Class Action Defense

July 17, 2026July 17, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seventh Circuit Holds That The TCPA’s Do-Not-Call Provision Does Not Cover Text Message

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 14, 2026, in Steidinger, et al. v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398, 2026 WL 2028517 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026), Judge Thomas Kirsch, writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, affirmed the dismissal of a putative class action complaint and held that 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) does not create a private right of action for the receipt of unwanted text messages.

The decision is significant because it represents the first federal appellate decision squarely holding that text messages are not “telephone calls” within the meaning of Section 227(c)(5) and significantly reduces potential TCPA-related liability for companies operating in the Seventh Circuit.

Case Background

The plaintiffs in this case are a group of individuals (“Plaintiffs”) who received text messages and calls from Blackstone Medical Services (“Blackstone”) promoting the company’s home sleep tests. Plaintiffs alleged that they received these communications even though they were either registered on the national do-not-call registry or after they communicated to Blackstone that they did not want to be contacted. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint against Blackstone, alleging violations of the TCPA and Florida’s mini-TCPA law, seeking statutory damages, an injunction, and declaratory relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs sued under Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA which provides plaintiffs with a private right of action for certain “violation[s] of the regulations prescribed under this subsection.” 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5)(a).

Blackstone moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ TCPA claims. It argued that because the private right of action in Section 227(c)(5) is limited to any “person who has received more than one telephone call,” the provision only applies to “telephone calls” and not text messages. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois agreed with Blackstone. Jones v. Blackstone Med. Servs., LLC, 792 F. Supp. 3d 894, 902 (C.D. Ill. 2025).The district court concluded “based on a plain reading of the TCPA and its implementing regulations, Section 227(c)(5) does not apply to text messages.” Id. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claim and dismissed the lawsuit. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Seventh Circuit’s Ruling

In a 13-page opinion, Judge Thomas Kirsch, writing for the Seventh Circuit, succinctly concluded “that § 227(c)(5) does not permit plaintiffs to sue for the receipt of unwanted texts.” Steidinger, 2026 WL 2028517, at *1.

The Seventh Circuit explained that Section 227(c)(5) creates a private right of action for any individual “who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period” in violation of the regulations implementing that subjection. Id. at *2(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)). Thus, the dispute hinged on the meaning of the term “telephone call” when the statute was passed in 1991. Id.

As Judge Kirsch explained, in 1991, a “telephone” was defined as “[a]n instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance” and a “call” was defined as “to get or try to get into communication by telephone.” Id. Therefore, a “telephone call” would have “referred to communication via sound.” Id. But “[t]ext messages do not reproduce sounds” and would not have been thought of as calls (especially given that the first text message was not sent till 1992). Id.

After observing other structural elements of the TCPA which would suggest narrower reading of the term “telephone call,” the Seventh Circuit also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation of “call,” which included text messages, was entitled to deference. In McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation, 606 U.S. 146, 168 (2025), the U.S. Supreme Court had already determined that courts are “not bound by the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA.” Thus, the Seventh Circuit determined that it would not afford deference to the FCC’s interpretation.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit opined on the public policy concerns remedied by the TCPA. The Seventh Circuit explained that, when Congress passed the TCPA, it “specifically found that telemarketing calls create a public safety risk when they seize telephone lines needed for emergency or medical assistance.” Steidinger, 2026 WL 2028517, at *5. But “[s]pam text messages don’t pose this risk, making it unsurprising, or at the very least reasonable, that § 227(c)(5)’s private right of action would cover telephone calls but not messages.” Id.

In short, “[r]epeated, unwanted text messages are undoubtedly a nuisance. But they do not fall within the private right of action created by § 227(c)(5).” Id.

Implications For Companies

The Steidinger decision is likely the single most important decision in the post-McKesson era.

For TCPA cases filed in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, a company cannot be sued based on text messages that were allegedly made in violation of the TCPA’s implementing regulations. As a result, the typical claims that are often brought under Section 227(c)(5) will no longer be available to plaintiffs where the communications in question were text messages. These claims include situations where a company allegedly violated the national do-not-call registry’s requirements, their own internal do-not-call registry’s requirements, where texts were made without caller identification information, where texts were made during “quiet hours,” and other claims typically brought under Section 227(c)(5). Steidinger should take each of these claims off the table within these jurisdictions.

Steininger, however, is not the end of this fight. In Howard v. Republican National Committee, 164 F.4th 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2026), the Ninth Circuit determined (albeit while considering a Section 227(b)(3) claim) that text messages were covered by the broad definition of the phrase “any call” as applicable in that case. Although there may theoretically be some daylight between the phrase “any call” as interpreted in Howard, and the phrase “telephone call” as interpreted in Steidinger, this decision certainly signals a growing methodological division between these two circuits.

While Steininger is undoubtably beneficial for companies, corporate counsel should be mindful that this case does not mean their texts are unregulated for at least three reasons. First, even in the Seventh Circuit, private plaintiffs can still theoretically bring claims under Section 227(b)(3) if the texts are made using an “automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). Second, there are also other federal, state, and local jurisdictions which prohibit the conduct previously protected by the TCPA in the Seventh Circuit. And third, Steininger only removes the risk of a federal class action lawsuit under Section 227(c)(5), it does not eliminate the risk of an FCC enforcement action related to a company’s text messaging programs.

We will be monitoring any developments in this space and corporate counsel should continue to check in regularly as the TCPA landscape continues to shift.

July 14, 2026July 14, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seventh Circuit Undoes Novel Privacy Class Settlement Due To Lack Of Separate Representatives For Nationwide Class And State Sub-Classes

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Hayley Ryan, and Tyler Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 13, 2026, in the case captioned as In Re Clearview AI, Inc. Consumer Privacy Litigation, No. 25-1673, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 20406 (7th Cir. July 13, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated a district court’s approval of a novel class action settlement between Clearview and individuals alleging that Clearview violated privacy laws by “scraping” their public photos from the internet to improve the company’s facial recognition technology. The Seventh Circuit held that the absence of separate class representatives for the nationwide class and the state-specific subclasses was a “key procedural problem” requiring vacatur of the settlement.

