By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Hayley Ryan
Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 20, 2026, in Clark v. Blue Diamond Growers, Case No. 22-CV-01591, 2026 WL 483275 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2026), Judge Jorge L. Alonso of the U.S. District for the Northern District of Illinois denied class certification in a deceptive advertising lawsuit brought under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”). The Court concluded that the named plaintiff was not an adequate class representative because she knew the allegedly misleading representation was false yet continued purchasing the product. Because that knowledge defeated proximate causation and created a unique defense, the Court determined that class certification was improper.
This decision is a reminder that plaintiffs asserting deceptive advertising claims must show they were actually deceived. Where a named plaintiff knew “the truth” and continued to buy the product anyway, adequacy under Rule 23(a)(4) is vulnerable.
Background
Plaintiff Margo Clark filed a putative class action complaint against Blue Diamond Growers, a cooperative of California almond growers that sells flavored almonds, including “Smokehouse® Almonds.” Id. at *1. She alleged that the “Smokehouse®” label misled consumers into believing the almonds were smoked in a smokehouse, when in fact the smoky flavor derived from added seasoning. Id. According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, this purported misrepresentation enabled Blue Diamond to charge a price premium in violation of the ICFA. Id.
Plaintiff moved to certify a class of Illinois purchasers of Smokehouse® Almonds from March 2019 to the present. Id.
The Court’s Ruling
Judge Alonso denied certification based on a failure to establish adequacy of representation. Id. at *2. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4), a class may be certified only if “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Where the named plaintiff is subject to an arguable unique defense, however, adequacy is lacking. Id. at *1.
Here, the dispositive issue was proximate causation under the ICFA. To prevail on a deceptive advertising claim under the ICFA, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged deception proximately caused her injury, i.e., that she was actually deceived. Id. at *2. A plaintiff who knows the truth cannot establish proximate cause because she was not misled. Id.
At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she learned as early as 2019 or 2020, after viewing a Facebook advertisement from her counsel, that the almonds were seasoned rather than smoked. Id. Despite that knowledge, she continued to purchase the product for over a year. Id. The Court found this testimony fatal, holding that Plaintiff was “inadequate to serve as the class representative because she cannot show proximate causation as required to prevail on her claim.” Id.
Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to rehabilitate the claim through a declaration asserting that the Facebook advertisements were not targeted to Illinois consumers in 2019 or 2020. Id. However, counsel also acknowledged in the same declaration that Plaintiff submitted her information in response to the advertisement approximately one year before signing her representation agreement in March 2022. Id. The Court concluded that this timeline did not resolve the proximate cause problem. Even accepting counsel’s version, Plaintiff “saw the advertisement around March 2021, yet she still continued to purchase almonds for another year.” Id.
Plaintiff’s counsel also relied on Plaintiff’s amended interrogatory responses in which she claimed she first learned the almonds were not smoked during a conversation with her attorney after signing the representation agreement. Id. at *3. Based on that revision, Plaintiff’s counsel argued that Plaintiff could establish proximate causation because she stopped purchasing the almonds after she signed the representation agreement. Id.
The Court was unpersuaded. Weighing the deposition testimony, the declaration, and Plaintiff’s original interrogatory responses, the Court concluded that Blue Diamond’s proximate cause defense was at least arguable – and that was sufficient. Id. The Court emphasized that a unique defense need only be “arguable” to defeat adequacy, and here it was “certainly arguable.” Id.
Accordingly, the Court denied certification and directed the parties to submit a joint status report addressing how they intend to proceed on Plaintiff’s individual claims and whether they have considered settlement discussions in light of the Court’s certification ruling. Id.
Implications for Companies
Clark reinforces a core Rule 23 principle that a named plaintiff subject to a unique defense cannot adequately represent a class. In deceptive advertising cases under the ICFA and similar statutes, knowledge is often outcome-determinative. If a plaintiff knew of the alleged defect before purchasing, or continued purchasing after learning the truth, proximate causation becomes vulnerable.
For companies defending consumer fraud class actions, deposition testimony, purchase history, and discovery into when and how the plaintiff allegedly learned of the “defect” or deception may provide a powerful adequacy challenge. As Clark illustrates, even an “arguable” unique defense can be enough to defeat class certification.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Gregory S. Slotnick, and Elizabeth G. Underwood
Duane Morris Takeaways:On February 12, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s refusal to so order a proposed consent decree between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and a union that would have substantially modified and terminated court supervision over the union’s referral hall and hiring practices in a Title VII enforcement action that has been pending for fifty-five years. United States Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Loc. 580 of the Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, Joint Apprentice-Journeymen Educ. Fund of the Architectural Ornamental Iron Workers Loc. 580, Allied Bldg. Metal Indus., No. 25-CV-44, 2026 WL 392327, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 12, 2026). Applying the standard set out in S.E.C. v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 294 (2d Cir. 2014), the Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the proposed settlement was not “fair and reasonable” and did not adequately resolve the core discrimination claims in the original 1971 complaint. Id. at *4. The Second Circuit, like the district court, emphasized the union’s consistent failures to comply with court‑ordered recordkeeping obligations, the gaps in the critical referral‑hall data, and the need for a more extensive factual record before the court may unwind extensive injunctive relief and oversight in this case. Id.
Case Background
The litigation began in 1971, when the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed suit against Local 580 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Ironworkers and the Join Apprentice-Journeymen Educational Fund of the Architectural Ornamental Iron Workers Local 580 (“Local 580”), alleging race discrimination in their employment practices, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at *1. The complaint asserted that Local 580 engaged in “patterns and practices” of discrimination that denied non-white individuals employment opportunities because of their race. Id. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Local 580 systemically excluded non-white individuals from union membership and refused to refer them for available ironworking jobs. Id.
In 1974, the EEOC was substituted as plaintiff for the DOJ. Id. at n.1. In 1978, following negotiations, the district court entered a consent judgment that: (1) permanently enjoined the union from discriminating against Black and Hispanic ironworkers; (2) established remedial membership benchmarks for Black and Hispanic workers; and (3) imposed specific data‑collection and recordkeeping requirements regarding operation of the union’s referral hall — “a clearinghouse in which the union matches available members with employers requesting ironworking services.” Id.
Over the ensuing decades, however, the union repeatedly failed to comply with its obligations. Id. Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the district court issued multiple contempt orders addressing non‑compliance and increased the scope of its mandatory union remedial obligations. Id.
