Category: EEOC Litigation

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca Bjork, and Anna Sheridan

Key Takeaways:  In EEOC v. Security Assurance Management Inc., No. 25-CV-00181, 2025 WL 2911781 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2025),  Judge Rudolph Contreras of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia refused to pare back the EEOC’s pregnancy and lactation claims against Security Assurance Management, Inc. (“SAM”), leaving all five causes of action under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) and both Title VII counts intact. Applying Rule 12(c), the Court held – in an order denying Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss – the “heavy burden” on a defendant seeking judgment on the pleadings and determined that the EEOC’s theories — though factually overlapping — targeted distinct harms and therefore were not “duplicative.” The Court’s refusal to dismiss any of the EEOC’s PWFA counts sends a clear signal that defendants will face an uphill battle when trying to narrow pregnancy-related claims at the pleadings stage, particularly after filing an answer.

Case Background

The EEOC filed suit under Title VII and the PWFA on behalf of Simone Cooper, a special police officer who was reassigned after the client at her post did not want her working at the site while pregnant. (Compl. ¶ 17).  As the court summarized, the EEOC “brings this employment discrimination action against Security Assurance Management, Inc. pursuant to Title VII … and the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,” alleging that SAM “disciplined and removed an employee, Simone Cooper (‘Ms. Cooper’), from her assignment due to her pregnancy-related condition and her need for accommodations.” Id. at *3.

After her maternity leave, Cooper was placed at a Hampton Inn post where she “was breastfeeding and had the pregnancy-related medical condition of lactation.” Id. The court noted that she “could nonetheless perform the essential functions of her job as an Unarmed Special Police Officer,” but SAM “repeatedly denied or ignored Ms. Cooper’s accommodation requests.” Id. The consequences were significant, as “Ms. Cooper leaked through her clothing during the workday on at least two occasions,” and because SAM provided no adequate space, “Ms. Cooper had to pump in her car in the Hampton Inn parking lot.” Id.

Despite outreach by Cooper, her union representative, and her attorney, the company allegedly did not engage in any interactive process. SAM eventually issued a written warning for “excessive absenteeism” that included days she was not scheduled and the day she left after leaking through her uniform. Id. at *4. She was later removed from the schedule entirely.

The complaint asserts seven claims, including two under Title VII and five under the PWFA for failure to accommodate, adverse action based on accommodation requests, denial of employment opportunities, retaliation, and interference. After it filed its Answer, SAM filed a partial motion to dismiss seeking dismissal of three of the counts as purportedly duplicative.

The Court’s Ruling

Because SAM filed an Answer before seeking dismissal, the court treated the request as a Rule 12(c) motion. As Judge Contreras explained, such a motion “will be granted only if Defendant can demonstrate that no material fact is in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” and at this early stage the movant “shoulders a heavy burden of justification.” Id. at *6.

The Court began with its definition, citing from Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran’s “duplicative claim test.” It explained that “duplicative claims are those that stem from identical allegations, that are decided under identical legal standards, and for which identical relief is available.” Id. at *7 (quoting Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 81 (D.D.C. 2010)).  SAM argued that several PWFA claims were repetitive, but after analyzing each count, the Court held otherwise.

Most notably, SAM asserted that the “Adverse Actions” claim duplicated the PWFA retaliation claim because both concerned similar employment decisions. Judge Contreras disagreed, emphasizing that the counts “assert different motivations for Defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” Id. at *8. The adverse-action theory centers on actions taken “on account of” Cooper’s accommodation requests, while retaliation requires adverse treatment because she opposed unlawful practices. “Because Count Two (Adverse Actions) and Count Four (Retaliation) arise from different allegations,” the court concluded, “the claims are not duplicative.” Id. at *9.

The Court applied the same reasoning to SAM’s attempt to collapse the PWFA adverse-action, denial-of-opportunities, and interference counts into the single failure-to-accommodate claim. Those theories, Judge Contreras explained, each addressed different harms and are evaluated under distinct legal standards. As a result, “none are duplicative,” and the Court denied the motion in full. Id. at* 7.

Implications For Employers

This opinion is a reminder that overlapping facts do not automatically render multiple statutory claims redundant — especially under the PWFA, where Congress created several discrete causes of action aimed at different workplace harms. Courts are giving each theory breathing room rather than collapsing them into a single “pregnancy discrimination” count.

Procedurally, the decision warns defendants against using post-Answer motions to trim suits. Under Rule 12(c), the movant faces a “heavy burden,” and close questions typically favor allowing the case to proceed to discovery.

Substantively, the facts the Court credited (removing a visibly pregnant worker at a client’s request, ignoring repeated lactation-related accommodation needs, forcing pumping in a car, and disciplining a worker for consequences of inadequate accommodations) are the kinds of scenarios likely to support claims not just under the PWFA, but also under Title VII.

The decision reinforces that the PWFA is a powerful, stand-alone statute with multiple actionable theories. Courts will not readily prune these claims at the pleading stage, and the EEOC is deploying them aggressively. Employers should treat pregnancy-related accommodation requests with the same rigor as disability accommodations – engage promptly, document communications, provide appropriate space and break time, and avoid client-driven decisions that move or remove pregnant workers.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Adam D. Brown, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: On November 25, 2025, in Cross v. EEOC, No. 1:25-CV-3702, 2025 WL 3280764 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2025), Judge Trevor N. McFadden of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed an Amazon delivery driver’s lawsuit against the EEOC.  The lawsuit alleged that the EEOC illegally halted investigations of disparate impact claims following an executive order from President Trump.  The district court’s ruling is at least a short-term win for employers, demonstrating that a plaintiff who is not the subject of an EEOC action cannot easily resort to the federal courts to challenge the internal investigation and enforcement policies that caused the EEOC not to pursue theories of employer liability. The “win” is likely the first in a series of challenges to the EEOC’s stance on disparate impact litigation.

