Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. – Page 4 – Class Action Defense

February 9, 2024 by Alex W. Karasik

Spygate 2.0? New England Patriots Sued In VPPA Privacy Class Action

By Alex W. Karasik and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 1, 2024, a football fan filed a class action lawsuit against the New England Patriots in a Massachusetts federal court, alleging that the football team’s mobile app (the “App”) knowingly disclosed users’ location data and personal information to third-parties in alleged violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”). This lawsuit marks the latest high-profile VPPA class action lawsuit filing, which have significantly spiked in the last two years.

Although the recent tide of VPPA class action court rulings has generally tipped in favor of defendants, the plaintiffs’ class action bar is still exploring novel theories to bring these high-stakes cases. Companies must therefore pay close attention to privacy-related issues involving mobile applications, including what data is collected and to whom it is transmitted.

The VPPA

Congress passed the VPPA in 1988. The statute imposes liability on, “[a] video tape service provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). A “video tape service provider” is defined as “any person, engaged in the business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials.” Id. 3-4 (citations omitted). “Personally identifiable information” (“PII”) is defined as “information which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video service provider.” Id. In essence, the statute purports to account for advancements in video-delivery technology by defining a “video tape service provider” broadly to include any business engaged in the “rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials.” Id.

The New VPPA Class Action Lawsuit

Plaintiff alleges that he downloaded and installed the App to his mobile phone and regularly used it to access video content. Id. at 2. When downloading the App, users are presented with an option to sign into an existing account, create a new account, or continue without signing in by selecting “MAYBE LATER.” Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff alleges that consumers who select “MAYBE LATER” are not presented with the App’s Terms of Use or Privacy Policy. And even if users select “JOIN NOW”, they are redirected to a login screen where they have the option to log in, but are not required to view or assent to any terms of use or privacy policy unless they take additional steps to create an account. Id. at 5.

In terms of data collection, the lawsuit alleges that when a user opens a video on the App, the App sends the content type, video title, and a persistent identifier to the user’s device. The App then transmits to third parties the user’s information, including location (in geographical coordinates and altitude), advertising ID, and video content consumption. Id. at 6. According to the complaint, the New England Patriots allegedly leverage users’ geolocation so it can maximize advertising revenue and, to that end, uniquely identify its users. For Android software users, the complaint alleges that the Patriots unique advertising ID called an Android Advertising ID (“AAID”) for each of its users with third-parties, which enables a third party to track the user’s movements, habits, and activity on mobile applications. Id. at 10.

Accordingly, the lawsuit alleges that through the New England Patriots’ dissemination of consumers’ PII, third parties such as Google can collect and store billions of metrics and events and make it easier for clients to make data-driven decisions, and these reports are continuously updated and metrics are reported as they occur. Id at 16. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class defined as “All persons in the United States who used the Patriots App to watch videos and had their personally identifiable information — including but not limited to the videos they watched, their geolocation, and their unique advertising IDs — transmitted to one or more third parties.” Id. On behalf of the class, Plaintiff seeks an award of damages, including, but not limited to, actual, consequential, punitive, statutory, and nominal damages.

Implications For Businesses

This lawsuit represents another example of class action plaintiffs’ lawyers using traditional state and federal laws – including the long dormant VPPA – to seek relief for alleged privacy violations. In applying modern technologies to older laws like the VPPA (passed in 1988), courts have grappled with issues such as the determination of who qualifies as a “video tape service provider” or a “consumer” under the statute. It will be interesting to follow this lawsuit to see whether the Court follows the recent trend of courts dismissing VPPA class actions.

That said, this high-profile filing also suggests that companies should regularly update their online consent provisions as needed to specifically address the VPPA. Businesses that pro-actively implement compliance mechanisms will thank themselves later in terms of preventing class action litigation.

February 9, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Colorado Federal Court Rules That The EEOC May Seek Back Pay Claims In ADA Lawsuit Against Trucking Company

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Western Distributing Co., No. 1:16-CV-01727, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17225 (D. Colo. Jan. 31, 2024), Judge William J. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing and granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to reconsider. Both post-trial motions involved disparate impact claims for qualified disabled employees concerning Defendant’s return-to-work policies. For employers facing EEOC-initiated lawsuits under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”) concerning employment policies, this decision is instructive in terms of the record evidence and filings courts will consider when deciding post-trial motions.

Case Background

On July 7, 2016, the EEOC filed suit on behalf of individuals with disabilities who worked for Defendant Western Distributing Co. (“Western”), a trucking company. The EEOC alleged Western’s employment policies disparately impacted these individuals under the ADA.

Western’s policies required employees to return to work on a “full-duty” basis after medical leave; required certain drivers to static push and pull 130 pounds of weight; and required certain drivers to be able to static push and pull 130 pounds of weight at 58 inches above the ground. Id. at 2.

In January 2023, a jury decided that Western’s “full-duty” policy had a disparate impact on disabled drivers. The post-trial motions resulted from the jury’s decision and Western moved to dismiss for lack of standing (“Standing Motion”) and moved to reconsider the Court’s denial of its yet-to-be-filed Rule 50(b) motion (“Motion to Reconsider”).

Standing Motion

The Court denied Western’s Standing Motion. In reviewing Western’s arguments, the Court determined Western put “great weight … on: (1) Senior U.S. District Judge Lewis T. Babcock’s Bifurcation Order; and (2) several statements by the EEOC’s counsel and the Court during the trial.” Id. at 2.

