Ryan Garippo – Class Action Defense

June 5, 2026June 5, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

President Trump’s New National Enforcement Program For The EEOC And What It Means For Employers

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., George J. Schaller, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 4, 2026, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) announced its National Enforcement Plan (the “NEP”) for fiscal years 2025 – 2029. The NEP reflects the EEOC’s new priorities under President Donald Trump and formally rescinds the agency’s strategic objections during President Joseph Biden’s administration.

Employers should take note of this development as it is clear that the NEP signals a forthcoming crackdown on: (1) employers’ diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) programs; (2) instances of “anti-American” bias; (3) efforts to limit “single-sex spaces” for transgender individuals; and (4) failures to provide religious accommodations.

The EEOC’s National Enforcement Plan

As readers of this blog will know, the EEOC looks and acts differently under President Trump than it did under President Biden. President Biden’s strategic priorities, which we wrote about here, here, and here, largely focused on discrimination resulting from the use of artificial intelligence, preventing systemic harassment, enforcing equal pay obligations, and protecting historically marginalized groups. President Trump’s EEOC is a lot different.

On June 4, 2026, the EEOC’s Chair Andrea Lucas (R) and Commissioner Brittany Panuccio (R) rolled out the agency’s new NEP over the objection of Commissioner Kalpana Kotagal (D). The NEP describes the agency’s areas of strategic focus because “it is not feasible for the [EEOC] to devote the same amount of resources to each charge.” (NEP at 2.) Thus, “the agency must continue to be strategic about the matters it prioritizes to maximize the agency’s impact.” (Id.) To that end, the EEOC identified four major areas where it intends to be more proactive in its enforcement efforts, each of which is discussed more fully below.

First, the EEOC stated an explicit intention to attempt to “[r]emedy[] DEI-related race and sex discrimination.” (Id. at 6.) In particular, the EEOC cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. 303 (2025), Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), and Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) as the basis for its decision. As a result, we expect to see continued efforts from President Trump’s administration to crackdown on DEI programs both in the workplace and in higher education.

Second, the EEOC states that it plans to prosecute claims with an intent to “protect[] American workers from anti-American national origin discrimination.” (NEP at 6.) This prosecutorial decision tracks with last year’s first-of-its-kind settlement against LeoPalace Resort, which we blogged about here, where a group of American workers alleged that they were subject to less favorable treatment than their Japanese colleagues. We can also expect these enforcement actions to continue throughout the second Trump administration.

Third, the EEOC intends to ensure access for women to “single-sex spaces at work” due to the “binary nature of sex.” (Id.) This objective continues to signal a rollback of President Biden’s efforts to enforce protections in favor of transgender workers, and tracks with the agency’s decision last year to dismiss all lawsuits seeking to enforce such protections. As readers will recall, we blogged about the decision to dismiss these lawsuits here because they were purportedly based on “gender ideology extremism.” This area is one where there is the potential for a significant uptick in EEOC enforcement actions and investigations.

Fourth, the EEOC stated its continued commitment to “religious liberty rights” including the right “to receive religious accommodations and be free from religious discrimination, harassment, and related retaliation.” (Id.) As we explained here, however, employers can expect certain types of religious bias to be policed more heavily than others. In accordance with President Trump’s policy platform, EEOC Chair Lucas has explicitly cited “antisemitism” as the basis for the current emphasis on religious discrimination. This enforcement priority tracks with recent appellate court decisions, such as EEOC v. Center One, LLC, No. 22-2943, 2024 WL 379956, at *4 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024), where the Third Circuit held that forcing an employer to work on Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah could create “’intolerable’ conditions of discrimination.” Thus, the EEOC is signaling its intent to continue to build on precedent like Center One in the religious discrimination space.

Implications For Employers

Employers should take note of these enforcement priorities as it previews the types of cases that the EEOC intends to pursue both through investigations and litigation. Thus, if they have not already, corporate counsel should consider whether any revisions are necessary to their organization’s DEI programs as well as to any policies concerning differential treatment provided based on national origin, sex, or religion.

Further, if an organization receives notice of an EEOC charge or subpoena – particularly one targeting a pattern, practice, or policy based on the above-mentioned objectives – it should take such allegations extremely seriously and contact experienced counsel to help them navigate the process.

May 28, 2026May 28, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

U.S. Supreme Court Delivers Arbitration Exemption To Last-Mile Local Drivers

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Eden Anderson, Rebecca Bjork, Ryan T. Garippo, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 28, 2026, in Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, 2026 WL 1485669 (U.S. May 28, 2026), and in a much-anticipated ruling following a grant of certiorari from the 10th Circuit’s decision in Brock v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 121 F. 4th 753 (10th Cir. 2024), Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a unanimous opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court that affirmed the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) transportation worker exemption for “last-mile” delivery drivers. Today’s opinion builds on the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in Southwest Airlines Company v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022), and Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park Street, LLC, 601 U.S. 246 (2024, to expand the FAA exemption for transportation workers seeking to bypass arbitration. The decision has significant implications for companies who employ delivery drivers and the logistics industry generally, and will play an important factor in re-shaping the arena of class and collective action litigation.

Case Background

Angelo Brock, a Denver-based delivery franchisee who had purchased distribution rights to baked goods produced by Flowers Foods, Inc. (known as a “last-mile” delivery driver), brought a putative class and collective action in a Colorado federal district court alleging that Flowers Foods had underpaid its franchisees in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and state laws. Id. at *2. “Brock picks up [Flowers Foods’] products from a warehouse in Colorado and delivers them to local stores, all without leaving the State.” Id. He also signed an arbitration agreement. Id. As a result, Flowers Foods filed a motion to compel arbitration under the terms of the agreement that it entered into with its franchisees, which the district court denied, citing 9 U.S.C. § 1., which exempts workers engaged in interstate commerce, and is commonly known as the FAA’s transportation worker exemption. Id.

In denying Flowers Foods’ motion, the district court concluded that Brock fell within the ‘‘transportation worker exemption” of § 1 of the FAA, which exempts transportation workers who engaged in interstate commerce from arbitration. Thus, even though Brock did not cross state lines, the district court reasoned that he had engaged in the transportation of the company’s products – which were created outside of the state – because he delivered those products in Colorado. Id. As a result, the district court declined to compel arbitration. Id.

Following an appeal of that decision by Flowers Foods, which argued that a worker who does not leave the state, like Brock, does not qualify for the exemption, the 10th Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision based on its determination that Brock’s “intrastate route formed a constituent part of the . . . interstate journey” of the cross-border delivery of Flowers Foods’s products. Id. Flowers Foods then sought review from the U.S. Supreme Court.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted Flowers Foods’ petition for writ of certiorari and sought to answer the question of whether a worker can fall under the “transportation worker exemption” for interstate workers under § 1 of the FAA if they neither cross state lines nor interact with vehicles that do. Id. at *3.

