Introduction
The Vietnamese labor law is oriented employee-friendly to the greatest extent and in most cases is interpreted to the disadvantage of the employer. It has an effect particularly in labor law-related disputes which are in most cases decided in favor of the employee. The employment contract has to be based on the standard contract drawn up by MOLISA which, however, can and should be adjusted to individual requirements of particular enterprises in order to do justice to the interests of employers and employees. Here, a particular attention should be directed to non-competition clauses and such which ensure the protection of company secrets. However, the statutory provisions must not be violated in order to avoid nullity of the labor contract. Since the Vietnamese law is still immature, enterprises and subordinate agencies can by all means have a direct influence on its development by pointing to inconsistencies. Legal bases can be found in various statutes, but the core law is the Labor Code of 02 July 2012. Moreover, the labor law-related issues are regulated by the National Insurance Act, the Vocational and Further Education Act, the Trade Union Act as well as the Act on Vietnamese Working Abroad and numerous implementing regulations of the government and competent ministries. The Vietnamese law does not now industry-wide multi-employer agreements yet. Practice-oriented are rather collective work agreements in which the wage level, social security contributions, working hours and breaks, safety at work and rights to strike as well as the bonus system are regulated and which have to be signed by a trade union representative and the principal of the company. Enterprises with more than ten employees are obliged to issue the so-called Internal Labor Rules and to register them with MOLISA. They have to regulate the following contents:
– working hours and rest periods;
– regulations within the company;
– health and safety at work;
– protection of the property and confidentiality of company secrets;
– specific examples of behaviors meaning a violation of these provisions;
– punishments to be expected in case of infringement (e.g. official rebuke) Continue reading “Lawyer in Vietnam Oliver Massmann Labor law”
Anwalt in Vietnam Oliver Massmann Pharmaindustrie Arzneimittelmarkt
Vietnams Gesundheitssystem befindet sich momentan aufgrund des Wirtschaftswachstums und der schnellen Entwicklung des Landes im Allgemeinen im Umbruch.
Vor zwanzig Jahren stand das Gesundheitswesen unter der alleinigen Kontrolle der Zentralregierung. Später wurde deutlich, dass neben staatlichen Subventionen noch weitere Mittel zur Finanzierung des Systems von Nöten waren.
Inzwischen existiert ein aus drei Komponenten bestehendes System. Das Gesundheitswesen wird seitdem entweder über Regierungsmittel, aus der eigenen Tasche der Bevölkerung oder mittels einer Krankenversicherung finanziert. Zudem ist die Gebührenerhebung für Arme aufgehoben worden. Dennoch stammen die meisten Krankenhauseinnahmen aus privaten Zahlungen. Im Gegensatz zu anderen asiatischen Ländern wendet Vietnam sehr viele Mittel für die Gesundheitsversorgung auf. Die Ausgaben hierfür umfassen etwa 5% bis 6% des Bruttoinlandsproduktes. Besonders beachtlich ist der Unterschied zwischen öffentlichen und privaten Ausgaben. Während der Privatwirtschaft fast drei Viertel der Ausgaben zugerechnet werden, erbringt der öffentliche Sektor nur ein Viertel davon.
Obwohl Vietnam einem fortwährenden Fortschritt untersteht, ist es dringend nötig, das Gesundheitssystem weiter auszubauen. Das Land behauptet, viele ansteckende Krankheiten beseitigt zu haben. Dennoch verursachen Malaria, Trachom, Tuberkulose und Cholera, Poliomyelitis und Typhus noch immer eine hohe Todesrate. Im Jahr 2003 brach SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) aus und verursachte schwere Folgen.
Ein Grund für die Krankheiten ist die mangelnde Hygiene und Aufklärung der Bevölkerung. Die Regierung hat sich für die Vornahme der gewöhnlichen Impfungen gegen Diphtherie, Tetanus, Keuchhusten, Polio-Myelitis, Tuberkulose und sogar Masern ausgesprochen. Kommunale Heilzentren wurden etabliert und zudem wurde die Aufklärungsarbeit gefördert. Hiervon war der Hinweis, sauberes Wasser und gewaschene Lebensmittel zu sich zu nehmen, und die Lebensbedingungen im Allgemeinen den gewöhnlichen westlichen Standards anzupassen, umfasst.
Die Regierung hat auch ein Programm für die Ausrottung von Ratten, Mücken und Fliegen erlassen. Dank einiger Verbesserungen in den letzten Jahren ist die Lebenserwatung gestiegen und die Rate der Kindersterblichkeit auf 3,4% gesunken. Hierbei handelt es sich aber dennoch um eine relative hohe Rate. Zudem existieren weiterhin eine Menge Fälle chronischer Unterernährung, insbesondere bei den ethnischen Minderheiten in den abgelegenen Regionen und dem Bergland.
Auch HIV und Aids stellen ein großes Problem dar. Schätzungsweise 215.000 Menschen sind HIV positiv. Hiervon handelt es sich bei ca. 8.500 Personen um Kinder im Alter zwischen 0 und 15 Jahren. Es gibt ca. 22.000 Waisen, die ihre Eltern wegen AIDS verloren haben.
Die Ausbreitung der Krankheit ist zum einen auf intravenösen Drogenkonsum und zum anderen auf ungeschützten Geschlechtsverkehr zurückzuführen, der nicht zuletzt von vielen Frauen beruflich vorgenommen wird. Diesbezüglich haben die Regierung, die Partei und die Nationalversammlung mit Programmen zur Förderung von Prävention und Kontrolle begonnen. Vietnam ist auch eines der 15 Länder, die im Rahmen eines globalen AIDS Bekämpfungsplans Mittel erhalten, der US$ 15 Milliarden umfasst. Continue reading “Anwalt in Vietnam Oliver Massmann Pharmaindustrie Arzneimittelmarkt”
베트남 – 국제거래 관련 세무 서비스 By: Oliver Massmann and Choi Ji Ung
Ⅰ. 해당국가 국내서비스 수취인 및 지급인 고려사항
A. 베트남기업이 외국기업에 법률서비스제공 또는 금액지불을 할때 해당국가는 법적제한(세금 외)이 있습니까?
베트남 동은 자유교환성 통화가 아니므로, 베트남기업이 외국기업에게 보수 지불에 있어서 외환관리 규정이 적용됩니다. 상품수출 또는 다른 해외수입으로부터 외화를 버는 베트남기업들은 반드시 베트남에서 허가된 해외 신용기관에 은행계좌를 보유하고 있어야 합니다[1]. 서비스 제공을 위한 외국기업에게 외화지불은 반드시 허가된 신용기관을 통해 송금되어야 합니다[2].
“보험, 항공, 호텔, 관광, 국제 출입항같은 격리구역에서 제공되는 서비스를 제외한 베트남 내에서 베트남기업으로부터 외국기업에게 지불은 베트남 동으로 이루어져야 한다”고 외환 법령에 규정되어 있습니다[3]. 그러나 위에서 언급한 서비스외의 서비스를 제공하는 외국기업은 여전히 “외국계약자”로서 서비스를 제공할 경우 외국통화로 보수를 받을 수 있습니다[4]. 따라서 위에 나온 외의 서비스를 베트남 외국기업 자회사가 서명한 계약에 따라 제공하는 외국기업의 경우 베트남기업으로부터 외화로 보수를 지급받을 수 없습니다.
베트남기업들은 자신들의 외화보유상황에 맞게 행동을 취하므로, 베트남기업들이 외화로 지급하기로 하였다하더라도 주의하시기 바랍니다. 베트남기업이 지불에 대한 충분한 외화가 없는 경우, 기업들은 외화를 은행에서 구입해야 합니다. 외환거래는 외화조달율을 기반으로 하고 있고 모든 베트남기업들의 외환필요량을 정부가 보장하진 않습니다. 실제로 외화보유량이 충분치 못하여 지급이 지연되는 경우도 있습니다. 베트남기업이 금액을 지불하지 못하는 상황이 발생했을 때 외국기업이 소송을 할 권리를 갖을 수 있도록 지불관련 서비스 계약 초안은 신중히 작성되어야 합니다[5].
B. 서비스의 제공을 위해 관련 업체에 지불 한 금액의 세금 공제에 제한이 있습니까?
베트남 기업 “발주”서비스는 외국 서비스 제공업체에 지불하기 전에 계약자 세금을 원천 징수해야합니다. 외국기업이 국내서비스”발주자”로서 하청계약을 할 경우 원천징수의무는 수급인이 베트남기업인지 외국기업인지에 따라 다릅니다[6].
– 하청업체가 베트남기업인 경우
외국계약자는 하청계약금액을 ‘발주자’에게 반드시 알려야 합니다. ‘발주자’는 하청계약금액의 세금을 원천징수하지 않습니다. 외국계약자는 원천징수하지 않은 전체 도급금액을 베트남하청업체에 지급합니다. 베트남 하청업체는 다른 사업과 마찬가지로 이 사업관련하여 세금을 납부할 의무가 있습니다.
– 하청업체가 외국기업인 경우
“발주자”는 하청금액을 포함, 계약금 총액의 세금을 원천징수해야 합니다. 외국 계약자는 세금없이 외국하청업체에게 하청금액만을 지불하고 전체 계약에 대한 세금납부증명서를 하청업체에게 제공해야 합니다.
D. 원천징수세 적용률:
1. 외국기업 서비스에 대한 지급
VAT: 세액 계산에 이용된 매출액의 0~10%
EIT: 세액 계산에 이용된 매출액의 5%; 운송및 건설서비스는 2%
2. 외국기업에서 제공하는 전문지식, 지적재산권에 대한 지급
VAT: 면제
EIT: 세액 계산에 이용된 매출액의 10%
3. 현지서비스를 제공하는 국제 그룹 비용의 지사 몫 지급
현지서비스를 제공하는 국제 그룹 비용의 지사 몫 지급은 외국기업과 지사의 하청계약을 통해서만 지급할 수 있습니다. 지사의 몫은 “발주자”의 계약금 관련 원천징수액에서 제외됩니다. 그리고 지사는 사업에 대해 납세의 의무가 있습니다.
Ⅱ. 해당국가 외국서비스 제공업체와 수취인의 고려사항
A. 외국기업이 해당관할구역에 서비스를 제공하는 경우, 어떤 경우에 기업은 해당관할구역에 소득세를 납부해야 합니까?
1. 외국 서비스 제공업체에게 조세 조약 혜택이 없는 경우
외국 서비스공급자는 서비스가 베트남 현지 사업장에 의해 제공되어지는지 여부와 관계없이 EIT를 납부해야 합니다.
2. 외국 서비스 제공업체에게 조세 조약 혜택이 있는 경우
외국 서비스공급자는 서비스가 베트남 현지 사업장에 의해 제공되어지거나 베트남에서 소득이 파생될 경우 EIT를 납부해야 합니다. 베트남 현지 사업장을 가진 외국서비스공급자는 베트남 에서 소득이 파생될 경우, 베트남 외에서 과세소득이 생길 경우 그리고 베트남사업장 운영비에 대해서 세금을 납부해야 합니다. 또한 베트남사업장 운영과 관련되지 않았다하더라도 소득이 베트남에서 파생되어질 경우 세금을 납부해야 합니다. 반면 베트남사업장을 가지고 있지 않은 외국 서비스공급자는 베트남에서 파생되어지는 소득에 대해서만 세금을 납부하면 됩니다.
“국내(베트남)사업장” 은 EIT 법에 다음을 포함하여 정의되어 있습니다.
– 지점, 관리 사무소, 공장, 작업장, 창고, 운송, 광산, 석유 탐사구역, 천연자원 개발 구역, 천연자원 개발또는 탐사를 위한 장비
– 건설 현장, 건설 및 설비 작업, 건설 및 설비 감독활동
– 직원고용, 다른 주제를 통한 컨설팅서비스를 포함하여 서비스제공을 위한 시설
– 외국기업 에이전시
– 다음과 같은 경우의 베트남 대표 사무소: 외국기업 명으로 계약을 체결하는 기관, 외국기업 명으로 계약을 체결하진 않지만 베트남에서 서비스제공을 하거나 상품운송을 하는 기관
“국내(베트남)사업장” 의 정의는 각각의 조세 조약에 따라 다릅니다.
B. 관할구역에서 서비스를 제공하는 외국기업이, 어떠한 경우관할구역에 현지법인을 설립해야 합니까?
외국기업의 현지법인의 종류는 다음과 같습니다.
– 대표사무소: 대표사무소는 이윤추구 활동을 할 수 없습니다.
– 지점: 베트남에 서비스를 제공하기 위해 지점을 설립하는to date only은행, 로펌에게 라이센스가 부여 됩니다.
– 외국인투자(합작투자, 외국기업의 지분소유 및 사업협력계약)에 관한 법률아래 현지진출: 외국인투자자의 라이센스 취득은 산업별, 국가별로 다른 베트남의 시장 정책에 따릅니다.
베트남에 서비스를 제공하기 위하여 외국기업이 반드시 현지법인 설립을 해야한다는 법률규정은 없습니다. 그러므로 현지법인설립 없이 베트남에서 서비스제공이 가능합니다. 그러나 현지업체에게만 가능한 프로젝트 및 현지업체에게 우선순위를 주는 프로젝트 때문에 많은 외국기업이 현지 법인설립을 고려하고 있습니다.
Ⅲ. 해당 국가 외국서비스제공업체 직원관련 고려사항
A. 만약 관할구역 비시민권자, 비거주자가 외국기업에 고용되어 관할구역에 서비스를 제공할 경우, 어떠한 경우에 개인소득세를 납부해야 합니까?
베트남 국적이 아니고 거주를 하지 않는 자가 외국기업에 고용되어 베트남에 서비스를 제공할 경우에 베트남에 개인소득세를 납부하여야 합니다. 또한 이 소득세는 베트남 체류기간에 따라 달라집니다.
