Tag Archives: PPP

VIETNAM – THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY INCORPORATED DUANE MORRIS’S RECOMMENDATIONS INTO VIETNAM’S FIRST EVER LAW ON INVESTMENT IN THE FORM OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP)

On 13 May this year, Dr. Oliver Massmann discussed about the Draft PPP Law with key personnel of the National Assembly. On 8 July 2020, Vietnam’s first-ever Law on Investment in the form of Public-Private Partnership was published, incorporating the following recommendations suggested by Duane Morris:

1. Clarify the scope and scale of power projects eligible for PPP investment

Article 4 of the PPP Law envisages that 5 sectors eligible for PPP investment include:
a/ Transportation;
b/ Power grids, power plants, except for hydroelectricity power plants and cases of State monopoly in accordance with Electricity Law;
c/ Irrigation; water supply; drainage, and wastewater treatment; waste treatment;
d/ Healthcare, education, training
dd/ Infrastructure for application of information technology
The PPP law also stipulates the total investment capital requirement for a PPP project. For instance, excluding Operation & Maintenance Contracts, power projects must have the minimum total invested capital of VND 200 billions. The figure is lower (VND 100 billions) for projects in areas with difficult socio-economic conditions.

2. Emphasize the importance of bankable PPP contracts

Duane Morris suggested that the National Assembly should consider providing a bankable PPP contract template in the Law itself or in its guiding decree/circular. In Article 47 of the PPP law, it was supplemented that the Government shall regulate the issuance of standard contracts for BOT, BTO, BOO, O&M, BTL, BLT, BT or mixed contracts projects.
Regarding lenders’ step-in right, PPP Law sets forth that in case of termination of PPP project contract ahead of the deadline and it is required to select a replacement contractor to ensure the progress of the project, the lender must coordinate with the State to select the alternative investor.

3. Determine in details investment incentives that investors can enjoy

Article 80 specifies that investors are provided with security regarding land access rights, right to use land and other public properties, property mortgage right, right to trade the project and its infrastructure system. PPP project enterprises are also given priority to utilize public services for implementation of the project, and competent agencies must assist investors in carrying out necessary procedures in order to optimize this priority.

Other notable provisions in the new PPP Law:

1/ Foreign currency balance-ensuring scheme is applicable to projects subject to the National Assembly or the Prime Minister’s issuance of decision on investment policy. The latter applied for projects with total invested capital of at least VND 5000 billions, suggesting that all power projects eligible for PPP investment are automatically eligible for this foreign currency scheme. In addition, there is a ceiling of 30% to be imposed for all PPP projects.

2/ Revenue risk sharing mechanism
When the actual revenue reaches more than 125% of the revenue in the financial plan of the PPP project contract, investor to share with the State 50% of the increase between actual revenue and committed revenue in the contract.
When the actual revenue reaches less than 75% of the revenue in the financial plan of the PPP project contract, the State to share with investor 50% of the decrease between actual revenue and committed revenue in the contract. This revenue reduction sharing mechanism is applied when the following conditions are met:
1. Type of contract: BOT, BTO or BOO;
2. The cause of loss is change in laws and policies;
3. Measures to adjust product and public service prices and contract terms have been implemented but the total revenue is still less than 75%; and
4. The State Audit has audited the revenue reduction.

3/ Selection of contractors to execute PPP projects
PPP contracts must contain binding content on the contractor’s responsibility if the quality of the project does not meet the agreed requirements.
Usage of domestic contractors is encouraged for works that can be carried out by them.

4/ Governing laws: PPP contract, its annexes and related documents are to be construed and interpreted in accordance with Vietnamese laws.

Conclusion
It is our pleasure that the National Assembly took into consideration Duane Morris’ advice and recommendations. These moves are a step in the right direction.
It remains to be seen whether there will be the political will to fully implement PPP projects regularly and on large scale.

***
Please do not hesitate to contact the author Dr. Oliver Massmann under omassmann@duanemorris.com. Dr. Oliver Massmann is the General Director of Duane Morris Vietnam LLC, Member to the Supervisory Board of PetroVietnam Insurance JSC and the only foreign lawyer presenting in Vietnamese language to members of the NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF VIETNAM.

LAWYER IN VIETNAM DR. OLIVER MASSMANN KEY COMMENTS ON DRAFT PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP LAW DATED 5 MARCH 2020 (“PPP DRAFT”)

1. Positive:

– Eligible Sectors (Art. 5): business sectors, which are qualified for investment in PPP form, have been selectively considered and proposed, not as broad as the those under Decree 63/2018/ND-CP (“Decree 63”). This would help to concentrate the valuable resources and finance on efficient and necessary sectors. However, please refer to our notes on incompletion of this clause in the Negative Section as below.

– Language (Art. 34): language for selection of international investor may be in both Vietnamese and English.

– Step-in rights of lenders (Art. 55): Lenders have rights to take over the project and propose another investor to continue the project. This provision has addressed the constraints that inhibit cross-border financing will be essential for diversifying sources of funding for energy-sector investments. International financing can provide for both the electricity and midstream gas sectors in terms of longer tenors and fixed-interest rates, which domestic capital market cannot satisfy.

– Guarantee on Foreign Currency Conversion (Art. 82): it is positive that the PPP Draft still remains this guarantee regime, as the one under Decree 63. However, the scope and conditions to enjoy this are very limited and do not meet the expectation from the investors as discussed in the Negative Section as below.

– Revenue risk sharing (Art. 83): it is indeed a very bold proposal in the PPP Draft that enabling the State to share the revenue loss of investors, subject to certain conditions and qualifications. Though we have few comments on the scope of this mechanism as below. We highly appreciate that the drafter has tried to address one of current issues of PPP form, i.e., non bankability and high risk.