In 2019, following a period without discrimination complaints, the EEOC assessed whether ongoing court supervision remained necessary. Id. at *2. Interviews with 41 Black and Hispanic current and former Local 580 members revealed that 17% reported racial discrimination, often involving referral-hall operations or job allocation. Id. The EEOC’s labor economist analyzed “fund office” data from 2009–2019, which showed racial disparities in overtime and working days (attributed to employer rather than union conduct), and “hiring hall dispatch” data limited to June 2018–2019, which showed no statistically significant disparities and mixed results on unemployment duration. Id. Based on this record, the EEOC and the union negotiated a proposed consent decree that would impose new, less stringent compliance obligations, vacate all prior remedial obligations and court orders, immediately terminate the special master’s appointment, and end judicial oversight after three years. Id.
In 2020, the parties jointly moved to enter the proposed consent decree. Id. The district court requested supplemental information, including the union’s 2009–2018 referral-hall data, which was missing from the economist’s report but which had been required by court order, and evidence of efforts to address the documented disparities. Id. Ultimately, the district court denied the motion without prejudice in 2022, determining the EEOC’s submission was insufficient, and the parties had “entirely failed” to produce the missing data and had not described remedial actions, as required. Id.
In 2023, the parties renewed their motion for the same proposed decree. Id. at *3. The district court again denied the motion in 2024, concluding the settlement was not “fair and reasonable” and not in the public interest. Id. The court reasoned that without mandated referral-hall data and evidence of remedial efforts, it could not conclude the decree would resolve the core discrimination allegations, and that approval could signal that other litigants may ignore court-ordered recordkeeping without consequence. Id.
The EEOC appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in finding the proposed consent decree was not fair and reasonable and was not in the public’s interest. Id.
The Second Circuit’s Ruling
The Second Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s denial of the proposed consent decree, finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the decree failed the “fair and reasonable” standard. Id. at *1. The Second Circuit applied the Citigroup framework, which requires a proposed consent decree to be both “fair and reasonable” and not disserve the public interest. Id. at *4 (quoting Citigroup, 752 F.3d at 294). According to the Second Circuit, to determine whether a proposed settlement is “fair and reasonable,” a district court considers four factors, including: “(1) the basic legality of the decree; (2) whether the terms of the decree, including its enforcement mechanism, are clear; (3) whether the consent decree reflects a resolution of the actual claims in the complaint; and (4) whether the consent decree is tainted by improper collusion or corruption of some kind.” Id. (quoting Citigroup, 752 F.3d at 294–95).
The Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the proposed decree failed the third factor – whether the consent decree reflects a resolution of the original claims. Id. Specifically, Local 580’s persistent failure to comply with court-ordered recordkeeping requirements left critical gaps in the data about referral-hall operations, rendering the economist’s conclusion of race-neutral operations of “limited utility.” Id. The Second Circuit noted that, given a history of over fifty-five-years and multiple contempt orders, the district court reasonably required a more extensive factual record to evaluate whether the proposed settlement addressed the 1971 complaint’s core allegations. Id.
Regarding the public interest analysis, the Second Circuit found that the district court’s first rationale, that entering a favorable judgment despite Local 580’s disregard for recordkeeping mandates could signal to future litigants that court orders may be ignored without consequence, was a permissible public interest consideration independent of agency policy. Id. at *5. However, the Second Circuit noted that the district court’s second rationale, declining to defer to the EEOC’s public interest determination based on the agency’s shifting policy priorities—was likely an error under the Citigroup standard, which instructs courts not to reject settlements based solely on disagreement with agency policy decisions. Id. Ultimately, because the proposed decree still failed the “fair and reasonable” requirement, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial without needing to reverse on the public interest issue. Id.
Implications For Employers
This decision signals that, in long-running cases – particularly those with a history of noncompliance – district courts may demand more extensive factual showings before approving proposed consent decrees, even when the parties reach an agreement and even when an enforcement agency also supports settlement. Moreover, this decision underscores the importance for employers to ensure strict compliance with all court-ordered recordkeeping requirements, as courts may refuse to approve favorable settlements where mandated records are missing or incomplete, despite the parties’ agreement.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and Anna Sheridan
Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 9, 2026, in Oliver, et al. v. Navy Federal Credit Union, Case No. 24-1656 (4th Cir. Feb. 9, 2026), the Fourth Circuit issued a 2-1 ruling partially affirming a district court’s order striking class allegations from a complaint alleging racial discrimination in mortgage lending before any discovery had occurred. In addition to the parties’ briefs, the Fourth Circuit received briefs from four amici supporting the defendant, indicating substantial interest in the outcome of the appeal. Navy Federal Credit Union prevailed in the district court on its motion to strike the class allegations from the complaint pled under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision striking the Rule 23(b)(2) allegations because it found that the district court acted prematurely, given the legal standards governing when courts are authorized to do so (which it helpfully clarified). However, under those same legal standards, the majority concluded that the district court properly struck the plaintiffs’ Rule 23(b)(3) allegations. The dissenting judge concurred with the decision to affirm striking the Rule 23(b)(3) allegations but would also have affirmed the ruling striking the Rule 23(b)(2) allegations.
The decision is a helpful illustration of how defendants facing class action litigation can use the mechanism of Rule 23(c)(1)(A) to eliminate class-wide exposure early in the process, along with the limitations of such an approach.
Case Background
Laquita Oliver and nine other named plaintiffs, who all are either Black or Latino, brought a putative class action against Navy Federal Credit Union in 2023 alleging that the lender systematically discriminates against minority mortgage loan applicants based on their race. Slip op. at 3. Plaintiffs allege that the lender uses a “semi-automated underwriting process” and a single form for collecting information from every applicant that includes information that can be proxies for race, resulting in unlawful intentional and disparate impact discrimination. Id. at 4, 15-16. They sought class-wide relief for “all minority residential loan applicants from 2018 through the present” whose loans were denied, issued with less favorable terms, or processed more slowly than non-minority applicants. Id. at 4. Plaintiffs sought certification of a class to provide injunctive and declaratory relief generally applicable to the class as a whole under Rule 23(b)(2), and also certification under Rule 23(b)(3) – allowing class treatment where common issues predominate over individualized issues. Id. at 16.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and a motion to strike the class allegations in the complaint under Rule 12(f) and Rule 23(d)(1)(D). Id. at 5. It argued the case could not proceed as a class action due to myriad differences between the loan products they offer, and because the plaintiffs “failed to explain how an undefined underwriting process could produce discriminatory effects for class members who applied for different [loan] products.” Id. The district court denied the motion to dismiss but granted to motion to strike the class allegations, and the Plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 5.