The Supreme Court Decision

In a unanimous decision, Justice Neil M. Gorsuch authored the 8-page opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court that affirmed the 10th Circuit’s ruling and held that “transportation workers” are exempt from the reach of the FAA, citing the statutory text, historical use, and U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

The Supreme Court cited its three recent decisions addressing § 1 of the FAA, including New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105 (2019), Southwest Airlines Company v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022), and Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park Street., LLC, 601 U.S. 246 (2024), to reject Flowers Food’s argument that in order to qualify for the exemption, a worker must cross state lines or engage with a vehicle that does. Id. Based on the statutory text, the Supreme Court found nothing in the language of the FAA requiring crossing state lines or interacting with a vehicle that does so. Under the definition for “interstate commerce” provided by Black’s Law Dictionary, the Supreme Court further noted, the transportation of goods between states includes intrastate activity. Id.

The Supreme Court also cited historic use of “interstate commerce” by referencing case law from the 19th and early 20th centuries, including discussing a case concerning steamship transportation of goods called The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1871), where the Supreme Court had found that a steamer that operated in one state without direct contact with other vessels transporting the goods into other states was found to engage in interstate transportation because the goods were destined for other states. Id. at *4.

Further, the Supreme Court rejected Flowers Foods’ argument that prior precedent was erroneously based on the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause, and not the FAA. The Supreme Court noted that the similarity in the language between the Clause and § 1 were “probative” of the common conception of the meaning of the term used by both at the time that the FAA was enacted. Id.

Finally, the Supreme Court declined to find that the distribution agreement between Flowers Foods and Brock was relevant to the analysis. The Supreme Court did not find any significance to the fact that the agreement was signed by Brock’s independent company, and thus affirmed the judgment of the 10th Circuit by expanding the transportation worker exemption to individuals who do not travel to other states or come into contact with vehicles that do. Id. at *5.

Implications For Employers

As we predicted in a previous post in October 2025 (here – blog post), the Supreme Court’s decision is highly significant for logistics companies and deliver driver employees. This decision further expands the “transportation worker exemption” to make it much more difficult for employers to compel arbitration in class and collective actions brought by workers in transportation and transportation-adjacent positions. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, which was designed to prevent an analysis that hinges on “game of tag” with vehicles engaged interstate commerce, now has the potential to sweep in a wide variety of workers whose conduct is only tangentially related to movement of a company’s products across state lines.

Despite this blow to employers’ arbitration defenses, there are still some arguments for companies to assert in order to maintain their arbitration programs. By its own terms, the Supreme Court’s opinion is limited to whether § 1 requires a bright line rule that workers who “never cross[] state lines and never interact[] with vehicles that do” are outside of the FAA exemption and does not opine on whether a worker could be so attenuated from interstate commerce that they fall outside the scope of the exemption. Further, some arbitration agreements may be enforceable under state law and, therefore, the choice of law provisions in those these agreements will likely be the difference maker in whether a class action will survive a motion to compel arbitration or not. As a result, corporate counsel – particularly in the logistics industry – should follow the developments in this space closely, because their arbitration programs are under siege and a new wave of class actions is likely headed for their organizations.

May 27, 2026May 27, 2026 by Jennifer A. Riley

The Beard Group’s Class Action Money & Ethics Conference Covers Major Developments And Trends In Class Action Litigation

By Jennifer A. Riley, Greg Tsonis, George J. Schaller, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: Jennifer A. Riley, Greg Tsonis, George J. Schaller, and Ryan T. Garippo, members of the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Group, recently attended the Beard Group’s Class Action Money & Ethics Conference organized in New York City. The conference, held on May 21, 2026, hosted hundreds of attendees, covered key trends in class action litigation, and honored several attorneys for their accomplishments in the class action industry. Jennifer A. Riley of Duane Morris gave the keynote address, and George J. Schaller and Ryan T. Garippo of Duane Morris received awards for their accomplishments as two of 12 Premier Class Action Lawyers Of Tommorow in the United States.

The Conference

At the Class Action Money & Ethics Conference, the Beard Group, Inc. hosts a gathering of the top class action professionals to discuss the hottest topics in class action and multi-plaintiff litigation, including new filings, pre-trial proceedings, settlements, verdicts, and the latest trends in this area of the law. The Conference featured panelists and attendees who are attorneys on both sides of the bar, judges, as well as other professionals who focus their work on class action litigation.

The Conference features panels that speak on a wide range of topics. These topics included the use of data analytics and artificial intelligence in class action litigation, mass arbitrations, the trends in data breach and consumer protection litigation, environmental class actions, and more.

The State Of The Industry

Jen Riley, Vice Chair of Duane Morris’s Class Action Defense Team, opened the Conference by presenting the ten latest trends in class action and multi-plaintiff litigation in her keynote speech. The presentation is based on the findings from the Duane Morris Class Action Review, which is a “one-of-a-kind” publication, that summarizes class action trends and decisions across substantive areas of law.

As Jen Riley explained, in 2025, class action litigation exploded which led to record-breaking settlement figures by a wide margin. In 2025, the ten largest class action settlements can be aggregated to a total of over $79 billion dollars which were paid from corporate defendants to individuals across the nation. This trend was driven by high class certification rates, high quantities of class action filings, shifts within the substantive claims that plaintiffs are pursuing and several other variables. The net effect of these trends was that the class action mechanism served as an effective tool for the plaintiffs’ bar to redistribute wealth at an unprecedented level.

Jen Riley also discussed the shifting landscape with respect to some of the most cutting-edge defenses to defeating class actions. She discussed the success of corporate defendants in defeating class actions via motions to compel arbitration, and some of the latest case law on arbitrations that is currently being litigated before the U.S. Supreme Court. In addition, she reviewed the ongoing federal appellate circuit split concerning the standards for when to grant conditional certification (if at all) under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the applicability of the personal jurisdiction defense to the claims of individual class and collective action members. Jen Riley, providing the keynote address, is pictured below:

Panels On Class Actions And Related Issues

Following Jen Riley’s keynote address, numerous panels followed on the state of class action litigation across various areas of substantive law. The panels in the morning focused on a wide range of topics. The first panel discussed the use of data analytics in class action litigation, particularly by plaintiffs’ attorneys, to identify potential defendants to sue and then effectively prosecute their clients’ claims after. There were also panelists on securities class actions, which helped explain the role that private plaintiffs’ firms have to play during the Trump administration’s control of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The morning ended with a discussion of the future of litigation financing and the impact of various state laws on the continued viability of the practice.