Case Background

The plaintiff in this case, Leah Cross, who worked as Amazon delivery driver for several months in 2022, was fired after she failed to satisfy Amazon’s delivery quota requirements.  In May 2023, Cross filed a sex-based charge of discrimination against Amazon with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, asserting violations of Title VII and Colorado state law.

Cross contended that Amazon’s delivery quotas and resulting bathroom limitations had a disparate impact on female Amazon employees.  Specifically, she alleged, Amazon enforced excessively high delivery quotas, which forced delivery drivers to forgo bathroom breaks.  According to Cross, this disparately impacted female delivery drivers because of their differing personal needs relative to male drivers.

In January 2024, the EEOC’s Denver office began investigating the charge.  But in April 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14281 titled “Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy,” which instructed federal agencies to deprioritize enforcement of antidiscrimination laws based on disparate impact theories of liability.  That Executive Order also specifically directed the EEOC to examine all pending investigations of such claims and take appropriate action consistent with the new enforcement priorities.

In September 2025, the EEOC issued a memorandum requiring staff to close all investigations of disparate impact claims, which included Cross’s claims.  Thereafter, Cross filed a lawsuit against the EEOC, alleging that she “ha[d] been denied the benefit of a full investigation” by the Commission.  Cross v. EEOC, No. 1:25-CV-3702, 2025 WL 3280764, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2025).

Cross claimed the EEOC’s memorandum violated § 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that: (1) the Commission acted contrary to Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by “selectively exclud[ing] categories of discrimination from the charge-investigation process;” (2) the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in abruptly changing its policy; (3) the Commission’s memorandum constituted a substantive rule that was “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations”; and (4) the Commission should have promulgated its memorandum through proper notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.  Id.  Therefore, Cross sought a preliminary injunction requesting, among others, for her investigation to be reopened.

The Court’s Opinion

The Court held Cross failed to establish that she had standing to bring her claims and thus dismissed Cross’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without addressing them on the merits.  To remedy Cross’s alleged injuries, the Court suggested that Cross could pursue a Title VII action directly against Amazon.

The Court determined that Cross did not show any judicially cognizable injury from the EEOC’s closure of her investigation.  Moreover, the Court opined that “even if that were the kind of injury capable of judicial resolution, Cross has not shown that a favorable ruling by this Court would redress that injury.”  Id. at *1.

The Court explained that “federal courts are ‘not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive branch’ should ‘bring more’ investigations and enforcement actions.”  Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 680 (2023)). Under applicable case law recognizing this principle, the Court held, because Cross was not the subject of an EEOC enforcement action, she lacked standing to challenge the agency’s investigation and enforcement decisions. 

Implications For Companies

The Court’s ruling is a win for companies, confirming that federal courts currently are not willing to interfere with the EEOC’s internal investigation and enforcement policies regarding disparate impact claims.  Even more broadly, the Court’s order reinforces the substantial deference federal courts grant the EEOC in its internal decision-making processes, which could cut in different directions depending on the enforcement priorities and policies of a particular executive branch or EEOC leadership regime.

Crucially, however, employers are not in the clear.  Companies still should be proactive and continue to audit regularly their hiring and employment practices for potential disparate impact, which remains unlawful under both federal and state laws notwithstanding any vacillation in EEOC policy.  While the EEOC may choose to deprioritize pursuing disparate impact claims, a charging party who receives a Notice of Right to Sue letter still can file a private lawsuit in reliance on longstanding precedent regarding disparate impact.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Alex W. Karasik, and Gregory Tsonis

Duane Morris Takeaway: Thank you to all the loyal blog readers and followers who joined us for our Year-End EEOC Strategy And Litigation Review webinar! In this 30-minute program, Duane Morris partners Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Alex W. Karasik and Gregory Tsonis analyzed the latest impact of the dramatic changes at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, including its new strategic priorities and the EEOC lawsuits filed throughout fiscal year 2025, and discussed how heading into FY 2026 with significant changes implemented by the Trump administration, employers’ compliance with federal workplace laws and agency guidance remains a corporate imperative.

If you were unable to attend the webinar, it is now available on our podcast channel. Click to watch below and stay tuned for important EEOC trends and developments throughout the year.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Alex W. Karasik, Jennifer A. Riley, Gregory Tsonis, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways:  In FY 2025 (October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025), the EEOC’s litigation enforcement activity stalled significantly compared to previous years.  By the numbers, FY 2025 lawsuit filings ended on the lower end of the spectrum with 94 lawsuits filed compared to the height of filings in FY 2018 (217 lawsuits).  The decline in enforcement activity suggests that during President Trump’s second term in office, employers should not expect the EEOC to be as aggressive as past regimes in terms of the volume of government enforcement lawsuits, particularly in terms of systemic litigation.