The Fourth Circuit’s Decision
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision striking the Rule 23(b)(3) class allegations from Plaintiffs’ complaint before any discovery had occurred but reversed the decision to strike the class allegations seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2). The dissenting judge would have affirmed the district court’s decision in full.
As a threshold matter, which this blog’s more wonkish readers will appreciate, the Court of Appeals took the time to sort through a procedural miasma present in Rule 23 litigation relating to motions to strike class allegations. Navy Federal Credit Union, like many other defendants before them, had moved to strike under Rule 12(f) – which allows courts to strike material from complaints that they deem to be “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous” (id. at 7) – along with Rule 23(d)(1)(D), which allows them to order that a party amend their pleadings to remove class allegations. Id. at 8. The Fourth Circuit determined that those rules, as a logical and practical matter, cannot form the basis for a district court to issue an order striking class allegations, but instead, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) does. Id. at 6, 9. That rule requires district courts to decide class certification issues at “an early practicable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). Because a decision to strike class allegations necessarily implies that those allegations cannot possibly form the basis for a decision on class certification, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Rule 23(c), which is entirely concerned with the class certification process, is the proper procedural vehicle. Id. at 6-9. Even though Navy Federal Credit Union did not raise that rule as its procedural mechanism for seeking to strike the class allegations, the Court of Appeals decided it would do so sua sponte in affirming the order striking the Rule 23(b)(3) class. Id. at 9, n.1.
Then, the majority explained how district courts should analyze allegations in class action complaints when defendants move to strike them to determine whether the time is right to do so. In other words, such motions may not be granted prematurely, and district courts within the Fourth Circuit must now do so by looking to the face of the complaint. Applying the 1978 precedent established in Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1978), it decided that if the class claims fail as a matter of law, district courts may strike them before any discovery has occurred. Id. at 6. However, district courts commit legal error if they grant such motions where the dispute cannot readily be resolved by looking at the complaint alone. Id. at 11-12. The majority concluded that just as a district court may never grant class certification based solely on the face of the complaint, a court may deny class certification at that preliminary stage only if the class allegations do not satisfy Rule 23’s class certification requirements as a matter of law. Id. at 13.
Finally, the majority examined whether the district court erred when it granted Navy Federal Credit Union’s motion to strike both class claims before discovery occurred. It decided that the district court exceeded its discretion when it struck the Rule 23(b)(2) class claim, but it was not error to strike the Rule 23(b)(3) class claim. Id. at 14. The majority noted that while it was not entirely clear based on the record before why the district court ruled the way it did on the defendant’s motion, the language used indicated a concern from the district court judge about the manageability of the Rule 23(b)(3) class claims and whether a class action would be a superior method for trying such claims, given the material variations in the types of mortgage products applied for and their various requirements. Id. at 14-15. Thus, the plaintiffs’ factual allegations could not be tried on a class-wide basis consistent with Rule 23. But the allegations relating to the Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief class was different, the majority concluded. The allegations underlying that class claim are far more cohesive and centralized than the others, making it error for the district court to strike those allegations under Rule 23. Id. at 16-18.
Implications For Class Action Defendants
When companies are sued in class actions, it is crucial for them to have corporate counsel that understand not only the stakes and extreme exposure risk such lawsuits present, but also the nuances and often-changing jurisprudence governing Rule 23. Motions to strike class allegations are a very powerful tool for such companies to use, and the Fourth Circuit’s decision is a welcome clarification of how to think deliberately and critically about the prospects for such motion practice to succeed. The key is to understand the relationship between the specific facts alleged in such complaints and the requirements of Rule 23, in all of its nuances.
Duane Morris Takeaway:This week’s episode features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman, Jennifer Riley, and Daniel Spencer with their discussion of the key trends and developments analyzed in the new edition of the EEOC And Government Enforcement Litigation Review – 2026.
Jerry Maatman: Thank you for being here, loyal blog readers and listeners, for the next episode of our regular podcast series, The Class Action Weekly Wire. My name is Jerry Maatman, and I’m a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today are my colleagues and fellow partners, Jen Riley and Daniel Spencer. Welcome.
Jennifer: Great to be here, Jerry. Thanks for having me.
Daniel: Yeah, thanks, Jerry.
Jerry: Today, we’re here to announce our publication of the 2026 edition of Duane Morris’ EEOC And Government Enforcement Litigation Review. The review is available on our blogsite as an e-book and is a must-read for employers.
Jennifer: Absolutely, Jerry. Government enforcement litigation continues to look more and more like class action litigation in terms of both its exposure and its complexity. When you’re dealing with lawsuits brought by agencies like the EEOC or the Department of Labor, you’re often looking at significant risk, a large number of claimants, and serious reputational concerns for the companies involved.
Daniel: And one of the key points that we emphasize in the Review is that while these cases resemble class actions, they don’t actually operate the same way procedurally. In private class actions, plaintiffs have to jump through a bunch of hoops, like Rule 23, to get through class certification. That’s not the case with government enforcement and litigation.
Jerry: Exactly. A great example is what are known as EEOC systemic pattern or practice lawsuits, where there’s no class certification requirement, and the practical impact of the case, however, is just like a class action in terms of the amount of money necessary to defend it, the amount of management time that has to be allocated to the defense of the case, and the need to defend against widespread company-wide allegations of alleged discriminatory behavior. It’s certainly a high-stakes sort of lawsuit.
Jennifer: And that’s why employers cannot afford to underestimate these cases. Even without Rule 23, EEOC systemic lawsuits raise many of the same strategic and litigation challenges as private class actions raise. And those agencies are aggressive – the EEOC and the DOL, they continue to be two of the most active federal enforcement bodies.
Daniel: Yeah, Jen, and the numbers from 2025 really drive that point home. In fact, the top 10 EEOC enforcement action settlements and verdicts totaled $41.43 million, which is a notable increase from $25.95 million in 2024. The trend tells us that enforcement activity is not slowing down.
Jerry: I think it’s pertinent to note that the Department of Labor numbers are even more eye-popping from the perspective of corporate decision makers. In 2025, the top 10 settlements in the DOL space totaled $3.29 billion. That was up, quite a bit from 2024, when it was $335 million. So, you can see how dramatic the increase has been with the Department of Labor on its radar screen, looking for employers engaged in what it calls as alleged wage theft against workers.
Jennifer: Those DOL cases covered a range of issues, also Fair Labor Standards Act claims, as well as litigation involving consent decrees and injunctions. The rulings we analyzed in the review show how broad and potentially impactful the DOL enforcement actions can be.