The Court found the obvious purpose of the bifurcation order was “(1) to give the parties a clear procedure for trying this action; and (2) to give the jury issues it can legally decide and reserve for the Court issues upon which it must rule.” Id. at 3. The Court reasoned that Judge Babcock’s bifurcation order “clearly contemplate[d] separate fact finding on ‘all individual claims and resultant damages’” and construing the order otherwise would be “unjust and border on absurd.” Id. at 4.

As to the statements during trial, the Court concluded that “back pay is viewed as equitable relief . . . to be decided by the judge.” Id. at 3. Therefore, the Court opined that it “will not ascribe to it the power to foreclose retrospective relief to which the EEOC and aggrieved individuals might be entitled. Nor will the Court rule such relief is improper simply because the EEOC did not present any damages evidence to a jury that could not award equitable back pay.” Id. at 4.

Motion to Reconsider

The Court granted Western’s request to reconsider arguments raised in its initial Rule 50(a) motion. The Court addressed Western’s arguments and denied each in full.

First, Western argued “the EEOC waived its Disparate Impact Claim to the extent it was based on the “full-duty policy” by failing to include this claim in its proposed “Challenge Standards” instruction. Id. at 5.

The Court determined its order one month before trial on the EEOC’s motion for partial summary judgment included both the “full-duty and maximum leave policies ‘[as] two of the thirteen discriminatory standards, criteria, or methods of administration that form the basis of the Disparate Impact Claim.’” Id. at 6. The Court also reasoned that Western was aware of the need to defend against the full-duty policy given the “significant body of evidence Western in fact prepared and marshaled to do just that.” Id.

Second, Western sought reconsideration concerning the adequacy of the evidence the EEOC presented at trial with respect to the existence of the full-duty policy and its disparate impact on qualified individuals with disabilities. Id. at 7. The Court denied Western’s request to re-weigh the evidence as the jury during trial “was attentive, engaged, and clearly thoughtful in issuing a narrow verdict.” Id. at 8. As to the disparate impact portion, the Court highlighted that this portion was “a retread of one of Western’s rejected summary judgment arguments.” Id. at 7. Therefore, the Court decided it would “not functionally reverse its own legal conclusions reached during the summary judgment phase.” Id. at 8.

For the same reasons, the Court denied Western’s third argument regarding statistical evidence of the 130-pound push/pull tests as a “re-tread” of an issue already decided on summary judgment. Id. Finally, the Court denied Western’s argument because it “[was] merely a short summary of the arguments raised in the Standing Motion.” Id.

Implications For Employers

Employers that are confronted with EEOC-initiated litigation involving employment policies should note that the Court relied heavily on the established record including prior issued orders, previous motions raising the same or similar arguments, and statements made by counsel at trial.

Further, from a practical standpoint, employers should carefully evaluate employment policies that may impact individuals with disabilities, as courts and juries are apt to scrutinize these materials.

February 9, 2024February 9, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Three Months After Class Certification Was Denied, New Mexico Federal Court Allows Sixteen FedEx Delivery Drivers To Intervene In A Class Action

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Emilee N. Crowther

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Martinez v. Fedex Ground Package System, Inc., No. 20-CV-1052, 2024 WL 418801 (D.N.M. Feb. 5, 2024), Judge Steven C. Yarbrough of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico granted the intervention motion of 16 putative class members to join the lawsuit, The Court held that the plaintiff-intervenors met the standard for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2). The Court’s decision in this case serves as an important reminder that Rule 23 and Rule 24 employ two separate commonality standards, and that class action cases are not automatically over when a court denies class certification.

Case Background

On October 12, 2020, Plaintiffs Fernandez Martinez and Shawnee Barrett (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit against Defendant Fedex Ground Package System, Inc. (“Fedex”), alleging that Fedex misclassified them as independent contractors and failed to pay them and putative class members overtime wages in violation of the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act (“NMMWA”).

On November 8, 2022, Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all current or former New Mexico FedEx drivers who were paid a day rate without overtime compensation. On October 27, 2023, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that common questions predominated over individualized issues pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). Martinez v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., No. 20-CV-1052, 2023 WL 7114678 (D.N.M. Oct. 27, 2023).

On December 15, 2023, a group of 16 putative class members (the “Intervenors”) filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs in the Lawsuit under Rule 24. Martinez, 2024 WL 418801, at 1. In their motion, the Intervenors alleged that they, like Plaintiffs, were “current or former New Mexico FedEx delivery drivers who were paid the same amount of money regardless of how many hours they worked in a day, resulting in no premium payment for overtime hours worked in violation of the [NMMWA].” Id.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted the Intervenors’ motion. Id. at 2. It held that the Intervenors presented sufficient “questions of law and fact in common with the main action” under Rule 24. Id.

The Court noted that permissive intervention under Rule 24 is appropriate where (i) a federal statute creates a conditional right, or (ii) where the “intervenor has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Id.

In its opposition, FedEx asserted that because the Intervenors were employed by independent service providers (“ISPs”) to deliver packages on behalf of FedEx, and were not employed by FedEx directly, FedEx was not liable under the NMMWA for allegedly unpaid overtime. Id. Further, FedEx argued that the commonality requirement of Rule 24 was not met because the Court already found the absence of a common question when it denied class certification. Id.

While the Court recognized that it denied class certification under Rule 23’s commonality requirement, it was not persuaded by FedEx’s arguments. The Court underscored that under Rule 24, “rather than asking whether a question is susceptible to resolution ‘in one stroke,’ courts must ask whether intervenors present ‘questions of law and fact in common with’ the main action.” Id.

The Court concluded that the “existing plaintiffs and every intervenor [would] assert that certain common aspects of [FedEx’s] contracts with ISPs [made FedEx] a joint employer and, consequently, jointly liable for any [NMMWA] violations.” Id. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Intervenors satisfied the Rule 24 commonality standard and were permitted to join the lawsuit as plaintiffs. Id. at 3.