– Dispute Resolution (Art. 104): the relevant provision on dispute resolutions have been improved in comparison with those of Decree 63. In brief, it is crystal clear now disputes between investors involving at least a foreign investor and / or disputes between investors / PPP project company with foreign parties could be resolved by either local courts / arbitration and / or foreign or international arbitration. In terms of disputes between the state and investors / project company, the PPP Draft has in-principle required local courts / arbitration but enabled other agreement between the parties in the project contracts and / or otherwise provided by international treaties of Vietnam. This is a significant improvement as Vietnam has signed several major international treaties such as CPTPP and EVFTA. We give to your attention the advantage of some international treaties as below:

“The CPTPP and the EVFTA make it possible that foreign investors could sue Vietnam Government for its decisions according to the dispute settlement by arbitration rules. The violating party must take all necessary measures to promptly comply with the arbitral decision. In case of non-compliance, as in the WTO, the CPTPP and the EVFTA allow temporary remedies (compensation) at the request of the complaining party. The final arbitral award is binding and enforceable without any question from the local courts regarding its validity. This is an advantage for investors considering the fact that the percentage of annulled foreign arbitral awards in Vietnam remains relatively high for different reasons. It is crucial that foreign investors now could take advantage of the requirements under the CPTPP and the EVFTA (as also recognized by the PPP Draft) to enhance functionality of their PPP projects in Vietnam. In case these entities make wrongful decisions, foreign investors could take recourse to arbitration proceedings and have the arbitral awards fully enforced in Vietnam.”

2. Negative:

1. Art. 5 The scope of sectors eligible for PPP investment form is not crystal clear and need further guidance from the Government and Ministries. For example, in terms of power projects, in practice some major profile thermal power projects have been implemented in cooperation with the Government under the Build – Operate – Transfer (BOT) umbrella (a form of public private partnership (PPP), it appears that the Government would not offer this kind of treatment for renewable energy projects at large (except, perhaps in theory, for very large and prominent ones).

Foreign investors (most of them engaging small scale projects) do not prefer PPP structure for their power plant projects, due to complexity of this structure and the lack of clear guidance, especially feed-in-tariff and consequently bankability. However, on the contrary, BOT seems to be suitable for larger scale projects and often give investors a better position to negotiate with the Government on key project indicators at the outset, which may not be available in other investment platforms.

Recommendation: Consider clarification on the scope and scale of power projects eligible for PPP form. In addition, for large scale power projects, it is crucial to enable all sub-projects of a mega power project could be together invested in the PPP form. For example, a LNG-to-power project could only be efficiently invested with other sub-projects such as terminal, FSRU, pipelines, etc.

2. Art. 47 Lack of clear and bankable terms of PPP contract. It is critical that an international form of bankable PPP contract is provided in the PPP Draft. Other related transaction agreements could be further developed as agreed by the parties but bankable templates should be drafted and attached to the guideline for implementation of PPP Draft.

Recommendation Terms and conditions of PPP contract are too general and vague.

Considering to provide a bankable PPP contract template in the PPP Draft or in the guiding decree / circular for PPP Draft.

3. Art. 57 It is not reasonable for forcing governing law to be the Vietnamese law. Especially, Vietnam has signed several international treaties and in principle allowed rules of such international treaties to be applied in PPP projects.

It is an international norm and feasible for a foreign related transactions to be governed by foreign law of a third country (not Vietnam or investor’s country) to the extent certain specific areas / agreements must be in compliance with Vietnamese law such as land regime, taxes, etc.

Recommendation: Considering for the parties to agree on the governing law of a third country (not Vietnam or investor’s country, e.g., Singapore law) to the extent certain specific areas / agreements must be in compliance with Vietnamese law such as land regime, taxes, etc.

4. Art. 80 The investment incentives are underdeveloped and quite similar as those provided under Decree 63. This is a safe approach but it would confuse the investors on the incentives and how to enjoy them under the PPP Draft.

Recommendation: Considering not referring to other laws and regulations on determination of investment, land and tax incentives for PPP forms.

For example, at least the PPP Draft should determine whether the PPP project could enjoy incentives such as an encouraged investment project or special encouraged investment project, etc.

5. Art.82 The conditions for foreign currency balance is very limited. As discussed above, only large scale projects prefer and may satisfy conditions of PPP investment forms. Thus, the scope for application of this foreign currency balance would need to be extended to all PPP projects, or at least for power projects and grid projects.

Foreign currency balance ensuring scheme is only applicable to projects subject to investment policy decision of the Nation Assembly and Prime Minister. In addition, there is a ceiling of 30% to be imposed.

In practice, several projects could not reach financial closure as scheduled because they cannot agree with the government about the convertibility of profits earned in local currency into foreign exchange for repatriation and payment for input commodities (coal, gas).

The demand for foreign currency associated with BOT projects and associated tariff revenues to be covered in the energy sector could escalate dramatically through 2030, up to US$23 billion/annually by 2030.

Recommendation: Considering to extend the scope eligible for foreign currency balance.

Foreign exchange convertibility has been a concern among investors. In the absence of such government convertibility guarantees, there is limited availability of currency hedging instruments that would allow private investors to cover currency risks through the market. The assurance on the availability of foreign currency shall definitely facilitate investment procedures. The ceiling of 30% should be removed as well.

Government guarantees for other obligations such as off-taker obligations and obligations towards infrastructure, payment obligations (including deemed commissioning and termination payments), etc. depending on projects.

6. Art. 83 Revenue risk sharing mechanism: (i) the investors, PPP project enterprises shall share with the State 50% of the increase between actual revenue and committed revenue in the contract; and (ii) the State shall share with the investors, the PPP project enterprises 50% of the decrease between actual revenue and committed revenue in the contract if, inter alia, the project does not use state’s budget and the cause of the loss is the change of policies, laws.

