Pennsylvania Superior Court Shoes In Consent Framework For State Wiretap Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer Riley, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On October 23, 2026, in Thompson v. C. & J. Clark America, Inc., No. 74 WDA 2026, 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 557 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2026), the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated a lower court’s grant of summary judgment to footwear retailer C. & J. Clark America, Inc. (“Clarks”) in a putative class action alleging that a third-party analytics vendor “wiretapped” visitors’ interactions with the retailer’s website in violation of Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (“WESCA”) and constituted common law invasion of privacy. The Superior Court rejected the trial court’s holding that communicating over the internet amounts to consent to interception, and adopted the framework articulated in Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 3d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2025), in its entirety, holding that a reasonably conspicuous privacy policy disclosing third-party tracking can establish implied consent under WESCA’s all-party consent exception. The decision underscores an emerging line of state court rulings scrutinizing online privacy policies more closely, with wider implications for litigation to be brought against companies with an online presence.

Background

On February 14, 2023, Plaintiff, a consumer, brought a putative class action against Clarks in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County alleging that the shoe retailer, through third-party vendor Content Square, wiretapped the electronic communications of visitors to its website, including their “mouse movements, clicks, keystrokes … URLs of web pages visited, and/or other electronic communications,” in violation of WESCA and common law invasion of privacy.  Id. at *1-2. Plaintiff claimed that after visiting the Clarks website on her phone and browsing for sandals, she received unwanted, targeted ads for sandals, including for those sold by Clarks. Id. at *6-7. Plaintiff’s complaint stated that she had not entered her name, email address, or payment information, did not create an account on the website, and did not use the chat function. Id. Further, Plaintiff claimed that she never reviewed the website’s terms of use nor the cookie policy. Id. at *7.

The Court of Common Pleas dismissed her common law invasion of privacy claim on preliminary objections but allowed her to proceed on her WESCA claim. Id. at *2. On December 5, 2025, it granted summary judgment to Clarks. Id. at *8. In a 3-5 decision relying on Commonwealth v. Proetto, 2001 PA Super 95, 771 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. 2001), Commonwealth v. Cruttenden, 619 Pa. 123, 58 A.3d 95 (Pa. 2012), Commonwealth v. Diego, 2015 PA Super 143, 119 A.3d 370 (Pa. Super. 2015), and Commonwealth v. Byrd, 661 Pa. 85, 235 A.3d 311 (Pa. 2020), the Court of Common Pleas held that a website visitor need not have known that she was being tracked or by whom, and that her “‘very act’ of sending an electronic communication over the Internet amounted to her express consent to recording.” Id. at *15-16. The Court of Common Pleas determined that “when [plaintiff] surfed the Internet for summer sandals and clicked on the Clarks America website, she should have known that Clarks America or another acting on its behalf was tracking her activity.” Id. at *16.

Plaintiff appealed, and the Superior Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the matter back to the Court of Common Pleas.

The Superior Court’s Decision

On October 23, 2026, the Superior Court issued its decision after considering (1) whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in finding that a website visitor gives their express consent to being wiretapped through the act of sending an electronic communication over the internet; (2) whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in finding that Clarks’ third-party vendor was its agent and thus permitted to circumvent WESCA’s all-party consent requirement; and (3) whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in holding that Plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie showing sufficient to allow a trier of fact to find that her communications with Clarks’ website were unlawfully intercepted by the third party vendor. In an opinion written by Judge Mary P. Murray and joined by Judges Mary Jane Bowes and Judith F. Olson, the Superior Court found that the Court of Common Pleas had erred on the issue of consent, and found the last question moot, and thus vacated and remanded the decision.

The Superior Court, finding a dearth of Pennsylvania case law applying WESCA to the circumstances at issue,  based its decision on what it referred to as a “highly instructive” 2025 ruling in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entitled Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 3d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2025) (“Popa II”), which followed a reversal of summary judgment granted in Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 3d 535 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (“Popa I”), to a defendant in a putative class action alleging similar claims, reversed by the Third Circuit in Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 52 F.4th 121 (3d Cir. 2022) (“Popa III”). Id. at *28.  In Popa II, the Third Circuit held that “there is no sweeping direct-party exception to civil liability under WESCA,” reasoning that the General Assembly’s 2012 amendment codifying a narrow intended-recipient carve-out for law enforcement limited Proetto and Cruttenden to their facts. Id. at *31. On remand, the District Court in Popa III had held that the plaintiff constructively consented to third-party tracking because the defendant retailer’s privacy statement adequately disclosed third-party data collection and was reasonably conspicuous in the website’s footer. Id. at *33-44.

The Superior Court found that the record raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether Content Square tracked Plaintiff’s communications, and that such tracking would constitute an interception under WESCA. Id. at *47. The Superior Court agreed with the Court of Common Pleas that under WESCA § 5704(4), consent turns on an objective, “reasonable user” standard: “whether a reasonable Internet user in [plaintiff’s] position knew or should have known that the contents of her communications with the Clarks website would be acquired by a third party,” and that actual knowledge is not required. Id. at *47-48. But the Superior Court held that the Court of Common Pleas erred with its application of the statute. Id. at *48.  It found that the lower court’s conclusion that a sender’s ignorance of the recipient’s identity is irrelevant was in error because of the reliance on Proetto and Cruttenden, which had involved two-party communications with police officers posing as the intended recipient, and a 2012 amendment to WESCA licensed only police officers to do so. Id. at *48-50. As the Superior Court observed, “misrepresenting one’s identity in order to receive communications appears to be a prerogative belonging to police officers.” Id. at *49.

The Superior Court found that the Court of Common Pleas had removed Proetto’s language on the “very act of sending a communication over the Internet” being consent from its context, which, in Proetto was a chat room message received in recorded form by its intended recipient. Id. at *51-53. The Superior Court explained that “Proetto and its progeny do not support the blanket ruling, which implies that any person sending any form of communication over the Internet inherently consents to the acquisition of that communication’s contents by anyone who happens to be listening/recording.” Id. at *52. The Superior Court found that the Court of Common Pleas erred by failing to apply the reasonable person standard to the particular form of communication at issue, here, a shopper’s interaction with a retail website, and by failing to consider whether a reasonable person would be aware that someone other than the intended recipient might acquire the communication. Id. at *52-53.

The Superior Court agreed with Clark’s reasoning, relying on Popa III, that “a reasonably prudent person has a lower expectation of privacy on the Internet, particularly with respect to the kind of non-sensitive data involved here.” Id. at *55. While acknowledging that WESCA is content-neutral and that a violation does not require sensitive information, the Superior Court held that the “innocuous nature” of the data is relevant to the reasonable person standard. Id. at *55.