Daniel: And that’s why this Review is so important for companies across the country. It looks at the legal issues that are being litigated, the enforcement strategies these agencies are using, and identifies and understands those critical trends for companies trying to stay ahead of the risk.
Jerry: Well, that’s well said, Jen and Daniel. And for anyone who wants to dig deeper, the full Review is available in e-book format on the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog. And we’ll be continuing to cover legal developments and rulings in the EEOC and the DOL space over the remainder of 2026, so stay tuned to the Class Action Weekly Wire.
Jennifer: Thanks for having me on the podcast, Jerry, and thanks to our listeners for being here. As always, subscribe to stay updated on the latest trends in class action law.
Daniel: Glad to be a part of the podcast, and thanks very much to all the listeners. Be sure to download your copy of the Review today.
Duane Morris Takeaway: The final trend in our DMCAR series outlines how the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) inspired more representative lawsuits than any other statute in America over the past three years. According to the California Department of Industrial Relations, the number of PAGA notices filed in 2025 approached 9,900, which surpasses the 9,464 PAGA notices in 2024.
DMCAR co-editor Jennifer Riley outlines this trend in the following video:
The so-called PAGA reform legislation passed in 2024 by California lawmakers seemingly did little to nothing to curb interest in these cases.
The PAGA created a scheme to “deputize” private citizens to sue their employers for penalties associated with violations of the California Labor Code on behalf of other “aggrieved employees,” as well as the State. A PAGA plaintiff may pursue claims on a representative basis, i.e., on behalf of other allegedly aggrieved employees, but need not satisfy the class action requirements of Rule 23.
Thus, the PAGA provides the plaintiffs’ class action bar a mechanism to harness the risk and leverage of a representative proceeding without the threat of removal to federal court under the CAFA and without the burden of meeting the requirements for class certification.
The PAGA’s popularity in recent years, however, also flows from its status as one of the most viable workarounds to workplace arbitration agreements. Thus, it presents one of the most pervasive litigation risks to companies doing business in California.
The Growth Of PAGA Notices Continues
According to data maintained by the California Department of Industrial Relations, the number of PAGA notices filed with the LWDA has increased exponentially over the past two decades.
The number grew from 11 notices in 2006, to 1,606 in 2013, and then underwent three sizable jumps – to 4,530 in 2014, to 5,732 in 2018, and to 7,464 in 2023, each coinciding with a significant shift in the legal landscape regarding arbitration. In 2024, notices exceeded 9,464 for the first time and, in 2025, the number of PAGA notices reached a new all-time high of approximately 9,981.
Employers saw the largest single year increase in 2014, when the number of notices increased from 1,605 in 2013 to 4,532 notices in 2014, an increase of 182%.
The most significant drop in the past two decades occurred in 2022, when notices fell from 6,502 in 2021 to 5,817 in 2022, before their resurgence in 2023 and continued growth in 2024 and 2025. The following chart illustrates this trend.
These numbers closely tie to the shifting impact of workplace arbitration programs, in that each of the major shifts coincides with the timing of a significant expansion or pull back in the law governing the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
PAGA reform seemingly has had little to no impact on the growth on PAGA filings. On June 18, 2024, Governor Newsom announced that labor and business groups had inked a deal to alter the PAGA in return for removing the referendum to repeal the PAGA from the November 2024 ballot. The California Legislature quickly moved to approve two bills (AB 2288 and Senate Bill 92). The alterations included reforms to the penalty structure, new defenses for employers, changes to the PAGA’s standing requirements, and a new “cure” process for both small and large employers, among other changes. These reforms affect all PAGA notices filed on or after June 19, 2024, with some exceptions. As noted above, however, PAGA reform did little to quell PAGA filings.
Could PAGA Activity Skyrocket?
As noted above, the PAGA emerged as one of the most popular tools of the plaintiffs’ class action bar in recent years due to its potential immunity from workplace arbitration agreements. The California Supreme Court is poised to consider the viability of so-called “headless” PAGA actions in 2026 – i.e., actions that lack or disclaim any individual PAGA claim (often because the plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement covering such claim) and seek to pursue only the representative PAGA component on behalf of other allegedly aggrieved employees.
The growing adoption of arbitration programs led the plaintiffs’ class action bar to identify various workarounds, and the PAGA emerged as one of the most viable in 2016 when the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, 59 Cal.4th 348 (Cal. 2014). In that case, the California Supreme Court held that representative action waivers in arbitration agreements are “contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state law.” Id. at 384. In so holding, Iskanian essentially immunized PAGA claims from arbitration and permitted plaintiffs to pursue representative actions under PAGA unhindered by arbitration agreements or commitments to arbitrate on an individual basis. The decision undoubtedly fueled the filing of PAGA notices in 2014, which catapulted from 1,606 in 2013 to 4,530 in 2014.
The PAGA suffered its first setback as an arbitration work-around in 2022 with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S.Ct. 1906 (2022). In Viking River, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, to the extent Iskanian precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims, and thereby “prohibit[s] parties from contracting around this joinder device,” the FAA preempts such rule. Id. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the lower court should have compelled arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim and should have dismissed the PAGA representative claim. Id.
The set-back was short lived as, in 2023, the California Supreme Court minimized the impact of the Viking River decision. In Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 14 Cal. 5th 1104 (Cal. 2023), the California Supreme Court took up the issue of whether, under California law, a PAGA plaintiff who’s individual PAGA claim is compelled to arbitration retains standing to bring a representative PAGA claim. The California Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative. It held that, once a PAGA plaintiff is compelled to arbitrate his or her individual PAGA claim, so long as he or she is found to be an “aggrieved employee,” the plaintiff retains standing to maintain a non-individual PAGA claim in court. Id. at 1105.
By deciding that an individual who signs an arbitration agreement can return to court after arbitration to pursue a representative proceeding under the PAGA, the California Supreme Court relegated arbitration agreements to a mere hurdle rather than a bar to PAGA representative actions. Still, the plaintiffs’ bar has continued its attempt to eliminate the arbitration defense altogether to streamline their ability to proceed with representative actions in court. One emerging tool is the so-called “headless” PAGA action.
While such a tool seemingly runs counter to the ruling in Adolph and other cases, which have held that a PAGA claim necessarily consists of both and individual and representative portions, the California Court of Appeal gave it life in April 2024 with its decision in Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, 101 Cal. App. 5th 533 (2024). In that opinion, the California Court of Appeal denied a motion to compel arbitration, holding that a plaintiff could maintain a representative PAGA action, even without an individual PAGA claim, so long as the plaintiff alleges that he or she suffered a Labor Code violation.