Implications For Companies

The decision in Martinez v. FedEx serves as an important reminder for defendants that class actions are not necessarily over once class certification is denied – and some members of the putative class may take a run at joining the lawsuit per Rule 24. Additionally, it underscores the distinct commonality analyses under Rule 23 and Rule 24.

February 8, 2024February 8, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Announcing The Duane Morris EEOC Litigation Review – 2024

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: Given the importance of compliance with workplace anti-discrimination laws for our clients, we are pleased to present the second edition of the Duane Morris EEOC Litigation Review – 2024. The EEOC Litigation Review – 2024 analyzes the EEOC’s enforcement lawsuit filings in 2023 and the significant legal decisions and trends impacting EEOC litigation for 2024. We hope that employers will benefit from this deep dive into how the EEOC’s priorities reveal themselves through litigation. Click here for a copy of the EEOC Litigation Review – 2024 eBook. You can also watch our recent discussion with EEOC Commissioner Keith Sonderling at our Duane Morris Class Action Review Book Launch here.

The Review explains the impact of the EEOC’s six enforcement priorities as outlined in its Strategic Enforcement Plan on employers’ business planning and how the direction of the Commission’s Plan should influence key employer decisions. The Review also contains a compilation of significant rulings decided in 2023 that impacted EEOC-initiated litigation and a list of the most significant settlements in EEOC cases in 2023.

We hope readers will enjoy this new publication. We will continue to update blog readers on any important EEOC developments, and look forward to sharing further thoughts and analysis in 2024!

February 5, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

California Federal Court Denies Class Certification Of COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Nathan K. Norimoto, Nick Baltaxe

Duane Morris Takeaways: On January 28, 2024, in Chavez, et al. v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, No. 22-CV-06119, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14785 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2024), Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied class certification for a failure to accommodate religious beliefs claim premised on a workplace COVID-19 vaccine mandate. Specifically, the Court held that the putative class was not certifiable as the class failed to meet Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements. The decision is a good roadmap for employers dealing with the continuing fall-out of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Background Of The Case

Defendant San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (“BART”) implemented a workplace policy mandating that all employees needed a COVID-19 vaccination by December 21, 2021. Id. at 2. In response, BART received 188 requests for religious exemption and accommodation. Id. While some employees did not complete the exemption application process, 148 employees submitted applications to BART, noting varying belief systems such as “Christianity,” “Catholic,” “Islamism,” or even personal belief systems such as being “anti tyranny [sic].” Id. at 3. A panel of BART employees then reviewed each application individually and conducted further interviews with the applicants before deciding to grant or deny the request. Id. at 5.

Of the 148 completed applications, BART granted 70 religious exemptions and denied 78. Id. Those who were denied were given the option to either comply with the mandate, retire, voluntarily resign, or be terminated. Id. In total, 36 employees either retired, resigned, or were terminated. Id. BART considered accommodation for the 70 employees who were granted exemptions, but ultimately did not provide any accommodations as they could not “identify a reasonable accommodation that did not place an undue hardship on the District.” Id. at 6. Of the 70 applicants who were denied accommodation, 37 resigned, retired, or were terminated. Id. BART additionally received 25 requests for medical exemptions, and eight medical exemptions were granted, with those employees being placed on unpaid leave that only ended upon vaccination. Id.

Plaintiff Gabriel Chavez and 16 other named plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging that BART’s policy violated Title VII, the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Id. at 7. Plaintiff sought to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) composed of “all employees employed by BART who (1) have been ordered to submit to a COVID-19 vaccination, (2) have sincerely held religious beliefs which prevent them from taking the vaccine, (3) have submitted a request for a religious exemption, and (4) were denied a religious accommodation.” Id. Plaintiff also proposed a second, alternative class consisting of all employees employed by BART who “(1) have been ordered to submit to a COVID-19 vaccination, (2) have sincerely held religious beliefs which prevent them from taking the vaccine, (3) have submitted a request for religious exemption and religious accommodation, and (4) whose request for a religious exemption were denied.” Id.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court examined the class certification requirements under Rule 23(b)(3), which provide that a plaintiff must establish “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Id. at *8. The Court held that Plaintiffs’ proposed class, as well as the proposed alternative class, did not satisfy the predominance and superiority requirements, and denied Plaintiffs’ certification motion. Id. at 23.

First, the Court examined the requirement of common issues predominating over any questions affecting only individual members. Id. at 11-20. With respect to Plaintiffs’ Title VII and FEHA claims, the Court noted that whether or not an individual had a bona fide religious belief – a requirement for both claims – there were too many individual systems of belief to examine. Id. at 12. The Court held that nearly every named plaintiffs’ application contained a distinct system of belief, and any examination of whether or not a request rested on a “bona fide religious belief” would necessarily require an individual inquiry into each plaintiffs’ belief system. Id. The Court expressed doubt that the various written or interview responses of one plaintiff will have any evidentiary impact on the bona fide religious belief of the class as a whole. Id.

Next, the Court held that BART’s undue hardship showing required an individualized inquiry of factual issues. Id. The Court noted that the potential class members are drawn from a large diversity of jobs – over a dozen unique jobs – and that accommodations reasonably considered for a “train conductor’s request bear no relation to the job functions and reasonable accommodations BART must consider when evaluating the exemption request of a manager of technology programs, a fire protection worker, or a police officer, or a senior operations supervisor liaison.” Id. 13-14. Further, the Court found that the inclusion of some union employees in the putative class also required individualized inquiries as the union’s contracted-for-rights “grant impacted workers certain rights, such as seniority, that BART is not required to transgress upon.” Id. at 14. Moreover, the Court indicated that a significant portion of the class would not be impacted by an “undue hardship” analysis, as 78 of the proposed members were not even considered for accommodation. Id. at 15. The Court did acknowledge that some aspects of the undue hardship consideration may be more amenable to common proof, but in light of the putative class’s “job diversity,” it reasoned that any undue hardship analysis “cannot be understood without an interrogation of individual employees’ job duties.” Id. at 16.