The Superior Court then held that a website privacy policy may convey implied consent to an interception if it “disclose[s] the nature of the interception to a reasonable reader” and is “reasonably conspicuous” on the webpage. Id. at *57. It found Clarks’ privacy policy to have satisfied the first prong because it disclosed that Clarks and its “third party partners” used cookies, pixel tags, and web beacons to “track the actions of users,” and that third parties “may place cookies on your browsers for purposes of tracking consumer behavior.” Id. at *57-61. The Superior Court found the policy “rife with references to the involvement of third parties,” and concluded that “reasonable readers of the Privacy Policy would know that the content of their communications with the Clarks website would be intercepted by third parties.” Id. at *61-62. The Superior Court rejected the opinions of Plaintiff’s expert that the policy did not cover Content Square because it applied only to data collected by “www.clarksusa.com” because the Superior Court found that such a technical distinction “would not be appreciable by an average Internet user,” and it agreed with Popa III that WESCA does not require a privacy policy to “reveal granular details about the identity of the ‘third parties’ or the specific type of cookies used.” Id. at *62.

The Superior Court adopted Popa III’s rejection of Plaintiff’s argument that tracking begins before a user can reach the privacy policy. Id. at *63. It further refused to import the heightened, “unambiguous manifestation of assent” standard that the Superior Court had applied to online arbitration agreements in Duffy v. Tatum, 354 A.3d 14 (Pa. Super. 2026), explaining that Plaintiff waived no constitutional right and that the alleged infringement “is of such low stakes” that the Third Circuit had found it insufficient to confer Article III standing. Id. at *63-65. The Superior Court thus held that “a website’s browsewrap privacy policy, if reasonably conspicuous, may be sufficient to demonstrate that a reasonable user should know about the data-collection practices disclosed in the policy, thereby conferring implied consent under WESCA section 5704(4).” Id. at *66.

Ultimately, however, the Superior Court rejected Clark’s contention that a link to its privacy policy was conspicuously located at the center of the bottom of its website because it was not supported by evidence in the record. Id. at *68. Thus, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Superior Court could not conclude that Clarks had met its burden for consent. Id. The Superior Court therefore vacated without prejudice and remanded, authorizing the parties to supplement the record. Id. at *70.

Implications For Companies

With the decision in Thompson, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has laid out the governing framework for WESCA class actions in Pennsylvania courts via Popa. Courts in the state are instructed to more closely scrutinize whether website users have been reasonably apprised of a site’s privacy policy, and whether such policies inform users of any tracking they are subject to. A simple click or scroll is, under this ruling, may no longer be argued as consent to be tracked. The key takeaway for companies operating websites utilizing tracking software or third party vendors include the importance of preparing a conspicuous and clear privacy policy that discloses use of such technology and/or vendors, and that a visible and accessible privacy policy may be the centerpiece of a defense of consent in wiretapping litigation.

New Jersey Federal Court Affirms “Modest Factual Showing” Required During Conditional Certification Of FLSA Collective Action

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Shannon Noelle, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 12, 2026, Judge Brian R. Martinotti of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied an employer’s Rule 72 objection of Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer’s decision granting conditional certification in Dotson, et al. v. TZ Insurance Solutions LLC, Case No. 2:25-CV-13323 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2026).   Three named plaintiffs, former and current sales agent employees of the insurance company-defendant, brought a collective action alleging the Company violated the FLSA by failing to compensate them for time spend logging in and out of computer systems and excluded non-discretionary bonus and commission payments from the regular rate of pay.   The Company challenged the Magistrate Judge’s conditional certification decision on the basis that it did not adequately consider the Company’s declarations regarding its timekeeping process and certified an overbroad collective action not requested in the complaint that included non-remote and remote employees.  These arguments were rejected as was the Company’s request for interlocutory review of whether the two-step framework is applicable in the Third Circuit.  The Court opined that a two-step process applies requiring only a “modest factual showing” at the first, conditional certification stage during which Plaintiffs can rely on declarations establishing that “similarly situated plaintiffs do in fact exist” that were affected by a common employer policy.

Case Background

Plaintiffs Kimberly Dotson, Jennifer Connor, and Amenda McConnell brought a putative collective action individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, against TZ Insurance Solutions LLC (“TZ Insurance,” or “Defendant”), alleging violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and common law by failing to compensate them for all time worked.  Id. at 2.  Plaintiffs, current and former hourly insurance sales agents that all worked remotely, specifically alleged that TZ Insurance did not pay them for required pre-shift, meal-period, and post-shift bootup and boot-down work, and that it underpaid their overtime by leaving non-discretionary bonus and commission payments out of their regular rate of pay.  Id.

The Company moved to dismiss the claims, but the District Court denied the motion.  Id.  On February 11, 2026, Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification.  On July 29, 2026, Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer granted the motion.  On August 12, 2026, the Company challenged the ruling. It advanced three arguments challenging the Magistrate Judge’s decision, including:  (1) it failed to consider Defendants’ declarations explaining its timekeeping process for Sales Agents and detailing two studies it commissioned to estimate the time it takes Sales Agents to bootup and log-in or shut down and log out of computer systems; (2) it was overbroad in conditionally certifying a group of non-remote and remote Sales Agents that are not similarly situated; and (3) included a breach of contract claim that could not be certified under the FLSA because it was not pled as such in the complaint.  Id. at 4. The Company also requested, in the alternative, for certification of an interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the two-step framework for FLSA actions applies in the Third Circuit.  Id. Defendants’ three arguments were denied as was its request for interlocutory certification of whether the two-step framework applies.   

The Court’s Ruling

As to the Company’s first challenge, the Court, in rejecting the argument, found that the first stage of conditional certification requires only a “modest factual showing” to demonstrate a “factual nexus between the manner in which the employer’s alleged policy affected him or her and the manner in which it affected the proposed collective” and that “similarly situated plaintiffs do in fact exist.” Id. at 5.  This factual showing, to be clear, is a low threshold requiring just “something beyond mere speculation.” Id.  As such, the Court found that Defendants’ declarations regarding timekeeping processes went to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims as the evidence “seeks to disprove Plaintiffs’ allegations of the timekeeping process Defendant required them to perform and the amount of time the processes took.” Id. at 6-7.  Moreover, on the modest factual showing front, the Court found that though Magistrate Judge Hammer’s “conclusion was based on Plaintiffs’ declarations, courts in this circuit have consistently found declarations sufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating similarly situated plaintiffs exist.”  Id. This portion of the Court’s opinion underscores the leniency of the modest factual showing standard; whereas, Plaintiffs’ declarations were sufficient to meet their burden, Defendants’ declarations were insufficient to rebut their showing. 

In rejecting the Company’s second challenge, the Court found that “Plaintiffs’ declarations alleged the same policies applied to all Sales Agents” and that the Company’s declarations did not dispute this point, either.  Id. at 7. The Court also noted that Plaintiffs submitted job postings for the Sales Agent position, which listed uniform responsibilities for remote and location-specific Sales Agents.  Id. All of which the Court reasoned supported the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Sales Agents were subject to the same treatment, “amounting to the required modest factual showing.”  Id. The Court clarified, “Judge Hammer was not yet required to determine [if] the members of the collective were in fact similarly situated to the named plaintiffs.” Id.

