused from legal obligations. Chief among these protections are continued enforcement of existing safeguards against fraud, unintended bias, discrimination, infringements on privacy, and other harms from AI. The White House seeks parity with the Federal Government in enforcement efforts and creating new appropriate safeguards against harmful AI use.

Significantly, within 180 days of issuing the EO, the Secretary of Labor is tasked with consulting with agencies and outside entities (including labor unions and workers) to develop and publish principles and best practices for employers to maximize AI’s potential benefits. In so doing, the key principles and best practices are to address job-displacement, labor standards and job quality, and employer’s AI-related collection and use of worker data. These principles and best practices further aim to prevent any harms to employees’ well-being.

Implications For Employers

This lengthy order should alert employers that AI is here to stay and the perils of AI use will change as the technology further augments the modern workforce.

As AI becomes more engrained in employment, employers should be mindful of the guidance developed in the EO and should stay up to date on any legislation that stems from AI usage. If businesses have not been paying attention to AI developments, now is the time to start.

October 18, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Federal Court Denies Class Certification In A Nationwide FCRA Lawsuit Due To Issues With Commonality, Adequacy Of Representation, And Predominance

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Emilee N. Crowther

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Sgouros v. Transunion Corp., No. 1:14-CV-01850, 2023 WL 6690474 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2023), Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification in a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) case because Plaintiff failed to satisfy the Rule 23 requirements of commonality, adequacy of representation, and predominance. For entities facing FCRA class actions, this decision provides a concise explanation of what factors courts may consider with respect to commonality, adequacy of representation, and predominance in ruling on a motion for class certification.

Case Background

In this litigation, Defendants are collectively a well-known American consumer credit reporting agency. In 2013, Defendants offered a 3-in-1 Credit Report, Credit Score & Debt Analysis for consumers to purchase. The 3-in-1 report included a VantageScore, which, similar to a FICO score, looks at the information in a consumer’s credit report and generates a score to help lenders determine a consumer’s creditworthiness.

On June 10, 2013, Plaintiff purchased a 3-in-1 Credit Report and VantageScore from Defendants. Id. at 1. On the same day he purchased the report, Plaintiff alleged he was denied his desired auto loan because “the credit score the lender was provided was more than 100 points lower than the number contained in the VantageScore [Plaintiff] purchased.” Id.

Plaintiff later testified he knew the VantageScore was “useless” in September 2012, and failed to provide an explanation as to why he purchased a VantageScore nine months after such realization. Id. Plaintiff also testified that, contrary to the allegations in his complaint, he did not buy the score in advance of his search for an auto loan, and “he did not read the TransUnion website content that accompanied the purchase of his VantageScore.” Id.

In 2014, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging violations the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”). Id. Plaintiff sought to represent a nationwide class and a Missouri-based class consisting of all persons “who purchased a VantageScore 1.0 Score through TransUnion Interactive’s website, or its predecessor website, during the period October 1, 2009, to September 1, 2015.” Id.

The Court’s Decision

The Court held that Plaintiff failed to establish commonality, adequacy of representation, and predominance for both the FCRA and MMPA claims under Rule 23(a) and (b), and denied class certification. Id. at 6.

Rule 23(a)(2) – Commonality

Plaintiffs must demonstrate that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class” to meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). Id. at 3. Importantly, Plaintiff is required to “demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury,’” and that the claims are “capable of classwide resolution.” Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)). Plaintiff asserted five questions to establish commonality. Id. Overall, the Court found Plaintiff’s commonality questions were insufficient because they “merely restate[d] the core elements of statutory violations” and did not demonstrate “to what extent the class members suffered a common injury.” Id.

Specifically as to the alleged FCRA violations, the “core liability dispute” was whether or not Defendants failed to supply the class “with a credit score . . . that assist[ed] the consumer in understanding the credit scoring assessment of the credit behavior of the consumer and predictions about the future credit behavior of the consumer.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff asserted that the VantageScore could not assist consumers in understanding their credit score assessment “because the VantageScore was not similar enough to a FICO score and or widely used by lenders.” Id. at 4. The Court disagreed. It held that because Plaintiff failed to present any argument or evidence “independent of a comparison to a FICO score,” Plaintiff’s common questions were not “capable of common answers,” and Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement was not met. Id.