This decision is an important reminder that courts evaluating class settlements will closely scrutinize whether all classes and subclasses have adequate structural protections, including separate class representatives with separate counsel in cases where class members may have divergent interests.

Background

Clearview operates “a search engine for faces,” whereby the company scrapes photographs of individuals from public websites and analyzes them using artificial intelligence to generate “facial vectors” reflecting the geometry of a person’s facial features. Id. at *3. A search of Clearview’s database using a photograph of a person returns other photographs of that same person, together with links to the websites where the photographs were located.

The case arose from 11 putative class actions filed in federal district courts against Clearview and related defendants, which were ultimately transferred to the Northern District of Illinois for coordinated pretrial proceedings.

After the appointment of interim lead class counsel, Plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint asserting claims for declaratory judgment and unjust enrichment on behalf of a Nationwide Class comprised of all individuals in the United States whose biometric data was or is contained in Clearview’s database. Plaintiffs also asserted claims under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) on behalf of an Illinois Subclass; claims under various California laws on behalf of a California Subclass; claims under New York’s civil rights code on behalf of a New York Subclass; and claims under the Virginia Computer Crimes Act and for statutory commercial misappropriation of identity on behalf of a Virginia Sub-class.

The parties first engaged in settlement discussions in 2022, which failed because Clearview lacked the financial ability to make the substantial immediate payments sought by Plaintiffs. But after mediating the case in 2023, the parties agreed to a settlement structure under which class members would acquire equity stake in Clearview. Specifically, the settlement provided that upon an initial public offering or a merger, consolidation, or sale of Clearview, the Class would receive a payment equivalent to a 23% equity stake in Clearview as of September 6, 2023. Alternatively, in lieu of that payment, the court-appointed settlement master could either (i) sell the settlement stake to a third party for a “commercially reasonable price” or (ii) make a cash demand equal to 17% of Clearview’s revenue from the date of final approval of the settlement until the date of such demand. Id. at *7.

The settlement stake itself would be divided unevenly among Class members based on the specific forms of relief available under the relevant state laws: ten shares to each member of the Illinois Subclass; five shares to each member of the California, New York, and Virginia Subclasses; and just one share to each member of the Nationwide Class. Notably, none of the eight original class representatives agreed to the settlement, so lead class counsel replaced them with four new representatives, each of whom belonged to one of the “favored” state-specific sub-classes.

After the District Court granted final approval, Objectors Robert Weissman and Rick Claypool, both members of the Nationwide Class, appealed. They argued that the settlement was not “fair, reasonable, and adequate” because (i) it did not provide injunctive relief, (ii) the future equity-stake and cash-demand fallback made the settlement’s value too uncertain, and (iii) the Nationwide Class lacked separate representation during the settlement negotiations.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit vacated the District Court’s approval of the settlement and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Seventh Circuit rejected the Objectors’ two substantive challenges to the settlement, concluding that a fair settlement did not necessarily require injunctive relief and that the uncertainty associated with the equity-based structure was not disqualifying because “uncertainty is inherent” in such settlements. Id. at *11, 16.

The Seventh Circuit, however, agreed with the Objectors’ third argument regarding the settlement being deficient due to the absence of a separate Nationwide class representative with separate counsel. The Seventh Circuit explained that class action litigation relies on “structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected.” Id. at *23 (quoting Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997)). One such “important structural feature” is the requirement that class representatives, who owe a fiduciary duty to absent class members, approve any proposed settlement. Id.

The Seventh Circuit emphasized that “[n]ot just any representative will do” and that the critical question is whether “the court can be confident that absent class members have been represented fairly.” Id. at *24-25. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Nationwide Class lacked adequate representation because “none of the named class representatives was in a position to represent solely the interests of the Nationwide Class in allocating the settlement.” Id. at *29; see id. at *31 (“Appointment of separately counseled class representatives for identifiable, significantly different groups of claimants with fundamentally conflicting interests is Rule 23’s primary mechanism for such protection.”).

On this basis, the Seventh Circuit vacated the District Court’s approval of the settlement and remanded the case.

Implications For Companies

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in In Re Clearview AI, Inc. Consumer Privacy Litigation is a cautionary tale for companies structuring, or defending, class action settlements involving multiple classes or subclasses with potentially divergent interests. Where claimants fall into distinct groups with conflicting stakes in how settlement proceeds are allocated, courts will expect each group to have its own class representative with its own counsel at the negotiating table. A settlement that may be fair and reasonable on its face can be vacated if it lacks these structural safeguards, as without such protections a reviewing court cannot confirm that each class’s interests was independently considered during negotiations. Companies should keep this principle in mind at the outset of class settlement negotiations to avoid the possibility of a proposed class settlement failing on appeal due to the lack of necessary structural safeguards.

July 13, 2026July 13, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Ninth Circuit Revives Dishwasher Warranty Class Action Against Whirlpool, Reversing Dismissal Of Washington Consumer Protection Act Claim

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 6, 2026, in Shellenberger v. AIG WarrantyGuard, Inc., et al., No. 25-1448 (9th Cir. July 6, 2026), Judges Christen, Hurwitz, and Bade of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of a putative class action alleging that AIG WarrantyGuard, Inc. and Whirlpool Corporation violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) in connection with a KitchenAid service plan. The Ninth Circuit held that the named Plaintiff plausibly alleged that the Defendants’ offer letter and service contract, taken together, had the capacity to deceive a reasonable consumer, and that the district court erred in resolving that fact-intensive question at the motion to dismiss stage.

This ruling serves as a cautionary tale for companies that market service plans, particularly where buyout provisions or qualifiers in the fine print may be read as cutting against the offerings set out in consumer offer letters.

Case Background

Plaintiff Hadassah Shellenberger (“Plaintiff”) filed a putative class action against AIG WarrantyGuard, Inc. and Whirlpool Corporation (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting a claim under the CPA, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.86.020, 19.86.093. Id. at 1. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants’ offer letter created the impression “that the KitchenAid Service Plan would provide repairs or replacements for covered malfunctions, with repairs performed by KitchenAid-certified technicians, at no out-of-pocket expense to her.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff further alleged that this impression was inconsistent with the terms of the service contract, which included a buyout option, exercisable at Defendants’ sole discretion, allowing Defendants to technically satisfy all obligations under the contract without ever providing a repair or replacement. Id.

