Georgia Federal Court Declines To Dismiss ERISA Prohibited Transaction Claims And Certifies Class Despite Differences In Class-wide Investment Choices

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Brian W. Sullivan, and Jesse S. Stavis

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On August 2, 2023, Judge Clay Land of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted a motion to certify a class of participants in an ERISA class action involving an employer-sponsored defined contribution plan in Goodman v. Columbus Regional Healthcare System, Inc., No. 21-CV-15, 2023 WL 4935004 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 2, 2023). The Court rejected defense arguments to deny certification of one large class in favor of smaller sub-classes based on differences in the investment choices and resulting injuries of putative class members.  Instead, the Court concluded that allegations that the asserted injuries were caused by Defendant’s common conduct warranted class certification without regard to such differences.  For these reasons, the Goodman decision is instructive for ERISA plans and fiduciaries defending putative class claims under the ERISA.

Case Background

Plaintiffs were participants in a defined contribution plan (the “Plan”) sponsored by their employer, Defendant Columbus Regional Healthcare System, Inc.  Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant violated its fiduciary duties under the ERISA by failing to prudently monitor and control the Plan’s investments and expenses and because it caused the Plan to engage in prohibited transactions with the Plan’s record-keeper and investment advisor (together, the “Service Providers”).  Goodman, 2023 WL 4935004, at *1-2.  Plaintiffs moved to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(1) consisting of all plan participants or beneficiaries of the plan with an account balance on or after February 2, 2015 through the termination of the Plan.  Id.

Class Certification Granted

Plaintiffs sought to certify a class with respect to their three ERISA claims that Defendant violated its duty to prudently monitor investments and expenses and had engaged in prohibited transactions.  Id. at *3.  Defendant opposed certification on the grounds that “the class proposed by Plaintiffs is so broad that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to establish standing, commonality, and typicality” as required by Rule 23.  Id. at *4.

Addressing Defendant’s standing challenge first, the Court acknowledged that, to have standing, Plaintiffs and other Plan participants “must have suffered a decrease in value of their defined contribution accounts due to a breach of fiduciary duty.”  Id.  The Court rejected Defendant’s argument that “it is possible that some members of the putative class as presently defined did not suffer any loss due to the alleged breaches of fiduciary duties.” The Court reasoned that “this is not a standing problem but a liability issue.”  Id.  It explained that “[t]he possibility that some putative class members may not ultimately make a recovery does not eliminate standing for class certification purposes,” particularly where evidence of specific losses “should be readily ascertainable.”  Id.

The Court likewise rejected Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiffs failed to establish the commonality or typicality requirements of Rule 23(a).  The Court explained that commonality requires a showing that class members have suffered “the same injury” and that their claims depend on “common questions or law or fact” with common answers.  Id. at *5.  Typicality, the Court explained, requires evidence of “a sufficient nexus” between the claims of the Plaintiffs and those of the putative class as shown by claims or defenses arising “from the same event or pattern or practice” and “based on the same legal theory.”  Id.  Together, the Court opined that commonality and typicality require Plaintiffs and the class members to have the same interest and suffer the same injury, even though the Plaintiffs need not have suffered injury “at the same place and on the same day as the class members.”  Id.

Applying these principles, the Court rejected Defendant’s suggestions “that there must be a separate sub-class for each allegedly imprudent investment and that the named Plaintiffs cannot establish typicality for allegedly imprudent investments options in which they did not invest.”  Id.  Instead, the Court held that this “level of granularity” was not “required at the class certification stage” where Plaintiffs had alleged that Defendant employed “flawed selection and monitoring practices” that were the same for class members across all investment options.  Id.  The same was true of “the excessive fee and prohibited transaction claims,” which were based on Defendant’s “alleged failure to insist” that the Service Providers charge “no more than reasonable fees, which resulted in harm to Plan participants” invested in relevant funds.

As such, the Court concluded that “the alleged cause of the injury remains the same across all funds.”  Id.  On these allegations, the Court found that there were common questions capable of class-wide resolution and for which Plaintiffs’ claims were typical of the class – whether Defendant breached its fiduciary duties by offering imprudent investments and by allowing the Service Providers to collect unreasonable fees.  The Court determined that more granular issues concerning the specific investments and injuries of particular class members “relate to the degree of injury and level of recovery” such that the Court did “not see the benefit of dividing the proposed class into sub-classes by investment option.”  Id. at 5-6.  For these reasons, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class.

Implications for Employers and Plan Administrators

Goodman is typical of federal court decisions in the last several years addressing motions to certify classes in cases asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims under the ERISA.  The ruling underscores that the focus for class certification of such claims remains on the existence of common, injury-producing conduct rather than the similarity of the resulting injuries.  Courts generally will not decline to certify a class based on differences in the investment options chosen or injuries suffered by class members so long as those investments or injuries are linked by a defendant’s common conduct, at even high levels.

Illinois Federal Court Rejects Efforts To Dismiss BIPA Claims Involving Virtual Try-On Technology

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Gregory Tsonis, and Kelly Bonner

Duane Morris Takeaways – In a significant decision for retailers, Judge Manish Shah of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently denied in part Defendant Estée Lauder’s motion to dismiss proposed class action claims that its consumer “try-on” technology violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”).  The Court rejected Defendant’s personal jurisdiction argument, as well as claims that its website terms and conditions required Plaintiff to arbitrate her dispute, and that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue on behalf individuals that used websites Plaintiff herself did not visit. In a decision entitled Kukovec v. The Estée Lauder Companies, Inc., Case No. 22-CV-1988 (N.D. Ill.), the Court determined, however, that Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead that the cosmetics giant intentionally or recklessly violated consumers’ biometric privacy rights, and thereby dismissed those claims.  The ruling in Kukovec illustrates the ongoing legal risks for retailers in using “try-on” tech to enhance customer service.