Similarly, “[b]ecause [Plaintiff’s] MMPA common question . . . [was] premised on the same logic as the FCRA claim,” the Court found that “commonality was not met.” Id.

Rule 23(a)(4) – Adequacy of Representation

A named plaintiff must also establish they can adequately serve as a class representative under Rule 23(a)(4). Id. A named plaintiff is inadequate if they “have serious credibility problems” or if they have “antagonistic of conflicting” interests to absent class members. Id. The Court held that Plaintiff was inadequate to represent the class on both the FCRA and MMPA claims due to Plaintiff’s questionable credibility and the inconsistencies in his deposition testimony. Id. at 4-5.

Rule 23(b)(3) – Predominance

The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the putative class claims “predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and are “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Id. at 5. The Court found that the FCRA’s statutory requirement of assisting a consumer in understanding their credit score is “necessarily individualized given the inherently personal nature how credit scores are calculated and consumers’ personal behaviors,” and predominance was not met. Id.

Implications For Credit Reporting Companies

This ruling provides a straightforward analysis of what elements courts may find persuasive in ruling on a motion for class certification in an FCRA class action. It ought to be a required read for corporate counsel in any FCRA case.

October 15, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

D.C. Federal Court Denies Class Certification For COVID-19 Remote Learning Claims Due To Inadequacy Of The Class Representative

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Gur-Ravantab, et al. v. Georgetown University, No. 1:22-CV-01038, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179493 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2023), Judge Trevor McFadden of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification on the grounds that the named Plaintiff was neither an adequate representative of the proposed class nor even a member of it.

For companies facing motions for certification motions in class actions, this decision is instructive in terms of considerations over the circumstances where a named plaintiff may fall short of satisfying the adequacy requirement under 23(a)(4).

Case Background

The named Plaintiff, Emir Gur-Ravanatab (“Plaintiff”), was a Class of 2020 graduate of Georgetown University. Id. at 1. In March 2020 of his final semester, the COVID-19 pandemic swept the nation. Id. at 2. Defendant, Georgetown University (“Defendant”), like many other schools, announced its transition to remote instruction for the rest of the Spring 2020 semester. Id.

Plaintiff alleged that he entered a contract with the Defendant, and under that contract, Plaintiff paid tuition in exchange for a guarantee of “in-person classroom learning and other services.” Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff alleged that there was a material difference in value between in-person and remote instruction. Therefore, despite Defendant’s transition to remote instruction, Plaintiff was never paid the difference. Id. at 2.

Plaintiff alleged breach of an express and implied contract claims, and an unjust enrichment claim. Id. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, and restitution for his claims. Id. He also moved to certify a class on behalf of other students who similarly formed contracts with Defendant and were enrolled as undergraduate students “during the Spring 2020 semester who paid tuition and Mandatory Fees.” Id. Plaintiff alleged the class covered roughly 7,300 other current and former university students. Id.

The Court’s Decision

The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. It held that the named Plaintiff was not an adequate representative of the class he proposed to certify nor even a member of the class. Id. at 1.

The Court reasoned the requirements of all class action suits are well-settled under Rule 23. Id. at 3. These requirements are known as “numerosity,” “commonality,” “typicality,” and “adequacy.” Id. at 4. Additionally, the Court relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that “has ‘repeatedly held’ that ‘a class representative must be a part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.’” Id. After a plaintiff and his proposed class satisfy those requirements, then the plaintiff and the proposed class must fall within one of the three “buckets” of class actions enumerated under Rule 23(b). Id. at 4-5. The Court found Plaintiff “stumbled before reaching Rule 23(b)” as he was “both an inadequate representative of the proposed class, and a non-member” of it. Id. at 5.

The Court focused its ruling on the adequacy prong under Rule 23(a). The Court opined that “[Plaintiff] does not share the same interests as the other class members, and indeed, has a potential conflict of interest with them,” and therefore is “not an adequate class representative.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff suffered two problems, including: (i) Plaintiff’s mother is an employee of the university; and (ii) Plaintiff did not personally pay tuition or mandatory fees. Id. at 7-8. Therefore, the Court determined “he lack[ed] the kind of concrete stake in the outcome of th[e] litigation necessary to be the vigorous advocate the class is entitled to.”

