Adam Brown – Class Action Defense

June 24, 2026June 24, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

California Federal Court Grants In Part And Denies In Part Workday’s Motion To Dismiss In Mobley v. Workday

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Adam D. Brown, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: In the closely watched AI-related litigation entitled Mobley, et al. v. Workday, Inc., No. 23-CV-00770 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2026) (ECF No. 360), Judge Rita F. Lin of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order denying in part and granting in part Workday’s motion to dismiss. The Court denied Workday’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) claims, holding that Plaintiffs adequately alleged a nexus to California because Workday allegedly designs, develops, and operates its algorithmic screening tools from its California headquarters. Id. at 3-4. The Court also denied the motion as to one of the plaintiffs’ Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim, determining that her new proxy-discrimination factual allegations fell within the scope of a prior order granting leave to amend to address certain deficiencies in a prior iteration of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, despite Workday’s argument to the contrary. Id. at 8. However, the Court granted Workday’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff Rowe’s newly asserted race-based disparate impact claim because Rowe did not seek leave to add a race-based claim, and therefore Rowe could not add this claim to the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). Id. at 9.

For employers and AI vendors defending against AI employment discrimination claims, this decision provides important guidance on how defendants can successfully move to strike unauthorized claims and legal theories that exceed the scope of court-granted leave to amend.

This development follows the Court’s previous Discovery Order, which we blogged on here, Workday’s unsuccessful Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, which we blogged about here, Workday’s first successful Motion to Dismiss, which we blogged on here, and the EEOC’s amicus brief filing, which we blogged about here.

Case Background

Plaintiffs Derek Mobley, Jill Hughes, Sheilah Johnson-Rocha, and FaithLinh Rowe brought this action against Workday, alleging that Workday’s algorithm-based applicant screening tools discriminated against them and other similarly situated job applicants based on race, age, and disability. Id. at 1. After the Court ruled on two rounds of motions to dismiss, Mobley proceeded on claims for disparate impact discrimination based on race under Title VII, disability under the ADA, and age under the ADEA. Id. at 1-2.

On November 12, 2025, Mobley sought leave to file a further amended complaint adding three new named plaintiffs and claims for sex-based discrimination under Title VII and sex-based, race-based, and age-based discrimination under the FEHA. Id. at 2. The Court found good cause for the late amendment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 16. Id. Workday moved to dismiss the resulting Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), and the motion was granted in part and denied in part. Id. Plaintiffs were given leave to remedy deficiencies in their FEHA claims, which lacked allegations of a nexus to California, and Hughes was given leave to amend her ADA claim. Id. Plaintiffs then filed a TAC. Id.

Subsequently, Workday filed a motion to dismiss and to strike portions of the TAC, arguing Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims failed to plead a non-conclusory nexus between the alleged misconduct and California, and that the other amendments were unauthorized because they fell outside the scope of Plaintiffs’ leave to amend. Id. at 1.

The Court’s Decision

The decision addressed several issues.

Plaintiffs’ FEHA Claims Were Plausibly Asserted

First, the Court denied Workday’s motion to dismiss the FEHA claims, finding that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Workday, whose principal place of business is in California, participated in the alleged misconduct from its California headquarters. Id. at 3. The TAC alleged that Workday’s tools were “designed, developed, maintained, and controlled from [Workday’s] California headquarters” and that the “screening, scoring, and rejection” of Plaintiffs’ applications “originate[d] in and [was] carried out from California.” Id. at 4. The Court reasoned that the TAC adequately alleged “material participation in the allegedly unlawful discriminatory employment decisions by an actor (Workday, through its algorithmic decision-making tools) in California.” Id.

The Court rejected Workday’s argument that its liability as an agent under the FEHA must turn on the liability of its customers, relying on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Grp., 534 P.3d 40 (Cal. 2023). Id. Under Raines, Workday is not subject to derivative liability based on its employer-customer’s liability but instead “is directly liable for its ‘own engagement in FEHA-regulated activities on the employer’s behalf.’” Id. (quoting Raines, 534 P.3d at 53).