Though the overall filings totals are lower than previous years, certain geographic regions, types of claims, and key industries remain prime targets of the Commission’s lawsuits.  Our analysis of these patterns is set forth below and is offered to arm employers with the EEOC’s FY 2025 litigation scorecard through an evaluation of district office enforcement activity, filings by statute and discrimination basis, and the most impacted industries. 

In sum, there is still a bevy of EEOC lawsuits being filed against businesses, but in a more localized and targeted fashion.  Employers should continue their legal compliance with all EEOC initiatives.

Lawsuit Filings Based On Month And Year

The EEOC’s fiscal year ends each year on September 30.  The final deluge of filings for EEOC-initiated litigation maintained its year-end boost in 2025.  This year, in September alone, 35 lawsuits were filed, down from September filings in FY 2024 (50 lawsuits filed) and September filings in FY 2023 (67 lawsuits filed) – but still a significant total, nonetheless.  Of the 94 total filings this year, just over one-third of EEOC lawsuits were filed in September, down from FY 2024’s last-minute filing frenzy accounting for half of that year’s filings.  The following chart shows the EEOC’s filing pattern over FY 2025:

We track the EEOC’s filing efforts across the entire fiscal year with its beginning in October through the anticipated filing spree in September.  Unlike other fiscal years, the EEOC’s filing patterns were consistent in the first half of FY 2025, peaking with 14 lawsuits in January.  Filings again slowed down until Summer, where there was a resurgence of another 14 lawsuits in June 2025.  Thereafter, lawsuit filings dipped until the “eleventh hour” in September.

Comparing these filings in FY 2025 to previous years, the EEOC filed significantly less lawsuits than in FY 2024 (111) and FY 2023 (144 lawsuits), signaling a trend in decreased EEOC enforcement activity.  Though EEOC litigation filings continuously decreased compared to pre-COVID era filing metrics, the EEOC’s presence as a litigation powerhouse persists.  The following graph shows the EEOC’s year-over-year fiscal year filings beginning in FY 2017 through FY 2025:

Lawsuit Filings Based On EEOC District Offices

In addition to tracking the total number of filings, we closely monitor which of the EEOC’s 15 district offices are most actively filing new cases throughout the EEOC’s fiscal year.  Some district offices tend to be more aggressive than others.  Some focus on different case filing priorities.  The following chart shows the number of lawsuit filings by each of the EEOC district offices.

In FY 2025, Philadelphia and Chicago led the pack in filing the most lawsuits at 11 each, followed by Indianapolis with 8 filings, then Atlanta, Birmingham, Houston, and Phoenix with 7 filings, and Charlotte, New York, and Miami each with 6 filings.  St. Louis had 5 filings, Los Angeles and San Francisco had 4 filings, and Dallas had 3 filings.  Memphis had the lowest amount with only 2 filings. 

Like FY 2024, Philadelphia proved itself as a leader in EEOC enforcement filings. Chicago remained steady with 11 filings, same as FY 2024.  St. Louis (2 filings in FY 2024) and Phoenix (4 filings in FY 2024) also experienced increases in filings compared to last year.  Other offices comparatively lagged in enforcement activity, Atlanta (11 filings in FY 2024), Indianapolis (9 filings in FY 2024), and Houston (8 filings in FY 2024), showed slight decreases in enforcement activities.  Across the board filings generally evened out for each district office compared to FY 2024, but overall, filings fell.  

Although filing trends were down for all Districts, the total filings demonstrate the EEOC maintained its consistent litigation strength, across all district offices.  Employers with operations in Philadelphia and Chicago should pay extra attention to EEOC charge activity given the aggressiveness of the Commission in those regions.

(Note: Three EEOC press releases from the Washington D.C. Field Office included their lawsuit filings as part of the Philadelphia District Office statistics)

Lawsuit Filings Based On Type Of Discrimination

We also analyze the types of lawsuits the EEOC filed in terms of the statutes and theories of discrimination alleged. This enables us to determine how the EEOC is shifting its strategic priorities.

When considered on a percentage basis, the distribution of cases filed by statute skewed significantly in favor of Title VII cases when comparing FY 2025 to previous fiscal years.  Title VII cases once again made up the majority of cases filed, as they constituted 50% of all filings in FY 2025 (decreased from 58% of all filings in FY 2024, significantly down from 68% of all filings FY 2023 and 69% of filings in FY 2022, and decreased compared to 61% of all filings in FY 2021).

Overall, ADA cases also made up the next most significant percentage of the EEOC’s FY 2025 filings – totaling 31.5%.  This is an overall decrease in previous years where ADA filings amounted to 42% in FY 2025, 34% in FY 2023, and 37% in FY 2021.  Though these filings are marginally higher than FY 2022 where ADA filings on a percentage basis amounted to 29.7% of all filings.

There was also an uptick in ADEA filings, as 9 ADEA cases were filed in FY 2025, whereas 6 age discrimination cases were filed in FY 2024, after 12 age discrimination cases were filed in FY 2023 and 7 age discrimination cases were filed in FY 2022.  Like FY 2024, this year the EEOC pursued Pregnant Worker’s Fairness Act cases with 6 filings compared to FY 2024’s 3 filings.  In addition, FY 2025 had a slight increase in Pregnancy Discrimination Act cases where 5 cases were filed compared to FY 2024’s 4 filed cases.  Notably absent from FY 2025’s filing balance are cases under the Equal Pay Act and Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act.  The following graph shows the number of lawsuits filed according to the statute under which they were filed.