As to potential class conflicts, Plaintiff’s mother was a Turkish language instructor with the university, and hence he had a close familial relationship to a person who may be harmed by a judgment against the university. Id. at 8. Further, Plaintiff testified in his deposition that his parents, including his mother “exert a ‘pretty major’ influence over his decisions.” Id. The Court reasoned that “Rule 23 requires that class representatives be able to engage in arm’s-length dealings with the opposing side” and Plaintiff did not meet that standard. Id. However, the Court acknowledged that this conflict on its own “would not be enough, standing on its own, to defeat adequacy,” but other problems persisted. Id.

Plaintiff’s second problem was he did not share the same interest in this case as the other class members. Id. Plaintiff “sued for a refund of the difference in value between the education he paid for and the one he got,” but Plaintiff “did not pay for an education at all.” Id. The Court considered Plaintiff’s student account as the operative measure for educational payments. Id. at 8-11.

On balance, the Court construed the student account two ways. Either, Plaintiff did “not pay [Defendant] a dime,” Id. at 9, or Plaintiff “got more money out of [Defendant] that semester than he put in.” Id. at 11. Based on the Court’s reasoning, both accountings lead to the same problem, i.e., that Plaintiff “will likely have no compensatory damages to claim,” and “without compensatory damages, [Plaintiff] cannot claim punitive damages either.” Id. Therefore, the Court held that Plaintiff could not obtain meaningful relief, and thus, “he lack[ed] ‘the incentive to represent the claims of the class vigorously.’” Id. As a result of Plaintiff owing no money towards tuition and Mandatory Fees, the Court found he “quite simply is not a member of the proposed class.” Id.

The Court further discussed the second named Plaintiff, Emily Lama, and her exclusion from the class as well because she was “enrolled as a graduate student during the Spring 2020 Semester,” meaning she also did not fit the undergraduate class description. Id. at 11-12.

Accordingly, as there was no named Plaintiff to represent the class, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Id. at 12.

Implications For Companies

Companies confronted with motions for class certification should take note that the court in Gur-Ravantab relied on Plaintiffs’ inability to adequately represent the class based on a fact intensive analysis that disqualified the named Plaintiff as a suitable class representative. Further, from a practical standpoint, companies should carefully evaluate class representatives for unique characteristics that are distinguishable from the proposed class.

October 11, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Report From London: What A Comparative Analysis Of International Class Action Litigation May Teach USA-Based Companies

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: USA-based companies are experiencing a deluge of class action litigation. At the Thought Leaders Global Class Action Conference in London, Jerry Maatman of the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Group gave a keynote address on the state of U.S. class action litigation and how Asian, European, Australian, and African-based corporations should be “looking around the corner” to ready themselves for new class action theories spreading to their respective jurisdictions. Class and collective-based litigation is likewise growing at a precipitous rate in non-U.S. jurisdictions, and corporations operating in the global economy are subject to a patchwork quilt of procedural and substantive differences in how the plaintiffs’ class action bar is suing defendants and seeking large-scale recoveries.

The London Thought Leaders Global Class Action Conference – with a robust two day agenda and roster of speakers from Europe and Asia – examined diverse issues on cutting-edge class actions on a global basis. Subjects included the phenomenon of the “continuous evolution” of class action theories; the surge of crypto class actions claims; collective, opt-in and opt-out representative actions in England; the dawn of ESG class actions filed by NGO’s, consumers, workers, and advocacy groups; data privacy litigation on a class and collective action basis; and cross-border consumer fraud class action theories.

I had the privilege of speaking on how U.S. class action litigation impacts the global economy and litigation in non-U.S. jurisdictions. For a comparative law panel discussion, I presented along with Professor Miguel Sousa Ferro of the University of Lisbon Law School, and the Managing Partner of Milberg Sousa Ferro, a leading class action firm based in Portugal. We discussed – and debated – a comparison of the procedural differences between USA-style opt-out class action mechanisms and European Union-style opt-in / opt-out procedures. We used the recent opioid class action products liability class actions and European mass tort lawsuits as a case study to compare and contrasts the pros and cons of each judicial system and the array of mechanisms to protect consumers, injured parties, and corporate defendants.

Against that backdrop, Professor Ferro and I analyzed the future of global class actions, especially in light of the record-breaking class action settlement numbers in the USA in 2022 and 2023, which is fueling the explosive growth of class and collective litigation. We agreed that as to various substantive areas, privacy litigation is posed to remain “white hot” and grow over the next few years, as the pace of technology continues to underlie all aspects of the economy.