Recommendation: The risk sharing mechanism should be further developed to cover all other risks that may arise during the implementation of the PPP project (e.g., force majeure, change in law, price fluctuation, low selling price, etc.)

7. N/A Long negotiation process: it is due to several issues: (i) no clear list of approvals for the Project to be ready-to-build and / or operation, (ii) land site clearance and compensation process is still very challenging, (iii) not all decisions / procedures having a clear time-limit.

Recommendation: Recommending to provide all time-limits for all decisions / procedures and it is deemed to be provided if the state authority fails to issue such decisions. In addition, it is recommended to have a basic ready-to-build approval list for the investors to pursue and operate the PPP projects.

***
Please do not hesitate to contact the author Dr. Oliver Massmann under omassmann@duanemorris.com. Dr. Oliver Massmann is the General Director of Duane Morris Vietnam LLC, Member to the Supervisory Board of PetroVietnam Insurance JSC and the only foreign lawyer presenting in Vietnamese language to members of the NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF VIETNAM.

ベトナムの世界銀行がドウェイン・モリス法律事務所に対し、ベンチマーキング・インフラ民間連携(PPP)について、知っておくべき以下の疑問を問う

ケーススタディの仮定
· プライベートパートナー(プロジェクト会社)は、ベトナムで運営されている民間企業のコンソーシアムによって設立された特別目的会社(SPV)です。
· 調達機関は、ベトナムの国家/連邦機関であり、輸送部門(国道)の国家/連邦インフラ・プロジェクトの設計、建設、資金調達(完全または部分的)、運用、および保守を計画しています。 1億5,000万米ドル(または現地通貨での相当額)の投資額は、可用性の支払いまたは使用料で賄われています。
· このため、調達機関は、競争力のあるPPP調達手順に従って、入札の公募/入札の招待/提案の要求/資格の要求を開始します。
定義
· 「民間連携(PPP)」とは、公的資産またはサービスを提供するための公的機関または当局と民間企業との間の契約上の取り決めを指します。この調査の目的のために、この定義は特定の国または管轄で使用される用語に関係なく適用され、政府支払いまたはユーザー支払いPPPの両方に適用されます。
· 「規制の枠組み」には、すべての法律、規制、ポリシー、拘束力のあるガイドラインまたは指示、標準的なPPP契約、一般的な適用に関する他の法的文書、司法上の決定、およびPPPに関連する先例を管理または設定する行政裁定が含まれます。これに関連して、「ポリシー」という用語は、すべての利害関係者を拘束し、法律および規制と同様の方法で施行され、PPPの実装に関する詳細な指示を提供する他の政府発行の文書を指します。公共サービスを提供するための行動方針としてPPPを使用するという政府の意図の意味において、ポリシーと混同しないでください。「規制の枠組み」には、PPPを扱う法律、規制、政策などが含まれますが、これらに限定されません(PPPの調達は一般調達枠組みによって管理される場合があります。関連する法律および規制)。
· 「調達機関」とは、調達/入札プロセスが正常に完了した後、関連する資産および/またはサービスが民間パートナーによって提供されることを保証する責任を負う省、部門、または機関です。これは、PPPを担当する機関(すなわちPPP契約の特定、準備、調達、授与、管理)です。
· 調達用語:調達関連の用語は、調達手順の種類とプロセスの段階に応じて、管轄区域によって異なることを考慮して、調査で使用される用語は、現地の命名規則に最も適合するように寄稿者によって解釈される必要があります。特に、次の非網羅的な用語リストは、調査の文脈において互換性があると広く理解できます。
記事全文及び質問内容等に関しご質問等がございましたら、
お気軽にオリバー・マスマン(OMassmann@duanemorris.com)までご連絡くださいませ。

VIETNAM – PUBLIC-PRIVATE-PARTNERSHIPS (PPP) AND CPTPP AND EVFTA/IPA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS AND THE DRAFT PPP LAW

Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) have long been used as a vehicle for both emerging and developed markets to further enhance their public infrastructure to support growing socio-economic needs. Vietnam, however, has experienced an explosive economic growth over the past decade and is poised for even further expansion with their acceding to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and European Union—Vietnam Free Trade (EVFTA) agreements. With these two new growth mechanisms in-force, Vietnam’s infrastructure is struggling to accommodate that growth. The statutory cap on public funds utilization of 65 percent is rapidly approaching and the most viable investment form left for Vietnam is a functional PPP program.

Both CPTPP and EVFTA/IPA (Investment Protection Agreement) lay out very broad frameworks for supporting infrastructure development such as preferring renewable energy over environmentally-damaging alternatives and establishing development committees to determine how best to support that effort.[1] With the core of those agreements addressing elimination of almost all duties and tariffs on goods and services between the parties (over time), it makes the cost of acquiring hardware for energy infrastructure less. Additionally, the restrictions on cross-border trade in services required to construct and maintain technologically advanced platforms are lessened; further reducing the cost of an infrastructure project. Vu Tien Loc (president of Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry) speaking at an event “EVFTA and EVIPA: Opportunities for Business” held on July 1 by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, stated that EVFTA is the best FTA Vietnam has ever signed.[2] Vietnam is heading towards a foreign direct investment (FDI) generation, with higher quality, more advanced technologies, higher added value and a more eco-friendly environment, so the EVFTA will open the door for EU companies to complete these targets, Loc said.[3]

With these opportunities presented for Vietnam’s economic future, a draft law on PPP was drawn to address some of the concerns foreign investors have had regarding the regulatory environment for PPP in Vietnam. Mainly that there is not an appropriate level of risk allocation (too much on the investor), and there is not enough regulatory stability to support a long-term PPP project (generally 25-30 years). Many of the primary concerns have been discussed in other various articles; however, CPTPP and EVFTA/IPA have two restrictions reserved by Vietnam that can hinder the potential for expansive FDI in energy infrastructure (specifically power distribution)—CPTPP Annex IV and EVIPA Annex 2.1. Conversely, they also include dispute settlement provisions between member countries that can attract PPP investment if incorporated into the draft PPP law.