The Court also rejected Workday’s contention that applying the FEHA to its California-based conduct would amount to an impermissible extraterritorial application, reasoning that wrongful conduct within California’s borders is not properly understood as “extraterritorial” regardless of where an aggrieved worker resides. Id. at 5-7.

Plaintiff Hughes’s Amended ADA Claim Was Permissible

Second, the Court denied Workday’s motion as to the permissibility of Plaintiff Hughes’s ADA claim. Id. at 8. The TAC alleged that “algorithmic hiring tools can identify and rely upon [ ] proxy indicators of illness or health-related limitations” such as “medical-related leave, or patterns consistent with treatment and recovery,” and “can disproportionately flag and screen out such applicants based on inferred health status rather than job-related qualifications.” Id. The Court rejected Workday’s argument that the Court had not authorized new theories of proxy discrimination for physical disabilities, reasoning that the additional allegations were squarely within the scope of the leave to amend. Id.

Plaintiff Rowe’s Race-Based Disparate Impact Claim Was Dismissed

Third, the Court dismissed Plaintiff Rowe’s race-based disparate impact claim under Title VII, which sought for the first time to assert discrimination based on her race as an Asian American. Id. at 9. The Court reasoned that the Second Amended Complaint did not contain such a claim and that Plaintiffs had not previously sought or received authorization to add the claim, as the prior race-related allegations were limited to African American and Black applicants. Id.

Plaintiffs’ Direct-Employer Theory Was Stricken

Finally, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ new legal theory that Workday is liable as an employer because it used the challenged recruitment and hiring procedures in screening and selecting its own employees, explaining that this legal theory was unauthorized. Id. at 10.

Implications For Employers

This decision highlights that companies developing and operating AI-driven hiring tools in and/or from California may be subject to the FEHA for their own California-based conduct, even when the affected applicants reside and apply for jobs out of state.

Moreover, the Court’s treatment of the amendments to the complaint underscores the importance of carefully observing the scope of court-granted leave to amend. While the Court permitted new proxy-discrimination allegations supporting an existing ADA claim, the Court dismissed and struck a new race-based theory and a new direct-employer theory that exceeded the scope of the amendments the Court had authorized, illustrating that plaintiffs cannot use amendments to incorporate entirely new claims or theories without leave.

June 2, 2026June 2, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

California Federal Court Clarifies Limits On AI Bias Testing And Applicant Data Disclosure In Mobley v. Workday

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Adam D. Brown, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Mobley, et al. v. Workday, Inc., Case No. 23-CV-00770, 2026 WL 1510537 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2026) (ECF No. 340), Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order resolving three discovery disputes in this closely watched employment discrimination class action involving novel artificial intelligence (AI) issues. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of Workday’s bias-testing data, finding that the attorney-client privilege protects the data because Workday’s attorneys curated it and used the results in providing legal advice. The Court also denied Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Workday to produce its customers’ applicant data because Plaintiffs failed to show that Workday had control of that data within the meaning of Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the Court ordered production of Workday’s EEO-1 and Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) documents, finding those documents to be relevant to Workday’s knowledge of potential demographic disparities when utilizing its AI tools.

The ruling is significant for corporate counsel. For employers navigating the intersection of privilege, discovery obligations, and AI hiring tools, this ruling provides important guidance on protecting bias-testing data while recognizing the broad scope of discoverable information in AI employment discrimination cases.

This development follows Workday’s unsuccessful Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, which we blogged about here, Workday’s first successful Motion to Dismiss, which we blogged on here, and the EEOC’s amicus brief filing, which we blogged about here.