베트남에 연간 183일 미만 거주 또는 영주권 미소유, 특정 기간만큼 주택을 임대하지 않은 경우의 외국인은 소득에 대해 원천징수의 의무가 있습니다. 이와 반대로 183일 이상거주자, 영주권자, 베트남국적보유자의 경우 세금조항에 맞게 세금을 납부하게 됩니다.
외국인 베트남 비거주자는 고정된 소득세(01.%~20%)를 기반으로 세금을 납부해야 합니다.
Ⅳ. 베트남 현지에 법인이 있고 해외로 서비스를 제공하는 경우의 고려사항
A. 베트남 현지법인이 현지로부터의 수입만 세금이 부과되는지, 아니면 해외로부터 수입의 경우에도 세금이 부과되는지 궁금합니다. 또한 관할구역 내 법인이나 거주자가 해외로부터 수입을 얻는 경우, 관할구역의 소득세 납부대상에 포함됩니까?
베트남은 베트남거주자 및 베트남현지법인의 해외수입에 대해 세금을 부과합니다[7]. 베트남거주자 및 베트남현지법인의 해외수입에 대해서는 해외로부터 제공되는 서비스와 마찬가지로 EIT 납부의 의무가 있습니다.
B. 만약 관할구역에서 해외수입에 세금을 부과하는 경우 해당하는 소득세율은 어떻게 됩니까?
외국투자법인의 수입에 적용되는 세율은 외국투자법인 투자 라이센스에 지정된 기업 세율을 따릅니다. 표준 세율은 22%지만, 여러 요소에 의해 세율에 특혜(10%, 15% 또는 20%)를 받을 수 있습니다.
현재, 베트남 은행 및 로펌 지점에는 외국투자법인과 마찬가지로 22%의 세율이 부과되고 있습니다.
C. 이 관할구역에서는 특정 분야의 서비스 제공이나 해외에 서비스 제공관련 세제혜택이 있습니까?
VAT: VAT면제[8]
– 신용공여, 금융리스 서비스
– 생명보험, 학생, 가축, 작물, 식물 보험 및 기타 비-비즈니스보험
– 헬스케어 서비스
– 교육 및 직업교육
– 위생, 배수, 동물원, 공원, 공공재, 장례서비스 등의 공공서비스
– 문화예술 작품의 유지 보수, 수리, 공공사업, 인프라 프로젝트, 자선단체활동
– 대중교통
50% VAT 감면[9]:
– 건설 및 설비 서비스
– 운송 및 하역서비스
5% VAT 감면[10]:
– 상수도
– 기술, 과학 서비스
– 직접적으로 농업에 관련된 서비스
EIT: 사회경제적 어려움이나 특별지원이 필요한 분야에서는 무기한 10%, 20%의 우대세율의 혜택을 누립니다[11]. 실제로 외국투자법인들은 소득세가 수익에 부과되어 손실이 발생할 경우 기업소득세를 납부하지 않습니다.
4년간 지속된 그리고 이후 9년간 지속될“면세기간”에는 납부세액의 50%의 감면혜택이 있습니다[12]. 세금면제나 세금감면기간은 첫 회계년도 수입이나 총액을 기준으로 산정합니다[13]. 이전 법에서는, 외국인 투자자 세후이익 재투자에 대해서 재정부에 환불을 신청할 자격이 있었습니다. 하지만 아쉽게 이 규정은 새로운 투자관련법에서 폐지되었습니다.
Ⅴ. 이전 가격
A. 이 관할구역에서는 회사간 서비스에 적용되는 이전가격 규정이 있습니까? 있다면 간단히 요점을 설명해주시기 바랍니다.
이전가격 법은 2010년 4월 22일에 다음 NO. 66/2010/TT-BTC 세금운영법률조항에 규정되었습니다.
계열사간 이전가격조작을 방지하기 위해 반-이전가격조작 조치가 취해집니다. 세무 당국은 계열사 간의 이전가격조작이나 불합리한 이익률 발견시, 관련기업 수익에 시장가격에 맞는 세금을 부과할 권리가 있습니다. 시장가격결정을 위해, 세무 당국은 해당기업이 비계열사와의 거래가격이나 품질, 브랜드등의 조건을 고려한 유사상품,서비스의 시장가격을 이용합니다.
B. 이 관할구역에서는 모회사가 제공하는 관리형식 또는 사후투자관리에 회사간 비용이 청구되지 않는 것에 동의하십니까?
네 동의합니다.
인바운드 투자: 기업간 요금부과방식은 2가지가 있습니다. (i)관리비용에 할당하는 방법과 (ii)관리서비스제공으로 부과하는 방법입니다. 베트남지사의 경우 (i)방법만, 외국투자법인의 경우 (ii)방법만이 허용됩니다. 지사와 외국투자법인의 적절한 증거를 제시하여 회사간의 요금부과를 과세대상 소득에서 공제할 수 있지만 그렇게 해야할 의무는 없습니다.
아웃바운드 투자: 해외사업장의 수익도 본사와 함께 계산되므로, 기업간 세금관련 기업간요금부과는 문제가 되지 않습니다.
C. 이 관할구역에서 배당금 지급비용은 어떠한 세금으로 분류됩니까?
기업(외국투자법인의 현지지사)의 특성에 따라, 배당금지급비용은 관리비용이나 관리서비스제공항목에 분류되어 있어야 합니다.
[1] 법령No. 70/2014/ND/CP외환관련 조례 및 계정, 2014년 7월 17일에 공포한 외환관련 일부 조항을 보완, 추가한 조항- 제5조 1항
[2] 법령No. 70/2014/ND/CP외환관련 조례 및 계정, 2014년 7월 17일에 공포한 외환관련 일부 조항을 보완, 추가한 조항- 제 5조 2항
[3] 조례 No. 28/2005/PL/UBTVQH11 2005년 12월 13일에 기록된 외환관련 조례- 제22조, 2013년 3월 18일에 개정 된 조례 NO. 06/2013/UBTVQH13
[4] 회람 No. 32/2013/TT-NHNN 12월 26일에 공포한 베트남국가 은행의 베트남 영토에서 외국통화사용규제 규정- 제 4 조
[5] 경제문제 처리절차에 있어서, 경제관련 계약에서 제기된 지불 분쟁을 포함한 6개월 경제적 분쟁의 소송개시 법적제한- 제 31조 1항
[6] 회람 No. 169 C.2절
[7] EIT 법 – 제6조
[8] VAT법 – 제 5조
[9] 법령 78/1999 1999년 8월 20일 에 공포- 제1조 3항
[10] VAT법 – 제8조 2항
[11] 제13조 CIT, 제1조 6번째 절에서 수정된 법 No. 32/2013/QH13.
[12] 제 14조 CIT
[13] 제 14조 1번째 절, CIT, 제1조 8번째절에서 수정된 법 No.32/2013/QH13
Oliver Massmann is General Director of Duane Morris Vietnam LLC.
Interested in Vietnam? Visit: www.vietnamlaws.xyz
신투자법(Investment Law)과 기업법(Enterprise Law) – 개혁 인가 말장난인가 (minor fiddling)? By: Oliver Massmann and Choi Ji Ung
2014년 11월 26일, 법령 제67/2014/QH13 (“2014 투자법”)과 법령 제68/2014/QH13 (“2014 기업법)이 국회를 통과함에 따라 2015년 7월 1일부터 2005년 통과된 투자법과 기업법을 대체할 것이다. 신법과 구법의 차이와 이 차이가 베트남의 투자 환경에 미치는 영향은 아래 기술되어있다.
1. 2014 투자법
2014 투자법은 금지 혹은 제한된 기업활동의 수를 줄이는 데 중점을 두었다. 또한, 외국인 투자자를 새롭게 정의했고 외국인투자기업이라는 단어를 외국자본기업으로 대체하였다. 신법은 더 이상 직접투자와 간접투자를 구분 짓지 않고 베트남 내 투자에 대해서도 변경된 부분이 있다. 더 중요한 것은 2014 투자법에 처음으로 인수합병을 규제하는 조항이 포함되었다는 점이다.
새롭지만 더 명확한 개념
외국인 투자자는 베트남에서 투자 활동을 하기 위해 자본을 활용하는 모든 외국계 단체 혹은 사람을 지칭했다. 이는 지난 10년간 기업의 1%를 소유한 외국인이 외국인 투자자라고 불리는지, 49%를 소유해야 하는지, 혹은 51%를 소유해야 하는지에 대해 많은 혼란을 야기했다. 하지만 2014 기업법에 따르면 외국인 투자자는 외국법에 의해 설립된 모든 외국 법인 혹은 개인으로 단순명료하게 정의된다.
외국자본기업이라는 단어는 외국인투자기업을 대체하지만, 완전히 같은 뜻을 갖진 않는다. 외국자본을 가진 경제적 독립체는 구성원 혹은 주주가 외국인 투자자인 모든 경제적 독립체를 의미하고 얼마만큼의 지분을 외국인이 소유해야 하는지는 불명확하다. 그러나 2014 투자법에 의하면 외국인 소유지분의 비율에 따라 외국인 투자자의 인허가 절차가 달라지기 때문에 추후 더 상세한 설명이 없다면 투자 신청 절차에서 어려움이 반드시 생길 것이다.
금지/제한된 기업 활동 축소
2014 기업법의 제6조는 금지된 기업활동을 기존의 51개 활동에서 6개 활동으로, 제한된 기업활동을 386개 활동에서 267개 활동으로 축소하였다. 주목할 만한 사항은 구법은 투자자들에게 활동할 수 있는 특정 영역을 정해준 것에 비해 2014 투자법은 특별히 금지되지 않은 모든 영역에서 활동할 수 있게 해 준 점이다. 따라서 투명성이 더 보장되며 투자자들에게 보다 많은 투자 기회가 주어진다.
여러 투자 프로젝트의 시행 절차
베트남에서의 투자는 더 이상 직접 투자와 간접 투자로 나뉘지 않고 다음으로 구분된다:
투자 프로젝트를 위한 새 법인 설립
정부-민간 합작 투자
경영 협력 계약 투자
자본 출자, 주식 양수, 혹은 법인 출자 자본
i. 투자 프로젝트를 위한 새 법인 설립
앞으로 현지 투자자들이 투자 프로젝트를 진행할 때에는 투자 자본 금액과 상관없이 투자등록증명서(“IRC”)를 신청하지 않아도 된다. 그리고 투자 등록과 투자 평가 절차의 두 단계로 나뉘어 있던 신청 절차도 통합되었다. 하지만 베트남에 새 법인을 설립하고자 하는 외국인 투자자의 경우 기업등록증명서(“ERC”)의 역할도 하던 투자등록증명서를 신청하는 대신 두 증명서를 따로 신청해야만 하게 되어 시간과 비용이 모두 더 들게 되었다.
ii. 자본 출자, 주식 양수, 혹은 법인 출자 자본
2014 투자법 하에 외국인 투자자의 자본 출자는 아래와 같은 형태를 지닌다:
(1) 주식합명회사에서 발행된 주식 양수
(2) 유한책임회사 또는 합자회사에 자본 출자
(3) (1)과 (2)에 포함되지 않은 기업에 자본 출자
자본 출자, 주식 양수, 혹은 출자 자본으로 투자하는 외국인 투자자는 (1) 투자 활동이 외국인 투자자에게 조건부로 허용된 사업 활동에 해당될 경우, 또는 (2) 투자 활동으로 인해 대상 법인 내 특정 법인 정관자본의 51% 이상을 소유하게 될 경우 반드시 산업무역부에 투자를 등록하여야 한다. 특정 법인은 (1) 외국인 투자자가 상장 주식의 51%를 소유하거나 법인이 합자회사일 경우 조합원의 과반수가 외국인이거나 (2)
2. 2014 기업법
2014 기업법은 기업 설립 절차를 단순화하고 기업 경영에 새로운 조항을 더하며 그룹 규제를 명확히 한다.
기업 설립
2014 기업법은 더 이상 기업등록증명서에 사업 분야를 명시할 것을 요구하지 않는다. 따라서 기업은 이제 법으로 금지되지 않은 모든 사업을 해도 되고 등록 기관에 활동을 등록하기만 하면 된다. 조건부 분야에서 사업 활동을 할 경우 기업은 요구되는 모든 조건에 부합하는지 확인해야 하고 이 책임은 기업에 있기 때문에 당국 조사 결과 조건이 충족되지 못하였을 경우 벌금을 과할 수 있다. 또한, 기업등록증명서 발급 이후 150일 이내에 출자하기로 한 자본금을 전액 납입하지 않았다면 정관자본금 변경신청을 해야 한다. 또한, 유한책임회사도 구법과는 달리 정관자본금을 줄일 수 있다. 자본금 납입은 구법은 유한책임회사와 합자회사 모두 36개월을 주는 반면 신법은 90일의 기간을 준다. 이런 엄격함은 기초작업공정과 건설업 같은 대형 규모의 프로젝트에 큰 영향을 미칠 것이다.