As to the Free Exercise of Religion Claims, the Court determined that those claims could not satisfy the predominance requirement. In doing so, it noted that “the sincerity and religious nature of plaintiffs’ belief is . . . an individualized issue.” Id. at 20. The Court found that each of the plaintiffs cited a “myriad” of religious and of personal experiences, along with refusal due to “CDC VARS data and concerns regarding health consequences, the Organization of American States Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Senate Bill 1383 and Senate Bill 1159, among others.” Id. The Court concluded that the need to determine whether plaintiffs have met the bona fide religious belief threshold required individualized inquiries, which ultimately foreclosed class certification. Id.

Finally, the Court found that the putative class did not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement. The Court reasoned that class members have “significant interest in the individual control of their claims.” Id. at 21-22. As an example, it noted that two potential class members have already brought individual actions against BART, and that seventeen other employees had filed suit in a third case. Id. at 22. The Court held that “[p]utative class members’ demonstrated interest in bringing and controlling these various litigations further reflects the significant monetary and emotional stakes at issue, and counsels against certification.” Id. In closing, the Court noted that given “the wide range of individual issues and proof” there will also likely be difficulties in managing the class action. Id.

Implications For Employers

The ruling in Chavez, et al. v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District confirms that the need for individualized inquiries is a strong impediment to certifying a class action premised on COVID-19 vaccine accommodation theories of liability. This ruling stresses the specific importance of these individualized inquiries in the context of religious accommodations, which have recently been the subject of significant litigation after many employers implemented COVID-19 vaccine mandates in the workplace

January 29, 2024 by Alex W. Karasik

California Court Dismisses Artificial Intelligence Employment Discrimination Lawsuit

By Alex W. Karasik, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Mobley v. Workday, Inc., Case No. 23-CV-770 (N.D. Cal. Jan 19, 2024) (ECF No. 45), Judge Rita F. Lin of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed a lawsuit against Workday involving allegations that algorithm-based applicant screening tools discriminated applicants on the basis of race, age, and disability. With businesses more frequently relying on artificial intelligence to perform recruiting and hiring functions, this ruling is helpful for companies facing algorithm-based discrimination lawsuits in terms of potential strategies to attack such claims at the pleading stage.

Case Background

Plaintiff, an African-American male over the age of forty with anxiety and depression, alleged that he applied to 80 to 100 jobs with companies that use Workday’s screening tools. Despite holding a bachelor’s degree in finance and an associate’s degree in network systems administration, Plaintiff claimed he did not receive not a single job offer. Id. at 1-2.

On July 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed an amended charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). On November 22, 2022, the EEOC issued a dismissal and notice of right to sue. On February 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Workday, alleging that Workday’s tools discriminated against job applicants who are African-American, over the age of 40, and/or disabled in violation of Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, respectively.

Workday moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC as to his intentional discrimination claims; and that Plaintiff did not allege facts to state a plausible claim that Workday was liable as an “employment agency” under the anti-discrimination statutes at issue.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted Workday’s motion to dismiss. First, the Court noted the parties did not dispute that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge sufficiently exhausted the disparate impact claims. However, Workday moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for intentional discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA on the basis of his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Workday argued that the EEOC charge alleged only claims for disparate impact, not intentional discrimination.

Rejecting Workday’s argument, the Court held that it must construe the language of the EEOC charge with “utmost liberality since they are made by those unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading.” Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court acknowledged that the thrust of Plaintiff’s factual allegations in the EEOC charge concerned how Workday’s screening tools discriminated against Plaintiff based on his race and age. However, the Court held that those claims were reasonably related to his intentional discrimination claims, and that the EEOC investigation into whether the tools had a disparate impact or were intentionally biased would be intertwined. Accordingly, the Court denied Workday’s motion to dismiss on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Next, the Court addressed Workday argument that Mobley did not allege facts to state a plausible claim that it was liable as an “employment agency” under the anti-discrimination statutes at issue. The Court opined that Plaintiff did not allege facts sufficient to state a claim that Workday was “procuring” employees for these companies, as required for Workday to qualify as an “employment agency.” Id. at 1. For example, Plaintiff did not allege details about his application process other than that he applied to jobs with companies using Workday, and did not land any job offers. The complaint also did not allege that Workday helped recruit and select applicants.

In an attempt to salvage these defects at the motion hearing and in his opposition brief, Plaintiff identified two other potential legal bases for Workday’s liability — as an “indirect employer” and as an “agent.” Id. To give Plaintiff an opportunity to attempt to correct these deficiencies, the Court granted Workday’s motion to dismiss on this basis, but with leave for Plaintiff to amend. Accordingly, the Court granted in part and denied in part Workday’s motion to dismiss.

Implications For Businesses

Artificial intelligence and algorithm-based applicant screening tools are game-changers for companies in terms of streamlining their recruiting and hiring processes. As this lawsuit highlights, these technologies also invite risk in the employment discrimination context.

For technology vendors, this ruling illustrates that novel arguments about the formation of the “employment” relationship could potentially be fruitful at the pleading stage. However, the Court’s decision to let Plaintiff amend the complaint and have one more bite at the apple means Workday is not off the hook just yet. Employers and vendors of recruiting software would be wise to pay attention to this case –and the anticipated wave of employment discrimination lawsuits that are apt to be filed – as algorithm-based applicant screening tools become more commonplace.