The panels in the afternoon focused largely on consumer class actions and again covered many areas of substantive law. The afternoon opened with a lively panel on the current state of mass arbitrations, including a conversation regarding the plaintiffs’ bar’s use of arbitration agreements in their engagement letters, and how it impacts their ability to challenge the viability of arbitration agreements in federal and state courts across the country. There were panels on how the plaintiffs’ bar evaluates claims in data breach cases, as well as the shifting trends in data privacy class actions as a result. These panels were followed by additional discussions on the impact of multi-district litigation, environmental class actions, and a comparative analysis of global class actions which explained the various ways that plaintiffs are seeking to monetize mass torts and other alleged harms outside of Rule 23’s class action mechanism. The afternoon concluded with a panel on the scope of consumer protection class actions, including the cutting-edge theories that plaintiffs are pursuing to advance the law in this space, as well as the challenges in identifying plaintiffs to pursue such claims in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that service payments are per se impermissible in class action settlements.

Premier Class Action Lawyers Of Tommorow Award Ceremony

After the panels concluded, there was a reception which was emceed by the Honorable Kathy King, who is a Justice on the Supreme Court in New York County state court. Justice King gave her concluding remarks on the event and also awarded this year’s Premier Class Action Lawyers Of Tommorow with awards for accomplishments in the class action industry. The award was provided to twelve attorneys, under the age of 40, who are redefining the frontiers of class action litigation through innovative strategies, landmark victories, and unwavering commitment to justice on both sides of the bar.

This year’s award winners included Ryan Garippo and George Schaller, both of Duane Morris, who were honored to accept their awards from Judge King and the Beard Group. George and Ryan are pictured below:

May 19, 2026May 19, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

California Supreme Court Rules That A Smash-And-Grab Hardware Theft, With No Access To Sensitive Records, Does Not Automatically Result In Multi-Million Or Billion Dollar Liability Under California Privacy Laws

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Ryan T. Garippo, and Jamar D. Davis

Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 14, 2026, in J.M. v. Illuminate Education, Inc., No. S286699, 2026 Cal. LEXIS 2657 (May 14, 2026), the California Supreme Court held that the California Court of Appeal decision to deny a demurrer was improper for an incorrect application of privacy laws. This decision emphasizes why defendants should confirm whether a plaintiff sufficiently pled a cause of action that aligns with the remedies that he or she seeks to recover. Further, the opinion clarifies that injury under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 56, et seq. (“CMIA”) depends on whether the company subjects medical information to a substantial risk of unauthorized use or access, not whether the unauthorized user actually views sensitive data.

Case Background

Illuminate Education, Inc. (“Illuminate”) is a technology company that helps educators determine the academic progression of an individual student, as well as their areas of potential improvement. The company uses data from individual students, including medical data, to make these determinations. Illuminate provided its services to the Ventura County Office of Education, under which Plaintiff (a minor) was a student. Plaintiff provided his medical information to the Ventura County Office of Education, which then provided Plaintiff’s health data to Illuminate.

In 2022, Illuminate became aware of suspicious activity related to its systems. Illuminate promptly initiated an investigation. The investigation confirmed an unauthorized user gained access to Illuminate’s records, including students’ medical information. Illuminate sent a notice to the guardians of the affected students, including Plaintiff, informing them of the scope of the potential disclosure. The notice made it clear that Illuminate found no evidence that the unauthorized user (or users) was successful in actual or attempted misuse of the data.

After the breach, Plaintiff alleges that he received several mail solicitations at an address provided to only the Ventura County Office of Education. As a result, Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Illuminate, as health care provider, negligently managed the students’ medical records under the CMIA and failed to expediently disclose the data breach to those affected under the Customer Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80, et seq. (“CRA”).

The trial court sustained Illuminate’s demurrer, without leave to amend, after Plaintiff twice failed to cure deficiencies in his pleadings. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the demurrer, because Plaintiff may have been able to cure the defects in his complaint if a different legal analysis was applied.

Following that decision, the California Supreme Court set out to resolve the disagreement.

The California Supreme Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court’s analysis hinges on its statutory interpretation, involving the plain reading of the statutes and their legislative histories. Generally, this analysis fell into three distinct categories.

First, Justice Goodwin Liu, writing for the California Supreme Court, reasoned that Plaintiff failed to establish a valid claim under CMIA because he could not allege that Illuminate was a “provider of health care” under California Civil Code section 56.06. Relying on the text of section 56.06, the Supreme Court explained there are two ways for a business to qualify as a “provider of health care”: (1) a covered business maintains medical records to make the information available to either an individual or a health care provider upon request of the individual or provider; or (2) a covered business makes medical information available for an individual or a health care provider upon request to allow an individual to manage their information, or to help diagnose or treat the individual.

The Supreme Court also confirmed this interpretation by relying on the legislative history of the statutes. The Supreme Court observed that the legislative history confirmed that the legislature was concerned with situations where diabetics used a data platform to record glucose levels, or where people with hypertension used platforms to track their blood pressure. Relying on the legislative history, the Supreme Court observed that Plaintiff never alleged that Illuminate created a repository of student records that allowed the students to create their own records, or to access and share those records at their discretion. Instead, Plaintiff asserted that Illuminate stored medical information to help educators monitor, evaluate, and address student needs. As a result, Illuminate was not a “provider of health care,” because it did not make medical records available upon request of the individual or provider.

The Supreme Court also quickly addressed Plaintiff’s inability to satisfy the alternative method for determining whether Illuminate is a “provider of health care” because Plaintiff never alleged that Illuminate “provides medical information to health care providers or individuals for diagnosis and treatment of an individual.” Illuminate Education, 2026 Cal. LEXIS 2657, at *12. As a result, and after quickly dispensing with a few other arguments, the Supreme Court concluded that Illuminate was not a “provider of health care” under the CMIA.

Second, in addition to analyzing whether Illuminate was a “provider of health care,” the Supreme Court also determined whether Plaintiff had alleged sufficient injury to state a claim under the CMIA. The Supreme Court disagreed with Illuminate’s argument that injury requires an unauthorized person to view medical data, and ruled that a plaintiff alleges injury by claiming that the medical information was exposed to “a significant risk of unauthorized access or use.” Id. at *29.

The CMIA requires covered entities to “preserve[] the confidentiality” of medical information. Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(a). The Supreme Court stated that “confidentiality” requires “keeping information private or secret” and clarified that this obligation applies regardless of whether an unauthorized party actually views the data. Illuminate Education, 2026 Cal. LEXIS 2657, at *26. (“[W]e reject the rule that no breach of confidentiality has occurred until medical information is actually viewed by an unauthorized person.”). Instead, the determination of whether a covered entity failed to preserve the confidentiality of data depends on a factor-based analysis that considers the “form, duration, and extent of the data breach, as well as any mitigation efforts by the covered entity.” Id. at *30. Thus, a plaintiff need not allege that his or her data was “actually viewed” by a third party, because that person is “unlikely to know what an unauthorized party has done with their data unless they suffer actual damage” and instead “[a]ll relevant circumstances must be considered” when determining whether confidentiality was breached. Id.