We also collect data on the allegations for which the EEOC bases its litigation filing. 

The EEOC’s basis for suit remained the same among its core tenets, with Disability, Sex, and Retaliation claims leading the way.  Collectively, these three bases were alleged in 59.4% of FY 2025 EEOC filings.  In FY 2024, those same three core tenets also took the top three spots (collectively alleged in 67.6% of FY 2024 EEOC filings). Notably, in FY 2025, only 3 Race or National Origin based lawsuits were filed by the EEOC, or 2.3% of the total lawsuit filings.  In FY 2024, 8.9% of all filings included Race claims.  The following graph shows a comparison of the filings in FY 2025 to FY 2024 for the allegation basis in filings:

Lawsuits Filings Based On Industry

In monitoring the EEOC’s filings by industry, FY 2025 aligns with prior EEOC-initiated lawsuits in the top two industries compared to FY 2024, demonstrating the Commission’s focus on a few major industries.

In FY 2025, two industries remained in the EEOC’s targets: Hospitality and Healthcare:   On a percentage basis, Hospitality (Restaurants / Hotels / Entertainment) comprised 25% of filings, and Healthcare had 21.3% of filings.  A key difference in FY 2025 compared to FY 2024 is Manufacturing (15% of FY 2025 filings; 12.1% of FY 2024 filings) overtaking Retail (11.3% of FY 2025 filings; 23.1% of FY 2024 filings) as the next most targeted industry.  The staggering drop in enforcement actions against Retailers poses a distinct drop in enforcement actions in this industry.  Only one other industry, Transportation & Logistics, entered double digit enforcement activity (with 10%).The remaining industries in FY 2025 did not enter double-digit percentages though Staffing and Construction each experienced EEOC initiated litigation in FY 2025 (8.8%, and 8.8% of filings respectively per industry).

Unlike FY 2024, FY 2025 did not have any actions which involved Property Management industries.  Overall, the FY 2025 industry spread aligns with FY 2024, where Hospitality and Healthcare are the most heavily targeted industries.  Though Manufacturing and Retail swapped positions in enforcement priority, both still placed in the third and fourth impacted industries.  Like FY 2024, the EEOC’s FY 2025 fiscal year again did not advance any industry-based filings in the Automotive, Security, and/or Technology industries.

Like FY 2024, Hospitality and Healthcare employers should continue to monitor their compliance with federal anti-discrimination laws.  These industries are regular hotbeds for charges and ultimately lawsuits.  No matter the industry, every employer should recognize they are vulnerable to EEOC-initiated litigation as detailed by the below graph.

Looking Ahead To Fiscal Year 2026

Moving into FY 2026, the EEOC’s budget justification includes a $19.618 million decrease from FY 2025.  President Trump’s Administration prioritizes a return to the “agency’s true mission.”  The reinvigorated EEOC aims to “return to its founding principles and restore evenhanded enforcement of employment civil rights laws on behalf of all Americans.”  The EEOC’s mission is guided by the President’s pledge to “restore dignity to the American worker” and is bolstered by the President’s series of executive orders.

The FY 2026 EEOC budget justification signals a transition to “attacking all forms of race discrimination, including rooting out unlawful race discrimination arising from DEI programs, policies, and practices; protecting American workers from unlawful national origin discrimination involving preferences for foreign workers; defending women’s sex-based rights at work; and supporting religious liberty by protecting workers from religious bias and harassment and protecting their rights to religious accommodations at work.”  The Commission also intends to continue its efforts in incorporating technological advances, streamlining and improving operational processes, and refining its organizational structure to ensure efficiency and effective EEOC enforcement.

The EEOC also shifted its goals in FY 2025.  The EEOC now prioritizes three strategic goals.  First, the EEOC will combat and prevent employment discrimination through the strategic application of the EEOC’s law enforcement authorities.  In achieving this goal, the EEOC will employ broad remedial measures and exercise its enforcement authority fairly, efficiently, and based on the circumstances of the charge or complaint.  Second, the EEOC will prevent employment discrimination and advance equal employment opportunities through education and outreach.  Namely, the EEOC will increase public awareness of employment discrimination laws, and knowledge of specific rights and responsibilities under these laws, while also using its agencies to advance and resolve EEO issues.  Third, the EEOC will strive for organizational excellence through its people, practices, and technology.  In so doing, the EEOC intends to achieve a culture of accountability, inclusivity, and accessibility balanced against intake, outreach, education, enforcement, and service to the public to protect and advance civil rights in the workplace.

Key Employer Takeaways

In several respects, FY 2025 represented a change in enforcement targets and continued efforts in key discriminatory areas.  While total filings decreased, the new administration foreshadows a targeted approach in upcoming EEOC enforcement.  This is considerably true where the requested budget decrease reflects a narrower window of enforcement priorities but maintains the EEOC’s hallmark tradition of defending public civil liberties. 

Given the President’s second term is just beginning, the EEOC’s FY 2025 data should be taken with a grain of salt.  After all, it was a year of transition for the Commission.  The Commission’s FY 2025 filings suggest discrimination always stays within the purview of the EEOC’s priorities, but what constitutes “actionable” or “litigation-worthy” discrimination is wavering.  We anticipate these figures will grow by next year’s report.  Finally, given the volatility of the EEOC’s priorities, it is more crucial than ever for employers to stay abreast of EEOC developments and comply with anti-discrimination laws.