January 29, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

DMCAR Trend #9 – ESG Class Action Litigation Hit Its Stride

By Gerald L. Maatman and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: During the past year, the label “ESG” became “mainstream,” and discussion of its impact became a recurring topic of conversation in boardrooms across the country. ESG refers to broadly to “environmental, social, and governance,” which many companies have embraced as part of their business plans and corporate missions.

Watch the video below as Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman discusses the impact of ESG on class action litigation and how this trend will evolve in 2024.

DMCAR Trend #9 – ESG Class Action Litigation Hit Its Stride

ESG was not immune to lawsuits, and we saw a steady influx of class action litigation in two particular ESI spheres – (i) product advertising and (ii) employment and DEI-related lawsuits.

The former focused on product advertising and, in particular, on allegations that marketing campaigns touting products as “green” or “sustainable” or “carbon neutral,” among other things, are false, misleading, and deceptive. Commonly called “greenwashing,” these claims generally refer to false or misleading statements about the environmental benefits or about the performance of particular products or operations and, in particular, tend to target statements touting the “green” or “sustainable” or “eco-friendly” characteristics of such products or operations.

Most often, plaintiffs’ class action attorneys file greenwashing lawsuits as class actions. These lawsuits largely focus on claims that defendants marketed products as “environmentally responsible,” “sustainably sourced,” or “humanely raised,” arguing that such misleading claims induce purchasers to pay a premium for “greener” products.

In Smith, et al. v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., No. 4:18-CV-06690 (N.D. Cal.), for example, the plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit asserting various claims, including breach of warranty, misrepresentation, and violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, targeting Keurig’s representations regarding its K-cup coffee pods. In particular, Keurig marketed its K-cups as recyclable with labeling that consumers could “[h]ave [their] cup and recycle it, too.” The plaintiffs claimed that, in fact, the K-cups were not recyclable. In 2019, the court denied Keurig’s motion to dismiss, and, in 2020, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification. In February 2023, the court granted final approval of class action settlement for $10 million.

In Dwyer, et al. v. Allbirds, 598 F. Supp. 3d 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2022), the plaintiff filed a similar greenwashing class action alleging that defendant marketed its shoes, in part, based on their sustainability using statements like “Sustainability Meets Style” and “Environmentally Friendly.” The plaintiff brought claims for breach of express warranty, fraud, and unjust enrichment and asserted violations of §§ 349-350 of the New York General Business Law. Allbirds maintained a website showing the carbon footprint associated with its products based on a life-cycle analysis (LCA), and showing the environmental impact of its materials based on the third-party Higg Material Sustainability Index (Higg MSI). The plaintiff attacked the LCA tool and the Higg MSI standard as incomplete measurements of product sustainability. The court granted Allbirds’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

In Lizama, et al. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz LP, No. 4:22-CV-1170 (E.D. Mo. 2023), the plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging that the retailer deceptively attempted to “greenwash” its allegedly environmentally damaging practices. H&M’s “Conscious Choice” collection included items made from recycled and organic materials that H&M marketed as “more sustainable.” The plaintiffs alleged that, in fact, H&M’s clothing was not sustainable because the synthetic materials in the collection had a negative environmental impact. The plaintiffs asserted claims for violation of various California and Missouri statutes and sought to certify various sub-classes. On May 12, 2023, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the California claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed the Missouri claims because it found the alleged statements not misleading as a matter of law.

Relative to employment and DEI-related lawsuits, the plaintiffs’ class action bar focused numerous claims based on allegations that companies failed to live up to their representations regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion or breached their DEI commitments.

Plaintiffs anchored many of their class claims on board-related DEI commitments, employment discrimination, and workplace safety issues. In the corporate DEI cases, plaintiffs asserted claims that companies allegedly failed to live up to their DEI commitments or failed to abide by their DEI policies or practices. In many of the ESG-related employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs focused on claims that corporate officers or directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to address employment discrimination, by adopting policies that discriminate, or by failing to address safety concerns.

In Bucks County Employees Retirement System v. Norfolk Southern Corp., No. 2:23-CV-982 (N.D. Ga. 2023), for instance, the plaintiff filed a securities class action against the defendant and three of its managers alleging that they misrepresented the corporation’s worker safety practices prior to a chemical train derailment, leading investors to purchase company stock at inflated levels. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants committed to safety as a “core value” in their public statements and SEC filings but, in reality prioritized more lucrative practices at the expense of safety, such as longer and heavier trains and lower headcounts. The plaintiff asserted that such culture of “increased risk-taking” made the company more vulnerable to derailments.

As companies continue to add statements regarding their environmental impact or social responsibility to enhance their marketing efforts, communicate their company values, and/or attempt to appeal to consumers and shareholders attuned to ESG considerations, we expect to see ESG class actions continue their growth trajectory.

January 26, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

DMCAR Trend #8 – Generative AI Began Transforming Class Action Litigation

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: Generative AI hit mainstream in 2023 and quickly become one of the most talked-about and debated subjects among corporate legal counsel across the country, as numerous companies jumped to incorporate AI while attempting to manage its risks. In 2023, we saw the tip of the iceberg relative to the ways that generative AI is poised to transform class action litigation.

In the video below, Duane Morris partner Jennifer Riley discusses the latest AI class action rulings, and what companies can expect to see in AI litigation in 2024.