As to the Company’s third challenge, the District Court found that Plaintiffs did allege that the Company’s failure to include commissions and non-discretionary bonus payments into the regular rate of pay violated the FLSA disagreeing with Defendant’s claim that such a claim was not asserted in the operative complaint.  Id. at 8. The Court also found that the claim that Magistrate Judge Hammer certified was separate and distinct from the breach of contract claim — i.e., Plaintiffs alleged that they were not paid commissions in breach of their sales agent agreements and also alleged that such commissions were not factored into the regular rate of pay resulting in an underpayment of overtime pay.  Id. at 9. The second allegation was certified as part of the FLSA collective action.  Id. The Court further noted that the Third Circuit has rejected the argument that the regular rate of pay under the FLSA always has to be “actual wages.”  Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs simply brought two concurrent claims as they are permitted to do under applicable case law.  Id.

Finally, as to the Company’s request, in the alternative, that the Court certify the question of whether a two-step framework applies for interlocutory review, the Court declined to do so. It opined that this a settled area in the of law in the Third Circuit. Id. at 12.

Implications for Companies

The District Court’s decision in Dotson reinforces the Third Circuit’s firm adherence to the “modest factual showing” standard and the leniency in applicable of this standard as a practical matter.  In opposing conditional certification, employers would be well-advised to submit detailed declarations and documents showing differences in policies applicable to the proposed collective (remote vs. non-remote and locale-specific) and should also draft job postings carefully to avoid what could be viewed as concessions in litigation.

Second Circuit Revives Shelved Grocery Workers’ Waiting Time Suit

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 13, 2026, in Santos v. Lidl US, LLC, No. 25-2357 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 2026), the Second Circuit vacated a district court’s dismissal of a grocery worker’s time-shaving claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). The Second Circuit held that waiting time is compensable under the FLSA when an employer requires an employee to report to work at a specific time and be ready to work when there is no work to do for reasons beyond the employee’s control. It also declined to consider fifteen minutes of unpaid time a week as de minimis when argued at the pleading stage. For employers with shift workers, the ruling signals a narrowing of the Portal-to-Portal Act defense and gives plaintiffs’ lawyers a new basis for bringing collective actions in the Second Circuit.

Background

On January 26, 2024, Plaintiff Sandra Santos brought a class and collective action alleging that her employer, Lidl US, LLC (“Lidl”), had engaged in the unlawful practice known as “time-shaving” in violation of the FLSA and NYLL. Plaintiff, a store clerk and stocker at the grocer’s West Babylon, New York location, alleged that Lidl required her and other opening-shift employees to report to work fifteen minutes before the listed start time, though they were not always able to clock in until their shift start time or later, and that as a result they were not paid overtime. Plaintiff sought to represent a collective under the FLSA and a class under the NYLL.

On September 10, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed both claims with prejudice after holding that the Portal-to-Portal Act barred the FLSA claim and that because the NYLL claim was coextensive with it, it was barred, too. Plaintiff appealed, and the Second Circuit vacated and remanded to the District Court.

The Appeals Court’s Decision

Writing for the majority, Judge Beth Robinson cited to U.S. Department of Labor regulation 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(h) interpreting the Portal-to-Portal Act, writing that the regulation distinguished between when an employee voluntarily arrives early and conducts a “preliminary” activity, and when an employee is required to report at a set hour, is ready to work, and has no work to do for reasons beyond their control, where the employee is doing something “integral” to their principal activities. Id. at 1.  Under the § 790.7(h), the former is not compensable, but the latter is. Judge Robinson then cited to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005), which determined courts were required to apply a separate analysis on compensable work time where workers had been required to report at a specific time to begin donning protective gear prior to starting their shift only to find that no protective gear was available, including evaluating whether the donning was “integral” to the job they were hired to perform. Id. at 12.

In its defense, Lidl argued that Alvarez and § 790.7(h) were abrogated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014), which held that time spent waiting to go through a security line was a noncompensable postliminary activity because it was not a “principal” activity for which the workers were employed. Id. at 14. The Second Circuit declined to read the decision so broadly, writing that Busk did not “address the distinct scenario of a worker engaged to wait.” Id. at 15. Citing to Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944), Judge Robison wrote that an employee may be hired specifically to wait, and Busk did not upend the principle that “[r]eadiness to serve may be hired, quite as much as service itself.” Id. at 16.

Lidl responded that this is limited to workers such as firefighters and limousine drivers, but the Court of Appeals was unconvinced, writing that it found “no such limit in the text of § 790.7(h).” Id.

Finally, the Second Circuit rejected Lidl’s alternative argument that the time workers spent waiting was de minimis, writing that it could not “conclude from our precedents that fifteen minutes of uncompensated work time a week is de minimis.” Id. at 17.

Judge Richard J. Sullivan’s Dissent

In his dissent, Judge Sullivan wrote that the majority’s holding was in conflict with the Portal-to-Portal Act and with the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent, concluding that the wait time at issue was neither “integral” nor “indispensable” to plaintiff’s work as a grocery store clerk because Lidl could have eliminated it without affecting the principal activities of stocking or customer service. Id. at 23.  Judge Sullivan further wrote that § 790.7(h) applies only when waiting is an unusual break from routine, not a routine part of preliminary activities. Id. at 26.

Takeaways for Employers

The Second Circuit’s holding shows the enduring reluctance of the Second Circuit to broaden its reading of the U.S. Supreme Court Busk ruling on non-compensable waiting time, even when it sets new limits the Portal to Portal Act in determining compensable and non-compensable waiting time.  Employers scheduling workers to arrive prior to shift start are cautioned that this may trigger a finding that such workers are “engaged to wait,” and should tread cautiously in relying on the Portal-to-Portal Act to preclude litigation or utilizing a de minimis defense argument to limit damages.

Ohio Federal Court Grants Conditional Certification Of A Wide Collective Action Against The Cleveland Clinic Foundation

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Kathryn Brown, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On September 24, 2026, Judge Christopher A. Boyko of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted Plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification of a proposed collective of workers alleging that time-rounding practices resulted in overtime violations in Garner v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Case No. 23-CV-2258 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2026).  Judge Boyko found that Plaintiff had met her burden to show a strong likelihood that workers were similarly situated because she provided testimony, declarations, and an expert opinion that demonstrated that workers across multiple positions and facilities were all subject to the same non-neutral rounding policy. The opinion should be required reading for companies defending wage & hour claims in courts within the Sixth Circuit.

Case Background

Plaintiff Deborah Garner brought a putative class and collective action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated on November 21, 2023.  Plaintiff, a patient registrar and patient access specialist employed by Defendant, the Cleveland Clinic Foundation (“CCF”), alleged that CCF failed to pay non-exempt employees overtime at the statutory rate for all hours worked over forty, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) as well as Ohio’s wage and hour laws.  Plaintiff additionally claimed that CCF failed to pay all wages owed to workers due to improper rounding and/or editing of hours worked in Defendant’s timekeeping software, and failed to keep accurate time records.  Id. at 1-2. 

On January 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint as well as a motion asking the Court to facilitate notice to other similarly-situated potential plaintiffs, and the Court granted the motion after striking Plaintiff’s class claims.