Appellate courts have taken different views as to this strategy over the past year. On July 7, 2025, for instance, in CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court Of Fresno County, 112 Cal. App. 5th 872 (Cal. App. 2025), the Court of Appeal for the Fifth District concluded that a worker’s dismissal of his individual PAGA claim did not bar him from pursuing a representative PAGA claim. The trial court granted the worker’s unopposed motion to dismiss his individual PAGA claim, and the defendant then sought dismissal of the non-individual PAGA claim on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to proceed. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded that the PAGA statute is ambiguous on this point and, faced with an ambiguous statute, opined that the primary objective of the PAGA statute is to maximize enforcement of labor laws and deter employer violations. As such, it held that requiring arbitration of individual claims before pursuing non-individual claims would undermine those enforcement efforts and that, to achieve effective enforcement, the PAGA statute should be interpreted to allow “PAGA plaintiffs and their counsel the flexibility to choose among bringing a PAGA action that seeks to recover of civil penalties on (1) the LWDA’s individual PAGA claims, (2) the LWDA’s non-individual PAGA claims, or (3) both.” Id. at 917.
In Williams, et al. v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC, 2025 Cal. LEXIS 4161 (Cal. App. July 9, 2025), the Court of Appeal for the Second District reached the opposite conclusion. The plaintiff, a former insurance adjuster, filed an action alleging that the defendant failed to pay overtime compensation. Although the plaintiff separated from his employment in January 2022, the plaintiff waited until March 2023 to file a PAGA notice with the LWDA. The plaintiff thereafter filed suit solely on behalf of other current and former employees and did not seek penalties on his own behalf. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s action holding that, because the plaintiff filed his PAGA notice more than a year after his employment ended, his individual claim was time-barred and, without a timely individual claim, he could not maintain a PAGA representative claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling. It explained that a PAGA plaintiff must have a timely claim for violations he or she personally suffered. The plaintiff filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, and the California Supreme Court granted and deferred the appeal pending consideration and disposition of related issues in Leeper, et al. v. Shipt, 331 Cal. Rptr. 3d 450 (Cal. 2025)
In Leeper, the Court of Appeal for the Second District reached a similar conclusion. The plaintiff, a former Shipt worker, alleged that Shipt misclassified her and others as independent contractors in violation of state wage & hour laws. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration ruling that, because the plaintiff sought only non-individual civil penalties, there were no individual claims to arbitrate. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed. It reasoned that every PAGA action inherently includes an individual claim, alongside the representative claim. The Court of Appeal opined that the statutory language of the PAGA states that a PAGA action is one brought both on behalf of the plaintiff (the individual claim) and on behalf of others (the representative claim). On request for review, the California Supreme Court agreed to review the Court of Appeal’s order and to address the following questions: (i) Does every PAGA necessarily include both individual and non-individual PAGA claims, regardless of whether the complaint specifically alleges individual claims; and (ii) can a plaintiff choose to bring only a non-individual PAGA action?
If the California Supreme Court sides with the plaintiffs on these issues and allows plaintiffs to maintain “headless” or representative-only PAGA claims, it will allow plaintiffs with arbitration agreements to bypass arbitration and to avoid the risk that they might not succeed on their individual PAGA claims. If plaintiffs can avoid arbitration altogether, such a ruling surely would bolster PAGA’s popularity as an arbitration work-around. Either way, given the technical requirements of California wage & hour law, coupled with the potentially crushing statutory penalties available to successful plaintiffs, employers should anticipate continued growth of PAGA lawsuits in 2026.
The Duane Morris Class Action Review serves as a desk reference on all things class action. General editor Jerry Maatman discusses the origins of the Review and the scope of the findings in the 2026 edition.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Justin R. Donoho, Hayley Ryan, and Ryan Garippo
Duane Morris Takeaways: On November 13, 2025, in Cole, et al. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29698 (3d Cir. Nov. 13, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a ruling of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey’s in dismissing a class action complaint brought by website users against a diagnostic testing company alleging that the company’s use of website advertising technology violated the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”) and California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (“CMIA”).
The ruling is significant because it confirms two important principles: (1) CIPA’s prohibition against eavesdropping does not apply to an online advertising company, like Facebook, when it directly receives information from the users’ browser; and (2) the CMIA is not triggered unless plaintiffs plausibly allege the disclosure of substantive medical information.
Background
This case is one of a legion of nationwide class actions that plaintiffs have filed alleging that third-party technologies (“adtech”) captured user information for targeted advertising. These tools, such as the Facebook Tracking Pixel, are widely used across millions of consumer products and websites.
In these cases, plaintiffs typically assert claims under federal or state eavesdropping statutes, consumer protection laws, or other privacy statutes. Because statutes like CIPA allow $5,000 in statutory damages per violation, plaintiffs frequently seek millions, or even billions, in potential recovery, even from midsize companies, on the theory that hundreds of thousands of consumers or website visitors, times $5,000 per claimant, equals a huge amount of damages. While many of these suits initially targeted healthcare providers, plaintiffs have sued companies across nearly every industry, including retailers, consumer products companies, universities, and the adtech companies themselves.
Several of these cases have resulted in multimillion-dollar settlements; others have been dismissed at the pleading stage (as we blogged about here) or at the summary judgment stage (as we blogged about here and here). Still, most remain undecided, and with some district courts allowing adtech class actions to survive motions to dismiss (as we blogged about here), the plaintiffs’ bar continues to file adtech class actions at an aggressive pace.
In Cole, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant diagnostic testing company used the Facebook Tracking Pixel on both its general website and its password-protected patient portal. Id. at *1-2. According to the plaintiffs, when a user accessed the general website, the Pixel intercepted and transmitted to Facebook “the URL of the page requested, along with the title of the page, keywords associated with the page, and a description of the page.” Id. at *2-3. Likewise, when a user accessed the password-protected website, the Pixel allegedly transmitted the URL “showing, at a minimum, that a patient has received and is accessing test results.” Id. at *3.
Plaintiffs asserted that these transmissions constituted (1) a CIPA violation because the company supposedly aided Facebook in “intercepting” plaintiffs’ internet communications, and (2) a CMIA violation because the company allegedly disclosed URLs associated with webpages plaintiffs accessed to view test results along with plaintiffs’ identifying information linked to users’ Facebook accounts. Id. at *3.
The company moved to dismiss, and, in separate orders, the district court dismissed both claims. See 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116350; 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7205.