***This article is published in advance of EEOC’s FY 2025, with the data current as of 5:00 p.m. CST. Duane Morris will post the final numbers and statistics through FY 2025, by 5:00 p.m. CST on October 1, 2025.

***For more on the EEOC’s FY 2025, we invite you to attend Duane Morris’ Year-End EEOC Review Webinar on October 22, 2025.  To register for the webinar access the link here.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Alex Karasik And Gregory Tsonis

Mark your calendars for our bi-annual program analyzing the latest EEOC developments: Wednesday, October 22, 2025 from 11:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. Central. Reserve your virtual seat for the program here.

Join Duane Morris partners Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Alex W. Karasik and Gregory Tsonis for a live panel discussion analyzing the latest impact of the dramatic changes at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, including its new strategic priorities and the EEOC lawsuits filed throughout fiscal year 2025. In its annual performance report for FY 2024, the agency touted a record $700 million in monetary recoveries for workers through litigation and administrative avenues. Heading into FY 2026 with significant changes implemented by the Trump administration, employers’ compliance with federal workplace laws and agency guidance remains a corporate imperative. Our virtual program will empower corporate counsel, human resource professionals and business leaders with key insights into the EEOC’s latest enforcement initiatives and provide strategies designed to minimize the risk of drawing the agency’s scrutiny.

Presenters

Gerald L. Maatman Jr.

Jennifer A. Riley

Alex W. Karasik

Gregory Tsonis

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Bernadette M. Coyle, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: On September 12, 2025, in EEOC v. Support Center for Child Advocates, No. 2:25-CV-00310, (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2025), Judge John F. Murray of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the EEOC’s second unopposed motion for approval of a consent decree between the EEOC and Support Center for Child Advocates.  The Court remained unsatisfied with the lack of information with which the Court could assess the appropriateness of the parties’ agreement. 

This ruling demonstrates that approval of an agreed upon consent decree is anything but a guaranteed rubber stamp. Instead, it shows the importance of providing a factual basis and thorough reasoning to justify gaining court approval, even when motions are unopposed.

Case Background

On January 17, 2025, the EEOC, on behalf of charging party Meghan Seitz, filed a lawsuit against Defendant Support Center for Child Advocates regarding allegations of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  (ECF 1.)  Specifically, the EEOC alleged that the child advocacy organization discriminated against Ms. Seitz, a former employee with a high-risk pregnancy, when the organization denied Ms. Seitz an accommodation to work remotely during the COVID-19 pandemic.  (Id. ¶¶ 21–24.)

On August 15, 2025, the EEOC first moved for approval of the proposed consent decree.  (ECF 29.)  The motion includes the consent decree as “Exhibit A,” which sets forth the parties’ agreed-upon plan for Support Center for Child Advocates to provide future accommodations to similar employees, adopt an Equal Employment and non-discrimination policy, implement human resources and management personnel training, inform workers about their rights to accommodations, and pay Seitz $30,000, among other provisions.  (ECF 29-1.)

The Court denied the EEOC’s initial motion for entry of the consent decree on August 18, 2025.  (ECF 30.)  The Court reasoned that the motion requested the consent decree be entered “for the reasons stated therein” but included no reasons stated therein.  (Id. at 1 n.1.) 

The Court opined that it had no way of knowing whether the agreement was appropriate or not.  As a solution, the Court invited the parties to either file a stipulated dismissal after agreeing amongst themselves to the terms of the proposed consent decree or refile the motion with additional information.

Most Recent Filings And Order

On September 8, 2025, the EEOC filed a supplemental motion for entry of the consent decree, which provided an overview of the procedural history of the case.  (ECF 31.)  The EEOC also filed an unopposed memorandum in support of its motion.  (ECF 31-1.)  In the memorandum, the EEOC further outlined the case history, labeled as the statement of the case, and argued that settlement through a consent decree is a regular and appropriate manner of resolution and that the proposed consent decree satisfies the legal standard for judicial review.

On September 12, 2025, the Court denied the EEOC’s second motion for entry of the consent decree, finding the motion did not provide an adequate factual basis from which the Court could assess the appropriateness of the consent order.  (ECF 32.)  To resolve this issue, the Court noted that it would be willing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to build a record if the parties were interested.  (Id. at 1 n.1.)

Implications For Employers

The Court’s denial of the second motion for entry of the proposed consent decree in EEOC v. Support Center for Child Advocates should serve as a cautionary reminder to litigants that courts will not merely rubber-stamp EEOC consent decrees where a sufficient factual basis justifying approval is not provided to courts. 

Litigants must provide courts with more information than mere conclusory statements that the proposed consent decree is fair and reasonable for courts to approve of consent decrees.  Otherwise, litigants may find themselves forced to backtrack in the settlement approval process.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tiffany Alberty, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On September 3, 2025, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. A&A Appliance, Inc. d/b/a Appliance Factory Outlet, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-02456 (D. Colo. Sept. 3, 2025), Judge Daniel D. Domenico of the District Court for the District of Colorado granted Defendant A&A Appliance, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment as to the EEOC’s claims. The Court held that the EEOC failed to make a prima facie case of violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act because it had not shown Defendant was aware of a disability or request for accommodation from the charging party. This ruling illustrates the steps an employee must take to adequately demonstrate a disability and request an accommodation and the situations where an employer may be justified in terminating an employee who fails to return from taking leave under the Family Medical Leave Act.