Third, for the CRA claim, the Supreme Court ruled that Plaintiff did not state a cause of action against Illuminate because Plaintiff was not a customer within the meaning of the statute. To bring suit under the CRA, a plaintiff must establish that he or she is a “customer” within the meaning of the statute. Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 4th 456, 467 (2013). A customer is “an individual who provides personal information to a business for the purpose of purchasing or leasing a product or obtaining a service from the business.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80(c). Here, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff never alleged that he provided any personal information to Illuminate to purchase or lease a product, or obtain a service from Illuminate. The Supreme Court observed that the Ventura County Office of Education purchased Illuminate’s services and provided the student information, not Plaintiff. Moreover, the Supreme Court disregarded Plaintiff’s argument that he was the “ultimate” customer of Illuminate because the CRA “does not authorize suit by all consumers or beneficiaries; it authorizes a civil action for an injured ’customer.’” Id. at *32.

In the end, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

Implications For Companies

This decision emphasizes the importance of ensuring that a plaintiff has sufficiently pled all causes of action asserted. When the CMIA or CRA are involved, companies must consider whether they are, in fact, a covered entity in order to determine whether they are subject to the statutes’ reach.

Further, to assert injury under the CMIA for a data breach claim, the analysis hinges on the risk of unauthorized use, not what an unauthorized user is able to do with the data. Thus, it is imperative that companies take all reasonable steps to retain the confidentiality of sensitive records, making an extra effort to ensure that hardware is secure.

For CRA claims, companies need to pay special attention to which entities solicit or contract for their services as attention to these details can potentially thwart a potential CRA claim.

In short, organizations that use such medical data, and operate in California, should take note of this decision because it impacts their defenses both positively and negatively going forward.

May 4, 2026May 4, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

The Disorganization Defense: North Carolina Federal Judge Finds That Litigation Practices Of Plaintiffs’ Counsel Are Sufficient Grounds To Deny Class And Collective Certification

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Betty Luu, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 22, 2026, in Ayers, v. GKN Driveline North America, Inc., No. 23-CV-00581, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89819 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 22, 2026), Chief Judge Catherine Eagles of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied several motions to certify various claims as class and collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”) and the North Carolina Wage And Hour Act (the “NCWHA”). This decision underscores the responsibility of plaintiffs’ counsel to manage a case and present the court with a viable plan to bring their clients’ claims through trial. Otherwise, plaintiffs’ counsel runs the risk that the court will not certify these claims at all.

Case Background

This decision emerges in the context of a series of seven-year-long lawsuits against GKN Driveline North America, Inc. (“GKN”), the supplier of all-wheel-drive and other automotive components, for several major automotive manufactures. Plaintiffs James Ayers, John Carson, and Tameka Ferges (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought three separate wage-and-hour lawsuits, asserting claims under the FLSA and the NCWHA. Plaintiffs alleged that GKN required them to perform work off the clock, including before and after shifts, and during unpaid meal breaks.

In 2018, Plaintiffs filed an earlier case against GKN. In that case, Plaintiffs alleged GKN had two policies that resulted in underpayment of their wages: (1) a “time rounding” policy; and (2) an “automatic deduction” policy for meal breaks. The Court originally conditionally certified an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23 class action under both of those theories. But the court ultimately decertified both the FLSA collective and the Rule 23 class, finding that “individual issues would swamp any attempt to resolve the claims on the class or collective basis.” Id. at *5

After that decision, Plaintiffs – represented by the same counsel – refiled three similar lawsuits, which split the claims based on GKN’s plant locations, but otherwise left the theories mostly intact. Plaintiffs then filed renewed motions for class and collective certification in each of the three actions and again asked the Court to allow them to proceed on a representative basis. The Court’s opinion, for all three cases, followed.

The Court’s Decision

In her 28-page opinion, Chief Judge Eagles of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied Plaintiffs’ motions based largely on manageability grounds.

Chief Judge Eagles explained that “manageability principles are explicit in the requirements for a proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class” and that “wider case management concerns remain relevant in the collective context.” Id. at 13. Thus, it is generally a plaintiff’s attorney’s responsibility to present the court with an “organized presentation of claims, organized discovery and motions practice, and organized submission of evidence.” Id. But here, Plaintiff’s counsel failed to present a manageable class or collective in at least four different ways.

First, and perhaps most fundamentally, Chief Judge Eagles found that “plaintiffs propose no efficient method of resolving class-wide liability and individual damages across three different subclasses.” Id. at *18. Although Plaintiffs’ theory was premised on the notion that GKN had a “de facto off-the-clock” policy, Plaintiffs did not explain how they planned to “efficiently prove that each and every nonexempt employee was subject to that de facto policy and, even more crucially, how each class member was injured by this policy.” Id. at *18-19. Chief Judge Eagles found this omission troubling given that “plaintiffs have had years to think about these problems” and could not present the court with a manageable solution. Id. at *19. But Chief Judge Eagles did not stop there.

Second, having dispensed with the omissions in Plaintiffs’ theory of case manageability, Chief Judge Eagles turned to Plaintiffs’ counsel who she reasoned has “not demonstrated the organization, diligence, and mindset required to prosecute a complex case.” Id. at *21. Chief Judge Eagles explained that because she often had to prompt Plaintiffs’ counsel to prosecute the case, via supplemental briefing and discovery, she had lost confidence in their ability to manage the docket. This problem was compounded by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s filing of “several ‘emergency’ motions and amended ‘emergency motions’” which underscored their inability to “handle ordinary litigation problems.” Id. at *21-22.

Third, Chief Judge Eagles characterized Plaintiffs’ counsel’s Rule 23 analysis as the product of an unreliable “narrator of the record.” Id. at *22-23. She described Plaintiffs’ counsel’s submissions as “inaccurate at best and misrepresentations at worst.” Id. at *23. Similarly, for the FLSA claims, Chief Judge Eagles held that the “factual representations about the evidence in the plaintiffs’ briefing on an FLSA collective do not always hold up to scrutiny.” Id. at *31-32. These inaccuracies did not give her confidence that Plaintiffs’ counsel would be able to present a manageable case through trial.

Fourth, as to the FLSA claims, Chief Judge Eagles concluded by finding that “the plaintiffs have not proposed any plan, much less a workable plan, for the aggregation of all these claims.” Id. at *31. For example, Chief Judge Eagles highlighted that plaintiffs “have not explained how they will manage presenting evidence on all the different work activities at issue and [across] three different plants.” Id. She noted that – although it is often possible for plaintiffs’ counsel to create such theories — “[i]f they are unable to make the required showing after over seven years of litigation, there is no reason to think they will be able to do so by the time these cases are called for trial.” Id. at *33.

In short, Chief Judge Eagles explained that she “has certified several dozen class actions over the past fifteen years and is familiar with how to deal with disagreements between parties about managing and trying common and individual issues.” Id. at *26. “The problem here is not that management might be hard” but rather “that the plaintiffs proffer no plan for management . . . [a]nd the Court has no confidence that counsel will devise a workable plan.” Id. Thus, the motions were denied in their entirety.

