By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Olga A. Romadin, and Elizabeth G. Underwood
Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 18, 2026, Judge Anthony J. Brindisi of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the EEOC’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s earlier order denying cross-motions for summary judgment in EEOC v. Hunter-Tannersville Central School District, No. 1:21-CV-00352, 2026 WL 1759441 (N.D.N.Y. June 18, 2026). The district court found that the EEOC failed to satisfy the standard for reconsideration, reasoning that the EEOC had not identified an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error warranting relief.
This ruling is significant for employers defending Equal Pay Act claims and reinforces the high burden parties must satisfy to obtain reconsideration, namely, that a motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old issues or present evidence that was previously available.
Case Background
On March 26, 2021, the EEOC filed this action against the Hunter-Tannersville Central School District (“District”) alleging that the District violated § 206(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 by paying a former District superintendent, Dr. Susan T. Vickers (“Vickers”), less than her male colleagues for substantially equal work. Id. at *1. In response, the District denied the allegations and raised a statutory affirmative defense, asserting that any alleged pay disparity resulted from factors other than sex under 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv). Id.
After several years of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Id. The Court denied both motions, finding that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment in favor of either party. Id. The EEOC then timely moved for reconsideration, which the District opposed. Id.
The Court’s Decision
The Court ultimately denied the EEOC’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying cross-motions for summary judgment. Id.
First, the EEOC argued that the Court had erroneously accepted certain facts as undisputed after overlooking contrary evidence, specifically a deposition exhibit that the EEOC admittedly did not submit with its prior motion papers. Id. However, the Court rejected this argument for two reasons. Id. The omitted deposition exhibit did not qualify as “new evidence” because it was readily available at the time of the earlier briefing. Id. Moreover, the EEOC did not show that the omitted evidence was inconsistent with any of the challenged findings. Id. at *2.
Next, the EEOC contended that the Court misapplied Second Circuit precedent on the question of substantial equivalence. Id. The Court disagreed, explaining that the Second Circuit has made clear that “[w]hether two positions are ‘substantially equivalent’ for Equal Pay Act purposes is a question for the jury.” Id. (quoting Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 2001)). In particular, the Court determined that the EEOC did not show a clear error in the Court’s application of the law because the “expansive record” included “sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Vickers’ comparators had different or additional job responsibilities and performance requirements.” Id.
The EEOC also argued that the Court failed to require the District to “prove” that the pay disparities between Vickers and her comparators stemmed from gender-neutral factors. Id. at *3. The Court, however, determined that the EEOC’s argument misunderstood the relative burdens on a motion for summary judgment. Id. While the District would have needed to “prove” its affirmative defense as a matter of law to succeed on its own motion, to survive the EEOC’s motion and get to trial, “the District was only required to identify sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that ‘the pay disparity in question result[ed] from a differential based on any factor except for sex.’” Id. (quoting Eisenhauer v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 84 F.4th 507, 522–23 (2d Cir. 2023)). The Court found the District met that standard. Id.
Finally, the Court rejected the EEOC’s argument that the Court failed to apply the law requiring the District to prove that longevity and negotiation were gender-neutral factors. Id. In rejecting the EEOC’s argument, the Court noted that the EEOC cited no controlling authority for the proposition that longevity and negotiations cannot constitute factors other than sex, identifying several courts within the Second Circuit that have found such factors to be legitimate factors other than sex. Id.
Because the Court declined to reconsider its earlier ruling, the Court indicated that the EEOC’s contingent requests regarding the issues of willfulness, good faith, and damages were rendered moot. Id. at *4.
Implications For Employers
The Court’s decision underscores that motions for reconsideration are subject to a demanding standard and cannot be used as a second opportunity to relitigate issues or present evidence that was available during an earlier round of briefing.
This decision also reinforces that the question of whether two job positions are “substantially equivalent” under the Equal Pay Act is a fact-intensive inquiry properly reserved for a jury, and that shared job descriptions alone do not establish substantial equivalence as a matter of law. Id. at *2.
Lastly, the Court’s analysis confirms that longevity and salary negotiations remain viable “factors other than sex” under the Equal Pay Act in the Second Circuit. Id. at *3. Employers should therefore document the legitimate, gender-neutral factors underlying compensation decisions to support a potential affirmative defense in the event of an Equal Pay Act challenge.