As to the CIPA claim, the district court found that CIPA “is aimed only at ‘eavesdropping, or the secret monitoring of conversations by third parties,’” and that Facebook was not a third party because it received information directly from plaintiffs’ browsers about webpages they visited. 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7205, at *7-8 (quoting In Re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 140-41 (3d Cir. 2015)). As to the CMIA claim, the district court found that plaintiffs alleged only that the company disclosed that a patient accessed test results but not what kind of medical test was done or what the results were. 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116350, at *15. Accordingly, the district court held that plaintiffs failed to allege the disclosure of “substantive” medical information as required under the CMIA. Id.
Plaintiffs appealed both rulings.
The Court’s Decision
The Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at *1.
On the CIPA claim, the Third Circuit explained that “[a]s a recipient of a direct communication from Plaintiffs’ browsers, Facebook was a participant in Plaintiffs’ transmissions such that [the company] did not aid or assist Facebook in eavesdropping on or intercepting such communications, even if done without the users’ knowledge.” 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29698, at *6. With no eavesdropping, “Plaintiffs’ CIPA claim was properly dismissed.” Id. at *7.
On the CMIA claim, the Third Circuit explained that “at most, Plaintiffs alleged that [the company] disclosed Plaintiffs had been its patients, which is not medical information protected by CMIA.” Id. at *8. Thus, the Third Circuit held that the district court properly dismissed the CMIA claim. Id. at *9.
Implications For Companies
Cole offers strong precedent for any company defending adtech class action claims (1) brought under CIPA’s eavesdropping provision where the third-party adtech company directly receives the information from users’ browsers and (2) brought under the CMIA where the alleged disclosure merely shows that a person was a patient, without revealing any substantive information about the person’s medical condition or test results.
The latter point continues to appear across adtech class actions. Just as the plaintiffs in Cole failed to plausibly allege the disclosure of substantive medical information, courts have dismissed similar claims where plaintiffs allege disclosure of protected health information (“PHI”) without actually identifying what PHI was supposedly shared (as we blogged about here). These decisions reinforce that adtech plaintiffs must identify the specific medical information allegedly disclosed to plausibly plead claims under the CMIA or for invasion of privacy.
Duane Morris Takeaways: Recently we had the privilege of attending this year’s annual ABA conference on class action litigation. Cutting-edge issues under Rule 23 were the focus of discussion among session leaders and attendees. The consistent theme is that case law precedents are in a state of constant flux – and the “new normal” is “change…”
Key cutting-edge issues are summarized below in terms of top-class action issues for 2025.
Data Breach Class Actions
The focal point in class actions over data breaches is discovery of consultant work in the aftermath of a breach and whether the work product is privileged or not. Plaintiffs’ advocates asserted that discovery of facts is always allowed and that companies have complete control over the technology environment when remediation efforts are undertaken in the wake of a data breach. Defense proponents contended that such consulting expert work is a prime example of protected work product. Case law, however, is somewhat all over the lot and data breach litigation is increasing in scope and complexity.
This issue underscores what class action practitioners agreed upon – data breach class actions are exceedingly complex, raises vexing choice-of-law issues under state law, and are challenging in terms of managing the litigation process.
Trials In Class Actions
Once a rarity, trials in class actions are beginning to become more mainstream. A panel session on trying a class actions discussed how challenging such a trial is given the stakes and financial exposures in “big” lawsuits.
As an adjunct professor of law at Northwestern, I teach trial advocacy. The skillsets taught in my law school class resonated in this session – have an “elevator” presentation for the jury that boils down the complexities of the case into an easily understood explanation of the plaintiffs’ theories and the defendant’s defenses. Both plaintiffs and defense lawyers agreed that the ability to craft an effective “elevator” speech pays dividends in the successful prosecution and/or defense of a class action in a trial setting.
As a federal judge on the panel advised, “less is more” in terms of trying a complex dispute in a manner that engages the attention of a jury (and a judge).
Unresolved Rule 23 Issues
While many areas of class-wide ligation are in flux, the number one issue prompted agreement from all practitioners – the unresolved issue from Lab. Corp. v. Davis on the impact of uninjured class members on class certification and damages models prepared by experts in class cases. The “uninjured class member” issue continues to drive diverse outcomes and uncertainty relative to the concepts of Article III standing and predominance under Rule 23(b)(3).
Attendees agreed that the issue is ripe for U.S. Supreme Court review after the dismissal of the certiorari grant for jurisdictional issue in Lab. Corp.
Collective Action Certification Standards
The standard for conditional certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act is in flux. In essence, there are four distinct standards depending on what circuit law applies. The majority standard is based on Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89 (D.N.J. 1983).
For decades, many federal courts have relied on the two-step Lusardi approach for collective action certification. Under the Lusardi standard for conditional certification, plaintiffs only had to make a “modest factual showing” that they were victims of a common illegal policy or plan. Most courts applying this standard refused to weigh evidence or consider opposing evidence presented by the defendant. Such lenient notice standards allow plaintiffs to expand the size of a wage & hour lawsuit, significantly increasing pressure to settle, regardless of the action’s actual merits.
In the past four years, the Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal have found that Lusardi’s two step approach is inconsistent with the text of the FLSA. Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., LLC, 985 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2021); Clark v. A&L Homecare & Training Ctr., LLC, 68 F.4th 1003 (6th Cir. 2023). In Swales, 985 F.3d at 443, the Fifth Circuit rejected Lusardi’s two-step approach outright, and required its district courts to “rigorously enforce” the FLSA’s similarity requirement at the outset of the litigation in a one-step approach. Similarly, in Clark, 68 F.4th at 1011, the Sixth Circuit adopted a comparable, but slightly more lenient standard, requiring the employee to show a “strong likelihood” that others are similarly situated to him or her before the district court can send notice.
In contrast, the Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits continue to either follow or allow the district court to adopt the two-step framework outlined in Lusardi. Harrington v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 142 F.4th 678 (9th Cir. 2025); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001); Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 2010); Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001).
The Seventh Circuit, in a recent opinion written by Judge Thomas Kirsch, rejected the Lusardi framework but declined to go as far as Clark or Swales. The Seventh Circuit observed that the notice process should be facilitated by three guiding principles: (1) the timing and accuracy of notice; (2) judicial neutrality; and (3) the prevention of abuses of joinder. Richards v. Eli Lilly, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 19667, at *14 7(th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025). It reasoned that the Lusardi standard threatened the latter two principles by “incentivizing defendants to settle early rather than attempt to ‘decertify’ at step two . . . transforming what should be a neutral case management tool into a vehicle for strongarming settlements and soliciting claims.” Id. at * 17. Thus, the Seventh Circuit rejected Lusardi, but what to do in the alternative was a more difficult question.