Case Background

Defendant A&A Appliance, Inc. (“Defendant”) employed Karima Javanzad (“Claimant”) from February 2019 to June 2020. (ECF 172 at 1) Shortly before her termination, in April, the Claimant requested a retroactive 12-week leave of absence under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), citing various ailments for her and her son, including COVID-19. Id. at 1-2. Defendant granted the Claimant’s FMLA request from March 12 to June 7. Id. at 2. During her leave, the Claimant contacted Defendant on several occasions to inquire regarding the length of her leave and whether she could extend it. Id. Defendant consistently communicated with the Claimant and informed her that she could extend her leave “if the triggering condition for FMLA was extended by [her] medical provider.” Id. The Claimant did not return to work on June 8, she did not respond to Defendant’s requests to discuss her position, and she did not provide nor receive any confirmation that she ever contracted COVID-19 nor had any disability requiring an accommodation until after the end of her leave. Id. at 6-7. The last doctor’s note the Claimant received in May stated that she did not have any work restrictions. Id. at 6. On June 9, Defendant informed the Claimant that her FMLA had been exhausted and requested to further discuss her position, but Claimant never responded. Id. at 7. As such, Defendant terminated her employment on June 10.  Id. at 7.

In response to her termination, the Claimant filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). Id. at 2. When conciliation efforts between the parties failed, the EEOC filed a lawsuit on behalf of the Claimant against Defendant on the same grounds. Id. Following discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. Id.

The Court’s Order

The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on both the ADA discrimination and the retaliation counts. Id. at 4. On each count, the Court reasoned that the EEOC must show that the Claimant was either disabled or that she was engaged in a protected activity for which she was discriminated or retaliated against. See id. at 4-10. The Court concluded that the EEOC could prove neither element.

First, the Court noted that the Claimant provided three possible disabling illnesses, COVID-19, vocal cord paralysis, and gastritis. Id. at 7. However, she never received a formal diagnosis for any of them until after she was terminated. Id. Moreover, while the Claimant asserted that she was unable to return to work, her May doctor’s note contradicted her statements by indicating that she “did not have any [work] restrictions” and that she could return to work without issue. Id. at 6-7. The Court concluded that these “inconsistent representations regarding [Claimant’s] ability to return to work” coupled with the lack of clarity regarding her illness meant that “Defendant cannot be found to have been on notice of a disability that required accommodation under the ADA.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added).

Second, in the alternative, the Court held that, even if the EEOC had presented evidence that the Claimant suffered from COVID-19, the EEOC’s claims still failed. Id. The Court reasoned that, to recover for a claim for failure to accommodate or for retaliation for requesting an accommodation, an employee must “make an adequate request, making clear that she wants assistance for her disability.” Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Court, the Claimant’s requests for additional information regarding her remaining leave did not amount to an accommodation request. Id. In fact,“Ms. Javanzad never made an explicit request for an accommodation from Defendant — even for an additional leave of absence — until after her FMLA leave expired.” Id. And when she did request additional leave, the Claimant did not provide any details about the leave she was requesting. Id. The Court concluded that these facts provided an independent basis for entering summary judgment against the EEOC. Id. at 9.

Implications For Employers

The Court’s decision in A&A Appliance, Inc. serves as a reminder to both employees and employers. Although employers must engage in the interactive process for both ADA and FMLA purposes to reasonably accommodate employees’ disabilities, the onus rests with the employee to demonstrate a disability and to request an accommodation, effectively providing notice to the employer of the claimed disability. If the employee fails to satisfy either of these prerequisites, an employer is not on notice of any disability and may be justified in terminating the employee’s employment.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Adam D. Brown, and Gregory S. Slotnick

Duane Morris Takeaways: On August 25, 2025, in United States EEOC v. AAM Holding Corp. (In Re AAM Holding Corp.), 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21629 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a decision by the Southern District of New York and held the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) retains authority to investigate an EEOC charge even after the EEOC issues the charging party a right-to-sue letter and the charging party subsequently files a lawsuit in court.  This ruling significantly expands the scope of the EEOC’s investigative authority in the Second Circuit as it joins the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in allowing pending EEOC investigations to proceed following the agency’s issuance of right-to-sue letters to a charging party who thereafter files suit.  The decision is directly at odds with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 1997), that the EEOC’s investigative authority ceases upon the charging party’s filing suit pursuant to a right-to-sue letter.  The Second Circuit’s opinion follows the more recent trend of courts siding with the EEOC on its assertion of expansive investigative authority and allowing the agency to continue investigating charges despite the charging party’s separate private lawsuit.  With the decision, the split in authority now heavily favors the EEOC’s expanded authority, and employers should understand that ongoing EEOC investigations may continue in full force despite the agency’s issuing a right-to-sue letter.  Finally, the opinion confirmed that EEOC subpoenas must be construed generously and may properly request extremely broad categories of class-wide documents and information if the EEOC finds it relevant and in the public’s interest to seek same.  