기업 경영
i. 법정 대리인
필요에 따라 유한책임회사와 합자회사는 한 명 이상의 법정 대리인을 둘 수 있고 법정 대리인의 수, 직함, 권리, 의무는 정관에 명시되어있어야 한다. 만약 한 명의 법정 대리인만 있다면 그는 외국에 있을 때에는기간에 상관없이 본인의 권리와 의무를 대리할 사람을 지정해야만 한다.
ii. 합자회사의 구조
합자회사는 기업의 구조를 다음의 두 구조 중 고를 수 있다: (i) 주주 총회, 경영진, 통제 위원회와 이사 혹은 대표 이사. 기업에 11명 미만의 주주가 있고 주주들이 회사 총 주식의 50% 이상 가지고 있지 않을 때(shareholders which are organizations own less than 50% of total shares of the company)에는 통제 위원회가 요구되지 않음; 또는 (ii) 주주총회, 경영진, 이사 혹은 대표 이사.
그룹
2014 기업법은 모회사와 자회사를 분명하게 정의한다. 회사가 (i) 다른 회사의 정관자본금 혹은 일반 주의 50% 이상을 소유하거나; (ii) 직접 혹은 간접적으로 다른 회사의 경영진, 이사, 대표 이사의 과반수 또는 전부를 임명할 수 있거나; (iii) 다른 회사의 정관을 수정할 권리가 있을 때 모회사로 여겨진다.
자회사는 모회사의 자본을 납입하거나 주식을 양수할 수 없고 같은 모회사를 가진 회사들끼리도 서로 소유하기 위해 자본을 납입하거나 주식을 양수할 수 없다. 또한, 65% 이상 국유인 자회사끼리는 회사를 설립하기 위해 자본을 같이 납입할 수 없다.
결론
2014 투자법과 기업법으로 인해 외국인 투자자들에게 베트남의 투자가치는 더 상승했다. 하지만 투자자들의 입장에서는 더 좋은 대우와 설명이 필요하다. 신법의 시행을 위한 서류가 준비되고 신법 적용이 시작된 후의 실질적인 효과를 두고 봐야겠다.
Oliver Massmann is General Director of Duane Morris Vietnam LLC
Interested in Vietnam? Visit: www.vietnamlaws.xyz
Anwalt Vietnam Oliver Massmann Investitionslizenzierung
Die lokalen Behörden in Vietnams 58 Provinzen und fünf Gemeinden haben grundsätzlich die Befugnis, Investment-Lizenzen auszustellen. Die Provinzbehörden und Vorstände der industriellen Zonen sind die zuständigen Erteilungsstellen für die meisten Typen von Investitionslizenzen; ausgenommen sind die build-and-operate-Projekte (BOT, BO, BTO), die nach wie vor von der Zentralregierung ausgestellt werden. Inländische Investoren mit Projekten unter 15 Milliarden VND (etwa 714.000 USD) bedürfen keiner Investment-Lizenz. Das Verfahren zur Erlangung einer Investitions-Zertifikation ist komplex, die Investoren müssen die Genehmigung mehrerer Ministerien und/oder Agenturen einholen, abhängig von der Inhaberschaft (ausländisch oder inländisch), der Größe und dem Sektor der Investition. Projekte, die als von „nationaler Wichtigkeit“ erachtet werden, müssen von der Nationalversammlung gebilligt werden. Schlüssel-Infrastruktur-Projekte sind von dem Büro des Premierministers zu genehmigen (s.u.). Investitionen in bedingten Sektoren wie Rundfunk, Bergbau, Telekommunikation, Bank- und Finanzwesen, Häfen und Flughäfen, sowie Bildung sind einem komplexeren Lizensierungsverfahren unterworfen. Die Lizensierung wird verlangt, um eine neue Investition zu tätigen, aber auch bei signifikanten Änderungen innerhalb eines laufenden Unternehmens, etwa der bei Kapitalerhöhungen, Unternehmensrestrukturierungen durch Wechsel der Investitionsform oder der Anteilsverhältnisse zwischen inländischen und ausländischen Partnern oder bei Aufnahme zusätzlicher Geschäftsaktivitäten.
Die Dezentralisierung der Lizensierungskompetenz hin zu den Provinzbehörden hat in einigen Fällen zu einer Rationalisierung und Entbürokratisierung des Lizensierungsprozesses geführt und Bearbeitungszeiten verkürzt. Jedoch hat sie gleichzeitig zu erheblichen regionalen Unterschieden in Verfahren und Auslegung der relevanten Investitionsgesetze und –Investitionsregelungen geführt.
Zu den Investitionsprojekten, die vom Premierminister genehmigt werden müssen, gehören:
• Alle Projekte auf Flughäfen und in Seehäfen, ungeachtet der Kapitalquelle und Umfang;
• Bergbau,
• Öl und Gas;
• Rundfunk und Fernsehen;
• Spielcasinos; Tabak;
• höhere Bildung;
• Seeverkehr;
• Post und Lieferdienste;
• Telekommunikation und Internet Netzwerke;
• Druckerzeugnisse und Publikationswesen;
• unabhängige wissenschaftliche Forschungseinrichtungen;
• außerdem Einrichtungen von industriellen Zonen, von für den Export verarbeitenden, High-tech und Wirtschaftszonen.
Weiterhin sind erfasst alle Projekte, deren Kapital 1,5 Billionen VND (etwa 71 Millionen USD) übersteigt, ungeachtet ausländischer Inhaberschaft, im Bereich der Elektrizität; in der Mineralienaufbereitung und Metallurgie; im Eisenbahnwesen; bei Straßen und Binnenwasserstraßen; und in der alkoholischen Getränkebranche. Ferner alle ausländisch-investierten Projekte im Seeverkehr, Post und Telekommunikation; Publikationswesen und unabhängige wissenschaftliche Forschungseinheiten.
Vietnamesische Behörden beurteilen Investitionslizenz-Anträge anhand einer Reihe von Kriterien, darunter der rechtliche Status und die finanzielle Leistungsfähigkeit von ausländischen und vietnamesischen Investoren; die Vereinbarkeit des Projekts mit dem vietnamesischen „Master Plan“ für wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung; die der GVN oder der Kommunistischen Partei Vietnams erwachsenden Vorteile; die voraussichtlichen Erträge; Technologie und Expertise; effizienter Gebrauch von Ressourcen; Umweltschutz; Pläne für Landnutzung und Landräumungs-Entschädigung; Projektanreize einschließlich Steuersätzen und Land- Wasser- und Seeflächen- Mietzins (Nutzungsgebühren).
Das Handelsgesetz und das Ausfuehrungsdekret erlaubt ausländischen Firmen, Niederlassungen oder Repräsentanzen einzurichten. Niederlassungen können Handelsaktivitäten aufnehmen, während Repräsentanzen Kundenkontakt knüpfen und unterhalten können, verhandeln dürfen und Verträge für das Mutterunternehmen schließen können, darüber hinaus dürfen Repräsentanzen Marktforschung betreiben, aber sich nicht an kommerziellen oder auf Gewinnerzielung ausgerichteten Aktivitäten beteiligen.
Bitte kontaktieren Sie den Autor Oliver Massmann direkt unter omassmann@duanemorris.com wenn Sie Fragen haben. Oliver Massmann ist der Generaldirektor von Duane Morris Vietnam LLC.
INTERESSE AN VIETNAM? Besuchen Sie: www.vietnamlaws.xyz
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DISASTER OF DOMESTIC ARBITRATION VERDICT ANNULMENT IN VIETNAM – HOW TO AVOID? Oliver Massmann – Ho Gia Le Hoang
Enforcement of domestic arbitral awards in Vietnam
Recently, the media of Vietnam paid much attention to Vinalines case, the largest shipping corporation in Vietnam who lost an arbitration case brought to the Vietnam International Arbitration Center (VIAC). However, Vinalines then asked the court in Hanoi, Vietnam for annulment of VIAC’s verdict. Under the VIAC verdict, Vinalines has to pay VND62.5 billion to the South Korean SK E&C to compensate for its’ breach of a harbor construction contract with SK E&C at Van Phong transit port, Khanh Hoa province. Vinalines did accept this verdict but later on submitted a request to the Hanoi People’s Court for this verdict’s annulment. Meanwhile Vinalines also asked for the intervention and support of the relevant ministries.
Vinalines case is a typical example to show the reality that the arbitration law is being ignored in Vietnam. According to VIAC statistics, from 2003 to 2013, about 34% of domestic verdicts were annulled. After the enforcement of Arbitration Law of Vietnam in 2011, 20 verdicts were submitted for annulment and more than 50% of those were annulled by the court. The percentage of annulled foreign arbitral awards is much higher due to the matter of practice that the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards in Vietnam are almost impossible. Up to date, only a few awards have been submitted for enforcement in Vietnam. In this regard, it is questioned why a party can easily apply for the annulment of domestic arbitral awards and whether the applicable regulations of arbitration law in Vietnam provide too loose requirements for an annulment that allows the losing party to delay the enforcement of such award or even take advantage of annulment mechanism to settle the dispute through the court proceeding.
Regulatory frameworks on arbitration in Vietnam
At present, the major regulatory framework on arbitration proceeding in Vietnam includes the Law on Commercial Arbitration No. 54/2010/QH12, which took effect on 1 January 2011 (“Arbitration Law”) and replaced the Ordinance on Commercial Arbitration (“Arbitration Ordinance”) in 2003; Decree No. 63/2011/ND-CP of the Government on detailing the implementation of certain regulations in the Arbitration Law (“Decree No. 63/2011”) and Resolution No. 01/2014/NQ-HDTP by the Vietnamese Supreme Court guiding the implementation of a number of regulations in the Arbitration Law (“Resolution No. 01”).
Vietnam also ratified the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 in September 1995 and the provisions of the New York Convention have been incorporated into the arbitration laws in Vietnam.
When is a domestic arbitral award set aside?
According to the Arbitration Law, an arbitral award is final and binding to the parties, and only in a few circumstances, this award may be challenged. The court shall accordingly hear an application for setting aside an award on receipt of a petition from one of the parties.
Under Article 68 of the Arbitration Law, an arbitral award shall be set aside in the following cases:
i. there was no arbitration agreement or the arbitration agreement is void;
ii. the composition of the arbitration tribunal was [or] the arbitration proceedings were inconsistent with the agreement of the parties or contrary to the provisions of the Arbitration Law;
iii. the dispute was not within the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal; where an award contains an item which falls outside the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal, such item shall be set aside;
iv. the evidence supplied by the parties on which the arbitration tribunal relied to issue the award was forged; [or] an arbitrator received money, assets or some other material benefit from one of the parties in dispute which affected the objectivity and impartiality of the arbitral award; or
v. the arbitral award is contrary to the fundamental principles of the laws of Vietnam.
A party with sufficient evidence proving the existence of any of the above cases may request an arbitral award to be set aside within thirty (30) days from the date the award was granted. Upon receipt of such request, the court may adjourn a petition to set aside an arbitral award for up to sixty (60) days. When the court issued a decision to set aside an award, this decision may not be appealed and is final and valid for enforcement.
How did the courts resolve the requests for setting aside an arbitral award?
With more than 50% of domestic verdicts being set aside, it shows that the courts in Vietnam have somehow not been friendly with and not positively supported the arbitration tribunal. This situation mostly arises from the ambiguous grounds for setting aside an arbitral award under the Arbitration Law. In other cases, due to the lack of knowledge on arbitration tribunal, the judges do understand wrongly the arbitration proceedings and issue the annulment verdicts based on the very unreasonable grounds.
In reality, many domestic verdicts were set aside as the arbitration proceedings were inconsistent with the agreement of the parties or contrary to the provisions of the Arbitration Law. In practice, the arbitration proceedings may be lengthy with many different steps, processes and procedures, from the review of request for arbitration to the issuance of arbitral awards under the arbitration rules of each arbitration center. Therefore, it is possible and not avoidable when the arbitrator council and/or any relevant parties make some minor mistakes at any stage of the arbitration proceedings. Even some judges annulled the verdicts on the grounds that the arbitrator council did not use correct legal terms during the proceedings (e.g. using “inviting” instead of “convening” the parties) or the arbitrator was not impartial.
Another reason is that the verdict is in contrary to the fundamental principles of the law of Vietnam. This provision is very ambiguous and until now, there is no clear definition about or detailed guidance on the fundamental principles of the law of Vietnam. More importantly, it is noted that under the Arbitration Law (i.e. Clause 4 Article 71), the court shall not review the merits of the dispute which the arbitration tribunal already resolved, which is in this case disregarded by the court.
The consequence of unreasonably setting aside a arbitral award
The case of Vinalines and the statistics raised the concerns in the business community that the arbitrators’ decisions have not yet been duly respected and the businesses hesitate to resolve the dispute through arbitration proceeding. When an arbitral award, especially that was issued in compliance with the arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration Law, is unreasonably set aside by the courts, the losing party may resolve the dispute through either arbitration tribunal or the court. In this scenario, such party will possibly request for a court judgment and that will not only be unfair for the other party but also be a waste of time and expense for the relevant parties to restart all litigation.
Such way of dealing with the domestic arbitral award will make the businesses lose their faith in the arbitration tribunal and also constrain the development of legal system in Vietnam. This is against the recent efforts of the Vietnamese government in performing institutional and administrative procedures reforms to improve the efficiency of FDI attraction and become an attractive country for foreign business and investment.
How to protect the parties from the request for setting aside an arbitral award
Recently, with the issuance of Resolution No. 01, the Council of Judges gave a signal to support the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards in Vietnam as well as the development of arbitration proceedings. Resolution No. 01 provides more criteria and grounds for handling a request for annulment and especially, the cases when an arbitral award is set aside are more clearly defined.