Implications For Employers

Ayers presents two key lessons for corporate counsel grappling with how to manage these complex cases.

The first lesson is that the value of class and collective claims often can hinge on the identity and competency of opposing counsel. Where plaintiffs’ counsel is savvy, competent, and organized, the value of otherwise weaker claims can go up. In these cases, competent plaintiffs’ counsel can often be the difference in whether a class is certified, which is often the difference between millions of dollars of potential of exposure and not. Thus, corporate counsel should weigh the competency of his or her adversaries when assessing the risk that a putative class or collective action poses.

The second lesson is that hiring experienced defense counsel and developing an aggressive litigation strategy are critical for success in such cases. In Ayers, Chief Judge Eagles observed defense counsel’s strategy and explained “it has been clear for years that GKN intended to hold the plaintiffs to their burden of proof at every stage on every issue, as is their right.” Id. at *22, n.13. As a result, any delay by GKN ultimately did not negate the deficiencies by Plaintiffs’ counsel. It takes experienced counsel to toe this line and keep the focus on a plaintiff’s conduct. Corporate counsel should consider such experience when deciding who is best to represent their organizations.

April 30, 2026April 30, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Georgia Federal Court Holds That To Establish Article III Standing To Sue In Data Breach Class Actions, The Named Plaintiffs’ Injury-In-Fact Requirement Demands Nuanced And Detailed Pleadings

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and Ryan Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 23, 2026, in Hall v. Bitcoin Depot, Inc., Case No. 25-CV-04317 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2026), Judge William Ray of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed a putative class action alleging that users of Bitcoin Depot’s cryptocurrency ATMs were at significant risk of identity theft and attendant personal, social and financial harms due to a data breach. The District Court held that the Named Plaintiff did not properly plead a cognizable injury sufficient to confer Article III standing to sue, due to not pleading any specific misuse of his data. The decision clarifies the legal standards within the Eleventh Circuit regarding standing requirements in data breach class action cases, thus providing helpful and nuanced guidance for defendants facing similar lawsuits. This is especially true because the dismissal was granted without prejudice, affording the Named Plaintiff an opportunity to cure his defective pleading and potentially setting the stage for further litigation on this issue.

Case Background

Quincey Hall sued Bitcoin Depot, Inc. in federal court in the Northern District of Georgia on behalf of a putative class of consumers who used the company’s cryptocurrency ATMs. Id. at 2. After a data breach occurred affecting the ATMs, approximately 26,000 individuals’ personally identifiable information was exposed online. Id. After being notified by Bitcoin Depot that his information was amongst that involved in the breach, Hall filed his class action lawsuit as a “proposed representative of a class of individuals ‘impacted by [Bitcoin Depot’s] failure to safeguard, monitor, maintain and protect’ their personal information prior to the data breach.” Id.

Hall’s Complaint alleged that because of the data breach, he and the putative class members are “at [a] significant risk of identity theft and various other forms of personal, social and financial harm.” Id. at 3. He alleged that Bitcoin Depot is liable for common law tort and contract claims, as well as for violations of the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and he sought both monetary damages and injunctive relief. Id.

Bitcoin Depot filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) based both on a failure to state a claim and for lack of standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution. Id.

The Court’s Decision

Judge Ray granted Bitcoin Depot’s motion to dismiss the complaint and he did so without prejudice, allowing the Named Plaintiff an opportunity to correct his defective pleading. Id. at 10. The court’s analysis of the legal requirements for standing in data breach cases is clarifying because it demonstrates that nuance matters when considering whether the injury-in fact requirement for Article III standing is properly pled.

First, the court explained that to constitute a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III, the plaintiff must have standing to sue (id. at 3), and in the context of a class action lawsuit “only one named plaintiff must have standing as to any particular claim in order for it to advance.” Id. at 5 (citation omitted).

Second, the court explained that to demonstrate standing, a named plaintiff must show that “[he] has suffered ‘an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical[.]’” Id. Furthermore, when seeking damages specifically, the court explained that “the mere risk of future harm, standing alone, cannot qualify as a concrete harm.” Id. (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 436 (2021). And for injunctive relief, too, the named plaintiff must establish that there is a “substantial risk that, in the near future, they will suffer an injury.” Id.

Third, the court applied these standards to the allegations in the Named Plaintiff’s complaint and held that those allegations were insufficient to establish Article III standing. Hall had only pled a risk of identity theft and the resulting potential adverse impacts on him and putative class members. He had not pled any facts that his specific information had been leaked to known criminal dark websites that in similar circumstances have survived motions to dismiss in data breach cases. Id. at 9 (citing, inter alia, Green-Cooper v. Brinker, Int’l., Inc., 73 F. 4^th883, 889 (11^th Cir. 2023).) In short, the Named Plaintiff had failed to allege that there was any misuse of his stolen identity data, and that was fatal to his pleading under the established rules for Article III standing.

Implications For Data Breach Class Action Defendants

Data breach class actions are abundant, as corporate counsel working in this space know. As such, it is crucial for all to have an understanding of the possible defenses available at the pleading stage to reduce litigation risk and force potentially meritless claims to a second round of pleading and motion to dismiss practice. Understanding how district courts analyze nuances in plaintiffs’ pleadings relating to this important area of the law – Article III standing – is critical to launching a successful defense to any such claims.

March 25, 2026March 25, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Maryland Federal District Court Finds That Oral Consent Is Sufficient To Make Telemarketing Calls Using A Prerecorded Voice

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Anna Sheridan, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 20, 2026, in Bradley, et al. v. DentalPlans.com, No. 20-CV-010904, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59569 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2026), Judge Brandan Hurson of the U.S. District Court for District of Maryland decertified a certified class action and granted summary judgment on a named plaintiff’s Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) claim. The decision is premised on the legal conclusion that the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) lacked the authority to interpret the TCPA’s consent provisions to require prior express written consent for telemarketing calls and continues the trend of courts which are challenging the FCC’s longstanding monopoly to interpret the statute.

Case Background

DentalPlans operates a “direct-to-consumer marketplace” that sells dental savings plans, including plans offered by Cigna. In November 2018, Deborah Bradley called DentalPlans to enroll in a plan and the representative asked her whether the company had her consent to contact her using “automated dialing system or prerecorded message.” Bradley, et al. v. DentalPlans.com, No. 20-CV-01094, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10050, at *3 (D. Md. June 6, 2024). Bradley ultimately provided such consent and signed up for a dental discount plan with Cigna.

In September 2019, however, Bradley spoke to another DentalPlans representative and told that representative that she did not want her dental plan to automatically renew. As a result, DentalPlans started placing prerecorded calls to Bradley which informed her that “her membership was ending soon and that she could renew her plan.” After Bradley’s plan expired, she continued to receive prerecorded calls which “attempted to ‘win back’ [her] business by encouraging her to repurchase her Cigna plan with DentalPlans.” Id. at *5. In total, DentalPlans placed 10 “win back” calls to Bradley prior to the filing of the action.