Case Background

In March 2022, Eunice Raquel Flores Thomas (“Thomas”), a former dancer who worked at two Manhattan adult entertainment clubs (FlashDancers Midtown and FlashDancers Downtown (together, “the Clubs”)), filed a class-based charge with the EEOC alleging widespread sexual harassment and hostile work environment at both club locations.  AAM Holding Corp., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21629, at *3.  Thomas claimed she and other women were forced to change clothes in an open back room without doors that was video-monitored, and were pressured to have sex with high-paying repeat customers in champagne rooms, fearing adverse employment actions should they refuse.  Id. at *3-4. 

Following the EEOC’s initial notification to the Clubs that Thomas filed a charge, the EEOC requested information such as “the clubs’ policies regarding relationships between customers and employees, any records of sexual harassment complaints, and pedigree information for their employees, including each employee’s name, age, sex, race, position, dates of employment, and contact information.”  Id. at *4.  The Clubs objected to the EEOC’s requests as irrelevant and unduly burdensome to produce, and the EEOC thereafter issued two subpoenas demanding the employee pedigree information, which ultimately led to the EEOC petitioning the District Court for enforcement.  Id. at *4-5.  The District Court granted the EEOC’s petition and ordered the Clubs to produce the information, explaining that the relevance requirement is a “low bar” and that courts give the term a “generous construction,” allowing access to “virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.”  Id. at *5 (internal citation omitted).  The Clubs eventually filed a notice of appeal to the Second Circuit and moved to stay the enforcement order first in the District Court and then in the Second Circuit, both of which motions were denied.  Id. at *5-6.

Meanwhile, in July 2024, while the Clubs’ appeal before the Second Circuit was pending, the EEOC issued Thomas a right-to-sue letter, on the basis of which Thomas filed, in September 2024, a putative class action complaint in the District Court.  Id. at *6.  The Clubs then argued to the Second Circuit that the EEOC had been divested of its investigative authority (including its ability to issue subpoenas) once Thomas received her right-to-sue letter and filed suit.  Id.  The Clubs also reiterated their position that the underlying subpoenas’ demand for pedigree information for all club employees (not just Thomas) was overbroad and unduly burdensome.  Id.

The Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit began its opinion by providing background about the investigative process under Title VII.  It explained that the EEOC bears primary responsibility for enforcing Title VII under a multistep enforcement procedure that involves the filing of a timely charge, an investigation by the EEOC during the pendency of the charge, and, where appropriate, dismissal of the charge and issuance of a right-to-sue letter authorizing the charging party to pursue litigation.  Id. at *6-8.

The Second Circuit also addressed the Clubs’ argument that the EEOC’s investigative authority stops once it issues a right-to-sue letter and the party files suit.  Specifically, it addressed the Clubs’ reliance on the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 1997), which held that the initiation of a private suit by an aggrieved party marks the end of the investigation stage and thus terminates the EEOC’s investigative authority.  Id. at *8-9. 

Disagreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Hearst, the Second Circuit found no support in the text or structure of Title VII, instead citing Title VII’s broad grant of authority to the EEOC, which provides that the agency “‘shall at all reasonable times have access to . . . evidence . . . that relates to unlawful employment practices . . . and is relevant to the charge under investigation.’”  Id. at *9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a)) (emphasis added).  The Second Circuit determined that Title VII did not place any “strict temporal limit” on the EEOC’s authority to issue and enforce subpoenas and obtain evidence through the enforcement process, and that, in fact, the requirement that the EEOC complete its investigation within 120 days applies only “so far as practicable,” which the Court held does not establish “a hard stop.”  Id. at *10.

Moreover, the Second Circuit observed that the Supreme Court has held that the EEOC retains independent administrative “responsibility of investigating claims of employment discrimination” and therefore retains the right to file its own civil lawsuit even after the 180-day window, which does not end its responsibility or ability to investigate a charge.  Id. at *11 (citing Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977)).  

The Second Circuit further reasoned that a central part of the EEOC’s “broad public interest and role” in fighting employment discrimination is pursuing the public interest by enforcing the law even when that interest is distinct from or exceeds the private interest of the aggrieved charging party.  Id. at *11.  It noted the possibility that the EEOC could issue a right-to-sue letter only to have the charging party file suit and settle for nominal damages, a scenario in which, the opinion states, the agency would still be free to continue investigating ongoing unlawful discrimination that may be remedied by unique EEOC mechanisms like conciliation or public litigation.  Id. at *12.  Those mechanisms also include the EEOC’s ability to initiate class-wide enforcement actions without certification of a class representative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, as well as its ability to pursue injunctive relief.  Id. at *12-13.

Ultimately, the Second Circuit opined on these bases that the EEOC retains its authority to investigate, including issuing and enforcing administrative subpoenas, after it issues a right-to-sue letter and the charging party files a lawsuit.  Id. at *13-14.  The Second Circuit supported its holding by noting that, “[w]hen the EEOC determines that public resources should be committed to investigating and enforcing a charge, the statutory text unambiguously authorizes it to proceed,” citing to similar holdings (without dissent) in both the Ninth Circuit (EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 558 F.3d 842, 854 (9th Cir. 2009) and the Seventh Circuit (EEOC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 867 F.3d 843, 850-51 (7th Cir. 2017)).  Id. at *13-14 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The opinion also held the EEOC’s subpoena for pedigree information was not overbroad or unduly burdensome.  Id. at *14.  The Second Circuit determined the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that: (i) the materials were relevant to Thomas’s claims of widespread sexual harassment at the Clubs; and (ii) the Clubs failed to show that producing responsive documents and information would be unduly burdensome, rejecting the Clubs’ assertion, without factual detail, that the production would take approximately 300 hours of work.  Id. at *15-19.