The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s CPA claim, finding that she had failed to plausibly allege the first element of a CPA claim, namely, “whether the defendant has engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1.

The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s CPA claim. Id. at 7. The Ninth Circuit determined that Plaintiff’s interpretation of the offer letter was “facially plausible” because the offer letter mentioned only repairs and replacements as modes of performance, while the buyout option in the service contract provided an alternative manner of performance that was “inconsistent with the advertised benefits.” Id. at 3.

The Ninth Circuit rejected Defendants’ arguments that caveats in the offer letter and a fine-print disclaimer made Plaintiff’s interpretation implausible, finding the disclaimer language “insufficiently clear to change the apparent meaning of the offer letter’s representations.” Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the Ninth Circuit similarly rejected the argument that qualifiers, such as “covered” and “where applicable”, defeated Plaintiff’s reading, concluding that those terms plausibly limited only the specific representations immediately next to them. Id. at 5.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit highlighted that whether a representation is misleading to a reasonable consumer is “a fact-intensive question not typically susceptible to resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.” Id. at 7.

Implications For Companies

This decision underscores that companies cannot avoid liability at the motion to dismiss stage under the CPA and other similar consumer protection statutes by simply pointing to fine-print disclaimers or qualifying words like “covered” or “where applicable.” Instead, courts will look to whether that fine print is clear enough to actually change the overall impression created by a company’s offer letter.

Overall, companies should audit consumer-facing offer letters and relevant marketing materials against discretionary provisions in service contracts to ensure consistency and compliance, especially where materials promise specific modes of performance, such as repair or replacement by certified technicians as seen in this case, that could be undercut by a seller’s discretion to satisfy its obligations through a different mechanism.

July 9, 2026July 9, 2026 by Class Action Defense

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 155: Mid-Year Class Action Settlement Review & Analysis

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Jennifer Riley with their analysis of class action settlement data in the first six months of 2026 and their prognostications for trends shaping the remainder of the year.

Read the full mid-year settlement review in our previous blog post.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Hello, everyone, and welcome to the next episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, and with me today for the special mid-year review of class action settlements is Jen Riley. Jen, welcome back. Here we are halfway through 2026. What’s the big picture look like in the class action settlement space?

Jennifer Riley: Thanks, Jerry. Well, it’s been quite a ride. The data confirms essentially what we’ve been tracking since 2022. We are in a new era for class action litigation. Corporate defendants have been facing unprecedented settlement exposures. The total value of class action in government enforcement settlements hit $79 billion in 2025 that follows $66 billion in 2022, $51.4 billion in 2023, and $42 billion in 2024. As of mid-2026, we have already reached over $53 billion.

Jerry: That’s an enormous number. So, what we’re talking about is over $200 billion in just the last few years.

Jennifer: That’s exactly right. It is the largest multi-year span of settlements in U.S. legal history, and if current trends hold up, 2027 may end up ahead of the prior four years.

Jerry: Where are we seeing the biggest dollar amounts generated in these class action settlements?

Jennifer: Well, antitrust has historically had high settlements, and it is leading the charge this year with over $34 billion in settlements. Products liability and mass torts also have had big settlements this year, and has been no different in that area either, with almost $9 billion so far. Securities fraud settlements are also on track with last year’s numbers, and they’ve reached almost $2 billion so far.

Jerry: I know you track this space on a daily basis, 24-7. Any standout billion-dollar settlement cases come to mind?

Jennifer: So, there have been a few major ones. I would say the In Re College Athlete NIL Litigation is a big one. That one hit $2.78 billion alone. It finally gave athletes retroactive compensation for missed name, image, and likeness opportunities. So, that’s a historic shift in the landscape there. Also, worth noting that Purdue Pharma’s $7.4 billion opioid-related settlement. Just last week, Purdue announced that it is preparing to send an updated bankruptcy plan and proposed settlement to a vote following broad sign-on by all U.S. states and territories.

Jerry: These seem to be landmark figures. Are we seeing any high numbers of billion-dollar cases in and of themselves?

Jennifer: We are. So, there have been three billion-dollar settlements so far in 2026. That brings us to 45 total settlements over a billion dollars since 2022. That is the most in any four-and-a-half-year period ever.

Jerry: By your examination and analysis, are there any particular industries or sectors that are showing either surprising or emerging exposures in this area?

Jennifer: Great question. Data breach and privacy settlements have become increasingly prominent. Apple agreed to a $250 million settlement in a class action to resolve claims alleging that it misled millions of iPhone buyers by falsely touting AI capabilities for its Siri Voice Assistant 2024. Also, government enforcement settlements are on the rise. One of the billion-dollar settlements so far this year is an agreement with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and EI DuPont to resolve the state’s claims over contamination caused by the manufacture and discharge of forever chemicals.

Jerry: Let’s talk antitrust. You referred to that before. What’s the headline here?

Jennifer: So, the antitrust sector is very active, with notable cases against the NCAA, as I mentioned earlier, as well as Visa, MasterCard, and RealPage. There is a sustained focus on wage suppression and market manipulation. Those have been key areas of concern for regulators, as well as for plaintiffs.

Jerry: Are you seeing the same sort of similar energy from the Planum sparred compared to past years?

Jennifer: Absolutely. In fact, the size and pace of these settlements suggests that plaintiffs’ attorneys are pushing harder than ever, likely encouraged by that sheer size of recent wins.

Jerry: When you look at the trends and the data analytics, do you see any areas that are cooling off in 2026?

Jennifer: Great question. So, civil rights settlements have been fairly low this year. We’re also seeing some slowdown in TCPA-related cases, although final settlement approval for $28 million was granted in a case against SiriusXM Radio to resolve claims alleging that it made telephone calls to people on the Do Not Call Registry, or Sirius’ internal Do Not Call Registry. But overall, most sectors are either holding steady or are growing.

Jerry: Any closing thoughts to what should be uppermost on the mind of corporate counsel in this area?