For example, Resolution No. 01 guides that “the composition of the arbitration tribunal was [or] the arbitration proceedings were inconsistent with the agreement of the parties or in contrary to the provisions of the Arbitration Law” is when the arbitral tribunal fails to comply with the agreement of the parties on composition of the arbitral tribunal or arbitration rules, or the arbitral tribunal fails to adhere to regulations of the Arbitration Law, and such violation is considered serious by the court if the arbitral tribunal fails to make rectification at the request of the court. Thus, only when the violation is considered as serious, the judges are permitted to annul the verdict. Or “the arbitral award is contrary to the fundamental principles of the laws of Vietnam” is when the arbitral award violates the effective basic rules for formulation and implementation of the laws of Vietnam. In this case, the court must determine whether the verdict violated any basic rule of law and how such rule affected the dispute settlement by arbitration. The court shall only set aside an arbitral award after proving that it contravenes one or some basic rules which are not adhered to by arbitral tribunal when issuing the verdict, and such verdict seriously infringes upon the interest of the state, the lawful rights and interests of either party or any third party.
It is expected that when Resolution No. 01 is implemented, the domestic verdict will not be easily set aside like what happened previously. Another good news for the businesses is that in October 2014, the People’s Court in Hanoi decided to back the VIAC verdict regarding Vinalines’ case when the court opined that VIAC followed the arbitration proceeding under the Arbitration Law and other litigation procedures of Vietnamese laws. As a result, Vinalines has to enforce VIAC’s verdict. This court’s decision brings a hope to the businesses that from now on, the arbitration tribunal will be respected and the court will not set aside unreasonably any arbitral award.
However, as a matter of practice in Vietnam, it will take some more time to see how the courts in Vietnam implement this new regulation. We would suggest the businesses put a waiver agreement or provision that the parties will not seek any annulment at the court after a verdict is made by a chosen arbitration tribunal and in the event that any serious violation of arbitration proceeding leads to the annulment by the court, the parties will still agree to resolve the dispute through an agreement for international arbitration proceeding, e.g. Singapore International Arbitration Center with Singapore Arbitration Rules and one arbitrator tribunal.
Oliver Massmann is the General Director of Duane Morris Vietnam LLC. You can contact him underomassmann@duanemorris.com.
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Rechtsanwalt in Vietnam Oliver Massmann Investitionen Beantragungsverfahren
a.Dekret 108
Dekret 108 unterscheidet bei den Lizenzierungsverfahren zwischen in- und ausländischen Investoren. Von einem inländischen Investor wird die Vornahme zwei verschiedener Verfahren verlangt: zum einen die Registrierung des Unternehmens gemäß dem Enterprise Law und zum anderen die Beantragung der Zulassung des Investmentprojekts. Der inländische Investor kann von der Lizenzbehörde verlangen, beide Schritte zur gleichen Zeit vorzunehmen.
Für die Lizenzierung von Investmentprojekten für ausländische Investoren sieht das Dekret 108 von vornherein nur ein Lizenzierungsverfahren vor. Dies umfasst sowohl die Gesellschaftsregistrierung entsprechend dem Enterprise Law als auch die Registrierung oder Antragstellung des jeweiligen Investmentprojekts. Das Investmentzertifikat ist also gleichzeitig das Geschäftsregistrierungszertifikat. Die genaueren Voraussetzungen zur Antragstellung von Investmentprojekten sind im Dekret 88 geregelt.
Unklar und streitig ist jedoch bereits die Definition des Begriffs „Investment Projekt“. Das Investment Law definiert dieses als „ein Set aus Verträgen für mittel- oder langfristiges Kapital und für Investmentaktivitäten innerhalb eines bestimmten Gebiets und einer bestimmten Zeit“. Das Ausführungsdekret bestimmt jedoch nicht weiter, was mit „mittelfristigem Kapital“ gemeint ist und wie viel Kapital erforderlich ist, um ein Investmentprojekt anzumelden.
Weiterhin listet das Dekret 108 alle beschränkten Investmentsektoren auf, zu denen Rundfunk, Produktionen und Absatz von kulturellen Produkten, Ausbeutung und Erforschung von Mineralen, Errichtungen von Telekommunikationsinfrastrukturen, Telekommunikation und Internetservice, Errichtung von öffentlichen Postnetzwerken, Konstruktion und Betrieb von Häfen, Bedarfsartikel, Personenbeförderung, Meeresfischerei, Tabakproduktion, Grundstückshandel und Nebensparten, Import, Export und Absatzverkehr, sowie Bildung und Ausbildung, das Gesundheitssystem und andere Sektoren, die durch internationale Vereinbarungen beschränkt werden, zählen. Für die aufgeführten Sektoren enthält das Dekret keine detaillierten Richtlinien. Die Liste soll nur als Grundlage für die betreffenden Lizenzierungsbehörden dienen. Investoren müssen dementsprechend andere Vorschriften oder internationale Vereinbarungen beachten oder auf künftige Richtlinien warten, die detaillierte Bedingungen zur Festlegung von Verfahren in diesen Sektoren regeln. Das Investmentkapital ist ein Faktor, bei dem die Lizenzbehörde zur Bewertung ansetzen kann (z.B. 1,5 Trillionen VND in Art. 37 CIL oder 300 Billionen in Art. 46). Die Grenzwerte für Investitionen nach den genannten Zwecke sind im Dekret 108 alle in VND aufgeführt. Das neue Ausführungsdekret 108 sieht mehr Befugnisse für die Provinz Departments für Planung und Investitionen im Rahmen der Industrie-, Ökonomie-, Exportprozess- und Hightechzonen vor.
So soll das MPI nicht länger Anträge annehmen oder Investmentprojektlizenzen ausstellen, sondern nur noch in folgenden Fällen tätig werden:
• Konsens oder Dissens bei Standpunkten im Hinblick auf Projekte, die der Genehmigung
• des Prime Ministers (PM) bedürfen;
• Projekte, die aus den gesetzlich vorgegebenen Strukturen herausfallen;
• und in anderen besonderen Fällen.
Der PM behält sich grundsätzlich das Recht der Zustimmung vor bei allen Projekten auf den Gebieten der Bauausführung und Betrieb von Flughäfen, Flugtransporten, staatseigenen Häfen, Öl-und Gaserforschung, Rundfunk, Kasinobetrieb, Zigarettenproduktion, Universitiätsausbildung, Etablierung von Industrie-, Exportprozess-, Hightech- und Ökonomiezonen. Außerdem sollen alle Projekte mit einem Investitionsvolumen ab 1,5 Trillionen VND in den Bereichen Energie, Mineralabbau, Metallurgie, Bahnbau, Straßen, im Infrastrukturbereich (Inlandswassertransportwege) und in dem Bereich der Produktion und des Handels mit Getränken von ihm genehmigt werden. Darüber hinaus bedürfen ausländische Investitionsprojekte im Wassertransportgeschäft, im Post-, Telekommunikations- und Internet Service, im Print- und Publikationssektor ebenso der Genehmigung des PM wie schließlich auch Investitionsprojekte zur Gründung unabhängiger Wissenschafts- und Forschungszentren.
Es scheint somit, dass alle Investmentprojekte, die vom Provinz Department of Planning and Investment registriert oder lizenziert werden sollen, der prinzipiellen Genehmigung des PM’s bedürfen. Provinz Departments sollen Projekte annehmen, die aus den Industrie-, Ökonomie-, Exportprozess- und Hightechzonen herausfallen und solche, die kein Management Board besitzen. Die Management Boards sollen die Lizenzauthoritaet hinsichtlich der uebrigen Projekte haben.
Weiterhin ist bei diesen Projekten unklar, ob der Investor verpflichtet ist, diese Genehmigung vor Einreichung der Anträge bei den entsprechenden Departments oder Management Boards einzureichen. Hier regelt das Dekret 108 keine bestimmte Verfahrensweise. Dem Antrag auf Registrierung des Investmentprojekts müssen gemäß Dekret 108 ferner Unterlagen und Informationen über das konkrete Projekt beigefügt werden. Ebenso muss ein Antrag auf Aufnahme eines Unternehmens in die Registratur detaillierte Informationen über das Unternehmen und die Gründung des Unternehmens enthalten. Diese Dokumente müssen einheitlich bei einer Lizenzbehörde eingereicht werden. Dekret 108 enthält zwar detaillierte Regelungen über die einzureichenden Unterlagen für ausländische Investmentprojekte. Es enthält aber keine Richtlinien für die einzureichenden Dokumente zur Registrierung von inländischen Investmentprojekten. Früher war für bestimmte Unternehmen gesetzlich vorgesehen, ein Management Board einzustellen. Dekret 108 stellt es nunmehr sowohl dem in- als auch ausländischen Investor frei, ein Management Board zu beschäftigen oder nicht.
Bitte kontaktieren Sie den Autor Oliver Massmann direkt unter omassmann@duanemorris.com wenn Sie Fragen haben. Oliver Massmann ist der Generaldirektor von Duane Morris Vietnam LLC.
INTERESSE AN VIETNAM? Besuchen Sie: www.vietnamlaws.xyz
VIELEN DANK!
Rechtsanwalt Vietnam Oliver Massmann Infrastruktur
Vietnam bemüht sich nach Kräften, die bodengebundene Infrastruktur zu verbessern. Obwohl es sich noch in einer frühen Entwicklungsphase befindet, kann das Straßennetz Vietnams bereits als durchschnittlich bezeichnet werden. Für eine ungebremste wirtschaftliche Entwicklung müssen die bestehenden Mängel aber noch ausgeräumt werden. Das Hauptproblem hierbei stellt die Finanzierung dar. Allein die Kosten für Umsiedlungsmaßnahmen sind 4mal so hoch wie die eigentlichen Baukosten. Zudem können Verhandlungen zwischen den Baufirmen, Lokal- und Zentralverwaltung die Arbeiten in die Länge ziehen und verteuern. Gerade dies könnte sich aber auch als Chance für europäische Unternehmen darstellen: Beratung, Planung, Beaufsichtigung und Machbarkeitsstudien könnten von ihnen übernommen werden. Geplant sind mehrere neue Autobahnen, sowohl als Nord-Süd Verbindung als auch netzförmig im Norden mit Verbindung zu Hanoi.
a)Bahnstrecken
Die Eisenbahn wird bei der Bewältigung von Warentransporten nur zu 2,7% in Anspruch genommen. Auch hier sind aber Projekte geplant und teilweise schon in Arbeit, beispielsweise sollen Hanoi und Umgebung stärker erschlossen werden. Im Zusammenhang hiermit wurden Aufträge an ausländische Firmen im Wert von mehreren Millionen USD vergeben.
b)Häfen
Die Lage Vietnams bietet sich für Warentransporte per Schiff geradezu an. Vietnam hat 3260 km Küstenlinie, eine strategische Position nahe internationaler Schifffahrtsrouten und günstige natürliche Gegebenheiten wie Meerestiefe, Strömungen und Kanäle. Bisher verfügt Vietnam über 119 Häfen, von denen jedoch nur wenige fähig sind, große Containerschiffe aufzunehmen. Die Regierung hat angekündigt, den Schifffahrtssektor bis 2020 zu reformieren und zu einer Hauptsparte zu entwickeln. Es sollen weitere Tiefsee-Häfen gebaut und bestehende Häfen ausgebaut werden, zudem sollen neue Techniken für den Containerumschlag eingesetzt werden, um die Häfen zu internationalen Anlaufstellen zu entwickeln. Auch das Hafenmanagement und die gesetzlichen Grundlagen für die Hafenverwaltung sollen verbessert werden. Um weiterhin ein stabiles Wachstum zu gewährleisten, soll die internationale Wirtschaft stärker in das System integriert werden. Diese Vorhaben bergen wiederum Moeglichkeiten speziell fuer erfahrene Exporteure in den Bereichen der architektonischen und finanziellen Planung und den Betrieb von Hafenanlagen sowie im Bereich High-Tech Sicherheitsequipment.
i.Überblick
Die Bedeutsamkeit des Exports und des Handels für die vietnamesische Wirtschaft wurde bereits in zahlreichen Gremien diskutiert und hat sich mit der Abschwächung des Handelsdefizits bestätigt. Die Probleme im Hinblick auf die unzureichenden Kapazitäten der vietnamesischen Häfen werden jedoch in Angriff genommen. Am 3. Juni 2009 sind die ersten Schiffe mit einer Direktverbindung aus dem Hafen von Cai Mep/Thi Vai-Hafen aus Nordamerika augelaufen. Der Bau weiterer Häfen im Süden Vietnams wird bereits in Angriff genommen. Allerdings existieren weiterhin drei besorgniserregende Problembereiche, die daher dringend angegangen werden müssen, um Anreize für ein Wachstum durch Handel zu schaffen:[1]
Entwicklung der Transportinfrastruktur, um die zahlreichen industriellen Zonen mit den südvietnamesischen Hafenstädten zu verbinden
o Optimierung Zollabfertigungsabläufe;
o Koordinierung und Transparenz hinsichtlich der Entwicklung der Haefen im Norden Vietnams sowie die Errichtung der Transportinfrastruktur.
Der Highway 51 stellt weiterhin den bedeutendsten Verkehrsweg dar, wird jedoch dem erhöhten LKW-Aufkommen keineswegs gerecht, was zu alltäglichen Staus und Engpässen führt. Die so genannte Key Southern Economic Zone sollte daher Priorität im Ausbau geniessen und bis 2011 fertig gestellt werden, um das steigende Aufkommen bewältigen zu können. Das Highway-51-Erweite-rungsprojekt ist wesentlich zur adäquaten Aufnahme der erhöhten LKW-Container-Fracht gepaart mit privaten Wochendreiseverkehr. Weiterhin benötigt die HCMC – Long Thanh/Dau Giay Expressway eine zusätzliche Hauptverkehrsschlagader. Der 68 km lange Bien Hoa – Vung Tau Expressway verbindet bedeutende Industriezentren in der Dong Nai Provinz mit Tiefseeumschlagplätzen.