DMCAR Trend #8 – Generative AI Began Transforming Class Action Litigation

Opportunities For Enhanced Efficiency

As the COVID 19 pandemic brought video-conferencing tools into the mainstream, such tools enabled more litigants to conduct and to attend more hearings, more depositions, and more mediations in less time. While the debate continues as to their effectiveness, generative AI is poised to enable lawyers to far surpass those gains in efficiency, potentially enabling the plaintiffs’ class action bar to do “more with less” like never before, leading to more lawsuits that can be handled by fewer lawyers in less time and a potential surge of class actions on the horizon.

Less than a year into the generative AI movement, we have seen the technology influence various aspects of the legal process, including by assisting legal professionals in analyzing vast amounts of data; automating the review of documents, contracts, and communications; increasing the speed and potentially enhancing the accuracy of e-discovery; and automating and enhancing the dissemination of information in the class action settlement administration process.

Legal research, for example, traditionally required a time-consuming undertaking that involved sifting through dozens of decisions and secondary authorities. AI tools are enhancing this process through natural language search capabilities and machine learning algorithms that streamline the process and enhance the results. Document review similarly traditionally required a time-consuming and painstaking process. AI tools are using machine learning and text analytics, for example, to sort and categorize large datasets with increasing accuracy. By quickly analyzing extensive document sets, AI tools can expedite the discovery process, making litigation more efficient and cost-effective.

Likewise, AI has the potential to revolutionize the process of administering class action settlements. The participation in claims-made settlements, for instance, often falls within the range of 15% to 35%, depending upon various factors such as the type and method of notice. AI can be used in a variety of ways, including to find potential class members and thereby raise claim rates, while reducing administrative costs, increasing the amount available for distribution as well as the ultimate settlement payout.

In sum, the legal industry is poised to leverage this transformative technology to make leaps in enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the class action litigation process.

Risk Of Class Claims

While improving the efficiency with which the plaintiffs’ class action bar can litigate class actions, generative AI is providing an ocean of raw material for potential claims. Upon hitting the mainstream, AI promptly became the subject of class claims, which span multiple theories and areas of law.

While generative AI might improve the speed of interactions, for instance, users have the ability to exploit AI to generate massive amounts of false information or to simply inadvertently rely upon errors in AI-generated communications, giving rise to claims. Similarly, the SEC has warned businesses against “AI washing,” or making false claims regarding their AI capabilities, likening it to the greenwashing phenomenon that has been the target of an agency crackdown. The plaintiffs’ class action bar is using such representations about AI to fuel class claims for consumer fraud based on allegedly misleading or deceptive representations about the efficacy of AI technology. In Matsko, et al. v. Tesla, Case No. 22-CV-5240 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2022), for instance, a plaintiff filed a class action alleging that Tesla exaggerated the capabilities of its software and asserting various causes of action for breach of warranty and violation of California consumer protection laws, among others.

Companies that incorporate AI to streamline their decision-making processes likewise face the prospect of class action suits. Plaintiffs have filed suits against insurers that used algorithms to adjudicate claims, for example, as well as against agencies that used programs to deny or reduce government benefits. In Kisting-Leung, et al. v. Cigna Corp., Case No. 23-CV-01477 (E.D. Cal. 2023), for instance, a group of California consumers filed a class action complaint against a national health insurance company alleging that its use of an algorithm to deny certain medical claims constituted breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, intentionally interfered with contractual relations, and violated California’s Unfair Competition Law.

The developers of generative AI products have not remained immune. Such companies have faced a slew of class action lawsuits alleging privacy violations. In a series of lawsuits beginning in June and July 2023, the plaintiffs’ class action bar has alleged that, by collecting publicly-available data to develop and train their software, developers of generative AI products stole private and personal information from millions of individuals. In P.M., et al. v. OpenAI LP, No. 3:2023-CV-03199 (N.D. Cal. 2023), a group of plaintiffs filed a class action suit against OpenAI LP and Microsoft, Inc. alleging that by collecting publicly-available information from the internet to develop and train its generative AI tools, including ChatGPT, Dall-E, and Vall-E, OpenAI stole private information from millions of people, violating their privacy and property rights, among other claims. In J.L., et al. v. Alphabet Inc., No. 3:23-CV-03440 (N.D. Cal. 2023), the same plaintiffs’ firm filed a class action lawsuit against Google, similarly alleging that, by collecting internet data to train its tools like Bard, Imagen and Gemini, Google infringed privacy rights and violated the Copyright Act.

Developers of generative AI tools similarly have faced claims. Plaintiffs have filed class action lawsuits claiming that, by collecting and using internet data to train generative AI models, developers violated copyright laws. In Andersen, et al. v. Stability AI, Ltd., Case No. 23-CV-00201 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2023), for example, plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of artists alleging that Stability AI, Ltd. and Stability AI, Inc. “scraped” billions of copyrighted images from online sources, without permission, to train their models to generate new images without ascribing credit to the original artists. In Doe v. GitHub, Inc., 22-CV-06823 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2023), the plaintiffs, a group of developers who allegedly published licensed code on GitHub’s website, filed a class action lawsuit against GitHub, the online code repository, as well as Microsoft and OpenAI claiming that GitHub improperly used that code to train its AI-powered coding assistant, Copilot, without appropriate attribution in violation of copyright management laws.

As technology continues to grow and change, and the plaintiffs’ class action bar continues to flex its creativity, the number and types of claims are likely to expand and evolve during the upcoming year.

January 26, 2024January 26, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Virginia Federal Court Authorizes $2.4 Million Award For ERISA Severance Plan Benefits In WARN Act Class Action

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Kathryn Brown

Duane Morris Takeaways: On January 16 and 17, 2024, in Messer v. Bristol Compressors International, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-00040 (W.D. Va.), on remand from a Fourth Circuit decision, Judge James P. Jones of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia issued an opinion and order entering judgment in the amount of $2,407,471.90 for severance pay benefits owed under an ERISA employee benefits plan based on violations of the 60-day notice requirement of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1). The multi-million dollar ruling stems from a 2018 WARN-covered “plant closing” and follows an earlier award on November 23, 2021 of $1.39 million to certain class members for damages including back pay and interest owed pursuant to the WARN Act for the same notice violation underlying the recent ruling.