CPTPP Annex IV and EVIPA Annex 2.1

CPTPP Annex IV states, “[Regarding] all state-owned enterprises[4]…Viet Nam may require or direct the Entity [CPTPP member] to: (b) accord preferential treatment to…enterprises that are investments of Vietnamese investors in the territory of Viet Nam…pursuant to a government measure.” EVIPA Annex 2.1 states, “Viet Nam may adopt or maintain any measure with respect to the operation of a covered investment that is not in conformity with Article 2.3 (National Treatment); (h) …power transmission and/or distribution.” Both annexes allow Vietnam to require a potential member-country investor to use only Vietnamese domestic enterprises (majority-owned by Vietnamese nationals) in accomplishing the PPP project, if Vietnam so chooses. The EVIPA Annex is even broader than CPTPP by allowing “any measure” (regarding power transmission/distribution). It is also interesting to note that in EVFTA Appendix 8-B-1[5] (Specific commitments by Vietnam) Vietnam has agreed to virtually no restrictions on any construction companies or engineering services, including having a 100% member-country-owned commercial presence in Vietnam’s territory. In essence, CPTPP and EVFTA/IPA allow freer, fairer access to goods/services and investments; however, Vietnam can require any investor to utilize strictly Vietnamese resources regarding power or energy production and distribution. Most nations want to maintain national sovereignty and control of specific industries and resources they consider critical in supporting that sovereignty—that is not the issue here. This issue raised is one of regulatory uncertainties for investors.

These competing sections can cause consternation for a potential PPP investor. They may be able to complete the project for far less costs using their own member-country resources, but arbitrarily required at some point to utilize Vietnamese-owned companies that perhaps charge far more for the same good or service. The current draft PPP law is silent on this issue. PPP investors could be reassured, through contractual stability, of the guaranteed resources and services to be provided (and by whom) from the outset of the project. At a minimum, the draft PPP law should include a method for an investor to challenge a regulatory ruling or decision through an impartial, third party. While this issue might not derail a project, it could cause a qualified, reliable investor not to even want to bid a project; therefore, possibly driving the cost up or having a lower quality platform that will cost more in repair and maintenance in the long term. What the draft PPP law needs is to adopt the dispute settlement and resolution provisions of the CPTPP and EVFTA/IPA. In its current form, it does not mirror them.

Dispute Resolution Provision

Under Article 112 of the draft PPP law (dispute resolution) parties must use negotiation and conciliation first. This is the same as both CPTPP Chapter 28 and EVFTA Chapter 15/IPA Chapter 3. Continuing, a dispute involving a foreign investor (and between a State Agency) will be resolved through a Vietnamese arbitration organization or court, “unless otherwise agreed in the contract or unless otherwise stipulated in an international treaty of which Vietnam is a member.” If not stipulated in the contract, this means that if the foreign entity is a CPTPP or EUFTA/IPA member country, those agreements’ dispute chapters apply—maybe. Both agreements state that dispute resolution will be accomplished via mediation and arbitration for disputes generated under those agreements. There is no specific PPP language in the agreements; therefore, it will have to be proven that either of the agreements govern the project. This will add time and costs to the project, the government, the investor, and ultimately, the public.

Many PPP projects do not involve one, single foreign investor. There could be any number of various investor combinations to complete a specific project. A purely domestic, Vietnamese, single investor will be required to use Vietnamese arbitration or courts under Article 112—understandable. Any dispute between investors (state agency not involved) in which there is at least one (1) foreign investor will be resolved: “First, in Vietnamese court(s); then second, Vietnamese arbitrator(s); lastly, Foreign arbitrator(s).” Unless the foreign-investor here is a CPTPP/EVFTA member, or they have an international arbitration clause in their contract, there is no real option for the investor except for Vietnamese arbitration/courts.

The current draft PPP law’s Article 112 is more in line with general business transactions and not the magnitude of most PPP investments. They generally include multiple entities and financial vehicles/lenders, both foreign and domestic, ranging in the hundreds of millions to billions of USD. With the level of involvement regarding PPP projects, the draft PPP law should just state plainly that any dispute shall be resolved through international mediation and/or arbitration (unless stipulated otherwise in the contract). In effect, mirror the CPTPP and EVFTA/IPA Dispute Settlement Chapters. This will provide potential investors with the regulatory certainty they have been looking for. It will also alleviate any concerns around objectivity and neutrality for all parties. UNCITRAL stated in their UN guidelines for PPP in 2000, “…procedures should be established for handling disputes… (This is where arbitration should be a risk concession by the government…allowing international standards of the infrastructure sector to have an equal voice) [Emphasis added].”[6] Changing dispute resolution in the draft law to mirror the current trade agreements and UNCITRAL will help attract FDI for PPP infrastructure projects.

Summary

Vietnam needs to rely on the private sector to take their socio-economic growth to the next level. Government cannot satisfy the country’s requirements without it. Regulatory reform has been one of the biggest hurdles to overcome in satisfying the private sector’s concerns. From a statutory perspective, the CPTPP and EVFTA/IPA are able vehicles that give a wide berth for PPP projects to flourish. Within those landmark agreements, some conflicting areas do remain that can cause investor concern. From an operational perspective, government agencies need to streamline their processes to deliver services effectively under the laws and regulations (another major concern of investors). Eric Sidgwick, ADB country director for Vietnam, stated that Vietnam’s average disbursement rate is much lower than that of other recipients of the Asian Development Bank’s official development assistance (ODA) loans, largely due to cumbersome and time-consuming procedures.[7] While there is never a perfect solution for all parties, compromise is usually the most effective way to ensure buy-in from all involved. A way of alleviating investor’s concern over ambiguous and regulatory stability is to change the dispute resolution Article of the draft PPP law to mirror the already successful agreements of CPTPP and EVFTA/IPA.