Aus der ungenügenden infrastrukturellen Erschließung resultieren unnötige Kosten für Unternehmen:
• unzureichende Fahrbahnkapazitäten führen zu Strassenüberlastungen und erhöhen damit die Transportkosten;
• Engpässe an Strassenkreuzungen aufgrund von unzulänglichen Verkehrsregelungen verursachen höhere Lieferzeiten;
• der Betrieb von alten und ineffizienten LKWs führt zu höheren Betriebskosten.
Letztes Jahr hat eine Untersuchungskommission verschiedener Ministerien von China und Singapur festgestellt, dass die Koordinierung der Zollabfertigungsabläufe sowie eine erhöhte Transparenz in allen Provinzen und Distrikten ausschlaggebende Faktoren für eine wettbewerbsfähige Wirtschaft und einem florierenden Handel darstellen, und damit als Katalysator für Wachstum fungieren. Es wurden folgende Vorschläge zur Erreichung von Koordination und Transparenz im Bereich des Zollwesens, basierend auf Studien, unterbreitet:
• die Weiterentwicklung und Verbreitung von elektronischem Zollservice zur Koordinierung;
• Anwendung neuer Technologien wie EDI (Elektronischer Datentausch);
• Rationalisierung von Zollverfahren in allen Provinzen und Distrikten;
• Vereinheitlichung und Veröffentlichung von Zolltariffen.
Das Enwicklungsprogramm für Seehäfen im Norden Vietnams muss beschleunigt werden, da die derzeitig vorhandenen Häfen nur eine Tiefe von weniger als 8 m aufweisen, die nur die Löschung kleinere Schiffe bis zu 800 TEU zulassen und sich dadurch als uneffizient erweisen. Um nicht dieselben Fehler wie im Süden Vietnams zu begehen, muss das Augenmerk gleichzeitig auf die landseitige Infrastruktur gerichtet werden, die die Häfen mit den Industriegebieten verbindet, damit eine synchrone Entwicklung gewährleistet werden kann.
Die Seehäfen- und Infrastrukturentwicklung sollte folgende Empfehlungen beachten:
• die Errichtung grösserer, eingebundener Häfen, anstelle von einer Vielzahl kleiner Einheiten
• die Gewährleistung von zentralstaatlicher und provinzieller Zusammenarbeit;
• Nutzung von Kompetenz und Fachwissen;
• Errichtung ganzheitliche Infrastruktur (Strassen, Luftverkehrswege und Meeresverbindungen sowie Schienenverkehr);
• Projekte sollten für ausländische Investoren geöffnet werden;
• regelmässige Auswertung von Frachtzuwächsen in Kooperation mit der Hafenentwicklung.
ii.Vietnams neuer Hafenmasterplan 2020 – 2030
Hauptinhalte:
Vinamarine wurde von der vietnamesischen Regierung damit beauftragt, einen neuen Hafenmasterplan von 2020 bis ins Jahr 2030 zu entwickeln. Drei Berichte wurden bereits fertig gestellt und nach Vollendung soll dieser vom Premierminister genehmigt und dann veröffentlicht werden. Schwerpunkt des Masterplanes bildet der Ausbau der Seehäfen zur Förderung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Vietnams. Dies erweist sich als ausgesprochener Fortschritt, spielten der Ausbau der Seehaefen doch bisher lediglich eine zweitrangige Rolle, hinter der Entwicklung der Industrie. In dem Masterplan ist der Ausbau von sechs Hafengruppen geplant. Hevorzuheben ist, dass Anmerkungen und Empfehlungen von diversen Unternehmen und der VBF Untergruppe berücksichtigt und eingearbeitet wurden. Ein stärkerer Schwerpunkt wird nunmehr auf die Förderung der Infrastruktur gelegt und umfasst den Ausbau von Kanälen, Zubringerstrassen und Anbindungsmöglichkeiten an regionale Häfen. Die in Vietnam bestehenden Mechanismen hinsichtlich der Verwaltung und Leitung von Häfen weichen im Vergleich zu den Strukturen anderen Ländern stark ab. Bei letzteren übernimmt die lokale Regierung die Verantwortlichkeit bzgl. Verwaltung und Steuerung ihrer lokalen Häfen, in Vietnam unterfällt dies jedoch der Kompetenz der Zentralregierung. Aus diesem Grund stellt die Vernetzung verschiedener Terminals zu einem grossen Seehafen eine praktische Herausforderung dar, und es wird einige Zeit beanspruchen bis entsprechende rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen bestehen. Vinamarine und die Foreign Investment Agency haben die Bereitschaft erklärt, numehr mit der Port-Sub-Gruppe zusammenzuarbeiten und deren Empfehlungen zu verarbeiten.
Bei der Erarbeitung des Entwurfs wurde der Schwerpunkt auf vier Hauptaspekte gelegt:
• Entwicklungskonzepte,
• Entwicklungsziele,
• Grössenordnung der Entwicklung und
• Liste der Projekte, die bis 2015 Priorität geniessen.
Entwicklungskonzept:
Hauptaugenmerk liegt auf der synchron zu erfolgenden Planung und Entwicklung der unterstützenden Infrastruktur, wobei der Schwerpunkt konsequenterweise auf den Ausbau der Hafeninfrastruktur gelegt wird und insbesondere Logistikzentren errichtet werden sollen. Priorität besteht zudem hinsichtlich der Konstruktion von internationalen Umschlags- und Ausgangshäfen, unter Anwendung neuer fortgeschrittener Technologie. Da gegenwärtig kaum Kanäle und Durchfahrtswege vorhanden sind, ist zum Ausgleich der daraus resultierenden Auswirkungen, die Verlegung von Häfen an Flüssen in küstennahe Gebiete geplant. Unter Ausbau der Seehäfen wird demnach nicht nur der Aufbau von Terminals verstanden, sondern umfasst zugleich auch die Errichtung von unterstützender Infrastruktur. Zur Realisierung der Pläne ist die Mobilisierung von inländischen und ausländischen Investitionen vorgesehen. Um ein nachhaltiges Wachstum sicherzustellen, soll der Ausbau im Einklang mit der Umweltverwaltung und dem Umweltschutz erfolgen.
Entwicklungsziele:
Entwicklungsziele sind die aufeinander abgestimmte Entwicklung der Seehafenstandorte und der unterstützenden Infrastruktur in allen Regionen. Nachfolgend eine Übersicht des vorhergesehenen Frachtumfanges, der durch Vietnams Seehäfen transportiert werden soll:
• Bis 2015, ca. 480-590 Millionen Tonnen an Gütern pro Jahr (Container: 13-16 Millionen TEUS; 1.3 -1.6 Millionen internationale Touristen und Nord-Süd-Reisende).
• Bis 2020, ca. 820 – 1.080 Millionen Tonnen an Gütern pro Jahr (Container 24-30 Millionen TEUS; 1.9-2.4 Millionen internationale Touristen und Nord-Süd-Reisende).
• Bis 2030, ungefähr 1,400 -2, 100 Millionen Tonnen Fracht pro Jahr (Container 58 – 60 Millionen TEUS; 4.0 -5.9 Millionen internationale Touristen).
Laut Statistik, wurden im Jahr 2008 196.58 Millionen Tonnen an Gütern durch Vietnams Häfen transportiert (Container: 5.023 Millionen TEUS). Die Prognosen erfolgten auf Grundlage der Bewegungen des Weltmarktes. Der Masterplan soll ebenfalls Analysen und Vorhersagen hinsichtlich der verschiedenen Frachtarten umfassen.
Entwicklungsplan:
Vietnams Seehafensystem ist in sechs Gruppen unterteilt, und zwar:
Gruppe 1: umfasst Seehäfen im Norden (Quang Ninh und Ninh Binh Provinzen).
Gruppe 2: beinhaltet Seehäfen im nördlichen Teil Zentralvietnams (Thanh Hoa und Ha Tinh Provinzen).
Gruppe 3: besteht aus Seehäfen in der mittleren Region Zentralvietnams (Quang Binh und Quang Ngai Provinzen).
Gruppe 4: fasst die Seehäfen im südlichen Teil Zentralvietnams zusammen (Binh Dinh und Binh Thuan Provinzen).
Gruppe 5: umfasst Seehäfen in der östlichen Region Südvietnams (Ho Chi Minh City, Dong Nai, Ba Ria-Vung Tau und am Soai Rap River in Long An und Tien Giang Provinzen).
Gruppe 6: beinhaltet Seehäfen in der Mekong Delta-Region (Mekong Delta, Phu Quoc Island und an den südwestlichen Inseln).
Größenordnnung der Entwicklung:
Gruppe 1: Das geschätzte Frachtvolumen, das hinsichtlich der Häfen der ersten Gruppe für den Zeitraum bis 2020 vorhergesehen ist, beträgt 95- 150 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr (Container: 4.5-5.5 Millionen TEUS (0.6 -0.8 Millionen Touristen); bis 2030: 240-315 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr (Container: 10-16 Millionen TEUS; 1.4 -1.9 Millionen Touristen).
Hai Phong internationaler Ausgangshafen:
o Lach Huyen – nimmt Schiffe von 50,000-80,000 dwt und 4,000-6,000 TEUS Länge auf. Alle 600m besteht ein Ankerplatz für zwei Schiffe. Vinamarine wird mit den Bauarbeiten der ersten zwei Terminals im Lach Huyen Hafen beginnen.
o Dinh Vu – nimmt Schiffe mit bis zu 20,000-30,000 dwt auf.
o Cam River – bietet Platz fuer Schiffe bis zu 5,000-10,000 dwt.
o Chanh River – kann Schiffe mit bis zu 10,000-40,000 dwt aufnehmen, dieser Hafen ist auch in den Bereichen Schiffsreparaturen und Schiffsbau spezialisiert und zudem für industrielle Zwecke geeignet.
Hon Gai Hafen ist der regionaler Zentralhafen mit Cai Lan Terminals für Schiffe von 50,000 dwt, 3,000 TEUS:
o Andere spezialisierte Häfen sind: Cam Pha, Hai Ha, Van Gia, Mui Chua und Van Hoa.
o Zusaetzlich soll in dieser Region ein Ölterminal für den Norden errichtet werden, um die existierenden B2 bei Cai Lan zu ersetzen.
Gruppe 2 : das geplante Frachtvolumen bis 2020 wird auf 140-160 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr geschätzt (Container: 102,000-130,000 TEUS; bis 2030: 210 – 230 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr (Container: 180,000-350,000 TEUS).
Nghi Son ist der Zentralhafen, mit einer Aufnahmefähigkeit vonn 25,000dwt, Öltanker und Schiffe von 30,000- 50,000 dwt. Andere Häfen sind Cua Lo, Cua Hoi und Ben Thuy.
Gruppe 3 : Frachtumfang bis 2020 wird auf 80-105 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr geschätzt (Container: 0.3 – 0.4 Millionen TEUS, 0.4-0.5 Millionen Touristen); bis 2030: 140-205 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr (Container: 0.6-l.1 Millionen TEUS, 0.8-1.2 Millionen Touristen).
Da Nang Hafen ist der Zentralhafen für Schiffe von 20,000-30,000 dwt. Andere Häfen umfassen Dung Quat, Thua Thien Hue, Quang Binh und Quang Tri.
Gruppe 4 : Frachtumfang bis 2020 wird voraussichtlich 160-210 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr betragen (Container: 4.5-5 Millionen TEUS, 0.3-0.5 Millionen Touristen); bis 2030: 270-380 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr (Container: 9.0-l0.5 Millionen TEUS, 0.9-1.3 Millionen Touristen).
Van Phong, ein internationaler Umschlaghafen für Schiffe von 9,000 TEUS und 30,000 dwt Oeltanker.
Quy Nhon ist der Zentralhafen fuer Schiffe von 30,000-50,000 dwt. Andere Häfen sind Ba Ngoi, Nha Trang, Ca Na und Ke Ga.
Gruppe 5 : Frachtumfang bis 2020 wird auf 250-310 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr geschätzt (Container: 15-20 Millionen TEUS, 0.4-0.6 Millionen Touristen); bis 2030: 500- 650 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr (Containers: 35-52 Millionen TEUS, 1.0-1.3 Millionen Touristen).
Vung Tau ist der internationale Ausgangshafen mit Terminals:
o Cai Mep, Sao Mai-Ben Đinh für Schiffe von 6,000-8,000 TEUS
o Phu My-Thi Vai für Schiffe von 50,000 dwt, 4,000 TEUS
o Long Son für Petrochemikalanlagen, für Schiffe von 300,000 dwt und Schiffe von 30,000-80,000 dwt.
Ho Chi Minh City Hafen ist der Zentralhafen mit funktionellen Bereichen:
o Hiep Phuoc am Soai Rap Fluss für Schiffe von 50,000 dwt, 4,000 TEUS
o Cat Lai für Schiffe von 30,000 dwt
o Can Giuoc (in der Long An Provinz) und Go Cong (in der Tien Giang Provinz) am Soai Rap Fluss für Schiffe von 30,000 dwt.
Gruppe 6 : bis 2020 wird ein Frachtvolumen von 130- 160 Mil1ionen Tonnen pro Jahr erwartet (Container: 92,000-125,000 TEUS und 55,000 – 70,000 Touristen), bis 2030: 200 -300 Millionen Tonnen pro Jahr (Container: 180,000-350,000 TEUS und 80,000-120,000 Touristen).