The Court’s Ruling

Judge Boyko granted Plaintiff’s motion to facilitate notice to putative collective members on determining that there was a strong likelihood that the proposed collective members are similarly situated because the plaintiffs had met their burden to show that non-exempt hourly employees were all subject to the same rounding policies.  Id. at 1.  Plaintiffs provided declarations of 5 opt-in plaintiffs, deposition testimony, and an expert opinion regarding CCF’s rounding policies and practices. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff’s expert testified that CCF’s “rounding practices worked against the employees nearly 80 percent of the time.”  Id. at 20. 

Defendant argued that the scope of the proposed class and the variety of positions involved gave rise to individualized questions and issues, but the Court was unconvinced. Id. The Court determined that this evidence was enough to have “shown the rounding practice applied broadly to all the non-exempt employees” and was in line with the U.S. Supreme Court’s express determination that representative evidence in collective actions is permissible. Id.

However, the Court, citing to Plaintiff’s evidence, which showed that about 17% of employees suffered no injury, concluded that they lacked standing and were not similarly situated because they could claim no injury under the FLSA.  Id. at 21.

Defendants further argued that approximately 4.5% of CCF’s non-exempt hourly employees were subject to “flex rounding” or “quarter rounding” policies and were therefore not similarly situated because they were not subject to the general rounding policy at issue. The Court found that Defendant’s argument only supported Plaintiff’s argument that CCF had a system-wide rounding policy, and that it was not applied to “select employees or departments.”  Id. at 22.  The Court concluded that the evidence showed “a consistent, systemwide policy of rounding and that rounding heavily favored Defendant,” and therefore that Plaintiffs met their burden to show the putative collective was similarly situated, and granted Garner’s motion for a Court-facilitated notice.

Implications for Companies

In light of the opinion in Garner, companies with a workforce of non-exempt employees are well-advised to take stock of their timekeeping policies and practices, particularly when they operate multiple facilities and utilize timekeeping systems with rounding features.  Federal courts in the Sixth Circuit scrutinize any such policies to determine whether putative collective action members are subject to the same practices, and the likelihood of plaintiffs meeting the “strong likelihood” standard is greater when such policies are generally applicable across the employer’s sites and positions. A strong defense often features a showing that a company’s timekeeping policies and practices vary by position, department, and facility, and may be pointed to in arguing that putative collective members are not similarly situated enough to warrant collective-wide treatment.

Michigan Federal Court Drives Back Auto Manufacturing Employees’ Collective Action Efforts

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Shannon Noelle, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Glidwell v. Autoneum N. Am., Inc., Case No. 2:24-CV-12805, 2026 WL 2621157 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2026), in a decision issued on September 4, 2026, Judge Robert J. White of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Plaintiffs’ motion for court-facilitated notice to be distributed in a collective action alleging unpaid pre-shift and post-shift work in violation of the FLSA.  Judge White found that Plaintiffs’ evidentiary basis — namely, 6 declarations, including from one of the named plaintiffs and 5 from opt-ins — were insufficient to demonstrate “a strong likelihood” that thousands of employees across four states were similarly situated.

Case Background

Plaintiffs Roger Glidwell, Jr. and Amy Kelly brought an action against Autoneum North America, Inc. (“Autoneum”), an automobile parts manufacturer, asserting state law and FLSA claims alleging that the Company violated applicable wage and hour laws by failing to compensate employees across six plants in four different states for pre-shift and post-shift work.  Plaintiffs claimed that employees were required to clock in using Autoneum’s timekeeping system and to then do pre-shift work, including donning personal protective equipment (“PPE”) and attend meetings, and to do post-shift work by waiting for the next round of workers to start their shifts before clocking out.  Id. 1031-33, 1040.Plaintiffs alleged that “Autoneum would round, edit and otherwise manipulate the Plaintiffs’ start and stop times despite using a timekeeping system that records exactly when employees punch in and out each day.”  Id. at 1033.  The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ state law claims and only the FLSA claim remained at the time the Court was considering Plaintiffs’ Motion for Court-Facilitated Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs.  Id.

The District Court’s Ruling

Judge White denied Plaintiffs’ motion finding that the 6 declarations submitted fell short of meeting the “strong likelihood” evidentiary standard for demonstrating that potential opt-ins are similarly situated and, finding further, that to approve notice — to thousands of employees across six plants in four different states — without such an evidentiary showing would be unfair.  Judge White offered three bases for his decision to deny Plaintiffs’ motion. 

First, the Court found that Plaintiffs did not meet their required evidentiary showing for court-approval of the notice because the 6 declarations (one from named Plaintiff Kelly and the rest from 5 opt-ins) did not rebut assertions made in the Complaint and in the Company’s opposition demonstrating a lack of uniformity in policies amongst the plants regarding time recording and overtime pay and as to collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) and non-CBA facilities subject to different grievance procedures.  Though the Court agreed with Plaintiffs that declarations alone could potentially carry Plaintiffs’ burden, in the present case, it determined that the substance of the declarations could not overcome assertions in the Complaint and opposition briefing indicating that each plant used a different handbook or set calculation of work hours based on a CBA.  The Court noted that the named Plaintiffs “offered little evidence to rebut that each facility had its own system for calculating time worked” and, as such, there was no “strong likelihood that the underpayment was attributable to a companywide policy.”  Id. at 1038.  Because of the evidence showing that each plant had different handbooks and work hour calculations and indicating that some were governed by CBAs while others were not, the Court also found that the Plaintiffs were subject to differing individualized defenses as well.  Id.  In sum, Plaintiffs’ declarations could not overcome other evidence in the record showing differences amongst employees at the plants proposed to make-up the collective action at issue.

Second, turning to the issue of fairness with respect to distribution of the notice, and citing Clark v. A&L Homecare and Training Ctr., LLC, 68 F.4th 1003 (6th Cir. 2023), for the principle that sending notice can easily expand the “ranks” of a collective action “a hundredfold” and “forc[e] a defendant to settle,” the Court concluded that approving dissemination of the notice also would be unfair on such a sparse evidentiary showing.  Id. at 1040.  The Court observed that “[h]ere, there are thousands of employees across six plants in four different states that would receive notice” which could “amount[] to solicitation of those employees to bring suits of their own” if such employees are not eligible to join the lawsuit.  Id.  From that observation, the Court concluded that, given the size and scope of the potential collective and the “the impact notice might have on the ranks of th[e] collective action,” further evidence” was needed “to show that potential opt-ins are similarly situated.” Id.

Third, and finally, the Court found that not only was named Plaintiffs’ evidence insufficient and sparse, but also it had notable shortcomings.  Id. at 1041.  Two of the declarants had ended their employment over three years before the complaint was filed, putting their claims outside the statute of limitations period, and rendering their declarations irrelevant to the action at hand.  Id.  Further, one of the declarants was an opt-in plaintiff in a different FLSA action based on similar claims against the Company as to its Oregon, Ohio factory and, therefore, the declarant could not participate in the action rendering her declaration irrelevant as well.  Id. at 1041-42.In light of these additional deficiencies, the Court noted that it “only has four declarations across the six identified plants to rely on” which “further weaken[ed]” Plaintiffs’ position.  Id. at 1042. 