Jennifer: Yeah, so I would say the bottom line is that corporate defendants are operating in a legal environment where large-scale class actions, whether driven by consumers, employees, investors, or regulars, are pretty much a constant and a very costly risk. We’re in a high-stakes phase of class action litigation, and there’s really no indication that it’s slowing down or going to slow down in the foreseeable future.

Jerry: Well, Jen, thanks as always for your insights, and thanks to our listeners for tuning in. We will be sure to keep you updated with new developments on these settlement numbers. It sounds like for the upcoming Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2027 edition, is going to be a must-read.

Jennifer: I think it definitely will be. Thanks, Jerry, and thank you to our listeners.

July 7, 2026July 7, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

FAA Exemptions Now Incorporated Into California Law

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Daniel D. Spencer, and Kenny T. Tran

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 30, 2026, Governor Newsom signed Assembly Bill 2155 (AB 2155), which amends California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 to provide that any arbitration agreement deemed unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is likewise unenforceable under the California Arbitration Act (CAA). The amendment is designed to align California law with federal law by ensuring that the same limitations, exceptions, and exemptions governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the FAA also apply under the CAA.

Overview

AB 2155 expressly incorporates two significant FAA exemptions into the CAA, including: (1) the “transportation worker” exemption, which applies to contracts of employment for seamen, railroad employees, and other classes of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce; and (2) the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which renders predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable with respect to claims involving sexual assault or sexual harassment disputes.

AB 2155 becomes effective on January 1, 2027, and the legislation contains no indication that it applies retroactively. Prior to this amendment, employers frequently argued that even if the FAA did not govern an arbitration agreement, the agreement remained enforceable under the CAA because California law did not recognize the FAA’s transportation worker exemption. AB 2155 eliminates that argument. Beginning January 1, 2027, if an arbitration agreement is unenforceable under the FAA due to the transportation worker exemption, it will likewise be unenforceable under the CAA.

Implications for Employers

Employers, particularly those whose operations involve interstate commerce, should review their arbitration agreements and dispute resolution strategies in anticipation of AB 2155’s effective date. The amendment is likely to increase litigation challenging the enforceability of arbitration agreements, including class and representative actions brought by transportation workers and claims falling within the scope of the EFAA.

July 7, 2026July 7, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

DMCAR Mid-Year Review – 2026/2027: FLSA Conditional Certification Rate Drops, And So Far In 2026 Courts Are Granting Less Class Certification Motions Overall Compared To 2025

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: In the first half of 2026, across all major types of class actions, courts issued rulings on more than 155 motions to grant or deny class certification, and plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining or maintaining certification in 97 rulings, with an overall success rate of 63%. In contrast, comparing apples to apples, in the first half of 2025, courts issued rulings on more than 211 motions to grant or deny class certification, and plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining or maintaining certification in 145 rulings, with an overall success rate of 69%.

Percentages for year over year rulings for 2022 to 2025 are below. Across all major areas of class action litigation in 2025, courts issued rulings on 435 motions for class certification. Courts granted 297 motions for class certification in whole or in part, a rate of approximately 68%. In 2024, courts issued rulings on 432 motions to grant or to deny class certification. Of these, plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining or maintaining certification in 272 rulings, for an overall success rate of 63%. In 2023, by comparison, courts issued rulings on 451 motions to grant or to deny class certification, and plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining or maintaining certification in 324 rulings, an overall success rate of nearly 72%. In 2022, courts issued rulings on 335 motions to grant or to deny class certification, and plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining or maintaining certification in 247 rulings, an overall success rate of nearly 74%.

2022 – 74%
2023 – 72%
2024 – 63%
2025 – 68%
2026 – 63% (Mid-Year)

In 2026, the number of motions that courts considered varied significantly by subject matter area, and the number of rulings varied across substantive area:

The following list summarizes the results in each of ten key areas of class action litigation.

FCRA – 100% granted / 0% denied (2 of 2 granted / 0 of 2 denied)
TCPA – 100% granted / 0% denied (2 of 2 granted / 0 of 2 denied)
RICO – 100% granted / 0% denied (1 of 1 granted / 0 of 1 denied)
WARN Act – 100% granted / 0% denied (1 of 1 granted / 0 of 1 denied)A
Security Fraud – 80% granted / 20% denied (8 of 10 granted / 2 of 10 denied)
Antitrust – 71% granted / 29% denied (5 of 7 granted / 2 of 7 denied)
Consumer Fraud – 71% granted / 29% denied (10 of 14 granted / 4 of 14 denied)
Civil Rights – 65% granted / 35% denied (13 of 20 granted / 7 of 20 denied)
ERISA – 64% granted / 36% denied (9 of 14 granted / 5 of 14 denied)
FLSA / Wage & Hour (Conditional Certification) – 58% granted / 42% denied (39 of 67 granted / 28 of 67 denied)
Discrimination – 50% granted / 50% denied (2 of 4 granted / 2 of 4 denied)
FLSA / Wage & Hour (Decertification) – 50% granted / 50% denied (1 of 2 granted / 1 of 2 denied)
Privacy – 44% granted / 56% denied (4 of 9 granted / 5 of 9 denied)
Products Liability / Mass Torts – 0% granted / 100% denied (0 of 1 granted / 1 of 1 denied)
Data Breach – 0% granted / 0% denied (no class certification rulings in 2026)

The plaintiffs’ class action bar obtained 100% success rates in four areas, FCRA, TCPA, RICO, and WARN. There have only been two FCRA and TCPA certification rulings in 2026, and one each for RICO and WARN, which were all granted by the court for a 100% success rate. In cases alleging securities fraud violations, plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining orders certifying classes in 8 of 10 rulings, for a success rate of 80%. In cases alleging antitrust violations, plaintiffs managed to obtain class certification rulings in 5 of 7 rulings issued during the first half of 2026, a success rate of 71%. And in wage & hour litigation, plaintiffs were not nearly as successful as in previous years. They succeeded in obtaining orders certifying classes and/or collective actions in 39 of 67 rulings issued during 2026, a success rate of only 58%.