Implications For Employers

The Second Circuit’s decision means the EEOC’s investigative authority does not end when a charging party requests and receives a right-to-sue letter and thereafter files a suit.  Instead, the EEOC may, in its discretion, determine that the public’s interest either diverges from or exceeds the interests of the private charging party and may continue its ongoing investigation by issuing class-wide records and information requests. 

Companies must be keenly aware of the EEOC’s broad, ongoing investigatory powers in dealing with the charging party and the EEOC throughout the time after a charge is filed.  Employers should also be aware that courts are reluctant to deny the EEOC’s subpoena requests when the agency makes a showing of relevance, which is generously interpreted by courts in the EEOC’s favor.  While situations may arise in which the agency’s requests are truly overbroad or unduly burdensome in scope, businesses should assume they will have an uphill battle objecting to or greatly limiting any such requests, even after the charging party files a separate private lawsuit.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christian J. Palacios, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On June 05, 2025, in EEOC et al., v. Sis-Bro, Inc., Case No. 3:24-CV-00968 (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2025), Judge J. Phil Gilbert of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted a transgender worker’s petition to intervene in an EEOC discrimination case against her former employer, after the Commission moved to permanently dismiss the lawsuit to comply with a January 2025 Executive Order issued by President Trump. The Court opined that while it “recognize[d] that it may not dictate what cases the EEOC pursues” given that this was “the exclusive purview of the Executive Branch,” the worker also deserved a fair opportunity to litigate her claims.  Id. at 3.  This decision is noteworthy for its unique procedural posture.  During the first few months of the Trump Administration, the EEOC has realigned its enforcement priorities consistent with a flurry of executive orders, but, as this decision illustrates, the Commission’s pending enforcement actions may not be so easily dismissed to the extent a private litigant’s rights are implicated by the dismissal.

Case Background

In March 2024, the EEOC brought an employment discrimination case on behalf of charging party Rafael Figueroa a/k/a Natasha Figueroa, alleging her employer, Sis-Bro Inc., a pig farm, discriminated against her by creating a hostile work environment and constructively discharged her based on her sex and transgender status in violation of Title VII.  Id. at 1.  After surviving a motion to dismiss, the Court allowed Figueroa to intervene and assert state law tort and discrimination claims, all of which were either voluntarily dismissed, or dismissed by the Court without prejudice, shortly thereafter.  While discovery was ongoing, Sis-Bro filed a partial motion for summary judgment on the issue of back pay, front pay, and reinstatement, asserting Figueroa was not entitled to such relief given she was not legally eligible to work in the U.S. Id. at 2.  

While the partial motion for summary judgement was pending, the executive administration changed, and on January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14168, “Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government.”  After the Executive Order was issued, the EEOC moved to dismiss the action with prejudice, on the basis that continuing to litigate the matter would violate the Trump administration’s new Executive Order.  Id.  

As the EEOC’s motion to dismiss was pending, Figueroa sought to intervene a second time, filing yet another intervenor complaint asserting violations of Title VII (similar claims to that of the Commission), in addition to §1981 claims based on race, color, ethnicity, and national origin.  Id. at 7.  Figueroa did not request back pay, front pay, or reinstatement in her second intervenor complaint, but instead sought non-pecuniary and punitive damages, as well as attorneys’ fees.  Id. at 3.  In response, Sis-Bro moved to dismiss Figueroa’s motion to intervene, amongst other related motions, to dispose of the action entirely.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court began its ruling by observing, in dicta, that Figueroa had an interest in her claims that Sis-Bro violated the law, and while her claims may fail for other reasons, “the EEOC’s change of heart will not be one of those reasons.”  Id. at 4.  The Court then granted the EEOC’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, to ensure Figueroa’s rights were not impaired. Id. at 4-5. 

The Court next addressed Sis-Bro’s arguments and rejected the contention that Figueroa’s motion to intervene was untimely, given Sis-Bro was unable to demonstrate her second intervenor action would have any prejudicial effect.  Id. at 6.  Although the Court did not allow Figueroa to re-plead her §1981 claims (because they were dismissed in the previous intervenor action), Figueroa was allowed to plead a new Title VII claim, given it was like the one that the EEOC abandoned, despite surviving a motion to dismiss.  Id. at 7-8.  The Court reasoned that although Figueroa did not assert these claims in her original intervenor complaint, “she placed her confidence in the good faith of the EEOC to pursue her rights along with its other statutory claims” and she sought to timely intervene once it became clear that the EEOC “changed its mind.”  Id. at 9.  Accordingly, the Court found Sis-Bro should be ready to litigate the matter.

Implications For Employers

As the above case illustrates, despite the fact that there has been a “changing of the guard” and the EEOC under President Trump has drastically different enforcement priorities than the Biden Administration, the Commission’s pending enforcement actions will not be so easily dismissed by courts, to the extent pending enforcement actions conflict with newly promulgated executive orders, provided that the allegedly aggrieved private litigant is ready and able to pursue the action without the assistance of the Commission.

Given that the EEOC under President Trump has indicated it will be withdrawing from many areas championed during the Biden Administration (e.g., disparate impact cases and abortion-related Pregnant Workers Fairness Act accommodation actions), private enforcement actions may increase within the coming months to fill in the enforcement vacuum left open by the Commission.