Implications for Companies

In defending FLSA collective actions, Companies should prioritize identifying evidence of differences amongst its locations or departments demonstrating different wage and hour computations or grievance processes early and often throughout the lifespan of the litigation.  Though the conditional certification and notice authorization stages of court review are thought to be more lenient and preliminary, the Glidwell decision shows that the evidentiary showing is not a cursory one, at least in the Sixth Circuit, and provides fertile ground for employers to make an evidentiary showing of their own to take putative plaintiffs to task.

Show Your Work: California Federal Court Denies Preliminary Approval Of Data Breach Class Action Settlement

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Anna Sheridan, and Olga Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On September 16, 2026, in Jimenez, Jr., et al. v. OE Federal Credit Union, Case No. 24-CV-02746 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2026), U.S. District Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement in a data breach case involving over 220,000 individuals. The decision is a significant reminder that courts will scrutinize class action settlements for obvious deficiencies, and that plaintiffs seeking preliminary approval must “show their work” by providing detailed information about the relative value of their claims and the strengths and weaknesses of their case.

Case Background

Plaintiffs Daniel Jimenez Jr., Mark Hendren, and Erica Jaramillo are current or former customers of OE Federal Credit Union (“OEFCU”), which is described as “the country’s largest labor-based credit union.” Order at 1. OEFCU possessed its customers’ personally identifiable information (“PII”) and protected health information (“PHI”), including full names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, bank and financial account information, driver’s license numbers, medical procedure information, and health insurance information. Id. Sometime between August 19, 2023 and October 29, 2023, OEFCU suffered a ransomware attack and data breach resulting in unauthorized access to the PII/PHI of the named plaintiffs and the putative class.

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging claims for negligence, breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment, violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act, violation of the California Customer Records Act, and declaratory relief. They brought claims on behalf of themselves and a class of all persons identified as being impacted by the data breach. After OEFCU moved to dismiss, the Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing several claims with leave to amend and the declaratory relief claim with prejudice.

The parties subsequently engaged in mediation and reached a proposed class settlement. Under the proposed settlement, OEFCU agreed to establish a non-reversionary settlement fund of $2,300,000. Id. at 3.  Each class member could submit a claim of up to $5,000 for reimbursement of out-of-pocket losses traceable to the data incident. Settlement class members were also entitled to submit a claim for a pro rata cash payment from the net settlement fund, estimated at approximately $50 per claimant. California class members could claim an additional $75, subject to reduction based on the total number of claimants. The settlement agreement proposed to deduct $766,666.66 in attorney’s fees (one-third of the common fund), $5,000 each to the three class representatives as service awards, and undetermined amounts for litigation costs and settlement administration costs.  Id.

The Court’s Decision

Judge Tigar denied the motion for preliminary approval, identifying seven deficiencies that collectively prevented a finding that the settlement fell “within the range of possible approval” under Rule 23(e)(2). See In Re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

Adequacy of Relief — Rule 23(e)(2)

The first four deficiencies all bore on whether the proposed settlement provided adequate relief to the class. The Court began by questioning the use of a claims-made distribution process, noting that because OEFCU could readily identify class members from its own records, requiring them to submit claims was unnecessary and would predictably depress the actual payout — “[t]he effect of not simply distributing relief to the known class members is that the defendant will likely pay out much less than it would if there were no claiming process.” Order at 6. The Court noted that claims-made settlements are appropriate when it is the best or only option available, as is often the case with consumer class actions. Id. The Court faulted Plaintiffs for providing no information about the maximum potential recovery at trial, offering instead only boilerplate that the settlement “provides significant relief” and “is well within the range of other data breach settlements.” Relatedly, Plaintiffs supplied only generic statements about the “high level of risk, expense, and complexity” of continued litigation rather than a careful analysis of the claims and defenses — falling short of the Court’s requirement that movants “show their work by explaining the relative value of their claims in significant detail.” Order at 7–8 (quoting Haralson, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 970). Finally, the Court observed that the estimated $50 per-member pro rata payment was unsupported by evidence. Order at 8. After subtracting attorney’s fees alone, the actual per-member recovery was closer to $6, and would decline further once administration costs, incentive awards, and out-of-pocket reimbursement claims were accounted for — the Court noted that if just over 300 claimants sought the full $5,000 reimbursement, the pro rata share could dwindle to nothing for remaining class members. Order at 8.

Equitable Treatment — Rule 23(e)(2)(D)

The fifth deficiency concerned the settlement’s differential treatment of class members. The settlement provided California class members a higher recovery than non-California members, yet Plaintiffs identified no California subclass with distinct claims that might justify the disparity. Order at 8–9. The Court emphasized that unexplained disparate treatment “increases the likelihood that the settlement agreement does not meet the Rule 23(e) standard.” Id. at 9 (quoting Ferrington v. McAfee, Inc., No. 10-CV-01455, 2012 WL 1156399, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012)).

Accuracy and Procedural Compliance

The final two deficiencies concerned the quality of the submission itself. The Court identified a material discrepancy between the motion’s description of the timing of payments to class members and the actual terms of the settlement agreement. Order at 9–10. The Court also found that the motion failed to comply with the Northern District of California’s Procedural Guidelines for Class Action Settlements — including the requirements to explain anticipated versus maximum class recovery, to identify the settlement administration process and its costs, and to provide information about comparable settlements. Id. at 10; see also Bakhtiar v. Info. Res., Inc., No. 17-CV-04559, 2020 WL 11421997, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (“A movant’s failure to address the issues discussed in the Guidelines is a proper ground for denying a motion for preliminary or final approval of a class action settlement.”).

The Court denied the motion without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ filing a revised motion, which it ordered due by November 4, 2026. The Court also reminded the parties that the Ninth Circuit benchmark for attorney’s fees in a successful class action is 25% of the common fund, and that Plaintiffs should justify any deviation from that benchmark. Id.

Implications For Companies

The Jimenez decision is a reminder that courts will closely scrutinize class action settlements at the preliminary approval stage, particularly in data breach litigation impacting consumers. The decision underscores several key points for corporate counsel. Most importantly, parties should closely follow the Court’s Procedural Guidelines for Class Action Settlements as failure to heed those Guidelines can serve as an independent basis for denying preliminary approval.

On a more granular level, the Jimenez decision offers other relevant practice pointers for class action settlements. First, claims-made settlement structures may be disfavored where the class members are readily identifiable from the defendant’s records. Second, plaintiffs seeking preliminary approval must do more than offer boilerplate language about the risks of litigation — they must provide concrete information about the maximum potential recovery and a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of their claims. Third, settlements that provide differential treatment to subsets of class members without explanation may face heightened scrutiny under Rule 23(e)(2)(D).  Companies facing data breach class actions should work closely with counsel to ensure that any settlement submissions provide the level of detail and analysis that courts increasingly require before granting preliminary approval.