Please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Oliver Massmann under omassmann@duanemorris.com if you have any questions or want to know more details on the above. Oliver Massmann is the General Director of Duane Morris Vietnam LLC.

THANK YOU!

新規PPP関連法が立てうる、ベトナムのインフラ開発への道筋

著者:Giles T. Cooper

翻訳:志澤政彦(Masahiko Shizawa)

原文:https://blogs.duanemorris.com/vietnam/2018/06/19/will-a-new-ppp-law-pave-the-way-for-vietnams-infrastructure/

インフラというボトルネックに、ベトナムの急成長が直面している。政府には、今まさに必要な道路、鉄道、トンネルに資金を投下できるほどの予算がない。そこで専門家が目を向け始めているのは、民間セクターである。

この制約がある以上、非国家セクターの資金を輸送インフラ開発のため継続的に活用することが今すぐ必要となる。アジア開発銀行(ADB)によれば、2015年から2020年までの間のインフラへの投資のため、ベトナムは最大170億米ドルを必要とするだろうとのことである。

近年、ベトナム政府は官民連携(PPP)プログラムの下で投資プロジェクトに透明性を与えるよう進めてきた。PPPは、政府機関と民間投資家が協同してなす投資の一形態であり、インフラの建設、修復、運営、並びに管理、及び公共サービスの提供のために行われる。政府はPPPにより、開発目標達成のため民間セクターの効率性と専門性を活用することができる。

そうはいっても、そうしたプロジェクトの持続的な実施を阻む欠点や限界があり、現状で名乗りを上げるのに投資家は慎重を期している。

投資を勧奨する政令が提出されてきてはいる。しかし、その条件は魅力的とはいえず、そのようなプロジェクトに必要な柔軟性がないとの批判もある。PPP投資活動の主な規制は以前、PPP投資に関する政令15/2015/ND-CP号及び入札法の実施指針である政令30/2015/ND-CP号であった。

この国は、1990年から2016年までに総額162憶米ドルにも及ぶ84件のPPPプロジェクトを実施してきている。うち79%はエネルギー関連のものであった。 一方、2011年のPPPパイロットプログラムが制定されて以来、この法的枠組みを利用した新規PPPプロジェクトは一切登録されていない。

政府は最近、政令15/2015を改正し、ベトナムにおけるPPPプロジェクトの分野、投資条件、手続を特定した政令63/2018(政令63)を発行した。この新たな政令により、PPPプロジェクトにおける投資家の資本比率が20%にまで引き上げられる。政令63は2018年の6月に施行された。

これで十分といえるか

BOT(Build-Operate-Transfer)方式とBT(Build-Transfer)方式のプロジェクトに対する調査・監査結果によれば、そのほとんどにおいて、投資家選定の際の入札が限定され、低い競争性と透明性の欠如を招いたとのことである。また、プロジェクトの通知は未だにオープンな方法で実施されていない。

同時に、プロジェクト実施の管理は非効率的であり、建設作業の低質化等の様々な問題を引き起こしている。

これらの問題に対応して投資を促進するため、ベトナム国会は政府に、上記のような難点や法的制限を取り払うようなPPP関連法を作るよう求めた。

PPP関連法の成功に必要な3要素

  • 明確なリスク共有メカニズム

当局は未だ、政府がデベロッパーのため一定の最低収益を保証し、それに至らない場合に補填するようなリスク共有メカニズムを、明確に打ち出してきてはいない。この点は、プロジェクトがしばしば重大なリスクを伴うインフラの場合には特に重要である。規制の明確さにより投資家の信頼を得られるのではないだろうか。

現状のモデルでは、ほとんどのリスクを民間セクターに転嫁してしまっている。民間の投資家や事業者の誘致には、透明性のある政策枠組みと公平なリスク分配が鍵である。同様に、明確に定義されたプロジェクトの射程と期待できる金銭的な利益の適切な保証を伴った魅力的な取引のストラクチャーによって、PPPへの参加が奨励されるものと思われる。

  • 為替レート保証

長期的な融資は外貨によってなされるものの、ベトナムのインフラプロジェクトの収益は現地通貨ベトナムドンによる。これだと、プロジェクトの収益性に負の影響をもたらす。新たなPPP関連法を成功に導くには、長期的な建設プロジェクトの中で投資家が同等の交換レートを確保できるよう、政府による兌換保証メカニズムを盛り込む改善が必要となろう。

海外への外貨送金の制限も縮小される必要があろう。

こうした障害や通貨変動のリスクは、投資家の信頼に大きな影響を与える。これらを取り除くことが、この国の継続的前進に必要な種類のプロジェクト誘致に重要であろう。

  • 金銭的インセンティブ

典型的な長期投資であるインフラプロジェクトには、投資家に巨大な建築に必要な20年から30年もの間の関与をさせるため、対価としての追加のインセンティブや収益の保証が必要となろう。

このリスクを相殺するために、政府は開発の波及的効果の一部を投資家に報いることを考えてもよいだろう。インセンティブがあれば、収益が交通の流れや将来の予測不可能な状況に依存するといった、インフラ開発に内在的な不確実性を減らすことができるだろう。

要するに、やる気のある投資家の誘致にベトナムが必要なのは、信頼できる政策及び規制、加えて投資家の信頼を得られるようなPPPに特化した政府部門といった、透明性、公平性、予測可能性を確保できる枠組みである。