Courts Issued More Rulings In FLSA Collective Actions and Wage & Hour Class Actions Than In Any Other Areas Of Law

For the first half of calendar year 2026, courts issued more certification rulings in FLSA collective actions and wage & hour class actions than in other types of cases. Plaintiffs historically have been able to obtain conditional certification of FLSA collective actions at a high rate, which surely has contributed to the number of filings in this area. Of the 67 rulings addressing first-stage motions for conditional certification, the court granted 39, for a success rate of a much lower than typical 58%

In contrast, from January 1 to July 1, 2025, issued 74 rulings. Of these, 71 addressed first-stage motions for conditional certification of collective actions under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and 3 addressed second-stage motions for decertification of collective actions. Of the 71 rulings that courts issued on motions for conditional certification, 58 rulings favored plaintiffs, for a success rate of 82%.

At the decertification stage, courts generally have conducted a closer examination of the evidence and, as a result, defendants historically have enjoyed an equal if not higher rate of success on these second-stage motions as compared to plaintiffs. The results so far in 2026 have not supported that typical success. There have only been 2 rulings thus far that courts issued on motions for decertification of collective actions, and only 1 ruling favored defendants, for a success rate of 50%.

An analysis of the rulings demonstrates that a disproportionate number emanated from traditionally pro-plaintiff jurisdictions, including the judicial districts within the Second Circuit (16 decisions) and Ninth Circuit (14 decisions), which include New York and California, respectively.

Takeaways From Certification Statistics Midway Through 2026

Notable thus far at the halfway point of the year, there have been a very small number of rulings emanating from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits (2 and 1 decisions, respectfully), which was true in 2025 as well. There have overall been less rulings issued by the courts, and at a lower success rate than previous years.

We will continue to track class certification trends in 2026 and will report on final numbers in the Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2027, which will be published in the first week of January. Stay tuned!

July 6, 2026July 6, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Key Insights Into The EEOC’s Draft Strategic Plan For FY 2026-2030

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jamar D. Davis, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 1, 2026, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission released a preliminary draft of its 2026-2030 Strategic Plan. The draft sets forth the EEOC plans to prevent and address employment discrimination via improved procedures and key performance metrics, expand outreach and training activities, and improve internal processes via talent retention and use of technology that improves efficiency. The four-year plan was published on the regulations.gov webpage and is open for comment until July 19, 2026. Even if employers do not submit comments, they would be well-advised to review the draft and final Strategic Plan once it is announced because it provides a window into the EEOC Commissioners’ thinking for how the agency will use its resources to redress and deter workplace discrimination.

Introduction

Every four years, the EEOC prepares a Strategic Plan that guides its anti-discrimination enforcement priorities. The 2026-2030 Strategic Plan newly published on the regulations.gov webpage gives significant insight into specific goals and metrics that the agency will measure its performance by in the next several years. The three goals of the draft Strategic Plan and their significance are critical information for employers to understand in navigating interpretations and compliance with EEOC regulations and guidelines.

Operational Improvements And Performance Metrics Sought By The EEOC

The 2026-2030 Strategic Plan draft signals that the EEOC will focus its operations on three key areas. First, the EEOC aims to increase the number of favorable outcomes and to seek non-monetary relief where appropriate. For its matter outcomes, the EEOC aims to obtain at least one million dollars in monetary relief for select systematic investigations, to favorably resolve at least ninety percent of its enforcement lawsuits, and ensure its hearings, investigations, and appears meet or exceed unspecified metrics. (Draft Strategic Plan at 14-16.) On this point, the draft Strategic Plan explains that the EEOC will use its prosecutorial discretion to focus on prioritizing the investigation, litigation, and resolution of complex cases. (Id.) In addition to seeking monetary relief, the EEOC aims to also seek non-monetary relief. The draft Plan explains the EEOC’s view that this type of relief could encompass hands-on training for employers and workers, implementing discrimination deterrence practices, and monitoring. (Id.)

The EEOC additionally aims to “achieve[] targeted equitable relief and at least $1 million in monetary relief” at a rate of 80% of its systemic investigations where cause is found. (Id.) The draft Strategic Plan states that the emphasis here is on cases with broad overall impact and relief for employees impacted by systemic discriminatory patterns, practices, or policies. (Id.)

Further, “the EEOC will make significant progress toward enhanced monitoring of conciliation agreements,” with the goal of publishing developments of its achievements for each year. (Id.) The Strategic Plan explains that improved training, enhanced tracking, and streamlined reporting are crucial aspects of this point. (Id.)

With regards to employees of the federal government, the draft Strategic Plan outlines a baseline measurement for cabinet-level agency compliance with Equal Employment Opportunities. (Id. at 16.) This includes improvements in processing complaints, approving affirmative action plans, and establishing compliance with the Elijah E. Cummings Federal Employee Anti-Discrimination Act of 2020 through timeliness. (Id.) Reasoning that the federal government is the largest employer in the country, the draft Strategic Plan notes that “reducing unlawful employment discrimination in the federal sector is an integral part of combatting employment discrimination in the nation’s workplaces,” and thus will have a great impact on private sector employers. (Id.)

The EEOC aims to have “at least 90% of completed investigations and conciliations, hearings, and federal appeals meet or exceed criteria” implemented in the Quality Practices Plan (“QEP”) for each program. (Id.) Building on the EEOC’s prior Strategic Plan’s QEP, the Commission states that the quality targets for resolving cases without litigation paved a way to success when implemented rigorously. (Id. at 17.) Further, the EEOC will seek to assess the current status of its previous goals and update them as needed in FY 2027-2030. (Id.)

Next, the EEOC plans to broaden its outreach and training activities to ensure that employees know their rights, and that employers are equipped with the tools necessary to preclude discrimination. (Id. at 18-20.) The action items for this goal include use of social media engagement, the implementation of three innovative means to conduct outreach, updating training materials to be user-friendly, and tracking the effectiveness of each outreach effort. (Id. at 19, 22.)

The EEOC additionally seeks to improve its accessibility through updating its technological capabilities. (Id. at 17.) The priority outlined in its seventh measure highlights reducing processing time and looks to speed up the charge filing process following intake, with the ultimate goal of reducing pending cases in the long-term. (Id.)