Key Insights Into The EEOC’s Draft Strategic Plan For FY 2026-2030

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jamar D. Davis, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 1, 2026, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission released a preliminary draft of its 2026-2030 Strategic Plan.  The draft sets forth the EEOC plans to prevent and address employment discrimination via improved procedures and key performance metrics, expand outreach and training activities, and improve internal processes via talent retention and use of technology that improves efficiency.  The four-year plan was published on the regulations.gov webpage and is open for comment until July 19, 2026.  Even if employers do not submit comments, they would be well-advised to review the draft and final Strategic Plan once it is announced because it provides a window into the EEOC Commissioners’ thinking for how the agency will use its resources to redress and deter workplace discrimination.   

Introduction

Every four years, the EEOC prepares a Strategic Plan that guides its anti-discrimination enforcement priorities.  The 2026-2030 Strategic Plan newly published on the regulations.gov webpage gives significant insight into specific goals and metrics that the agency will measure its performance by in the next several years.  The three goals of the draft Strategic Plan and their significance are critical information for employers to understand in navigating interpretations and compliance with EEOC regulations and guidelines.

Operational Improvements And Performance Metrics Sought By The EEOC

The 2026-2030 Strategic Plan draft signals that the EEOC will focus its operations on three key areas.  First, the EEOC aims to increase the number of favorable outcomes and to seek non-monetary relief where appropriate. For its matter outcomes, the EEOC aims to obtain at least one million dollars in monetary relief for select systematic investigations, to favorably resolve at least ninety percent of its enforcement lawsuits, and ensure its hearings, investigations, and appears meet or exceed unspecified metrics.  (Draft Strategic Plan at 14-16.)  On this point, the draft Strategic Plan explains that the EEOC will use its prosecutorial discretion to focus on prioritizing the investigation, litigation, and resolution of complex cases.  (Id.)  In addition to seeking monetary relief, the EEOC aims to also seek non-monetary relief.  The draft Plan explains the EEOC’s view that this type of relief could encompass hands-on training for employers and workers, implementing discrimination deterrence practices, and monitoring.  (Id.)

The EEOC additionally aims to “achieve[] targeted equitable relief and at least $1 million in monetary relief” at a rate of 80% of its systemic investigations where cause is found.  (Id.)  The draft Strategic Plan states that the emphasis here is on cases with broad overall impact and relief for employees impacted by systemic discriminatory patterns, practices, or policies.  (Id.)   

Further, “the EEOC will make significant progress toward enhanced monitoring of conciliation agreements,” with the goal of publishing developments of its achievements for each year.  (Id.)  The Strategic Plan explains that improved training, enhanced tracking, and streamlined reporting are crucial aspects of this point.  (Id.)

With regards to employees of the federal government, the draft Strategic Plan outlines a baseline measurement for cabinet-level agency compliance with Equal Employment Opportunities.  (Id. at 16.)  This includes improvements in processing complaints, approving affirmative action plans, and establishing compliance with the Elijah E. Cummings Federal Employee Anti-Discrimination Act of 2020 through timeliness.  (Id.)  Reasoning that the federal government is the largest employer in the country, the draft Strategic Plan notes that “reducing unlawful employment discrimination in the federal sector is an integral part of combatting employment discrimination in the nation’s workplaces,” and thus will have a great impact on private sector employers.  (Id.)

The EEOC aims to have “at least 90% of completed investigations and conciliations, hearings, and federal appeals meet or exceed criteria” implemented in the Quality Practices Plan (“QEP”) for each program.  (Id.)  Building on the EEOC’s prior Strategic Plan’s QEP, the Commission states that the quality targets for resolving cases without litigation paved a way to success when implemented rigorously.  (Id. at 17.)  Further, the EEOC will seek to assess the current status of its previous goals and update them as needed in FY 2027-2030.  (Id.)

Next, the EEOC plans to broaden its outreach and training activities to ensure that employees know their rights, and that employers are equipped with the tools necessary to preclude discrimination. (Id. at 18-20.)  The action items for this goal include use of social media engagement, the implementation of three innovative means to conduct outreach, updating training materials to be user-friendly, and tracking the effectiveness of each outreach effort. (Id. at 19, 22.)

The EEOC additionally seeks to improve its accessibility through updating its technological capabilities.   (Id. at 17.)  The priority outlined in its seventh measure highlights reducing processing time and looks to speed up the charge filing process following intake, with the ultimate goal of reducing pending cases in the long-term.  (Id.)

Finally, the EEOC will strive to improve its overall operations via three distinct areas of focus, which include (1) personnel, (2) services, and (3) financial efficiency.  The EEOC would like to improve its operations with regards to its employees by maintaining staffing levels at or greater to 95% of the FTE baseline, invest in in-person trainings, and allow for select employees to participate in leadership development programs. (Id. at 25-26.)  For its services, the EEOC will issue feedback surveys to assess areas of growth for the intake process, outreach and training, and mediation services offered, then implement process improvements to targeted areas.  (Id. at 27.)  For budget concerns, each program area will strive to meet operating constraints and meet all submission deadlines.  (Id.)

Implications For Employers

The EEOC’s FY 2026-2030 draft Strategic Plan is a document that provides insight into the direction the agency will take to improve how it functions, and where it will focus the majority of its resources.  Knowing what to expect from the Commission over the next four years places employers at an advantage when it comes to contingency planning and updating workplace discrimination policies.

New Jersey Appellate Division Confirms Representative Wage Actions May Proceed Without Class Certification But Limits Look-Back Period For WHL And ESLL Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Olga A. Romadin, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 29, 2026, in Martinez v. T. Slack Environmental Services, Inc., No. A-1008-24 (N.J. App. Div. June 29, 2026), the New Jersey Appellate Division addressed key issues in a wage and hour representative action brought pursuant to the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“WHL”) and the Prevailing Wage Act (“PWA”), including whether a representative action brought under the WHL and the PWA is distinct from a class action under N.J. Rule 4:32-1, and the appropriate statute of limitations for companion wage claims.  Id. at 2.  The Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part a decision of the trial court holding that the WHL and PWA statutory language is independent of Rule 4:32-1 and therefore does not require class certification, and finding that a two-year—and not six—statute of limitations applies to WHL and Earned Sick Leave Law (“ESLL”) claims.  Id. at 3.

This decision is significant for employers in because it confirms that representative wage actions under New Jersey’s wage statutes may proceed outside Rule 4:32-1 class certification procedures while also clarifying that WHL and ESLL claims carry a two-year limitations period, and PWA claims carry a six-year limitations period as breach of contract claims.

Case Background

Juan Martinez (“Martinez”) alleged that he worked as an hourly laborer for T. Slack Environmental Services, Inc. (“T. Slack”), a small, non-union New Jersey contractor that employed between six and ten hourly laborers subject to the same pay practices from 2006 to 2019.  Id. at 3-4.