ライフサイクルコスト、安全性、レジリエンス(強靭性)、そして環境への影響といったその他の要素も、考慮される必要がある。

ベトナムのインフラ開発への需要は揺るぐまい。しかし、現状の立法状況が実現可能または収益性のあるPPPプロジェクトに繋がるとはいえない。PPP関連法の上述のような点をクリアにすれば、透明性を向上し、この国に目を向けている事業体のリスクを減らし、もって状況の改善が見込めるだろう。

ベトナム投資に関する情報については、GTCooper@duanemorris.comよりGiles弁護士または当事務所の弁護士一覧の弁護士にお問い合わせください。Giles はドウェイン・モリス・ベトナム法律事務所の共同代表であり、ドウェイン・モリス・ホーチミン支所の支所代表です。

ベトナム:インフラ開発のジレンマにグリーンボンドは効くか著者:Giles T. Cooper

翻訳:志澤政彦(Masahiko Shizawa)

原文:https://blogs.duanemorris.com/vietnam/2018/05/15/are-green-bonds-the-answer-to-vietnams-infrastructure-dilemma/ 

ベトナムを含む東南アジア諸国では、急成長とともに安定した資金源の確保が困難になってきた。

このことは、インフラ事業において顕著である。アジア開発銀行(ADB)の報告書によると、経済成長に伴い、2030年までにこの地域では2.8兆米ドルに相当する道路、橋梁、鉄道が必要になるとされている。

不安定さを増す政治情勢に直面している東南アジア諸国は、この先数年のインフラ開発の資金調達の選択肢としてより安全なものに目を向けている。「一帯一路」政策の下ですでに1兆米ドルものプロジェクトを支援してきた中国への過剰依存は、国内的解決策を経済が志向するにつれ、その規模が縮小されていくものであろう。従前に表明した境界線を踏み越えようとする中国の計画への恐怖は、資金の不正流用及び失敗したプロジェクトという具体的教訓と相まって、この地域周辺の国々に「一帯一路」の活用の再考を迫ってきた。

南シナ海の領域問題をめぐる政治的緊張及び増加傾向にある国際的な保護主義を前に、ベトナムのような国々は将来的な資金調達を自前で行う途を探る方向でいる。この地域全般で国家予算への負担は増加傾向にあり、この先数年で強く求められる成長のため投下すべき他の資金元を探そうとしている。一つの提案は、「グリーンボンド」の発行促進である。

「グリーンボンド」について知らなければならないこと

グリーンボンドは債券の一つであるが、発行者によって調達された資金は「グリーン」なプロジェクト、つまり、環境に配慮し、気候への懸念を考慮に入れたものに割り当てられる。グリーンボンドの発行が特に利益になるセクターは、再生可能エネルギー、インフラ、および建設業界である。

道路、橋梁、トンネル、そして鉄道の建設には、地域的及び全国的な気候に多大な負担をかけてしまう。そのため、環境フットプリントの低減を志向するプロジェクトの優先度は最も高い。

環境に配慮したプロジェクトに資金調達を集中させることに加えて、グリーンボンドは発行者の持続可能な開発への取り組みの深さを強調する意義もある。さらに、発行者はグリーン・ベンチャーにのみ投資をする特定のグループのグローバル投資家にアクセスできるようになる。国外のプレーヤーによるグリーンな投資への注目が高まっている中、資本調達のコスト削減にも貢献しうる。

ベトナムにとって意味するものとは

ドイツの開発機構であるGIZによれば、現在の炭素依存的成長からより持続可能な道筋へと移行し、その約束草案(Intended Nationally Determined Contribution、INC)に向けた行動をとるため、ベトナムは2020年までにおよそ307億米ドルを必要としている。

グリーンな成長のための資金のうち30%程度は国家予算、すなわち中央と各省の予算及び政府開発援助、からの拠出が見込まれているが、残りは民間セクターから供給されることとなるとみられる。

ベトナム政府が2011年から2020年の期間について承認したベトナム・グリーン成長戦略(Vietnam Green Growth Strategy, VGGS)の下では、資本市場がその目標達成のカギとなるだろう。グリーンボンドが死活的な役割を果たすのは、まさにこの点においてである。グリーンなプロジェクトや事業体のため特別に資金調達を行い、グリーンな商品のデリバティブの流通の素地を作り、さらに民間セクターの投資を持続可能な開発のため活用することになる。

国外からの関心としては、ベトナムのグリーンボンドの発行により、持続可能な開発、再生可能エネルギー、そして環境に配慮した成長を志向している国際投資家の誘致が期待されている。世界中の投資家が、気候変動の課題やエネルギーの移行につき、前にも増して注視している。環境問題を考慮に入れた投資ツール、特に開発途上国におけるものについて要求する投資家は、増加の一途を辿っている。

この地域で、ベトナムが持続可能な資金調達の見通しを見据えている唯一の国というわけではない。アセアン・グリーンボンド基準(ASEAN Green Bonds Standards、AGBS)が2017年11月に開発・実行され、アセアンでのグリーンボンドの発行に共通の基準が制定された。マレーシア、シンガポール、インドネシアの会社は、すでにアセアン・グリーンボンドと称された債券を発行している。

これらのグリーンボンドの発行によって調達された資金は、再生可能エネルギー、廃棄物処理、グリーンな建築物やインフラといった、持続可能性の要件を満たしたプロジェクトに配分され、さらに統合、連帯、アセアン全体の成長といった共通の目標に貢献するものである。何よりも、地域のリーダーたちは将来世代の犠牲のもとに成長は成り立たないことに気づいてきている。AGBSのような新たな取り組みが、環境に配慮した投資への資源の分配を促進するだろう。