Can Tho ist der Zentralhafen für Schiffe von 10,000-20,000 dwt. Andere umfassen Häfen am Tien, Hau und Cai Lon Fluss, Hon Chong in Kien Giang Provinz, An Thoi und Vinh Dam in Phu Quoe, und spezialisierte Häfen, um Kohle für Kraftwerke zu importieren.
Liste der Prioritätsprojekte für den Zeitraum bis 2015:
• Fahrrinnenvertiefungen in den Häfen in Haiphong, Cai Mep-thi Vai, Ho Chi Minh City Hafen am Soai Rap Fluss und Can Tho Hafen am Hau River.
• Errichtung der allgemeinen und Containerterminals in Cai Mep-thi Vai Hafen, Hiep Phuoc Hafen, Errichtung von Terminals, zum Export von Gütern und Import von Rohöl fuer Nghi Son und Long Son Ölraffinerien, Bau von Häfen, um Kohle für thermische Kraftwerke zu importieren.
• Konstruktion der Phase 1 am Van Phong internationaler Umschlaghafen und Errichtung von Lach Huyen internationaler Ausgangshafen.
iii.Anmerkungen zum Masterplan und Empfehlungen
Im Vergleich zu dem Entwurf, der im September 2008 vorgelegt wurde, lassen sich im neuen Masterplan einige bedeutende Fortschritte verzeichnen. Vietnam scheint erkannt zu haben, dass Häfen wesentlicher ein Motor wirtschaftlichen Wachstums darstellen. Der neue Entwurf wurde effektiver ausgearbeitet und zielt darauf ab, dem Wirtschaftswachstum und der Entwicklung von Gewerbezentren gerecht zu werden. Die Prognosen des Frachtumfanges bedürfen noch einer tieferen Diskussion und sollten sowohl detaillierter sein als auch die Grundlage der Voraussagen verdeutlichen.
Das Produktionsvolumen ist rasch gestiegen, wobei die existierenden Häfen diesem Anstieg zurzeit und in naher Zukunft keineswegs gewachsen sind. Daher sollte die Regierung mehr Investoren dazu anregen, Häfen und unterstützende Infrastruktur zu bauen. Der Masterplan sollte zudem denjenigen, die in der Lage sind, Grossschiffe zu beherbergen, eine erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit schenken. Weiterhin sollte das Ausbaggern von Kanälen und Fahrrinnen mit einer Tiefe von 16 Metern am Cai Mep-Thi Vai Hafen in Betracht gezogen werden. Laut Herrn Nguyen Ngoc Hue, Deputy General Director, Vinamarine, beruhen Voraussagen zum Frachtfassungsvermögen, das über vietnamesische Hafen transportiert werden soll, auf Vorhersagen durch makroökonomische Indikatoren und international anerkannte Methoden. Sobald der Masterplan fertig gestellt und genehmigt ist, wird Vinamarine die Bildung von Hafengruppen detailliert planen sowie weitere Workshops anbieten, um die genauen Vorhersagen des Frachtumfanges weiter zu diskutieren. Das Transportministerium hat einen Vietnam Transport Network Master Plan in Zusammenarbeit mit der japanischen Regierung fertig gestellt, der technische Unterstützung bereitstellt. Umfasst sind die Planung von Strassen, Bahnschienen und Wasserstrassen. Laut Vinamarine liegt der Fokus zunähst einmal auf den Ausbau der Zugangskanäle und Fahrinnen um die Häfen in Haiphong, Cai Mep- Thi Vai, Ho Chi Minh City und Dinh An. Die grösste Schwierigkeit bereitet das Aufrechterhalten von Tiefenanlagen der Zugangskanäle. Für Cai Mep- Thi Vai, wird gegen Ende 2009, mit den Arbeiten zur Ausbaggerung der Zugangskanäle mit einer Tiefe von bis zu 14 Metern begonnen. Die Arbeiten sollen in 18 Monaten fertig gestellt sein. Nach Aussage von Vinamarine wurde der Masterplan unter Einbeziehung der Entwicklung anderer Wirtschaftbereiche erstellt. Eine gründlichere Analyse auf die Auswirkungen sei jedoch nicht erfolgt. Der Masterplan berücksichtigt die geografischen Merkmale Vietnams, wie z.B. die ausgeprägten Küstenlinien.
Die Einzelheiten bzgl. der Methode zur Errichtung des Masterplanes und Erstellung der Prognosen wurden beim Treffen mit der Port Sub-Gruppe im September 2008 diskutiert. Auf Grundlage der geografischen Besonderheiten Vietnams wurden besonders geeignete Standorte fuer die Errichtung der Häfen aufgezeigt. Derzeit sind 24 Häfen in Planung.
Der Masterplan beruht auf folgenden Prinzipien:
• Errichtung der Häfen soll sich nicht nachteilig auf die Entwicklung anderer Wirtschaftsbereiche auswirken.
• Errichtung der Häfen muss mit den Naturbedingungen und dem örtlichen Bedarf einhergehen.
Laut Vinamarine sei eine zu tiefe Ausbaggerung der Fahrrinnen zu kostenintensiv. Der Plan sieht daher vor, dass im Norden, der Lach Huyen Hafen Kapazitäten zur Aufnahme von Schiffen mit 4,000 TEUS aufweisen soll; im Süden, wird Cai Mep Schiffe von 6,000 TEUS aufnehmen können. Schiffe von 9,000 TEUS und mehr werden dem internationalen Umschlaghafen Van Phong zugeteilt.
Gemäß dem 6. Energie Plan wird das Mekong Delta vier Thermalkraftwerke besitzen und zudem ist die Errichtung von schwimmenden Lagerplätzen geplant. Um den Bedarf der Thermalkraftwerke an Kohleimporte zu befriedigen, werden Schiffe von 10,000 dwt Kohle zu den schwimmenden Lagerhäusern transportieren und anschließend wird die Kohle mithilfe von Fähren und kleinen Schiffen zu den Kraftwerken transportiert. Berechnungen zufolge soll diese Methode die wirtschaftlich effizienteste darstellen.
Die vietnamesische Regierung wird sowohl die inländischen als auch die ausländischen Investitionsquellen zur Errichtung neuer Seehäfen mobilisieren und Investitionen von inländischen und ausländischen Unternehmen aus allen wirtschaftlichen Bereichen in Hafenprojekte in Form von FDI, joint ventures, BOT, BTO und BT fördern und erleichtern. Staatliche Fonds werden nur in die Entwicklung öffentlicher Einrichtungen zentraler Häfen und in die Errichtung von Infrastrukturposten wichtiger Hafenprojekte einfliessen. Ausländische Investoren können 100-Prozent ausländisch investierte Unternehmen errichten, um Häfen in der Form von BOT, BTO und BT-Projekten zu bauen.
Der Schwerpunkt muss auf die Umsetzung des Masterplanes gerichtet werden. Der Plan sollte neue Anreize zur Förderung privater Investoren sowie zur Verbindung der Häfen mit dem nationalen Transportsystem (Strassen, Bahnschienen, Luftwege etc.) vorschlagen. Die existierenden Mechanismen schrecken den privaten Sektor weiterhin von Investitionen in unterstützende Infrastrukturprojekte ab. Neue Häfen sollten im Einklang mit dem Wachstum anderer Sektoren geplant werden, um sicherzustellen, dass die Häfen effektiv genutzt werden.
iv.Schlussfolgerung
Der Masterplan sollte einen breitgefächerten und langfristigeren Blickwinkel im Hinblick auf nationale Ressourcen einer jeden Planungszeit aufweisen. Weitere Diskussionen sollten bezüglich der Vorhersagen des Frachtausmasses, insbesondere in Form von Containern/Transporte durch die verschiedenen Häfen zwischen staatliche Stellen und Unternehmen erfolgen, um angemessene und genauere Vorhersagen zu ermöglichen. Die Herausforderung, Transportsysteme, zur Verbindung von Häfen und Industriezentren sowie urbane Zentren zu erschaffen muss durch eine synchronisierte Transportplanungsstrategie in Vietnam und einem angemessenen Mechanismus zur Mobilisierung von hinreichenden Quellen zur Umsetzung der Strategie in Angriff genommen werden. Um die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der vietnamesischen Häfen zu steigern, müssen Ausbaggerungen von Kanälen und Fahrrinnen erfolgen, um Häfen zur Aufnahme von grösseren Schiffen zu befähigen. Massnahmen, zur Mobilisierung von Quellen zur einer effektiven Umsetzung des Masterplanes sollten vorgeschlagen werden.
Es muss darauf geachtet werden, dass der Hafenausbau und die entsprechenden Verwaltungsmodelle keineswegs nachteilige Auswirkungen auf die anderen Wirtschaftsbereiche und die Umwelt besitzen.
c)Straßen
Der Highway 51 stellt weiterhin den bedeutendsten Verkehrsweg dar, wird jedoch dem erhöhten LKW-Aufkommen keineswegs gerecht, was zu alltäglichen Staus und Engpässen führt. Die so genannte Key Southern Economic Zone sollte daher Priorität im Ausbau geniessen und bis 2011 fertig gestellt werden, um das steigende Aufkommen bewältigen zu können. Das Highway-51-Erweite-rungsprojekt ist wesentlich zur adäquaten Aufnahme der erhöhten LKW-Container-Fracht gepaart mit privaten Wochendreiseverkehr. Weiterhin benötigt die HCMC – Long Thanh/Dau Giay Expressway eine zusätzliche Hauptverkehrsschlagader. Der 68 km lange Bien Hoa – Vung Tau Expressway verbindet bedeutende Industriezentren in der Dong Nai Provinz mit Tiefseeumschlagplätzen.
Aus der ungenügenden infrastrukturellen Erschließung resultieren unnötige Kosten für Unternehmen:
• unzureichende Fahrbahnkapazitäten führen zu Strassenüberlastungen und erhöhen damit die Transportkosten;
• Engpässe an Strassenkreuzungen aufgrund von unzulänglichen Verkehrsregelungen verursachen höhere Lieferzeiten;
• der Betrieb von alten und ineffizienten LKWs führt zu höheren Betriebskosten.
i.Koordinierung der Zollabfertigungsablaeufe und Transparenz
Letztes Jahr hat eine Untersuchungskommission verschiedener Ministerien von China und Singapur festgestellt, dass die Koordinierung der Zollabfertigungsabläufe sowie eine erhöhte Transparenz in allen Provinzen und Distrikten ausschlaggebende Faktoren für eine wettbewerbsfähige Wirtschaft und einem florierenden Handel darstellen, und damit als Katalysator für Wachstum fungieren.
Es wurden folgende Vorschläge zur Erreichung von Koordination und Transparenz im Bereich des Zollwesens, basierend auf Studien, unterbreitet:
• die Weiterentwicklung und Verbreitung von elektronischem Zollservice zur Koordinierung;
• Anwendung neuer Technologien wie EDI (Elektronischer Datentausch);
• Rationalisierung von Zollverfahren in allen Provinzen und Distrikten;
• Vereinheitlichung und Veröffentlichung von Zolltariffen.
ii.Schlussanmerkung
Logistikkosten im Zusammenhang mit Infrastrukturinvestitionen beliefen sich auf 9.5% des BIP in den USA ; 11 % in Japan; 21 % in China and 25% in Vietnam und das Fehlen einer hinreichenden Hafeninfrastruktur kostet Vietnam ungefähr $1.7 Milliarden an logistischen Kosten pro Jahr, da lokale Unternehmen, Güter über Hongkong und Singapur transportieren müssen.
Bitte kontaktieren Sie den Autor Oliver Massmann direkt unter omassmann@duanemorris.com wenn Sie Fragen haben. Oliver Massmann ist der Generaldirektor von Duane Morris Vietnam LLC.
INTERESSE AN VIETNAM? Besuchen Sie: www.vietnamlaws.xyz
VIELEN DANK!
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[1] EU Economic and Commercial Counsellors’ report on Vietnam 2008
Lawyer in Vietnam Oliver Massmann Pharmaceutical Market
Vietnam’s healthcare system is currently in general on the move due to the economic growth and the rapid development.
Twenty years ago, the healthcare was under sole control of the central government. Later it became clear that apart from government subventions yet further means were necessary in order to finance the system.
Meanwhile, a system consisting of three components exists. Since then, the healthcare is financed either via government funds, out of the own pocket of the population or by means of health insurance. Moreover, the poor were released from the obligation to pay the fees. Nevertheless, most hospital revenue comes from private payments.
In contrast to other Asian countries, Vietnam spends very much funds for healthcare. The expenses for this purpose amount to about 5% o 6% of the gross domestic product.
Particularly noticeable is the difference between public and private expenditure. While nearly three fourth of the expenditure are attributed to the private sector, the public sector generates only one fourth of it.
Although Vietnam is subject to a constant progress, it is urgently required to continue extending the healthcare system. The country claims to have eliminated many infectious diseases. Nevertheless, malaria, trachoma, tuberculosis and cholera, poliomyelitis and typhus still cause a high mortality rate. In 2003, SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) broke out and had grave consequences.
A reason for the diseases is the lack of hygiene and education of the population. The government spoke out in favor of making usual vaccinations against diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, poliomyelitis, tuberculosis and even measles. Communal health centers were established and, in addition, the educational work was promoted. It included among other things the advice to ingest pure water and washed food and the adjustment of living conditions in general to usual Western standards.
Besides, the government launched a program for the eradication of rats, mosquitoes and flies.
Thanks to some improvements in the recent years, the life expectancy increased and the infant mortality rate dropped to 3.4%. Nevertheless, it is still a relatively high rate. Furthermore, a lot of cases of chronic malnutrition still exist, particularly in ethnic minorities in remote and mountainous regions.