As a result of these calls, on April 28, 2020, Bradley filed a putative class action lawsuit under the TCPA, alleging that the calls constituted unauthorized telemarketing calls using prerecorded messages. The crux of Bradley’s argument was that because these calls allegedly constituted “telemarketing” the applicable FCC regulations required prior express written consent, and oral consent would not suffice. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2). The court agreed with Bradley’s interpretation of the regulation, granted class certification, and certified a class comprised in part of “any consumer who signed up by telephone.” Id. at *27. Bradley then sent notice to the class members and the parties continued to litigate the case.

DentalPlans ultimately filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order granting class certification. In that motion, Dental Plans argued, inter alia, that the court’s reliance on 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) was misplaced following the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate that district courts are “not bound by the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA.” McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 168 (2025). The parties then briefed that issue.

The Court’s Decision

In a thorough 24-page opinion, Judge Hurson walked through the proper interpretation of the phrase “prior express consent” as used in the TCPA and the scope of Congress’s delegation to the FCC.

In so doing, Judge Hurson turned to the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Insurance Marketing Coalition Ltd. v. FCC, 127 F.4th 303, 312 (11th Cir. 2025), which explained that the “TCPA gives the FCC only the authority to ‘reasonably define’ the TCPA’s consent-provisions” and not create a non-statutory consent regime. Judge Hurson, therefore, reasoned that because the phrase “prior express written consent” was not contained in the statute, the proper interpretation of the statute’s actual language hinged on the authority that Congress delegated to the FCC.

Similarly, Judge Hurson looked to the Fifth Circuit’s very recent decision in Bradford v. Sovereign Pest Control of Texas, Inc., 167 F.4th 809, 812 (5th Cir. 2026), which held the TCPA provides “no basis for concluding that telemarketing calls require prior express written consentbut not oral consent.” (emphasis in original).

Based on these opinions, because the “written consent” language does not appear in the statute, Judge Hurson concluded that Congress needed to delegate the interpretation of the TCPA to the FCC for its current interpretation to stand. But no such delegation is contained in the TCPA. As a result, the “best interpretation” of the statute was that “express consent” is the only requirement imposed by the TCPA, even if the consent is obtained orally.

Therefore, because Bradley provided oral consent to DentalPlans receive such to prerecorded messages when she signed up for her dental plan, she (and, the class) had no viable claims. The court, accordingly, granted summary judgment on Bradley’s individual claim and decertified the previously certified class action.

Implications For Companies

The Bradley decision continues an important trend for companies making telemarketing calls to consumers.

As we explained here, when the Fifth Circuit decided Bradford, the written consent requirement has long been thought of as one of the hallmarks of the FCC’s regulatory regime and is often used by the plaintiff’s bar to assert technical violations of the TCPA even where it is clear that a customer approved of such calls. But the current trend shows that the underlying regulatory scheme is quickly eroding with each decision that passes.

Nevertheless, the decisions in Bradford and Bradley represent only the middle ground on these issues. Other courts would go further and hold that Congress’s entire delegation of any of its authority “run[s] afoul of the nondelegation doctrine, since there are no delimitations on the discretion it grants the” FCC. McGonigle v. Pure Green Franchise Corp., No. 25-CV-61164, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8059, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2026). Thus, the landscape of positions on such issues is wide ranging and changing by the day.

As a result of this shifting landscape, corporate counsel, and companies engaged in telemarketing, should continue to monitor this blog to stay apprised of any updates as new decisions continue to modify the FCC’s longstanding interpretation of the TCPA.

March 24, 2026March 24, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Nevada Federal Court Certifies A $3 Million Dollar TCPA Class Action Against Individual Nevada Realtor

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 13, 2026, in Garvey, et al. v. Gaitan, No. 23-CV-00920, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53447 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2026), Judge Andrew Gordon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada certified a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) class action against an individual realtor for violation of the statute’s prohibition against consentless prerecorded voice messages. The decision serves as a cautionary tale for companies and their individual agents, particularly those entities engaged in direct-to-consumer marketing, to consult experienced TCPA counsel in connection with their marketing campaigns to limit their potential exposure.

Case Background

In 2023, Britney Gaitan, a realtor based in Las Vegas, used an online third-party service to accumulate the homeowner contact information for home sellers whose online real estate listings were either withdrawn or expired. Gaitan then uploaded that list into a software that allowed her to send a prerecorded ringless voicemail message to the list of the home sellers she created. As a result, on March 3, 2023, and March 16, 2023, Gaitan sent these prerecorded voice messages to everyone on her list, including Wayne Garvey, one of the homeowners. Gaitan had no documentation that she received prior consent before placing these ringless voicemail messages.

Garvey ultimately filed suit against Gaitan alleging that she violated the TCPA’s prohibition on consentless prerecorded voice messages codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Garvey also sought to maintain the case as a class action and represent the owners of the 983 unique cell phone numbers that were called 1,983 times over the course of the two days. Put differently, Garvey ultimately asked the court to certify a class worth up to $2,974,500 or $1,500 per call.

The Court’s Ruling

On March 13, 2026, Chief Judge Andrew Gordon granted Plaintiff’s motion and certified a class against Gaitan. Although Gaitan raised arguments in response to many of the necessary elements for a plaintiff to certify a class action, the dispute largely hinged on Rule 23’s predominance requirement — i.e., whether a common questions of law or fact predominate over issues affecting only certain individual class members. To that end, Gaitan argued that four individualized issues would predominate.

First, Gaitan asserted that individualized inquiries were required to determine whether any class member actually listened to the voicemail. The problem, however, is that “Gaitan cite[d] no law that states a recipient must listen to the voicemail to suffer an injury under the TCPA.” Garvey, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53447, at *12. To the contrary, the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) only requires that a prerecorded voicemail must be “completed” to implicate the statute, and Garvey submitted such common proof via expert testimony. In short, the court concluded that these completed calls are “a central, common question of the class’s TCPA claims that predominates over any individualized issues.” Id. at *15.

Second, Gaitan asserted the same argument (i.e., an individualized issue as to whether any class member listened to the call) but repurposed it under the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. For the same reason, the court concluded that because Gaitan could not cite “any law that the putative class members need to listen to the prerecorded message to be injured under the TCPA . . . they have Article III standing if Gaitan used a prerecorded voice in her ringless voicemail drops when calling their cell phones, and they need not prove any other harm.” Id. at *18. This argument was overruled.

Third, Gaitan asserted that there was individualized inquires as to whether any given class member consented to receive prerecorded voice messages. As the court aptly observed, Gaitan “indicated that she has no documentation showing that she obtained consent from any putative class members.” Id. at *19. Gaitan tried to point to the terms of the multiple listing service (“MLS”), which supposedly require a homeowner to provide his or her phone number to create a listing, and argued this action constitutes consent to receive such calls. Although the court was unconvinced, it correctly observed that the consent defense would apply to the entire class and thus “Gaitan has not provided evidence that determining whether some MLS users consented to being contacted about their property is an individualized issue.” Id. at *20.