成長不全を来しているグリーンな成長

2020年までに達成されるべき指標の一つは、グリーンボンド市場を、現在およそ90兆米ドルのグローバル債券市場の少なくとも1%にまで拡大することである。これを現実のものとするため、ソブリン債発行者は断固たる決断をする必要がある。

流動性の欠如、債券の構造の限定的な多様性、及び確実に収益の見込めるプロジェクトの定期的で大きな流れの不在といったものが、未だにアジアの現地通貨によるグリーンボンド市場の特徴である。

加えて、社会的責任を果たそうとしている投資家からの恒常的な要求はまだ限定的であり、この市場の成長の可能性を阻んでいる。

そうはいっても、ソブリン債発行者が環境を整備し、強力な枠組みが適用される限り、現地通貨でのグリーンボンド市場の成長の見込みは大きい。制約となりうるのは、確実に収益の見込めるグリーンな投資の数と大きさであろう。

もしベトナムが「グリーンボンド」の動きを十全に活用しようとするなら、上述したような方法での資金の注入が解決策を示してくれるだろう。それは、インフラ事業における資金調達の穴を埋め、より速い拡張に向けた基礎を固め、そして、これまで長い間痛めつけてきた環境には休息をもたらすものであるはずだ。

ベトナムのグリーンボンドに関する情報については、GTCooper@duanemorris.comよりGiles弁護士または当事務所の弁護士一覧の弁護士にお問い合わせください。Giles はドウェイン・モリス・ベトナム法律事務所の共同代表であり、ドウェイン・モリス・ホーチミン支所の支所代表です。

Will a new PPP law pave the way for Vietnam’s infrastructure?

Fast-growing Vietnam is facing an infrastructure bottleneck. With the state lacking the budgetary might to finance the nation’s much-needed highways, tracks and tunnels, experts are increasingly looking towards the private sector to fill in the financial shortfall.

 

Amid such constraints, the continuing mobilisation of financial resources from non-state sectors for transport infrastructure development is urgently necessary. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Vietnam will need up to US$17 billion for infrastructure investment between 2015 and 2025.

 

In recent years, the Government has made moves to create a transparent legal framework for investment projects, under the public-private-partnership (PPP) programme. PPP is a form of investment between a government agency and a private investor for projects in construction, renovation, operation and management of infrastructure, as well as the provision of public services. Through PPP, governments can leverage efficiencies and expertise in the private sector to achieve their development goals.

 

However, shortcomings and limitations plague the sustained implementation of such projects and investors are wary of signing up in the current climate.

 

Although a number of decrees have been put forward to facilitate investment, critics have noted that the environment is not attractive and investors are not granted the necessary flexibility regarding these projects. PPP investment activities were regulated by Decree 15/2015/ND-CP on PPP investment and Decree 30/2015/ND-CP guiding the implementation of some articles of the Law on Bidding, as well as several other documents.

 

From 1990 to 2016, the country completed 84 PPP projects amounting to US$16.2 billion, with 79 percent of the projects in the energy sector. However, since the issuance of the PPP pilot programme in 2011, no PPP project has been signed under this framework. Compared with regional neighbours, foreign investment in infrastructure in Vietnam is lagging behind.

 

Recently, the government issued Decree 63/2018 (Decree 63), replacing Decree 15/2015, specifying the areas, investment conditions, and procedures for PPP projects in Vietnam. The new decree increases the investor equity ratio for PPP projects to 20 percent. Decree 63 takes effect in June this year.

 

Does this go far enough?

 

Inspection and audit results on build-operate-transfer (BOT) and build-transfer (BT) projects showed that most applied limited tendering in choosing investors, leading to low competitiveness and a lack of transparency. Meanwhile, the announcement of projects has yet to be implemented in an open manner.

 

At the same time, the supervision of projects’ implementation has been ineffective, leading to low quality construction works and many other problems.

 

In response to this range of issues, Vietnam’s National Assembly has requested that the government come up with a PPP law that removes such difficulties and legal restrictions in order to promote this form of investment.

 

3 things a successful PPP law should include

 

  1. A clear risk-sharing mechanism

 

Authorities have yet to clarify a risk-sharing mechanism in which the government guarantees a certain minimum revenue flow for the developer, agreeing to top it off if it isn’t met. This is especially important in the case of infrastructure, where projects can often carry significant risk. Some regulatory clarity would help investor confidence.

 

The current model transfers most of the risk on to the private sector. To attract private sector investors and operators, a transparent policy framework and fair allocation of risk are key. Similarly, attractive deal structures with a clearly defined project scope and adequate guarantees on the expected financial return will help to encourage participation in PPP deals.

 

  1. Exchange rate guarantees

 

Vietnam’s infrastructure projects will sell their output in the local currency, the Vietnamese dong, while long-term financing will be provided in a foreign currency. This has a negative impact on the bankability of such projects. A new and successful PPP law would need to improve on this point by including a mechanism for government guarantees of convertibility, so investors can be sure of the same exchange rate over the course of a long-term construction project.

 

Limitations on the remittance of foreign currencies overseas will also need to be scaled back.

These obstacles, and the risk of currency fluctuations, have a big impact on investor confidence. Their removal would go a long way in attracting the kind of projects needed to keep the country moving.

 

  1. Financial incentives

 

As a typically long-term investment, infrastructure projects will need added incentives and guarantees on return in order for investors to make the 20-30 year commitments required for big constructions.

 

To offset the risk, the government could look to rewarding investors with part of the spillover effect of development. Incentives could help to reduce the uncertainty inherent in infrastructure development, where revenues can depend on traffic flows and unpredictable circumstances in the future.

 

In short, to attract willing investors, Vietnam needs a framework that ensures transparency, fairness and predictability, including reliable policies and regulations as well as specialised PPP branches of government that investors can trust.