Furthermore, HIV and AIDS present a big problem. It is estimated that 215,000 people are HIV-positive. About 8,500 of them are children aged between 0 and 15 years. There are about 22,000 orphans who lost their parents because of AIDS.
The spread of the disease is to be put down on the one hand to intravenous drug use and on the other hand to unprotected sexual intercourse, not least because it is what many women do by profession. Taking it into consideration, the government, the party and the National Assembly launched programs promoting the prevention and control. What is more, Vietnam is one of 15 countries that receive funds within a global AIDS control plan amounting to US$ 15 billion.
There are still other communicable diseases in Vietnam. Among them are hepatitis B, parasitic diseases, acute inflammations of respiratory tracts, tuberculosis, dengue fever and Japanese encephalitis, etc. They cause about 30% of deaths. Moreover, non-communicable diseases, such as cardiovascular diseases, cancer and diabetes increase steadily. The abuse of tobacco, alcohol and drugs is more widespread than before. Such phenomena as suicide, violence and mental illnesses are on the increase.
Many differences in various populations groups are due to different living conditions, which are worse particularly in rural areas.
Some people still suffer from the effects of the use of dioxins that caused cancer, miscarriages and stillbirths. Moreover, a large number of not cleared explosive devices and landmines can still be found in rural areas.
Health promotion and health programs
Almost all hospitals in Vietnam are owned by the state. The insurance is too expensive for the majority of the population. The employer is indeed obliged to pay 18% of the income of an employee inclusive certain extra charges to a social insurance fund and, besides, has to pay 3% of the total amount of the wage or salary. Moreover, the employee has to pay 9.5% of the wage or salary and certain extra charges.
Altogether, the concept of health insurance in Vietnam is relatively new. Health insurances were introduced by the government as recently as 1992. Compulsory insurance applies to all active and pensioned employees in the public sector and all employees in private enterprises with 10 or more employees. The contribution rate amounts to 4.5% of the wage or salary, with the employer having to pay 3% and the employee 1.5%. Health insurances for children and farmers can be effected voluntarily. The government systems include also the issuance of free health insurance cards for the poor. At the same time, however, informal fees, which have a negative effect particularly on the less well-off in the population, are still charged. Naturally, the benefits of health insurances do not yet correspond to Western standards. The long delay in payments presents a particular problem. In 2001, the government developed a “Strategy for the Health of the Population” including two aspects: The reorganization of the health insurance system for the purpose of regulating financial relationships between the users and the providers and searching for new approaches to strengthening the quality and efficiency of nursing services.
Market development
The public expenditure for the healthcare constitutes only 1% of the gross national product and no more than 20% of the income from the healthcare.
The healthcare system is insofar undermined by charging illegal fees. 80% of the turnover is sold out of the own pocket of the population, which amounts to about US$ 23 per capita. Moreover, many medications and placebos are sold illegally.
Today, there are around 800 wholesale establishments. The cost of maintenance of these establishments is relatively high and amounts on average from 4% to 14% of the turnover.
Hospitals and pharmacies are in most provinces and larger towns. Private and public pharmacies are scattered all over the country. They sell usually both local and international products. Their number amounts to 41,500.
Depending on the educational system, the education to become a pharmacist takes 1 year, 3 years or 5 years. Unfortunately, no educational standards exist and each of these qualifications permits to open a pharmacy.
Market barriers
Despite the accession to WTO, some market barriers for investors still exist. Within these barriers fall for instance poor infrastructure, bad education of the population and not yet completed implementation of the WTO agreements.
Another problem is that the prices of pharmaceuticals do not vary. It induces the hospitals to buy from state-owned enterprises only.
The marketing of a product also poses difficulties. For instance, placing of an advertisement requires a special permission. Prescription drugs, which are usually sold only by the state anyway, may be praised in professional journals only. Other forms of advertisement may be made only after the participation in training courses and seminars. Since wholesalers are not allowed to advertise in hospitals, it is common that the advertisement is taken over by agents.
Natural and alternative medicine
Moreover, many Vietnamese trust only the traditional medicine. Basically, there are three kinds of alternative medicine: The northern medicine influenced by China (thuoc Bac), the southern medicine (thuoc Nam) and the western medicine (thuoc Tay).
The philosophy of the northern medicine is based on the Yin-Yang theory. The elements of this theory are of material and moral nature and represent the entire universe. Ying is the feminine, passive element whereas Yang is the active, masculine element. The human body is understood as microcosm in the universe that has to adjust its inner functions to external forces and to the nature. The underlying idea is to create harmony of a human being with the nature, which at the same time constitutes the basis of the medicine.
In the southern medicine, the treatment is performed using tropical plants and animals. Some of these traditional medicines proved to be extremely effective for curing dysentery, arthritis, gastritis, gastric ulcers, cardiac diseases, influenza and hypertension and, besides, have the advantage of being cheap.
The curing method of the western medicine is based on the contact with dangerous spirits.
Vietnamese physicians rely on a diagnosis consisting of four steps: examination, auditory perception, patient interview and pulse rate measurement. However, Vietnamese patients are rather suspicious of specific questions concerning previous medical history and symptoms.
The traditional medicine has a large share in the market. Almost 17% of the pharmaceutical and healthcare turnover comes from the traditional medicine. There are around 250 manufacturers of products for alternative medicine and 450 private enterprises practicing traditional medicine. The producers are successful even in the export.
Foreign investors should be always aware of the great mistrust towards modern medicine and the reverence towards traditional medicine.
Favorable development after the accession to WTO
After the WTO Agreement, a considerable relaxation of the so far limited rights of sale in Vietnam was expected and at least partly implemented in 2009. Prior to this, Vietnam’s structure of distribution was distinguished by statutory restrictions and bureaucracy: Only enterprises operating in the country were allowed to distribute their products themselves. All imported pharmaceuticals had to be brought into the country via a local state-owned enterprise or via an enterprise authorized to import. Consequently, the import enterprises were allowed only to buy foreign products from state-owned enterprises. Afterwards they could resell the imported goods to pharmacies. Only in rare cases had they also the chance to distribute them directly to hospitals. It was due to the fact that hospitals – although they have a certain budget which is provided in 50% by the government – had only over 15% of the budget at their free disposal.
The newly passed law, at the same time as the accession to WTO in 2007, brought the first favorable development. It shall establish equal conditions for national and international enterprises in the country. Since 2009, the formation of fully foreign enterprises is possible. According to this, also foreign manufacturers and wholesalers have been recently in a position to distribute pharmaceuticals without the aid of brokers. Foreign enterprises can also set up branches in Vietnam that are entitled to import goods and to trade. In the context of the sale of placebos, it is to be welcomed that in 2005 regulations concerning the competition law were introduced and the intellectual property rights were put under better protection.
General conditions, advantages and disadvantages for foreign investors
Vietnam offers the following advantages for investors in the pharmaceutical industry: Apart from the very favorable geographical location of Vietnam at the center of Southeast Asia, the country is to be characterized as politically stable. The economic situation improves continually, with the labor cost being still very low.
In 1992, establishing of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was launched with the goal to create free trade areas within the ASEAN countries, China and possibly India. It will be implemented by 2015. Since 1995, Vietnam is a member of the ASEAN countries and in 1996 it became a member of the AFTA.
Another favorable development is the reduction of the tax rate on pharmaceuticals to 2.5% planned for 5 years after the accession to WTO. The tax rate on cosmetic agents has been reduced from 44% to 17.9%.
Vietnam still imports many medicines, as for example antibacterial agents and antibiotics. These pharmaceuticals play a central role in prevention and treatment of diseases as well as within the scope of supply of raw materials for the industry in the country. Specific pharmaceuticals are still very rare in Vietnam and come mainly from France, Germany and Switzerland. Therefore presents itself the chance for investors to undertake their production in the country. The number of local enterprises in the country increases, too. Vietnam has over 180 pharmaceutical factories and only 25% of them are foreign-funded. Another positive aspect for foreign investors is the fact that the government promotes the cooperation of domestic and foreign enterprises in order to ensure the compliance with international standards. Since this decision of the government, foreign investments in the sector are on the rise. The growth potential results particularly from the fact that Vietnam has a large population, but very low per capita expenditure for pharmaceuticals as yet, namely amounting to less than 10 US dollars per annum.
The economic growth rate of 2007 exceeded 8.5%. The industrial production amounting to US$ 35.9 trillion has improved by 17%. Total exports amounted to US$ 48.4 trillion, which means an increase by 21.7%, and the number of foreign direct investments almost doubled. Their maximum level was around US$ 20.2 million. Taking it into consideration, the profit of the pharmaceutical market is expected to rise to about US$ 1.5 billion by 2011.
Legislation and requirements for obtaining licenses
Opening of a pharmacy is cumbersome. The application for the license can take months. It is particularly problematic that each individual pharmaceutical to be distributed has to be registered and could be applied for only by local manufacturers and local importing firms as yet.
On the other hand, the fees for the license of only US$ 2000 are relatively low. Two certificates have to be granted for the registration of an enterprise. For the sale, it is a so-called FSC certificate (“FSC”) and for the manufacturing a so-called Good Manufacturing Practices (“GMP”) certificate. The GMP can be replaced by the Certificate of Pharmaceutical Product (“CPP”). Besides, the product has to be subject to sampling at the Institute for Quality and Control.
The applications have to be submitted in English or French and additionally in Vietnamese. The Vietnamese administration has a separate Pharmaceutical Department that is responsible for granting and cancellation of licenses.
Compared to other Asian countries, the approval of pharmaceuticals is quite simply and quickly to obtain. Altogether, the validity of a license depends on the demand. Thus a license for 5 years is granted usually for a product that is not manufactured locally, but is in high demand. A 3-year license is issued for foreign products being in high demand which cannot be manufactured in adequate quantities at the local level. Altogether, 4 reports have to be submitted for the approval of a new pharmaceutical, namely a legal, a toxicological, an experimental and a clinical report.
The most important registration office for foreign investors is the Ministry of Planning and Investment (“MPI”). The MPI is responsible for granting licenses for substantial investments of foreign investors, but apart from that additionally the approval of other government agencies, as the Pharmaceutical Department, may be required.
Currently, there are over 300 foreign enterprises on the market. Most of them have only a representative office. Especially India and South Korea have a particularly big share in the market. However, the number of potential competitors increases by about 5 to 10% annually.
Especially as locally manufactured products belong mainly to state-owned firms, the prices are very low. Since the raw materials necessary for production have to be imported, also local firms are willing to cooperation.
Conclusion
The continuing economic upturn in Vietnam and the liberalization of the market after the accession to WTO could at the same time constitute a new profitable productive and distribution potential for Western enterprises. Except for the local industry, there are still not many competitors on the market. However, in order to attract investors, it is absolutely necessary to improve Vietnam’s infrastructure. Fortunately, there are already plans for the implementation of a subway and a new airport in Ho Chi Minh City.
In order to promote the pharmaceutical industry in concrete terms, the government has to take yet further modernization measures for the sector. Among them are the development and expansion of the industry of pharmaceutical and chemical substances and agents from medicinal plants, the promotion of the healthcare system and of a reasonable and safe use of medicines. Moreover, efforts have to be made to take steps against illegal distribution of unregistered pharmaceuticals.
Please do not hesitate to contact Oliver Massmann under omassmann@duanemorris.com if you have any questions on the above. Oliver Massmann is the General Director of Duane Morris Vietnam LLC.
INTERESTED IN DOING BUSINESS IN VIETNAM? VISIT: www.vietnamlaws.xyz
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Lawyer in Vietnam Oliver Massmann Negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement between Vietnam and the European Union: At this Rate Vietnam Will Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs Vietnam Needs a Sound Strategy
1. Brief Historic Overview/Lessons Learned from the Past
Since the mid 1990s, Vietnam is engaged in international trade. The US embargo on Vietnam was lifted in 1994 and Vietnam joined the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and subscribed to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), including the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPF) arrangements, in July 1995. During the same year, Vietnam signed the Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the EU. However, the most important steps towards international trade relations so far were taken with the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) with the US signed in 1999 and Vietnam’s accession to the WTO in 2007.
To understand the trade negotiations between Vietnam and the EU concerning the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and to develop a sound strategy, one has to have a look at the BTA and the WTO accession to avoid mistakes that have been made.
Consequently, the core points of the BTA and the WTO accession will be illustrated and the problems will be identified, before having a closer look at the negotiation process and the upcoming issues in relation to the FTA. The article will end with a final conclusion, providing some hypothetical advice for further negotiations addressed to Vietnamese negotiators.
a. BTA US – Vietnam
The US and Vietnam negotiated and concluded the BTA in 1999 and finally implemented it in 2001. It consists of over 100 pages of text, statistics and tables covering obligations on trade in goods, intellectual property rights, trade in services, development of investment relations, business facilitation and transparency. Clearly the Agreement covers a wide range of aspects and is complicated and comprehensive. Nevertheless, the Agreement was not only beneficial for the US in terms of concessions it was also an important step towards the WTO membership of Vietnam, although it did not cover all the WTO bilateral agreements with the US as the Vietnamese authorities anticipated. According to a study of Nguyen Quy Binh, the BTA was important to the Vietnamese for the following reasons: (1) It opened the US market for Vietnamese exports; (2) the BTA was a step towards the WTO accession; (3) it created more business opportunities; and (4) it signified that Vietnam’s commitment to international rules.
It is important to mention the fact that the US benefited a lot from the BTA partly because of the massive post-signing implementation effort they did (e.g. STAR program). One should keep this in mind when assessing the aftermath of the WTO accession.