In February 2020, Martinez filed a lawsuit in which he alleged that T. Slack failed to pay required prevailing wages for public work, including for tasks classified as “B” and “C” laborer functions under the PWA.  Id. at 4.  He also claimed that defendants miscalculated overtime by paying him at lower rates rather than using a blended or weighted rate when he worked on both public and private projects or in different job titles during the same week.  Id. at 5.  Martinez further alleged uncompensated “off-the-clock” work, including transporting equipment to and from worksites and defendants’ Kenilworth facility, and asserted that earned sick leave was improperly calculated using the lower private wage rate.  Id. at 5-6.

Following discovery conducted under the supervision of a special adjudicator, Martinez moved to certify a statutory representative action under the WHL and PWA in September 2024.  Id. at 6-7.  Defendants opposed on several grounds, arguing that Martinez had not satisfied the class action requirements of Rule 4:32-1, that a representative action was not permissible outside of Rule 4:32-1, that the putative class lacked numerosity, that Martinez was not an adequate representative, and that individualized questions precluded both representative and class treatment.  Id. at 7.

The motion court granted Martinez’s motion, certified the matter as a representative action, designated Martinez as the representative of defendants’ current and former employees, and imposed a six-year look-back period for overtime claims from February 28, 2014, to February 28, 2020.  Id. at 7.  Defendants appealed.  Id. at 8.

The Appellate Division’s Decision

The Appellate Division held, consistent with its recent decision in Cano v. County Concrete Corp., 483 N.J. Super. 459 (App. Div. 2026), that “the statutory language of both the WHL and PWA is independent of Rule 4:32-1 and therefore does not require class certification.”  Id. at 3.  The Appellate Division explained that the remedial nature of the PWA permits any worker “to maintain such action for and on behalf of [themselves] or other work[ers] similarly situated,” N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.40, and that this statute addresses the similar concerns of the WHL and ESLL.  Id. at 15.

In addition, the Appellate Division rejected T. Slack’s argument that Martinez was required to present evidence of other similarly situated employees to qualify as a representative action.  Id.  Instead, it determined that, as in Cano, Martinez’s complaint put defendants on notice regarding the existence of similarly situated employees, and that the plain language of the PWA and WHL does not require a named plaintiff to identify the similarly situated employees to defendants.  Id. at 15-16.  Defendants, moreover, were already aware of approximately fifteen employees whose names and contact information had previously been provided to Martinez.  Id. at 16.

Lastly, the Appellate Division reversed the six-year look-back period for WHL claims, and, by incorporation, ESLL claims.  Id. at 18.  Relying on Maia v. IEW Constr. Grp., 257 N.J. 330 (2024), the Appellate Division held that the 2019 amendment extending the WHL limitations period from two years to six years applies prospectively only, so the two-year limitations period governed those claims.  Id.

On the other hand, the Appellate Division affirmed the six-year look-back period for PWA claims.  Id. at 18-19.  Because PWA claims for unpaid prevailing wages are treated as breach of contract claims, and the PWA does not provide its own limitations period, the general six-year contract limitations period under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applied.  Id. at 19.

Implications For Employers

This decision confirms that representative wage actions under New Jersey’s WHL, PWA, and ESLL may proceed independently of Rule 4:32-1 class certification requirements.  While this may expand procedural avenues for plaintiffs pursuing wage claims on behalf of similarly situated employees, employers should note that the decision also limits potential exposure for WHL and ESLL claims by applying a two-year statute of limitations to pre-2019 conduct.

No Retake Allowed: New York Federal Court Denies EEOC’s Motion For Reconsideration In Equal Pay Act Case Against School District

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Olga A. Romadin, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 18, 2026, Judge Anthony J. Brindisi of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the EEOC’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s earlier order denying cross-motions for summary judgment in EEOC v. Hunter-Tannersville Central School District, No. 1:21-CV-00352, 2026 WL 1759441 (N.D.N.Y. June 18, 2026).  The district court found that the EEOC failed to satisfy the standard for reconsideration, reasoning that the EEOC had not identified an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error warranting relief.

This ruling is significant for employers defending Equal Pay Act claims and reinforces the high burden parties must satisfy to obtain reconsideration, namely, that a motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old issues or present evidence that was previously available.

Case Background

On March 26, 2021, the EEOC filed this action against the Hunter-Tannersville Central School District (“District”) alleging that the District violated § 206(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 by paying a former District superintendent, Dr. Susan T. Vickers (“Vickers”), less than her male colleagues for substantially equal work.  Id. at *1.  In response, the District denied the allegations and raised a statutory affirmative defense, asserting that any alleged pay disparity resulted from factors other than sex under 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv).  Id.

After several years of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  Id.  The Court denied both motions, finding that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment in favor of either party.  Id.  The EEOC then timely moved for reconsideration, which the District opposed.  Id.

The Court’s Decision

The Court ultimately denied the EEOC’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying cross-motions for summary judgment.  Id.

First, the EEOC argued that the Court had erroneously accepted certain facts as undisputed after overlooking contrary evidence, specifically a deposition exhibit that the EEOC admittedly did not submit with its prior motion papers.  Id.  However, the Court rejected this argument for two reasons.  Id.  The omitted deposition exhibit did not qualify as “new evidence” because it was readily available at the time of the earlier briefing.  Id.  Moreover, the EEOC did not show that the omitted evidence was inconsistent with any of the challenged findings.  Id. at *2.

Next, the EEOC contended that the Court misapplied Second Circuit precedent on the question of substantial equivalence.  Id.  The Court disagreed, explaining that the Second Circuit has made clear that “[w]hether two positions are ‘substantially equivalent’ for Equal Pay Act purposes is a question for the jury.”  Id. (quoting Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 2001)).  In particular, the Court determined that the EEOC did not show a clear error in the Court’s application of the law because the “expansive record” included “sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Vickers’ comparators had different or additional job responsibilities and performance requirements.”  Id.

The EEOC also argued that the Court failed to require the District to “prove” that the pay disparities between Vickers and her comparators stemmed from gender-neutral factors.  Id. at *3.  The Court, however, determined that the EEOC’s argument misunderstood the relative burdens on a motion for summary judgment.  Id.  While the District would have needed to “prove” its affirmative defense as a matter of law to succeed on its own motion, to survive the EEOC’s motion and get to trial, “the District was only required to identify sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that ‘the pay disparity in question result[ed] from a differential based on any factor except for sex.’”  Id. (quoting Eisenhauer v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 84 F.4th 507, 522–23 (2d Cir. 2023)).  The Court found the District met that standard.  Id.

Finally, the Court rejected the EEOC’s argument that the Court failed to apply the law requiring the District to prove that longevity and negotiation were gender-neutral factors.  Id.  In rejecting the EEOC’s argument, the Court noted that the EEOC cited no controlling authority for the proposition that longevity and negotiations cannot constitute factors other than sex, identifying several courts within the Second Circuit that have found such factors to be legitimate factors other than sex.  Id.

Because the Court declined to reconsider its earlier ruling, the Court indicated that the EEOC’s contingent requests regarding the issues of willfulness, good faith, and damages were rendered moot.  Id. at *4.

Implications For Employers

The Court’s decision underscores that motions for reconsideration are subject to a demanding standard and cannot be used as a second opportunity to relitigate issues or present evidence that was available during an earlier round of briefing.