Case Background

Too Faced Cosmetics, a cosmetics brand owned by Defendant Estée Lauder, operates a website featuring a try-on function to allows shoppers to virtually test its products.  When a shopper clicks a “Try It On” button, a pop-up box appears containing a disclaimer informing the shopper that their “image will be used to provide you with the virtual try-on experience” and a link to a privacy policy.  Id. at 4.  If the shopper selects the “Live Camera” option, the user’s computer camera is activated and the product is overlaid on part or all of the user’s face.  Id.

Plaintiff, an Illinois resident, alleged that Defendant’s try-on tool violated Section 15(b) of the BIPA by capturing users’ facial geometry without informing them how that data is collected, used, or retained.  Id. at 6.  Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant lacked a publicly-available written policy establishing how long such data is retained and when it is destroyed, in violation of Section 15(a) of the BIPA.  Id.  Plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit against Defendant, seeking to represent a class of individuals that used the virtual try-on tool not just on the Too Faced website, but also four other websites for Defendant’s other brands.  Id.  Defendant removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Act, then moved to dismiss the complaint.

The Court’s Ruling On Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss

Defendant sought to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on four grounds, three of which the Court fully rejected.

First, Defendant argued that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it since its “Try On” tool was “geography neutral,” did not target Illinois consumers, and the mere accessibility of the tool to Illinois consumers lacked the substantial connection to Defendant’s sale of cosmetics and employees in Illinois.  Id. at 8.   The Court rejected this “overly narrow” interpretation of personal jurisdiction. It held that “[t]he try-on tool is part of [Defendant’s] cosmetics marketing and sales strategy,” since those that use the tool are also presented with buttons to add the products to their cart or send as a gift.  Id. at 9.

Second, Defendant argued that venue was improper because Plaintiff’s claims were subject to arbitration pursuant to a provision in its website’s terms and conditions.  Id. at 11.  Central to the issue of whether Plaintiff had constructive knowledge of the arbitration agreement was whether the terms and conditions were presented in “clickwrap” form, where a customer has to affirmatively check a box to assent (as courts generally uphold such assent), or “browsewrap” form, where a customer’s continued use of a website is taken as passive assent (and which require more detailed analysis).  Defendant’s website contained both clickwrap and browsewrap forms, but the Plaintiff only visited pages with browsewrap forms.  Id. at 12.  Users of the virtual try-on tool received a pop-up notification that had Too Faced’s privacy policy, not its terms and conditions, though the privacy policy contained a link to the terms and conditions.  Id.  On other pages, the terms and conditions were presented at the bottom of webpages “in the middle of fifteen links to other pages on the site and six links to social media platforms. . .”  Id.  The Court held such a website design insufficient to provide constructive notice, since a customer “could easily try the tool without once confronting the terms-and-conditions link.”  Id. at 14.  Further, the Court rejected Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiff had constructive notice because she recently filed two other BIPA-related lawsuits against TikTok and L’Oréal, noting that a website user “is not automatically on notice that any website she visits likely has terms and conditions just because she’s visited other websites that have them.”  Id. at 15.  Accordingly, the Court held that Plaintiff lacked constructive knowledge and that the arbitration clause could not be enforced against her.

Third, Defendant also sought to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it provided only “conclusory legal statements” and lacked sufficient facts establishing that Defendant captured users’ facial geometry, collected biometric data, or acted negligently, recklessly, or intentionally under the BIPA.  Id. at 16.  The Court disagreed. It found that the complaint “alleged enough to infer” that Defendant captured Plaintiff’s biometric information and “no intermediary separated the defendant from the collection of plaintiff’s facial geometry.”  Id. at 17.  However, since recklessness and intentionality require a specific state of mind that Plaintiff did not allege, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for reckless or intentional conduct, but allowed Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint.  Id. at 18.

Finally, Defendant contended that since Plaintiff did not use the websites of its four other brands that utilize the virtual try-on tool, she lacked standing to sue on their behalf.  The Court noted that because no class had been certified, yet Defendant’s argument was premature. The Court reasoned that plaintiff “alleges an injury from a technology deployed across multiple websites” and that standing exists because Plaintiff’s injury “can be redressed by a decision in her favor.”  Id. at 20.

Implications For Companies Using Biometric Equipment

By allowing consumers to “try-on” products in a virtual environment, retailers increasingly rely on biometric data to provide hyper-personalized services and recreate the real-world shopping experience for the virtual world.  But as the popularity of try-on technology grows, so too does the legal risk from biometric data privacy lawsuits.  Since 2019, numerous retailers have been sued for violating the BIPA and other state biometric privacy laws for their use of try-on tech and other digital tools to personalize consumer recommendations.  The Kukovec decision highlights how new technologies expose companies to costly litigation, even when they take steps to notify consumers or mandate arbitration.  Companies should consider how they notify customers regarding try-on technology, ensure that their privacy policies stay current with evolving legislation and competing definitions of “biometric data,” and implement proper safeguards and consent processes.

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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