The Seventh Circuit decided that rather than endorse the rigid standards of Clark or Swales, its approach would be guided by “flexibility” and an analysis that is not an “all-or-nothing determination.” Id. at *19. Indeed, a plaintiff must now “make a threshold showing that there is a material factual dispute as to whether the proposed collective is similarly situated.” Id. at *21. Or, in other words, a plaintiff must “produce some evidence suggesting that they and the members of the proposed collective are victims of a common unlawful employment practice or policy.” Id, at *21-22. To counter a plaintiff’s evidence, an employer “must be permitted to submit rebuttal evidence and, in assessing whether a material dispute exists, courts must consider the extent to which plaintiffs engage with opposing evidence.” Id. at *22. It is not clear, however, the burden a plaintiff must satisfy to refute the defendant’s evidence to move forward.
This brewing circuit split suggest that U.S. Supreme Court review is necessary to resolve this important issue.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Ryan T. Garippo, and Andrew P. Quay
Duane Morris Takeaways:On September 30, 2025, in Dougherty, et al. v. Bojangles’ Restaurants, Inc., No. 25-CV-00065, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194879 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2025), Judge Kenneth D. Bell of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina dismissed a class action alleging violations of numerous state torts and the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act following an alleged cyberattack on Bojangles. The Court held the former employees of the fast-food chainfailed to plausibly allege a concrete injury, and therefore, lacked Article III standing. The Court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ theory of an “ongoing threat of identity theft” without any actual harm was not enough to sustain a concrete injury.
The decision illustrates that the mere possibility of future harm, without any actual harm, is not enough to plausibly allege an injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing. Further, building on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the decision highlights the requirements of traceability where plaintiffs cannot identify any harm connected to the transfer of personal information to a data breach defendant.
Case Background
Bojangles Restaurants, Inc. (“Bojangles”) was the alleged victim of a cyberattack in February 2024. Id. at *5. In November of that same year, Bojangles sent a notice to those who may have been impacted, stating “that certain files were viewed and downloaded by an unknown actor between February 19, 2024 and March 12, 2024.” Id.
In January 2025, after receiving the notice from Bojangles, Alexis Dougherty and eight other former employees (“Plaintiffs”), filed a putative class action complaint against Bojangles. Id. at *2. Plaintiffs alleged that Bojangles gathers various types of sensitive information from its employees, including names, addresses, Social Security numbers, driver’s license information, etc., and that Bojangles failed to implement “reasonable cybersecurity safeguards or protocols.” Id. at *4-5. Notably, however, Plaintiffs did not identify any sensitive information they provided to Bojangles, except for some Plaintiffs who alleged they provided their Social Security number or that Bojangles’ notice identified their Social Security number. Id. at *6.
Plaintiffs asserted two different theories of injury. Eight of the nine Plaintiffs did not allege any identity theft or data misuse; rather, they claimed injury based on “the threat of harm” from a potential sale of their information on the Dark Web, an uptick in spam calls, “diminution in value” of their personal information, time spent mitigating the potential impacts of the cyberattack, and emotional distress. Id. The remaining plaintiff alleged fraudulent charges on his debit card but did not allege that he provided the card number to Bojangles as part of his employment. Id. at *6.
Bojangles moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bojangles argued that eight of the Plaintiffs failed to allege a concrete injury without an actual misuse of their personal information, and that the remaining plaintiff’s alleged debit card fraud is not fairly traceable to the data breach.
The Court’s Opinion
In a 10-page opinion, Judge Kenneth D. Bell granted Bojangles’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without reaching the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
The Court held that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege Article III standing. Judge Bell explained that Plaintiffs’ allegations “only describ[e] the possibility of future harm that is inherent in every data security incident, but cannot support the Article III standing necessary to pursue a federal lawsuit.” Id. at *7. There was no dispute that Plaintiffs’ personal information may have been impacted by the data breach, but the potential threat of resulting damages failed to plausibly allege a concrete injury that is fairly traceable to the data breach. Id. at *6-7.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), governed the opinion. There, the named plaintiff on behalf of a putative class alleged that TransUnion, a credit reporting agency, violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to use reasonable procedures before placing a misleading alert in his credit file that labeled him as a potential terrorist, among other comparable threats. Id. at 419-21. The Supreme Court held that only class members whose credit reports had been provided to third-party businesses had suffered a concrete injury, and that the mere existence of misleading alerts in one’s own credit file did not cause such an injury. Id. at 417, 435.
Applying TransUnion to the facts at hand, Judge Bell reasoned that “Plaintiffs’ allegations of harm as a consequence of the Data Breach fall squarely in the ‘might be a problem’ rather than the ‘is already a problem’ category.” Dougherty, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194879,at *12. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ theory of an ongoing threat of identity theft or other data misuse failed to plausibly allege any actual harm, such as an attempt to open credit card accounts or otherwise steal information. Id. at *12-13. Further, most of the Plaintiffs did not identify any personal information that they personally provided to Bojangles, defeating any traceability argument. Judge Bell similarly dismissed Plaintiffs’ varied attempts to establish standing based on an uptick in spam calls, diminution in value of personal information, time spent mitigating the “potential impact” of the data breach, and emotional distress. Id. at 13-14. None of these harms constitute a concrete injury.
Judge Bell also dismissed the claims of the one Plaintiff who allegedly noticed fraudulent charges on his debit card, because he did not allege those charges were fairly traceable to the breach. Because the Plaintiff did not allege that he provided his debit card number to Bojangles as part of his employment, there was no way to connect those charges to the alleged breach. Thus, although those charges may constitute an injury-in-fact, they were insufficient on traceability grounds.
Implications For Companies
Dougherty illustrates the pleading requirements established in TransUnion, and the powerful tool that they can be in dismantling a nationwide data breach class action.
What’s more, the court in Dougherty seemed to take for granted that every class member must suffer an actual injury for each of their claims, even at the pleading stage in the litigation. Id. at *9 (“Therefore, following TransUnion, it is clear that to recover damages from Defendant, every class member must have Article III standing for each claim that they press requiring proof that the challenged conduct caused each of them a concrete harm”) (quotations omitted). This signal may be a favorable sign that Judge Bell agrees with the “sleeping lion” noted by Justice Kavanaugh in Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Davis, 605 U.S. 327 (2025) – i.e., whether “a federal court may . . . certify a damages class that includes both injured and uninjured members.” Id. at 328 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). For now, however, the Court left that issue until another day.