The decision highlights the extremely technical nature and high stakes of WARN Act litigation in the class action context.

Case Background

On July 31, 2018, Bristol Compressors International (BCI) notified employees that it would close its manufacturing facility in Bristol, Virginia, and their employment would terminate on or before September 30, 2018. BCI implemented several rounds of terminations over the next three and a half months, beyond the originally anticipated date of September 30, 2018 for the final terminations. However, BCI did not issue additional notice under the WARN to those whose employment ended after September 30, 2018. The manufacturing facility ultimately closed on November 16, 2018.

On October 19, 2018, a group of former employees sued BCI- under the WARN Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the company failed to provide 60 days’ notice of their terminations in accordance with the specific requirements of the WARN Act.

On June 20, 2019, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for certification of three sub-classes of former employees terminated due to the plant closing under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3). Sub-class One included employees involuntarily terminated between July 31, 2018 and August 31, 2018. Sub-class Two included employees involuntarily terminated after August 31, 2018 who signed a stay bonus agreement that included an express waiver of claims under the WARN Act. Sub-class Three included employees involuntarily terminated after August 31, 2018 who had not signed a stay bonus agreement.

Following a bench trial, the Court in 2020 granted summary judgment to BCI on the plaintiffs’ claim for benefits owed under a company severance pay plan. The Court found that BCI validly terminated its severance pay plan before the employment terminations. In a separate 2020 opinion, the Court dismissed upon summary judgment the WARN Act claims of four class members whose employment ended on October 19, 2018. The Court reasoned that BCI’s July 31, 2018 notification was adequate to prepare them for their later job losses. The plaintiffs appealed those prior rulings to the Fourth Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit’s Ruling

On April 3, 2023, the Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, reversed and remanded parts of the 2020 rulings. Messer v. Bristol Compressors International, LLC, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 7826 (4th Cir. Apr. 3, 2023) (per curiam).

The Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of severance pay benefits to the class, concluding the company did not terminate the severance pay plan in accordance with the ERISA’s requirements for modifying or terminating an ERISA-governed benefits plan. As a result, the severance pay plan was in effect when the employment terminations occurred.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision upholding the release of claims under the WARN Act to members of Sub-class Two. However, because the release of claims in the stay bonus agreements those class members signed explicitly carved out claims for vested benefits under the company’s “written benefit plans,” members of Sub-class Two did not waive their claims for severance pay benefits owed to them under the ERISA-governed employee benefit plan.

The Fourth Circuit also vacated the grant of summary judgment to BCI on the WARN Act claims of the four plaintiffs whose employment ended on October 19, 2018. The Fourth Circuit pointed to the regulation under the WARN Act providing that, if an employer postpones a covered plant closure for 60 days or more, additional 60 days’ notice under the WARN Act is owed to affected employees. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.10. Because the company issued no additional notice to those four individuals after July 31, 2018, but terminated their employment after September 30, 2018, the Fourth Circuit opined that a WARN Act violation was established.

The District Court’s Decision

On remand, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for summary judgment on the two issues on which the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. Consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, the Court held that all class members were entitled to severance pay benefits under the severance pay plan, plus interest, and the four plaintiffs whose employment ended on October 19, 2018 were in addition owed back pay and prejudgment interest for a 60-day period.

On January 17, 2014, the Court ordered the case closed, with leave granted to class counsel to file a supplemental motion for attorneys’ fees and costs within 30 days.

Implications For Employers

The Messer case is illustrative of the many decisions in recent years in which plaintiffs have recovered multi-million dollar judgments following class certification of WARN Act claims. Employers should remain vigilant to the WARN Act, and the potential exposure to 60 days’ worth of back pay, lost benefits and prejudgment interest in the event of violations, well before implementing any mass layoff or plant closure that may trigger its strict notification requirements.

January 25, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Federal Court Partially Dismisses Class Action Privacy Claims Involving “Eufy” Security Cameras

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Alex W. Karasik, and Tyler Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Sloan, et al. v. Anker Innovations Ltd., No. 22-CV-7174 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2024), Judge Sarah Ellis of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted in part a motion to dismiss privacy claims brought against the companies that manufacture and sell “eufy” security products. The Court dismissed the claims asserted under the federal Wiretap Act because Defendants were “parties” to the communication during which the eufy products sent security recordings to Plaintiffs’ mobile devices (notwithstanding that the products also sent the data to a server owned by Defendants). In addition, the Court partially dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act and under four state consumer protection statutes, thereby allowing Plaintiffs to proceed with their case only with respect to some of their claims.

For businesses who are embroiled in facial recognition software and related privacy class actions, this ruling provides a helpful roadmap for fracturing such claims at the outset of the lawsuit.

Case Background

Plaintiffs were individuals from various states who purchased and used Defendants’ “eufy” branded home security cameras and video doorbells. The eufy products can, among other things, detect motion outside a person’s home and apply a facial recognition program differentiate “between known individuals and strangers by recognizing biometric identifiers and comparing the face template against those stored in a database.” Id. at 3. Eufy products sync to a user’s phone through eufy’s Security app, which notifies a user of motion around the camera by sending the use a recorded thumbnail image or text message.