Finally, the EEOC will strive to improve its overall operations via three distinct areas of focus, which include (1) personnel, (2) services, and (3) financial efficiency. The EEOC would like to improve its operations with regards to its employees by maintaining staffing levels at or greater to 95% of the FTE baseline, invest in in-person trainings, and allow for select employees to participate in leadership development programs. (Id. at 25-26.) For its services, the EEOC will issue feedback surveys to assess areas of growth for the intake process, outreach and training, and mediation services offered, then implement process improvements to targeted areas. (Id. at 27.) For budget concerns, each program area will strive to meet operating constraints and meet all submission deadlines. (Id.)

Implications For Employers

The EEOC’s FY 2026-2030 draft Strategic Plan is a document that provides insight into the direction the agency will take to improve how it functions, and where it will focus the majority of its resources. Knowing what to expect from the Commission over the next four years places employers at an advantage when it comes to contingency planning and updating workplace discrimination policies.

July 2, 2026July 2, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

New Jersey Appellate Division Confirms Representative Wage Actions May Proceed Without Class Certification But Limits Look-Back Period For WHL And ESLL Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Olga A. Romadin, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 29, 2026, in Martinez v. T. Slack Environmental Services, Inc., No. A-1008-24 (N.J. App. Div. June 29, 2026), the New Jersey Appellate Division addressed key issues in a wage and hour representative action brought pursuant to the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“WHL”) and the Prevailing Wage Act (“PWA”), including whether a representative action brought under the WHL and the PWA is distinct from a class action under N.J. Rule 4:32-1, and the appropriate statute of limitations for companion wage claims. Id. at 2. The Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part a decision of the trial court holding that the WHL and PWA statutory language is independent of Rule 4:32-1 and therefore does not require class certification, and finding that a two-year—and not six—statute of limitations applies to WHL and Earned Sick Leave Law (“ESLL”) claims. Id. at 3.

This decision is significant for employers in because it confirms that representative wage actions under New Jersey’s wage statutes may proceed outside Rule 4:32-1 class certification procedures while also clarifying that WHL and ESLL claims carry a two-year limitations period, and PWA claims carry a six-year limitations period as breach of contract claims.

Case Background

Juan Martinez (“Martinez”) alleged that he worked as an hourly laborer for T. Slack Environmental Services, Inc. (“T. Slack”), a small, non-union New Jersey contractor that employed between six and ten hourly laborers subject to the same pay practices from 2006 to 2019. Id. at 3-4.

In February 2020, Martinez filed a lawsuit in which he alleged that T. Slack failed to pay required prevailing wages for public work, including for tasks classified as “B” and “C” laborer functions under the PWA. Id. at 4. He also claimed that defendants miscalculated overtime by paying him at lower rates rather than using a blended or weighted rate when he worked on both public and private projects or in different job titles during the same week. Id. at 5. Martinez further alleged uncompensated “off-the-clock” work, including transporting equipment to and from worksites and defendants’ Kenilworth facility, and asserted that earned sick leave was improperly calculated using the lower private wage rate. Id. at 5-6.

Following discovery conducted under the supervision of a special adjudicator, Martinez moved to certify a statutory representative action under the WHL and PWA in September 2024. Id. at 6-7. Defendants opposed on several grounds, arguing that Martinez had not satisfied the class action requirements of Rule 4:32-1, that a representative action was not permissible outside of Rule 4:32-1, that the putative class lacked numerosity, that Martinez was not an adequate representative, and that individualized questions precluded both representative and class treatment. Id. at 7.

The motion court granted Martinez’s motion, certified the matter as a representative action, designated Martinez as the representative of defendants’ current and former employees, and imposed a six-year look-back period for overtime claims from February 28, 2014, to February 28, 2020. Id. at 7. Defendants appealed. Id. at 8.

The Appellate Division’s Decision

The Appellate Division held, consistent with its recent decision in Cano v. County Concrete Corp., 483 N.J. Super. 459 (App. Div. 2026), that “the statutory language of both the WHL and PWA is independent of Rule 4:32-1 and therefore does not require class certification.” Id. at 3. The Appellate Division explained that the remedial nature of the PWA permits any worker “to maintain such action for and on behalf of [themselves] or other work[ers] similarly situated,” N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.40, and that this statute addresses the similar concerns of the WHL and ESLL. Id. at 15.

In addition, the Appellate Division rejected T. Slack’s argument that Martinez was required to present evidence of other similarly situated employees to qualify as a representative action. Id. Instead, it determined that, as in Cano, Martinez’s complaint put defendants on notice regarding the existence of similarly situated employees, and that the plain language of the PWA and WHL does not require a named plaintiff to identify the similarly situated employees to defendants. Id. at 15-16. Defendants, moreover, were already aware of approximately fifteen employees whose names and contact information had previously been provided to Martinez. Id. at 16.

Lastly, the Appellate Division reversed the six-year look-back period for WHL claims, and, by incorporation, ESLL claims. Id. at 18. Relying on Maia v. IEW Constr. Grp., 257 N.J. 330 (2024), the Appellate Division held that the 2019 amendment extending the WHL limitations period from two years to six years applies prospectively only, so the two-year limitations period governed those claims. Id.

On the other hand, the Appellate Division affirmed the six-year look-back period for PWA claims. Id. at 18-19. Because PWA claims for unpaid prevailing wages are treated as breach of contract claims, and the PWA does not provide its own limitations period, the general six-year contract limitations period under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applied. Id. at 19.

Implications For Employers

This decision confirms that representative wage actions under New Jersey’s WHL, PWA, and ESLL may proceed independently of Rule 4:32-1 class certification requirements. While this may expand procedural avenues for plaintiffs pursuing wage claims on behalf of similarly situated employees, employers should note that the decision also limits potential exposure for WHL and ESLL claims by applying a two-year statute of limitations to pre-2019 conduct.