Nonetheless, if corporate counsel’s organizations are facing a class action seeking damages stemming from an alleged data breach, corporate counsel should consider their ability to attack Article III standing on all fronts, not only as to the named plaintiffs, but also as to the class. If successful, other organizations may be able to make an early exit from a data breach class action on the theory that plaintiffs cannot plausibly allege an actual injury from the future possibility of their data misuse, much like the defendant in Dougherty.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., George J. Schaller, and Andrew P. Quay
Duane Morris Takeaways: On September 19, 2025, in Vidal, et al. v. The Hershey Co., No. 24-CV-60831, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184308 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2025), Judge Melissa Damian of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed a class action complaint alleging violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act for deceptive candy packing. The Court held the plaintiff-consumers failed to plausibly allege an economic injury, and therefore, lacked Article III standing. Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were “disappointed” with the lack of carved designs on Halloween-themed candy and blanket assertions that they “paid a premium” was not enough to sustain an economic injury.
The decision illustrates that conclusory statements, without an economic injury, are not enough to confer Article III standing. Though the ruling demonstrates “spooky” claims for deceptive labeling and deceptive advertising can support a potential class action, the Plaintiffs here could not show they sustained an economic injury.
Case Background
Plaintiffs Nathan Vidal and Eduardo Granados, on behalf of themselves and a putative class of consumers, filed a class action complaint against The Hershey Company (“Hershey”). Plaintiffs alleged they purchased certain decorative Reese’s products in Florida and that these products “misled” them in violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Id. at *4
Plaintiffs asserted they would not have purchased Reese’s Peanut Butter Pumpkins and Reese’s White Pumpkins had they known that the products did not contain detailed carvings of eyes and a mouth as pictured on the packaging. Id. at *3-4. Plaintiffs maintained “Hershey [] deceived reasonable consumers … into believing the [p]roducts were something that they were not.” Id. at *5. In true Halloween horror story fashion, Plaintiffs claimed that without the carvings and designs the products were “worthless” and that they would not have purchased them. Id. at *14.
Hershey moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim, Hersey also moved to strike Plaintiffs’ class action allegations. Id. at *4.
Hershey primarily argued Plaintiffs lacked standing because “they suffered no injury-in-fact.” Id. at *6. Hershey maintained Plaintiffs lacked standing because they only alleged an economic injury. Hershey however contended Plaintiffs did not suffer an economic injury because they still received “delicious Reese’s candy.” Id. Even still, Hershey countered that most of the at-issue products, contained “DECORATING SUGGESTION” disclaimers and both carved and uncarved images. Id. at * 7. Hershey similarly highlighted that Plaintiffs did not allege the products were defective, inedible, did not meet taste/flavor expectations, or that they lost any economic value without the decorative carvings. Id. at *14.
While Hershey’s motion was pending, Plaintiffs moved for class certification arguing they satisfied all the requirements under Rule 23 to certify a class of consumers who purchased any of the at-issue Reese’s products “based on a false and deceptive representation of an artistic carving” on the products packaging. Id. at *5.
The Court’s Decision
The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint because they did not allege a concrete economic injury and therefore lacked standing to pursue their personal claims and class claims.
In dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court reasoned the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of standing emphasizes that “[e]conomic injuries are the ‘epitome’ of concrete injuries,” and that such an economic injury can be the “result of a deceptive or unfair practice” where an individual is “deprived of the benefit of her bargain.” Id. at *15. In analyzing the benefit of the bargain a plaintiff’s damages are calculated based on “the difference in the market value of the product or service in the condition in which it was delivered and its market value in the condition in which it should have been delivered according to the contract of the parties.” Debernardis v. IQ Formulations, LLC, 942 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Carriuolo v. Gen. Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 986-87 (11th Cir. 2016)).
The Court relied on two analogous cases in considering Plaintiffs’ economic injury assertions. The first case concerned “honey-lemon cough drops” that “soothe[] sore throats” and based on those representations the “plaintiff believed that the cough drops contained lemon ingredients and were capable of soothing bronchial passages.” Id. at *17-18 (citing Valiente v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91089 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2023)). The Court in Valiente held plaintiff failed to allege an economic injury because the plaintiff did not allege the cough drops were defective, did not work as advertised, or were otherwise so flawed to render them worthless. Id. at *18.
The second case concerned plaintiffs who alleged they “paid a premium price” for “protein-infused brownies” that contained less than the advertised protein content. Id. at *18 (citing Melancon v. Alpha Prime Supps, LLC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21114 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2025). The Court in Melancon held plaintiffs failed to allege they suffered an economic injury for the same reasons as Valiente and also failed to identify any competing products for the Court to plausibly conclude that plaintiffs suffered a concrete injury in fact. Id.
Based on these cases, the Court agreed that “Plaintiffs here fail to allege Reese’s Products they purchased were defective or worthless.” Id. The Court explained “[p]ut simply, Plaintiffs do not allege that the products were unfit for consumption, did not taste as Plaintiffs expected, or otherwise were so flawed as to render them worthless.” Id. a
The Court reasoned Plaintiffs’ disappointment and conclusory allegations as to why they were deprived of the benefit of their bargain merely reflected their subjective, personal expectations of how the candies would or should have looked when unpackaged. Id. The Court held Plaintiffs’ failure to tie the value of the candies to their purported misrepresentation theory did not plausibly allege a concrete economic injury for purposes of Article III standing. Id. at *19. Further, the Court reasoned Plaintiffs made no allegations that would allow any measurement of “the difference between the value of the Reese’s Products with or without the decorative carvings.” Id.
The Court also determined Plaintiffs’ “[c]omplaint contain[ed] nothing more than allegations of Plaintiff’s subjective belief that they paid a price premium” and these blanket allegations were not enough to allege a concrete injury. Id. at *19-20.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint finding “Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to assert a claim for relief” individually or on behalf of a purported class. Id. at *20. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice preserving Plaintiffs’ ability to move for leave to amend within 15 days from the date of the Court’s Order. Id. at *23.
Implications For Companies
Companies faced with consumer fraud class action lawsuits alleging theories of false advertising and deceptive practices related to their products must consider standing at the outset of any litigation.
Vidal illustrates the importance of analyzing Article III standing issues in every lawsuit. The Vidal Plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient economic injury based on their personal expectations of how Halloween-themed candies should have looked and did not allege the candies were defective, flawed, or reduced the actual value of the product. Accordingly, the Court subjected their claims to dismissal.
Companies should not treat defective or false advertising product class action claims lightly, and if faced with such a lawsuit, Companies must consider all available defenses.