Fourth, Gaitan asserted that individualized inquiries were required to determine whether any individual owner of a telephone number was a “residential telephone line” within the meaning of the TCPA. The primary problem, however, is that residential telephone subscriber status is not an element of a claim under Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) unlike other sections of the TCPA. In other words, this argument was wholly inapplicable and “does not defeat class certification.” Id. at *21.

As a result, once the realtor’s most significant objection to class certification was overruled, it was a near forgone conclusion that a class would be certified and thus the court proceeded to grant Garvey’s motion.

Implications For Companies

There are multiple cautionary messages embedded in Gaitan for those engaged in direct-to-consumer marketing. The most salient three takeaways are listed below.

The first (and, most important) lesson of Gaitan is to obtain “express consent” prior to making calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice message. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). It can be difficult to defend a TCPA class action without a consent defense and Gaitan is no different.

The second lesson is that TCPA liability does not only attach to companies but may also be applied “to any person within the United States” who makes such calls. Id. Here, Britney Gaitan is the sole defendant facing TCPA liability and thus Gaitan’s personal assets are likely on the line for any resulting judgment. But that is not the end of the story. Many similar agencies have indemnification agreements with their agents, which require the agency to pay for the liabilities incurred by the agent. To the extent such an agreement exists here, both Gaitan and her agency may have exposure for this TCPA liability.

The third lesson is to ensure that any TCPA defense strategy is prophylactic in nature and crafted in collaboration with defense counsel well versed in this space. In this case, Gaitan raised arguments based on wholly inapplicable portions of the statute or asserted defenses with little chance of success given the facts of the dispute. If Gaitan consulted with experienced defense counsel in advance of the calls, then this situation could have been avoided. But once the calls are made, the best course of action is for a TCPA defendant to contact experienced defense counsel to help navigate any resulting class actions.

March 2, 2026March 2, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

The Fifth Circuit Green Lights Oral Consent Under The TCPA For Telemarketing Calls

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 25, 2026, in Bradford v. Sovereign Pest Control of Texas Inc., No. 24-20379, 2026 WL 520620, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2026), the Fifth Circuit held that the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) lacked the statutory authority under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”) to require prior express written consent for all telemarketing calls using a prerecorded voice. This decision reverses decades of precedent requiring written consent for such calls and green lights a path to future challenges to the TCPA’s implementing regulations.

Case Background

In 2023, Radley Bradford agreed to a contract with Sovereign Pest for pest control services. When Bradford executed that agreement, he orally provided his phone number to Sovereign Pest. As a result, Sovereign Pest called him on that telephone number several times to schedule renewal inspections and Bradford agreed to those renewals. By every account, it was a normal business relationship.

But there was one wrinkle. Sovereign Pest did not call Bradford using one of its live employees. Instead, it used a prerecorded voice. Prerecorded voice calls always implicate the TCPA and its draconian statutory damages. As a result, Bradford ultimately sued Sovereign Pest in a federal class action lawsuit claiming the call constituted telemarketing. Thus, because Sovereign Pest did not have “prior express written consent” to contact him using a prerecorded voice, Bradford claimed he was entitled to damages in the amount of $1,500 per call for the 24 calls it made to him. In other words, Bradford claimed Sovereign Pest owed him $36,000 in statutory damages and millions of dollars more to the putative class.

The only problem for Bradford was that the TCPA does not contain the term “prior express written consent.” It only refers to “prior express consent.” So, Bradford sought to rely on FCC regulations that have long required written consent to make telemarketing calls using a prerecorded voice. Bradford claimed that Sovereign Pests calls constituted such telemarketing. The district court disagreed with Bradford, granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Sovereign Pest, and held that the calls did not constitute telemarketing as a matter of law. Bradford appealed.

The Fifth Circuit’s Ruling

Judge Jennifer Elrod, writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirmed the judgment entered by the district court, but not for the reasons one might think. Rather than dive into whether or not the calls constitute telemarketing, the Fifth Circuit held that the distinction was irrelevant. It explained that although “[t]he regulation relevant to this case mostly tracks the statute” it adds an additional prohibition of “written consent for pre-recorded telemarketing calls.” Bradford, 2026 WL 520620, at *2. The FCC, however, did not have the authority to add that language to the statute.

In years past, courts may have deferred to the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA. In 2025, however, the U.S. Supreme Court unequivocally held that district courts are “not bound by the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA” and that courts are required to interpret the text of the statute for themselves. McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 168 (2025). Thus, because the plain language of the TCPA does not impose an additional requirement of written consent for telemarketing calls, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it was outside the scope of the FCC’s regulatory authority to require such consent. As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgement entered below.

Implications For Companies

The implications of Bradford cannot be understated.

The FCC’s imposition of a bright line rule requiring written consent for prerecorded telemarketing calls is one of the hallmarks of the statute’s regulatory regime. It is also a frequent tool used by the plaintiff’s bar to assert technical violations of the TCPA where it is clear by the context that a customer approved of such calls. In the wake of McKesson, however, the FCC’s regulations now fall by the wayside for district courts in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Companies operating in those states will now be able to rely on oral agreements with their customers to prove the existence of prior consent.

The Bradford decision is not alone. Some district courts have even suggested Congress’s delegation of any authority to the FCC “may run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine, since there are no delimitations on the discretion it grants the Commission.” McGonigle v. Pure Green Franchise Corp., No. 25-CV-61164, 2026 WL 111338, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2026). Although Bradford does not go that far, the decision represents unmistakable pushback on the FCC’s longstanding unchecked power to interpret the TCPA.

Of course, the standards are still far from clear as the Fifth Circuit is the only federal appellate court to have endorsed this approach. This decision continues the trend which has started to create a “patchwork” approach to the TCPA’s standards and complicates compliance for companies making calls nationwide. Thus, corporate counsel should continue to monitor this blog to stay on top of these varying decisions and contact experienced counsel if their organizations are facing TCPA related threats as the resulting liability can be ruinous.

November 19, 2025November 19, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Class Action Review Cited In Three U.S. Supreme Court Briefs

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Ryan T. Garippo, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 15, 2025, in Eli Lilly & Co., et. al. v. Richards, et al., No. 25-476 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2025), Eli Lilly & Co. filed a Petition For Writ Of Certiorari after a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which created a four-way circuit split as to the proper interpretation of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). This petition drew briefing from several amici curiae, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the CHRO Association.

Similarly, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision widened that circuit split to include five different methodical approaches in Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Andrew Harrington, et al., No. 25-559 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2025), Cracker Barrel also filed a Petition For A Writ of Certiorari.