Defendants advertised that the video recordings and facial recognition data obtained through eufy cameras are stored locally on user-owned equipment owned and that the data would be encrypted so that only the user could access it. Media reports later revealed, however, that the eufy products uploaded thumbnail images used to notify users of movement to Defendants’ cloud storage without encryption, and that users could stream content from their videos through unencrypted websites.

Claiming they relied to their detriment on Defendants’ (allegedly false) privacy-related representations when purchasing the eufy products, the eight named Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against corporate Defendants involved in the manufacture and sale of “eufy” products. In their complaint, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants violated: (1) the Federal Wiretap Act; (2) the Biometric Information Privacy Act (the “BIPA”); and (3) the consumer protection statutes of Illinois, New York, Massachusetts, and Florida. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion, holding that: (1) the Wiretap Act claim should be dismissed because Defendants were a party to the relevant communication (i.e., the transmission of data from eufy products to Plaintiffs via the eufy Security app); (2) the BIPA claims should be dismissed as to non-Illinois resident Plaintiffs; and (3) the claims brought under the relevant consumer protection statutes should be dismissed only to the extent they were premised on certain of Defendants’ public-facing privacy statements.

Wiretap Act Claims

The Court first addressed Plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claims, explaining that the statute “empowers a private citizen to bring a civil claim against someone who ‘intentionally intercepts [or] endeavors to intercept . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication.’” Id. at 8 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)).

Defendants argued that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Wiretap Act because the statute does not apply to a party to the relevant communication. Specifically, the Wiretap Act exempts a person who intercepts an electronic communication “where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).

The Court agreed with Defendants and thus dismissed Plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim. The Court described the relevant “communication” as the transmission of data from eufy products to Plaintiffs’ devices and explained that the transmission “is not between the eufy product and Plaintiffs, but rather between the eufy product and the eufy Security app, which Defendants own and operate. As such, the communication necessarily requires Defendants’ participation, even if Plaintiffs did not intend to share their information with Defendants.” Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added). The Court thus held that Defendants were parties to the communication, and Defendants also uploading the data to their own server (without Plaintiffs’ knowledge) did not change that conclusion.

BIPA Claims

Regarding Plaintiffs’ BIPA claims, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs failed to allege that the relevant data (which Defendants described as “thumbnail images”) qualifies for protection under the BIPA because photographs are not biometric data under the statute. The Court rejected this argument since Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants uploaded thumbnail information and facial recognition data (namely, “scans of face geometry”) to their server.

The Court agreed with Defendants’ second argument, however, which asserted that Plaintiffs’ BIPA claim failed to the extent it was brought by or on behalf of Plaintiffs who are not Illinois residents. The BIPA applies only where the underlying conduct occurs “primarily and substantially” in Illinois. The Court determined that the relevant communications between Plaintiffs and Defendants “occurred primarily and substantially in the state of residency for each Plaintiff.” Id. at 12-13. And the End User License Agreement for eufy Camera Products and the Security App stating that the agreement is governed by Illinois law did not change the result that the BIPA claim brought by non-Illinois residents must be dismissed.

Statutory Consumer Protection Claims

Finally, the Court turned to Defendants’ contentions relative to the alleged violations of the four state consumer protection statutes. In beginning its analysis, the Court explained that “[t]o state a claim for deceptive practices under any of the alleged state consumer fraud statutes, Plaintiffs must allege a deceptive statement or act that caused their harm.” Id. at 14. Moreover, “a statement is deceptive if it creates a likelihood of deception or has the capacity to deceive.” Id. at 15 (citation omitted); see also id. (noting that “the allegedly deceptive act must be looked upon in light of the totality of the information made available to the plaintiff”) (citation omitted). Defendants argued in their motion to dismiss that Plaintiffs did not allege cognizable deceptive statements because the statements at issue constitute either puffery or are not false.

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ statutory fraud claims in part. Specifically, the Court held that Defendants’ advertising in the form of certain “statements relating to privacy” (e.g., “your privacy is something that we value as much as you do”) constituted nonactionable “puffery.” Id. at 16. The Court therefore dismissed Plaintiffs’ statutory fraud claims insofar as they were premised on the similarly vague “statements relating to privacy.”

However, the Court denied Defendants’ attempt to dismiss the claims premised on their more specific statements about (1) end-user data being stored only on a user’s local device, (2) the use of alleged facial recognition, and (3) end-user data being encrypted. Defendants argued that these were “accurate statements” and thus could not serve as the basis for consumer fraud claims. The Court disagreed, ruling that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the storage, encryption, and facial recognition statements may have misled a reasonable consumer. Accordingly, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Implications For Corporate Counsel

The most significant aspect of Sloan v. Anker Innovations Limited is the Court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claims, given the rapidly emerging trend among the plaintiff class action bar of using traditional state and federal laws – including the Wiretap Act – to seek relief for alleged privacy violations. In applying modern technologies to older laws like the Wiretap Act (passed in 1986), courts have grappled with issues such as the determination of who is a “party to the communication” such that an entity is exempt from the statute’s scope. As data exchanges and data storage become more complex, the “party to the communication” determination reciprocally becomes more nebulous.

In Sloan, the “communication” was the eufy products transmitting data to Plaintiffs’ device and “contemporaneously intercept[ing] and sen[ding] [the data] to [Defendant’s] server.” Id. at 8 (citation omitted). Because Plaintiffs had to use the eufy Security app to access the data, and because Defendants owned and operated the app, the Court determined that Defendants necessarily participated in the communication. But the result may have been different if, for instance, Plaintiffs could use a different app (one not owned by Defendants) to access the data, or if unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, the eufy Securty app was actually owned and operated by a third-party entity. The upshot is that corporate counsel should keep these principles in mind with respect to any data-flow processes regarding end-user or employee data.