Case Background

Plaintiffs are suing Workday for utilizing an AI screening system that allegedly is more likely to deny employment applications from individuals who are African American, suffer from disabilities, or are over forty years old. Id. at *1. Workday Recruiting is a software product that helps customers manage hiring, and customers who purchase Workday Recruiting have access to an algorithmic feature called Candidate Skills Match, which determines the extent to which an applicant’s skills match the role to which they applied. Id. In 2024, Workday acquired HiredScore, which allowed Workday to offer additional features to customers, including Spotlight, a candidate review tool, and Fetch, a sourcing tool that connects organizations with potential talent by suggesting individuals for open jobs. Id.

As to the present discovery disputes, first, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel Workday to produce its bias-testing data and its customers’ applicant data. Id. at *3. The parties disagreed as to whether the bias-testing data was protected by attorney-client privilege and whether Workday had control of its customers’ applicant data. Id. Second, Plaintiffs sought to compel production of Workday’s EEO-1 and OFCCP documents, with the parties disputing relevance, burden, and waiver. Id. at *6. Third, Plaintiffs moved to compel Workday to provide deanonymized data of applicants’ names and other application information. Id. at *7.

The Court’s Decision

Attorney-Client Privilege Applied To Bias-Testing Data

First, the Court agreed with Workday that its bias-testing data was protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at *4. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the bias-testing data was privileged because Workday had shown more than mere direction from its attorneys and “ha[d] represented that its attorneys curated the data it used in the bias testing, the overall purpose of the testing was to provide legal advice and not to be used in a business capacity, and it ha[d] not submitted the data to a regulatory body.” Id.

Moreover, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that Workday had waived privilege by using the bias-testing data offensively through reliance on an “AI Fact Sheet” that stated Workday performs bias testing. Id. at *5. Instead, the Court held that “Workday’s invoking the mere existence of its bias testing outside of litigation [was] not enough to waive privilege.” Id.

No Control Over Customer Application Data

Second, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Workday to produce its customers’ applicant data. Id. at *6. The Court found that Plaintiffs had not met their burden of demonstrating that the provision of the Master Subscription Agreement allowing Workday to produce a customer’s data under a court order constituted “control” under Rule 34 because Workday did not have a legal right to obtain its customers’ data on demand. Id. at *6. However, the Court observed that some third parties that Plaintiffs had subpoenaed had taken the position that Plaintiffs should seek the data from Workday instead. Id. Thus, the Court encouraged the parties to work together to resolve the issue. Id.

Production Of EEO-1 and OFCCP Documents

Third, the Court ordered production of Workday’s EEO-1 and OFCCP documents, finding that Plaintiffs had met their initial burden on relevance. Id. In particular, the Court reasoned that Workday utilizes the same AI tools as its customers, and under either the agent or direct-employer theory, “Workday’s EEO-1 and OFCCP documents are relevant to its knowledge of potential demographic disparities when utilizing AI tools.” Id. at *6.

Deanonymized Applicant Data

Finally, the Court disposed of Plaintiffs’ request for deanonymized applicant data as moot because Plaintiffs had admitted in subpoenas seeking the same information from third parties that they did not need applicant names. Id. at *7.

Implications For Employers

This decision reinforces the concept that bias-testing data can be shielded from production under attorney-client privilege when an employer’s attorneys curate the underlying data and conduct bias-testing for the purpose of providing legal advice, as opposed to a business or regulatory compliance purpose. Of note, and as supported by this Court’s decision, companies that utilize AI in their hiring processes should structure their bias-testing under the direction of legal counsel to preserve attorney-client privilege.

Moreover, the Court’s ruling on EEO-1 and OFCCP documents suggests that employers and AI vendors should be aware that they may face broad discovery obligations regarding their own use of the same AI tools they market to customers, as in this case, the Court found Workday’s EEO-1 and OFCCP documents relevant because Workday uses the same AI tools as its customers.