July 2, 2026July 2, 2026 by Class Action Defense

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 154: Ninth Circuit Reverses Denial Of Motion To Compel Arbitration In Airport Collective Wage Action

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and associates Christian Palacios and Andrew Quay with their discussion of key ruling issued by the Ninth Circuit reversing a California federal judge’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Hello, everyone, and thank you for being here again for the next episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today are my colleagues, Christian and Andrew. Thank you both for being on our podcast.

Christian Palacios: Glad to be here, Jerry.

Andrew Quay: Thanks for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today, we’ll be discussing a very significant ruling by the Ninth Circuit that California employers, and really any employer using arbitration agreements, should be paying attention to. It’s the case of Cocom v. ABM Aviation. Christian, let’s start with the basics. What happened in this case?

Christian: So, this case involved a former airport janitor who filed a California wage and hour class action against his employer, ABM Aviation. Like many employers, ABM required employees to sign an arbitration agreement at the beginning of their employment. When the lawsuit was filed, ABM moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, finding the arbitration agreement procedurally and substantively unconscionable under California law, relying heavily on a 2024 California Court of Appeals decision called Cook v. University of Southern California. ABM appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Jerry: So, this wasn’t about whether the arbitration agreement itself is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. The question here was whether this particular agreement was so unfair under California law, that it couldn’t be enforced. Andrew, why did the district court think the agreement was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable?

Andrew: That’s right, Jerry. The district court focused on several provisions. First, it believed the agreement covered essentially every conceivable dispute between the employee and the company, and not just employment claims. Second, because it interpreted the agreement that broadly, it concluded the agreement lasted indefinitely. Third, it thought the agreement unfairly favored the employer because numerous affiliated entities and employees could invoke arbitration against the employee, while the employee supposedly had fewer reciprocal rights. Finally, the court concluded the agreement improperly waived certain forms of public injunctive relief; and looking at all those provisions together, the district court found the agreement was permeated with illegality and declined to even sever the problematic parts of it.

Jerry: Christian, the Ninth Circuit saw things differently. What was the outcome there?

Christian: It really did see things differently. The central issue was one of contract interpretation. The district court essentially read the phrase, including but not limited to, as making the arbitration agreement unlimited in scope. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, saying that’s not how California contract interpretation works. Instead, the Ninth Circuit applied the doctrine of Ejusdem generis, a long-standing principle that says when general language is followed by a list of specific examples, the general language is interpreted in light of those examples. Here, every specific example in the arbitration agreement involved employment-related disputes, wage claims, discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination, labor code claims, and similar employment issues. Because of that, the court held the agreement should be interpreted as covering employment disputes, not unrelated personal disputes years after the employment ended.

Jerry: Andrew, that sure seems like a pretty important distinction from Cook. Could you explain that for our listeners?

Andrew: Probably the biggest takeaway here. So, in Cook, the arbitration agreement expressly stated that covered claims, “whether or not arising out of employment.” It also specifically listed non-employment tort claims. So, the California Court of Appeals imagines scenarios like a former employee needing to arbitrate a medical malpractice claim at a university hospital or a defamation claim years after employment ended. The Ninth Circuit said that’s simply not what ABM’s agreement did. ABM’s agreement focused exclusively on employment-related claims, and that distinction changed almost every aspect of the unconscionability analysis.

Jerry: It also addressed durational issues, too, didn’t it?

Christian: That’s right. Once the court concluded the agreement only applied to employment-related claims, the duration issue largely disappeared. Employment claims naturally stop accruing when employment ends, and applicable statutes of limitations eventually cut off any remaining claims. So, unlike the agreement in Cook, this agreement wasn’t truly perpetual.

Jerry: What about the concept of mutuality? That’s a concept employers hear about frequently in this space.

Andrew: Mutuality basically asks whether both sides are giving up similar rights. The employee argued that affiliates, officers, directors, employees, vendors, and clients could enforce the arbitration agreement against him, but he couldn’t as easily enforce it against them. Again, the Ninth Circuit said context matters here. Because the agreement only covered employment-related disputes, any claim involving those third parties would still have to arise out of the employment relationship. The Ninth Circuit explained that this is very different from forcing employees to arbitrate completely unrelated personal disputes with company affiliates years later.

Jerry: The Ninth Curcuit opinion also discusses PAGA waivers and the concept of public injunctive relief. What did the court do there?

Christian: Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit didn’t actually decide whether those provisions were enforceable. Instead, it assumed that even if those provisions were invalid under California law, they could simply be severed because of the agreement’s severability clause. That represents a fairly employer-friendly approach because courts sometimes refuse to enforce arbitration agreements if they believe illegal provisions infect the entire contract. Here, the Ninth Circuit concluded that wasn’t the case.

Jerry: Let’s turn to the practical side of this Ninth Circuit decision. If you’re advising employers in the wake of Cocom, what lessons should they take away from this ruling?

Andrew: The biggest lesson here is careful drafting. Employers should avoid language suggesting that arbitration extends to every conceivable dispute between the parties. The safest approach is to expressly limit covered claims to those arising out of employment or the employment relationship. That helps avoid the problems that doomed the agreements in Cook and similar California cases.

Christian: I’d add that employers should also revisit older arbitration agreements. Many agreements drafted years ago contain broad, any and all claims language that may have seemed harmless at the time but now creates litigation risk under California’s unconscionability doctrine. It’s worth reviewing those agreements to make sure the scope is appropriately limited and definitely include a well-written severability clause.

Jerry: Well, great insights from both of you, Andrew and Christian. The ABM decision by the Ninth Circuit is a great reminder to companies to review their arbitration agreements to ensure that they’re clearly limited to employment-related disputes and to update agreements to reflect evolving notions of California law, rather than relying upon forms drafted years ago. So, thanks so much for being here today with us, Christian and Andrew, and thank you to our listeners for tuning in.

Andrew: Thanks for having me, Jerry, and thank you, listeners.

Christian: Thanks, everyone, for listening.

July 1, 2026July 1, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

California Court of Appeal Affirms Trial Court Judgment Defeating Malicious Prosecution Action Where Sister-in-Law Served As Class Representative In Underlying Lawsuit

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Daniel D. Spencer, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 10, 2026, in Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. John Donboli et al., No. D085849, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 360 (Cal. App. June 10, 2026), the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision in favor of Defendants in a malicious prosecution action stemming from a consumer class action over “Made in the U.S.A.” labeling on jeans. The Court of Appeal held that a familial relationship between a named plaintiff and class counsel does not, as a matter of law, deprive a class action of probable cause, and that Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court, 126 Cal.App.4th 1253(2005), does not establish a per se bar on relatives of class counsel serving as class representatives.