Significant for readers of this blog, both petitioners and amici also cited the Duane Morris Class Action Review as the authoritative source on FLSA certification statistics and the widening circuit split regarding when it is appropriate to send notice to would-be plaintiffs, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) in a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective action.

In its review of our practice group’s resource, Employment Practices Liability Consultant Magazine (“EPLiC”) said, “The Duane Morris Class Action Review is ‘the Bible’ on class action litigation and an essential desk reference for business executives, corporate counsel, and human resources professionals.” EPLiC continued, “The review is a must-have resource for in-depth analysis of class actions in general and workplace litigation in particular.

With the submission of our analysis to the U.S. Supreme Court, we are humbled and proud to be cited as the authoritative source in the class action space.

The Briefing In Richards And Harrington

Both Cracker Barrel and Eli Lilly correctly argued in their petitions that “the circuits are split five ways in how to interpret” Section 216(b) and the case law in this area “is in total disarray.” Both petitions ask the U.S. Supreme Court to help organize this “disarray.” As such, a brief guide through these disjointed methodological approaches is included below.

First, there is the familiar and lenient two-step standard in Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987), which was expressly adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 954 F.3d 502, 515 (2d Cir. 2020), and “acquiesced to . . . without express adoption” by the First, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. Kwoka v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston, LLC, 141 F.4th 10, 22 (1st. Cir. 2025); Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 534 (3d Cir. 2012); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001); Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001)

Under the Lusardi approach, at step one, a plaintiff moves for conditional certification, relying solely on his or her allegations, and not competing evidence submitted by the employer. If the employee’s motion is granted, would-be plaintiffs receive notice of the lawsuit and then have the ability to opt-in as party plaintiffs to the case and participate in discovery. At the close of discovery, the employer can then move to decertify the conditionally certified collective action, and prove the employees are not similarly situated with the benefit of discovery and evidence.

Second, in Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1114 (9th Cir. 2018),the Ninth Circuit adopted a variation of the Lusardi two-step approach but also required the plaintiff to show he or she is similarly situated to his or her fellow employees in “some material aspect of their litigation” and not just similar in some sort of irrelevant way, but the plaintiff may rely on mere allegations to make that showing.

Third, the Fifth Circuit in Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., LLC, 985 F.3d 430, 443 (5th Cir. 2021), rejected Lusardi’s two-step approach outright, and required its district courts to “rigorously enforce” the FLSA’s similarity requirement at the outset of the litigation in a one-step approach. “[T]he district court needs to consider all of the available evidence” at the time the motion is filed and decide whether the plaintiff has “met [his or her] burden of establishing similarity.” Id. at 442-43.

Fourth, the Sixth Circuit in Clark v. A&L Homecare & Training Ctr., LLC, 68 F.4th 1003 (6th Cir. 2023), adopted a comparable standard to Swales requiring the employee to show a “strong likelihood” that others are similarly situated to him or her before the district court can send notice, but leaving open the possibility of the employer filing a motion for decertification down the line. Clark, 68 F.4th at 1011.

Fifth, the Seventh Circuit in Richards, et al. v. Eli Lilly & Co, et al., 149 F.4th 901 (7th Cir. 2025), rejected the Lusardi framework but declined to go as far as Clark or Swales. Instead, the Seventh Circuit approach requires “a plaintiff must first make a threshold showing that there is a material factual dispute as to whether the proposed collective is similarly situated” to secure notice and an employer “must be permitted to submit rebuttal evidence” for the court to consider. Richards, 149 F.4th at 913. But, there is not a bright line rule as to whether the court should decide the similarly situated question in a one or two step approach as the analysis is not an “all-or-nothing determination.” Id. at 913-914.

Sixth, as correctly noted by counsel for Cracker Barrel, the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the D.C., Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have not yet opined on the proper interpretive method, leaving their district courts free to choose among the available options.

Duane Morris Class Action Review Citations

It should go without saying that these issues are complicated, and employers are looking to experienced practitioners to help them navigate this procedural morass. For that reason, both petitioners and the amici curiae turned to the Duane Morris Class Action Review, and its authors, as the authoritative source in support of their petitions.

The first citation is found in Eli Lilly’s petition for writ of certiorari, which cites Avalon Zoppo, Circuit Split Widens on Judicial Approach to Sending FLSA Collective Action Notices, Nat. L. J. (Aug. 11, 2025), regarding the proper interpretation of Richards, following the Seventh Circuit’s decision in that case. In that article, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Chair of the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Group, stated “[t]he [Seventh Circuit’s] holding is going to reverberate and have a huge impact on wage and hour litigation throughout the United States.”

The second citation can be found in Cracker Barrel’s petition, following the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Harrington, which cites directly to the Duane Morris Class Action Review for varying conditional certification rates under this patchwork quilt of legal standards. Indeed, in the 2024 and 2025 editions of the Duane Morris Class Action Review, our analysis showed that: (1) the federal circuit courts that follow or acquiesce to Lusardi grant conditional certification at rates of 84%; (2) the Ninth Circuit grants conditional certification at rates of approximately 71% under the lenient-plus approach; and (3) the remaining Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, with varied stricter standards, granted certification at rates approximating 67%. The petition further noted our finding that only approximately 10% of conditionally certified FLSA collective actions reach the decertification stage.

The third citation is found in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the CHRO Association’s amicus brief which relies on the Duane Morris Class Action Review for the proposition that “motions for conditional certification . . . are granted in a large majority of [FLSA] cases.” Looking at the statistics, the amici highlight “[i]n 2024, district courts granted 80% of motions seeking court-ordered notice” with “Plaintiffs enjoy[ing] similar success in past years”

These U.S. Supreme Court practitioners and defense counsel are not alone as others refer to the Duane Morris Class Action Review as “the Bible” on class action litigation. It is also relied on by some of the world’s largest plaintiffs’ firms and federal judges, see, e.g., Laverenz v. Pioneer Metal Finishing, LLC, 746 F. Supp. 3d 602, 614 (E.D. Wis. 2024). The Duane Morris Class Action Review is the “one stop shop” and authoritative source on collective action certification rates, collective action trends and analysis, and the implications, pressures, and contours that parties face when engaged in FLSA collective action litigation.

Implications For Employers

Although the petitioners are still briefing their petitions, it is clear that the myriad approaches adopted by the federal circuit courts are ripe for some clarity from the U.S. Supreme Court, which would hopefully provide a roadmap for district courts to assess collective actions uniformly.

Further, the framework for when and how to send notice under Section 216(b) are not the only issues presented by these petitions. Eli Lilly expressly invited the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989) and plaintiff-appellee in Harrington would also have the high court decide whether Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255 (2017) applies to collective actions, which we blogged about here.

Because these questions, and many others, remain in flux and unanswered, employers should monitor this blog for updates as it is a trusted source for companies, defense counsel, plaintiffs’ firms, federal judges, and U.S. Supreme Court practitioners alike. We will be following these petitions as they unfold.