November 26, 2025November 26, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

The EEOC Can Chart Its Own Path: Why The EEOC’s Latest “Win” Is Good News For Employers

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Adam D. Brown, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: On November 25, 2025, in Cross v. EEOC, No. 1:25-CV-3702, 2025 WL 3280764 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2025), Judge Trevor N. McFadden of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed an Amazon delivery driver’s lawsuit against the EEOC. The lawsuit alleged that the EEOC illegally halted investigations of disparate impact claims following an executive order from President Trump. The district court’s ruling is at least a short-term win for employers, demonstrating that a plaintiff who is not the subject of an EEOC action cannot easily resort to the federal courts to challenge the internal investigation and enforcement policies that caused the EEOC not to pursue theories of employer liability. The “win” is likely the first in a series of challenges to the EEOC’s stance on disparate impact litigation.

Case Background

The plaintiff in this case, Leah Cross, who worked as Amazon delivery driver for several months in 2022, was fired after she failed to satisfy Amazon’s delivery quota requirements. In May 2023, Cross filed a sex-based charge of discrimination against Amazon with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, asserting violations of Title VII and Colorado state law.

Cross contended that Amazon’s delivery quotas and resulting bathroom limitations had a disparate impact on female Amazon employees. Specifically, she alleged, Amazon enforced excessively high delivery quotas, which forced delivery drivers to forgo bathroom breaks. According to Cross, this disparately impacted female delivery drivers because of their differing personal needs relative to male drivers.

In January 2024, the EEOC’s Denver office began investigating the charge. But in April 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14281 titled “Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy,” which instructed federal agencies to deprioritize enforcement of antidiscrimination laws based on disparate impact theories of liability. That Executive Order also specifically directed the EEOC to examine all pending investigations of such claims and take appropriate action consistent with the new enforcement priorities.

In September 2025, the EEOC issued a memorandum requiring staff to close all investigations of disparate impact claims, which included Cross’s claims. Thereafter, Cross filed a lawsuit against the EEOC, alleging that she “ha[d] been denied the benefit of a full investigation” by the Commission. Cross v. EEOC, No. 1:25-CV-3702, 2025 WL 3280764, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2025).

Cross claimed the EEOC’s memorandum violated § 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that: (1) the Commission acted contrary to Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by “selectively exclud[ing] categories of discrimination from the charge-investigation process;” (2) the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in abruptly changing its policy; (3) the Commission’s memorandum constituted a substantive rule that was “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations”; and (4) the Commission should have promulgated its memorandum through proper notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. Id. Therefore, Cross sought a preliminary injunction requesting, among others, for her investigation to be reopened.

The Court’s Opinion

The Court held Cross failed to establish that she had standing to bring her claims and thus dismissed Cross’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without addressing them on the merits. To remedy Cross’s alleged injuries, the Court suggested that Cross could pursue a Title VII action directly against Amazon.

The Court determined that Cross did not show any judicially cognizable injury from the EEOC’s closure of her investigation. Moreover, the Court opined that “even if that were the kind of injury capable of judicial resolution, Cross has not shown that a favorable ruling by this Court would redress that injury.” Id. at *1.

The Court explained that “federal courts are ‘not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive branch’ should ‘bring more’ investigations and enforcement actions.” Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 680 (2023)). Under applicable case law recognizing this principle, the Court held, because Cross was not the subject of an EEOC enforcement action, she lacked standing to challenge the agency’s investigation and enforcement decisions.

Implications For Companies

The Court’s ruling is a win for companies, confirming that federal courts currently are not willing to interfere with the EEOC’s internal investigation and enforcement policies regarding disparate impact claims. Even more broadly, the Court’s order reinforces the substantial deference federal courts grant the EEOC in its internal decision-making processes, which could cut in different directions depending on the enforcement priorities and policies of a particular executive branch or EEOC leadership regime.

Crucially, however, employers are not in the clear. Companies still should be proactive and continue to audit regularly their hiring and employment practices for potential disparate impact, which remains unlawful under both federal and state laws notwithstanding any vacillation in EEOC policy. While the EEOC may choose to deprioritize pursuing disparate impact claims, a charging party who receives a Notice of Right to Sue letter still can file a private lawsuit in reliance on longstanding precedent regarding disparate impact.