This decision also reinforces that the question of whether two job positions are “substantially equivalent” under the Equal Pay Act is a fact-intensive inquiry properly reserved for a jury, and that shared job descriptions alone do not establish substantial equivalence as a matter of law.  Id. at *2.

Lastly, the Court’s analysis confirms that longevity and salary negotiations remain viable “factors other than sex” under the Equal Pay Act in the Second Circuit.  Id. at *3.  Employers should therefore document the legitimate, gender-neutral factors underlying compensation decisions to support a potential affirmative defense in the event of an Equal Pay Act challenge.

The Third Circuit’s FLSA Overtime Gap Time Decision Opens Up Circuit Split

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 3, 2026, addressing an issue of first impression on overtime gap time, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in U.S. Department of Labor v. Comprehensive Healthcare Mgmt. Servs. LLC, No. 24-2842, 2026 WL 1582064 (3d Cir. June 3, 2026), partially reversed an order of a district court that had awarded damages to the U.S. Department of Labor(“DOL”), which had brought a lawsuit on behalf of 6,000 healthcare employees, alleging various overtime violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by Comprehensive Healthcare Management Services LLC (“Comprehensive”). On appeal, Comprehensive argued that the district court had erred in finding that the FLSA affords a remedy for overtime gap time claims, which address non-overtime hours in a non-exempt employee’s workweek, as well as misapplied a lower burden of proof to some of the claims against it, had erred in its finding that certain employees were nonexempt, and in some of its factual findings. The Third Circuit agreed with the employer in part, and vacated and remanded the matter to the district court.

Case Background

In 2018, the DOL brought a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against fifteen nursing and assisted living entities owned and operated by Comprehensive Healthcare Management Services LLC and its chief executive officer, alleging that the defendants had failed to pay hourly employees for all hours worked and the appropriate rate of pay, as well as failing to keep accurate pay records in violation of the FLSA. Id. at *1. One of the claims involved overtime gap time, which occurs when an employee who exceeds the overtime threshold does not receive pay for all non-overtime hours worked. Id.

In January 2024, the district court held a bench trial, following which it ruled in favor of the DOL, finding that there were “system errors” in the calculation of pay. Id. at *2. The district court explained that the defendants’ timekeeping system had not kept an accurate record of employees’ working hours, and Comprehensive paid employees for scheduled hours instead of hours they actually worked, as well as that the system automatically deducted meal breaks, even if employees had worked through them, and that the defendants had failed to accurately pay overtime wages. Id. The district court found that employees were not paid the required one-and-one-half regular rate required under the FLSA, and that the regular rate did not include pay that was required to be calculated in it, including shift differentials, bonuses, and other types of pay. Id. The district court also concluded that some employees had been improperly classified as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement. Id. The district court, noting that the Third Circuit had not yet ruled upon the “viability of overtime gap time claims,” nonetheless awarded $35,804,438.20 in damages against Comprehensive for these violations. Id. at *3. Comprehensive appealed.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

On appeal, Comprehensive argued that the district court had erred in finding that claims for overtime gap time were cognizable under the FLSA. Id. at *3. The Third Circuit noted a disagreement among the circuits, with the Second Circuit having opined that overtime gap time claims were not cognizable under the FLSA in Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. Of Long Island, Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 115-17 (2d Cir. 2013), while the Fourth Circuit found that they were in Conner v. Cleveland County, 22 F.4th 412, 426 (4th Cir. 2022). Id. Writing for the majority in a split panel decision, Third Circuit Chief Judge Michael A. Chagares explained that “[w]hen the statutory language is clear, the text is the beginning and the end of our inquiry.” Id. at *4. On review of the text of the FLSA, the appellate court found no mention of overtime gap time and concluded that the statute does not provide a remedy to overtime gap claims.  Id. In finding that there was no support in the text of the statute for an overtime gap claims, the court of appeals rejected the Labor Secretary’s argument that under § 207 of the FLSA, the term “regular rate” contemplates an overtime requirement, and so requires that a regular rate must be paid for all hours worked. Id. Further, the Third Circuit was unconvinced by the Secretary’s reference to the DOL’s guidance, which stated that overtime under the FLSA requires the payment of all straight time worked during non-overtime hours, finding that this ran counter to the unambiguous text of the Act. Id. at *4-5. Finally, agreeing with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit determined that individuals seeking to bring such claims could do so under state laws. Id. at *5. Thus, agreeing with Comprehensive, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling finding that Comprehensive had violated the FLSA by failing to compensate certain employees for overtime gap time. Id.

In reviewing the remaining arguments brought by Comprehensive, the Third Circuit court found that the district court did not err in applying a lower evidentiary burden to the claims against Comprehensive under the Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) burden-shifting framework, where an employee alleging an employer failed to keep adequate records may do so by producing sufficient evidence prior to the burden being shifted to the employer to counter the claims. Id. at *5-6. Noting that the district court based its findings on the time and pay records produced by Comprehensive, the appellate court concluded that “Mt. Clemens did not affect the analysis for these claims.” Id. at *6. The Third Circuit also found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings or finding of an ongoing pattern or practice of regular rate miscalculation, writing that the single witness that Comprehensive had produced in support of its contention that employees were paid for all hours worked instead of based on their scheduled hours was found to be unreliable by the district court, and that the Secretary of Labor had produced more concrete proof in the form of an investigation, and documentary proof corroborated by hundreds of employees. Id. Next, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that employees at different facilities were regularly not paid for work performed through meal breaks based on a representative sample of employee testimony and the testimony of the company’s regional consultant. Id. at *7.

Finally, the Third Circuit agreed with Comprehensive that the district court’s determination that certain employees were not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements was an error because it had applied the “plain and unmistakable” burden of proof to its analysis, but under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79 (2018), an employer seeking to prove an employee’s exempt status does so by a preponderance of the evidence, and vacated the part of the lower court’s decision and remanded it for further proceedings. Id. at *8-9.

In a partial dissent, U.S. Circuit Court Judge Jane R. Roth wrote that the text of the FLSA “is far from clear,” and the case law defining a regular rate offered additional confusion that could be addressed by making the actual rate, contracted rate, and regular rate of pay to be the same, aligning with the Fourth Circuit decision in Conner and the U.S. Department of Labor guidance that the majority declined to endorse. Id. at *10-11.

Implications For Employers

Employers with a workforce falling under the FLSA should take heed in ensuring that exempt employees, such as those working in an executive, administrative, or professional capacity, meet the statutory minimums such as salary requirements to qualify as bona fide exempt from overtime requirements. Maintaining accurate pay and time records for exempt and non-exempt workers and conducting regular audits may serve well in defending against miscalculation allegations, as the appellate court here confirmed the lower court’s conclusion based on records provided by the company.

This federal appellate court decision further signals a circuit split on the issue of whether overtime gap time claims are cognizable under the FLSA, with the Third Circuit here joining the Second Circuit in deciding that under the plain meaning of the text they are not, while the Fourth Circuit maintains that the FLSA does offer relief for plaintiffs seeking to bring such claims.

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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