For companies that have faced consumer class actions and are considering malicious prosecution counterclaims, this decision underscores that the probable cause standard remains a high bar and requires a showing that any reasonable attorney would agree the underlying claims were totally and completely without merit.

Case Background

Citizens of Humanity LLC is a jeans manufacturer whose products had “Made in the U.S.A.” labels, despite Citizens Ingrid-style jeans having fabrics and components sourced from Japan and China. Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. John Donboli et al., No. D085849, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 360, *7 n. 2 (Cal. App. June 10, 2026).

In June 2014, attorneys John Donboli and JL Sean Slattery of Del Mar Law Group LLP filed a putative class action against Citizens in federal court, alleging the labels violated former California Business and Professions Code § 17533.7, the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and the Unfair Competition Law. Id. at *3.

In the federal court action against Citizens, Louise Clark served as the named-plaintiff who previously purchased Citizens’ Ingrid-style jeans. Citizens later discovered Clark was attorney Slattery’s sister-in-law. Id. Based on this familial relationship, Citizens moved to disqualify Del Mar Law Group as class counsel. While that motion was pending, Clark filed a motion to withdraw and substitute a new named-plaintiff, Coni Hass. Id. at *4. The federal court granted the motion to withdraw and substitute and found that the substitution “vitiate[d]” Citizen’s disqualification motion and also held Citizens “failed to demonstrate that [Clark] or her counsel . . . acted in bad faith” in requesting substitution. Id.

As the action was pending, the California Legislature amended § 17533.7 to permit “Made in the U.S.A.” labeling where foreign-sourced materials constitute no more than 5% (or 10% if not domestically sourceable) of the final wholesale value of the product. Id. In response to the amendment, Citizens moved to dismiss. The district court granted Citizens’ motion and allowed Hass leave to amend, but Hass elected not to amend and the case was dismissed. Id.

In February 2018, Citizens filed this action for malicious prosecution against attorneys Donboli and Slattery, Del Mar Law Group, and former named plaintiffs Clark and Hass (collectively “Defendants”).

Defendants moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, but the trial court denied their motion, and that ruling was later affirmed by this Court of Appeal (see Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Hass, 46 Cal.App.5th 589 (2020)). Citizens of Humanity, LLC, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 360 at *5.

In affirming, the Court of Appeal “found two conflicting narratives . . . regarding the origin of the federal mislabeling case.” Id. at *5-6. It concluded one possible narrative was “that Clark was a shill plaintiff, and [her attorneys] were aware of this fact.” The second possible narrative focused on Hass and whether Defendants “knew ‘that Hass purchased Ingrid-style jeans with a label that said ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ and components of those jeans came from a foreign country[.]’” Id. at *6.

After affirming, the case was remanded and the matter proceeded to trial. After opening statements, and after Citizens presented testimony from the company’s founder, the parties asked the court “to ‘review certain exhibits, [and] deposition testimony from Clark and Hass’ and the parties ‘agreed to have the [c]ourt make a determination on probable cause’” consequently waiving their right for the jury to decide that issue. Id. at *7. After accepting evidence and hearing argument the trial court ruled in favor of Defendants concluding “Citizens had not established [Defendants] lacked probable cause for” the previously filed putative class action and entered judgment for Defendants. Id. at *7-8. Citizens appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Citizens’ primary argument on appeal was that Defendants lacked probable cause as a matter of law because Clark, as Slaterry’s sister-in-law, was an improper class representative under Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court. Citizens relied on the Apple court’s observation that “the majority of courts . . . have refused to permit class attorneys, their relatives, or business associates from acting as the class representative.” Citizens of Humanity, LLC, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 360 at *10-11. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument on multiple grounds.

First, the Court of Appeal distinguished Apple factually and noted that the plaintiff in that case was an attorney at one of the representing firms who stood to gain monetarily from recovery of attorney fees. Id. at *11. The Court of Appeal reasoned that Apple addressed a “‘financial relationship and interdependence between’ the plaintiff and associated.” Id. Here, however, Citizens presented no information “about any ‘financial relationship’ between Slattery and Clark.” The Court of Appeal also determined it was not “reasonable to presume ‘interdependence’ solely based on [Slattery and Clark’s] relationship as siblings-in-law.” Id.

Second, the Court of Appeal held that the relevant passage in Apple is, “at best” “dictum that cannot bind very reasonable attorney on threat of a malicious prosecution judgment.” Id. at *12.

Third, it reasoned that even if a disqualifying conflict existed, it would not be fatal to the putative class action against Citizens. As the Court of Appeal noted “Clark could have pursued the claim with different counsel, or [Del Mar] Law Group could have proceeded with a different representative plaintiff, which is what the district court authorized here after Clark decided to withdraw.” Id. at *13.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed and agreed with “the trial court’s conclusion that Apple is not determinative of the probable cause analysis here.” Id.

Implications For Corporate Litigants

For companies facing consumer class actions, including those with origin-of-manufacture claims such as “Made in the U.S.A.,” this decision serves as a reminder that labeling must comply with current statutory standards.

Even assuming a company is successful in defeating a consumer class action, then companies considering malicious prosecution actions should take note that class representative conflicts, including familial relationships with class counsel, are evaluated on a fact-specific basis. There is no per se rule of disqualification, and even where a conflict exists, it goes to the fitness of counsel or the representative, not the viability of the underlying claim itself. As the Court of Appeal noted here, the class action can proceed with substitute counsel or a substitute plaintiff.

The decision in Citizens of Humanity, LLC, serves as a cautionary tale that even relatives of class counsel can potentially serve as class representatives and further narrows adequacy challenges to class certification. It also demonstrates another way class counsel can creatively select representative plaintiffs while still allowing courts to scrutinize representative plaintiffs for actual conflicts on a case-by-case basis.