From an economical point of view, the BTA was a huge success and very important for Vietnam. From 2001 to 2005, the bilateral trade between the US and Vietnam increased tremendously from USD 1.4 billion to over USD 7,6 billion. The imports of products from Vietnam into the US increased from around USD 1 billion to over USD 6.5 billion over this period. US Foreign direct investment (FDI) increased by an average of 27% from 2002 to 2004.
b. WTO Accession
On 11 January 2007 Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), becoming its 150th member. The accession process began in 1995 and within the following 11 years, 14 different multilateral and more than 40 different bilateral negotiations have been held. Vietnam paid a relatively high entrance fee in terms of WTO Plus obligations and special commitments in comparison to the founding members of the WTO, since Vietnam joined as a developing country with no market economy. However, another remarkable reason for Vietnam’s high entrance fee is the fact, that Vietnam joined the WTO right after China, which had to deal with the same fees, but could offer greater economic power/potential.
Unfortunately Vietnam tries to chance the terms of accession through sluggish implementation. Such bad practice is common within the ASEAN community. Vietnamese authorities admit that they were naive to accept the terms of accession when joining, so now try to learn from other countries in the region on how to evade the obligations and enforcement. Another reason for this behavior might be that Vietnam was forced to make law changes prior to its WTO accession. Vietnam felt “hard done by” as a result of the pressure of the WTO members and dragged its feet even more implementing later.
On paper, Vietnam’s concessions for market access liberalization are outstanding compared to other countries in the region. This is illustrated by the analyses below, where we compared the WTO commitments of Vietnam with other countries in the region. The different colors represent the restrictions of market access in the relevant country. Green stands for weak and very few limitations and red for extensive limitations while yellow stands for moderate restriction. The typical indicators are e.g. the number of open sectors, Joint Ventures requirements, limits on foreign owned shares and permission requirements.
Being the 150th member of the WTO, all eyes were on Vietnam at the time and the world acknowledged Vietnam’s extensive WTO commitments together with its market access liberalization.
Unfortunately, Vietnam did not meet expectations, since they tried to evade the implementation of the otherwise very promising WTO commitments. Initially foreign investors expected Vietnam to implement such commitments and thus liberalize its market, but soon realized that there were still protectionist thoughts within Vietnam. Naturally, investors were reluctant to funnel money into the Vietnamese economy. Hence, the Vietnamese authorities almost killed the goose that lays golden eggs called FDI, when they refrained from market liberalization, because they thought their domestic market was a self sustaining gold mine.
c. WTO Agreement on Government Procurement
The Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is a multilateral agreement within the WTO legal system. A WTO Member will not automatically become a member of the GPA when joining the WTO. Vietnam did not sign the agreement yet. The concept of the agreement is based on transparency, openness and non-discrimination as is the whole WTO system. By signing the GPA a country accredits its commitment to an open and transparent procurement market. This attracts foreign direct investment and avoids the constraining effects of protectionism. It also opens up a whole new market for foreign companies and guarantees a fair procurement procedure. That way Vietnam can get rid of the influence of corrupt Chinese companies and prevent accidents like the collapse of the Can Tho bridge, with death tolls of about 59 persons and 140 injured.
Vietnamese authorities are aware of the importance of the agreement. The MPI even held a conference in 2011 in Hanoi dealing with exactly this topic. Vietnam should consider signing this agreement as soon as possible since it would appease the minds of foreign investors. Apart from that, a smooth negotiation in this regard and a fast signing would be a good signal to the EU, showing that Vietnam is willing to adhere to international trading rules. Hence, signing the GPA would enlarge Vietnam’s international credibility. It is also very likely that the EU diplomats will demand that Vietnam signs the GPA as a condition to conclude the FTA.
Finally Vietnam would benefit from the GPA in various ways hence the Agreement should be signed as soon as possible.
2. Relations Between Vietnam and EU
Vietnam is the EU’s fifth largest trading partner within the ASEAN and the 35th out of the EU’s total trade. The ASEAN countries together are the 3rd largest trading partner of the EU. In 2010 the EU was Vietnam’s 3rd largest trading partner, only after China and the US. The EU is Vietnam’s biggest source of development assistance in grants, a large export market and one of its biggest sources of committed foreign direct investment. In 2011, the EU’s exports (goods) to Vietnam amounted to 5.2 billion USD and the EU’s imports to 12.8 billion USD. Important to mention is that the EU exports are dominated by high tech products (including electrical machinery and equipment, aircraft, vehicles, pharmaceutical products and iron and steel). In 2010 the EU and Vietnam concluded a Partnership & Cooperation Agreement, which was meant to be the first step towards a Free Trade Agreement and to enhance the political and economic relationship.
a. Negotiations Between Vietnam and EU
On 26 June 2012 the EU Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht, and the Vietnamese Minister of Industry and Trade, Vu Huy Hoang, officially launched negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and Vietnam.”I’m delighted to announce the opening of trade negotiations with Vietnam. The potential for both sides is enormous and the first negotiating round should take place just after the summer break”, said EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht.
The scoping process was concluded in February 2012 after a period of almost 2 years. In this preliminary phase (scoping) an agreement was reached for swift negotiations (2 to 3 years) for an ambitious FTA, liberalizing a major part (90%) of trade within 7 years. The first actual meeting is scheduled for 8. October 2012. However no analyses or preparations have been made until now, so at this point there will be no substantiated negotiations. The first meeting is likely to be considered a warm up phase. Consequently, the substance of the FTA will be discussed next year. Nevertheless, the negotiations are expected to conclude in 2014.
b. The FTA – Topics and Subjects
The aim of the FTA is to boost bilateral trade and resolve trade issues between the two parties. The EU will reduce its import tariffs and seek certain concession from Vietnam. Negotiations will cover trade related subjects such as goods, rule of origin, customs, trade facilitation, trade remedies, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, services, investment, intellectual property, public procurement, competition, sustainable development. At least the negotiators hope to deal with these points.
3. “Same Same But Different”
Having in mind the above painted picture, two questions arise: 1) Will the FTA have the same boosting effects on the Vietnamese economy as the BTA did; and 2) will there be the same problems concerning the implementation of the FTA as those mentioned in relation to the WTO accession.
a. Will the FTA Have the Same Boosting Effects as the BTA?
The BTA and the WTO accession already had a boosting effect on the Vietnamese economy and thus it is improbable that the FTA will have the same boosting effect. However, this does not mean that there will be no boosting effect at all. It is hard to predict the effect of the agreement since the economy in Europe has its own problems at the moment. Nevertheless, a good FTA could definitely attract investment from Europe and trigger trade with the EU, but Vietnam’s hopes should not be too high. It is not possible to compare the effect the BTA had with the one the FTA might have, since the BTA was the most important trade Agreement after Vietnam opened its market. Hence it is not surprising, that the BTA had an enormous boosting effect.
The situation at the moment on the other hand is completely different since Vietnam already opened its market and joined the WTO. Thus, the opportunity to grow is not as big as it was more than 10 years ago.
However, the EU is still interested in accessing the Vietnamese market and thus, it is very keen to negotiate special market access terms, as well as rules similar to the BTA’s commitments. Due to the fact, that the EU wants to be a trading partner of Vietnam on a similar level as the US, it is very likely that the boosting effect of a mutually beneficial agreement will take effect. However, making a reliable prediction, even before the negotiation process has become substantiated, is almost impossible.
b. Will the FTA Face the Same Implementation-Problems?
The same problems concerning a reliable prediction arise when asking if there will be the same implementation problems. Hence, it is more reasonable to point out to the Vietnamese Government, that if the same problems occur, the boosting effect will be inhibited. The economic potential of a FTA between Vietnam and the EU will vanish the same way expectations will vanish that Vietnam is fully committed to international trading rules.
This would be the worst thing that could happen, since it would not only slow down the potential boosting effect of the FTA, it would also affect international trade relations with other nations since Vietnam will lose credibility.
The Vietnamese authorities should keep the consequences of bad practice in mind, when negotiating the agreement. A protectionist aftermath, similar to the one after the WTO accession would be very harmful for the Vietnamese economy. Thus, once again, the Government would kill the golden egg laying goose, called FDI and international trade.
4. A Mutual Beneficial Agreement?
One of the core questions when it comes to FTA negotiations between Vietnam and the EU is who needs whom?
a. Does Europe need Vietnam?
The first alternative of this question would be: Does Europe need Vietnam. From a European prospective one could argue: no, the EU does not need Vietnam. Despite the problems within the EU its economy is strong and powerful, with trade relations to all parts of the world. There is no urgent need to engage trade relations with a non-market or transitional market economy like Vietnam.
However, this perception is too short sighted and a biased one. In 2015, there will be a FTA between the EU and ASEAN with a full liberalization of services. Hence, the member states of the EU will have full access to all ASEAN markets. As a developing country, Vietnam will be granted a grace period and must therefore open its markets only until 2023. Consequently, Vietnam will benefit from the open markets (free trade zone) without being obliged to open up their own markets until the end of the grace period in 2023. In December 2009, EU Member States gave the green light for the European Commission to pursue negotiations towards Free Trade Agreements with individual ASEAN countries. Negotiations with Singapore and Malaysia began in March 2010 and October 2010 respectively. Vietnam will thus be the third partner of the EU in the ASEAN region with whom the EU has started negotiations on a free trade agreement.
While pursuing a bilateral approach, the EU is not losing sight of the ultimate goal of achieving an agreement with ASEAN as a whole, one of the most dynamic regions in the world.
Despite this upcoming FTA, the EU needs a foothold in ASEAN prior to the signing of the FTA between ASEAN and the EU in 2015. Thus, the fact that the EU needs a foothold in ASEAN is a reason why the EU needs Vietnam and this shows why the above made statement is too short sighted.
b. Does Vietnam Need Europe?
Although the EU needs Vietnam, it is obvious that Vietnam needs the EU even more.
The first reason is, the EU is one of the largest investors in Vietnam with an investment volume around 1.8 billion US. This represents more than 12% of the total committed FDI in 2011. These figures indicate that the EU is very important for Vietnam in terms of investment and it is very likely that the trade relations and investment opportunities between the two parties will extend after the FTA is signed. However, this will only be the case if the commitments are mutually beneficial and will be implemented properly.
The second reason why Vietnam needs the EU is, because Vietnam approaches the so called “middle income trap”. Vietnam’s advantage in international trade is cheap labor, but in the course of becoming an industrialized country, living in Vietnam is becoming more expensive and thus the labor costs increase. This kills Vietnam’s advantage of cheap labor. Vietnam has to compete with countries like Cambodia and Burma and they do not only have cheap labor, they are also granted “everything but arms” status (EBA). The status is granted to leased-developed countries (LDCs) by the EU, with the effect that all imports into the EU from these countries are duty and quota free. Those benefits are not granted to Vietnam. Thus, it is very hard to compete with these countries without having a special trade agreement with the EU. The FTA would level the playing field with the LDCs.
The third reason is the reform of the generalized system of preference (GSP). The GSP is a formal system of exemptions from general WTO commitments and obligations. In the course of the reform, the maximum average annual income per capita will be fixed at USD 4000 per year to obtain GSP. When a country exceeds this average income, it will be excluded from the GSP. This will happen to Thailand. Vietnam is approaching this level, but it has not reached it yet. The consequence of Thailand being excluded from the GSP and Vietnam still being part of the GSP is not beneficial as it might seem at a first glance. More precisely, the exclusion of Thailand will have negative effects on Vietnam in terms of graduation. Graduation is the temporary exclusion from the GSP when a country monopolizes in a preferable import sector. When Thailand is permanently excluded from the GSP, the chance for Vietnam to be graduated becomes higher, since both countries produce and export the same goods. The consequence would be that Vietnam has to compete with other countries which are benefiting from the GSP without benefiting itself. This is a hard task and thus Vietnam needs another “joker” – a “joker” called FTA. This would protect Vietnam’s market access on a permanent contractual basis.
5. Conclusion
This study clarifies that Vietnam needs the FTA and the EU to compete with other countries in its region. It also indicates that Vietnam made mistakes in the aftermath of its WTO accession not implementing all its WTO commitments. This almost killed all the accession benefits. Furthermore, it was elaborated that the BTA had a boosting effect on the trade relations of the US and Vietnam and that a boosting effect after the FTA can be expected. However, this effect will not be as significant as the one of the BTA since Vietnam is already a member of the WTO.
In summary one can say that Vietnam has to draw its lessons from the former trade negotiations (BTA and WTO accession).
The FTA is a big chance for Vietnam to attract more FDI and to engage trade, with the consequence that the whole country will benefit. Therefore Vietnam needs to have a sound strategy when starting to enter into negotiation with the EU. It must furthermore avoid making the same mistakes again.
If we had to draft a sound strategy for Vietnam’s diplomats, we would advise them to:
a. Not miss the chance to gain FDI again;
b. Use the publicity and attention to attract investors;
c. Preserve the present market and secure the access to this sector (e.g. textile);
d. Adapt to new challenges – the textile market is not granted for ever;
e. Do not solely rely on the advantage of cheap labor;
f. Try to give the EU what they ask for to access their market – Vietnam needs the EU;
g. Sign the GPA as soon as possible;
h. Stick to your promises – implement what you have signed; and finally
i. Do not kill the egg laying goose called FDI by using protectionist measures as you did in the aftermath of your WTO accession!
Should you havce any questions, please contact Oliver Massmann under: omassmann@duanemorris.com; Oliver Massmann is the General Director of Duane Morris Vietnam LLC.
Interested in Vietnam ? Visit: www.vietnamlaws.xyz