 

Other factors, like life cycle cost, safety, resilience and environmental impact also need to be taken into account.

 

The demand for infrastructure development in Vietnam is robust, but the legislative environment is not currently conducive to the signing of PPP projects that are viable or bankable. Clarification in the form of a PPP law that covers the above points would improve the situation by increasing transparency and reducing risks for enterprises eyeing the country.

 

For more information about investment in Vietnam, please contact Giles at GTCooper@duanemorris.com or any of the lawyers in our office listing. Giles is co-General Director of Duane Morris Vietnam LLC and branch director of Duane Morris’ HCMC office.

Lawyer in Vietnam Dr. Oliver Massmann – Public Private Partnerships – Enhancing Functionality – Making use of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership and the EU – Vietnam Free Trade Agreement for Better Functionality of the New PPP Decree

Decree No. 15/2015/ND-CP on public-private partnership (“PPP”) (“Decree 15”) when introduced in 2015 was highly praised by legal commentators to be well drafted and make the PPP Laws in Vietnam move closer towards bankable projects.

However, in implementation process, there have been conflicting legal issues that deter investors from choosing PPP as an investment method, leading to a humble number of PPP projects thus far. For example, Decree 15 made a progress in other previous PPP regulations in clearly allowing project contracts to be governed by foreign law, namely contracts involving a foreign party and government agency guarantee contracts. The issue only arises when it comes to real-estate related matters, which are not yet finally decided under the Land Law which law will be the governing law.

Moreover, as PPP laws are only at Decree level, regulatory framework for PPP projects mainly includes the Law on Enterprises, Law on Public Investment, Law on Bidding, etc. most of which regulate public investment instead of private one or investment cooperation between the Government and private investors. The investors are also concerned about the stability of PPP regulations, as they are mainly Decrees. While a PPP project could take years to complete, regulations at Decree level may change and cause investors confusion in implementation of the laws. The state agencies also face certain difficulties in managing these PPP projects. According to a real story shared by an officer at VCCI, after the Government signed a PPP contract with an investor, due to changes in policies, the Government amended its determination of the contract value. As a result, the land price increased by 14 times as much as previously agreed, leading to substantial loss for the investor.

According to the Ministry of Planning and Investment, during 2016-2020, it is expected that there will be 598 registered PPP projects with total investment amount of VND 250,000 billion. Given the shortcomings of Decree 15, it would be hard to achieve these numbers without its replacement by another Decree. In that context, Decree No. 63/2018/ND-CP (“Decree 63”) was issued on 04 May 2018 and takes effect from 19 June 2018 to eliminate bottlenecks in PPP implementation.
Decree 63 – What is new?

Capital contribution responsibility

The investor is responsible for contributing and mobilizing capital for the project implementation, in particular, the ratio of the investor’s capital in the owner’s equity is determined as follows:
– For projects with total investment amount of up to VND1,500 billion, the equity capital that the investor must maintain must be at least 20% of the total investment capital;
– For projects with total investment capital of more than VND1,500 billion:
o For investment portion of up to VND1,500 billion: the equity capital that the investor must maintain must be at least 20% of the total investment capital;
o For investment portion that exceeds VND1,500 billion: the equity capital that the investor must maintain must be at least 10% of the total investment capital.

There is no capital contribution requirement from the Government side.

Project approval authority

Decree 63 makes it clear the following authorities will approve PPP projects:
– The National Assembly decides the investment policy of important national projects;
– The Prime Minister decides the investment policy of the following projects:
o Projects Type A using state budget from 30% or above or below 30% but more than VND300 billion of the total investment capital of the project;
o Projects Type A using BT contracts.
– Ministers of relevant ministries decide investment policy of their own projects not falling within the approval authority of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister.
– Provincial People’s Councils decide investment policy of the following projects:
o Projects Type A not falling under the approval authority of the Prime Minister;
o Projects Type B using public investment budget; and
o Projects Type B using BT contracts.
– The provincial People’s Committee decides the investment policy of projects in their provinces not falling within the approval authority of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister and the provincial People’s Council.

Payment methods in BT projects

Practice shows that investors are very interested in well-located land when implementing BT projects. However, when such land fund gradually becomes exhausted, BT projects seem not to attract investors. Decree 63 has added another method in addition to the exchange of land for infrastructure, so that the investors will have more options in receiving payments. Specifically, the investor may also receive payment in the form of the transfer of right to conduct business, exploit works/ services, etc.

How to take advantage of the CPTPP and the EU-Vietnam FTA (EVFTA) in PPP projects to enhance the functionality of PPP projects in Vietnam

Covered government entities and agencies

According to Decree 63, tenders for the selection of PPP investors will follow the Law on Public Procurement. While the Vietnam’s Law on Public Procurement still shows some shortcomings, Vietnam will be bound by its commitments in the Government Procurement chapter in the CPTPP and the EVFTA, including the procedures to conduct a tender and in specific circumstances that the Government must conduct a public tender. The investors now have the opportunity to participate in procurement by Vietnam’s government entities and challenge the Government if it does not grant the investors the opportunity to do so in qualified circumstances.
The CPTPP and the EVFTA both make a list of government entities and agencies whose procurement of particular̉ goods and services at a particular amount must be subject to public tender. While the CPTPP only allows expansion of the list within 5 years upon the entry into force of the agreement, the EVFTA allows a longer period (i.e., 15 years).
Covered procurement

Government procurement of goods or services or any combination thereof that satisfy the following criteria falls within the scope of the EVFTA and CPTPP Government Procurement rules:

Criteria

How to appeal Government tender decision?

The CPTPP and the EVFTA make it possible that foreign investors could sue Vietnam Government for its tender decisions according to the dispute settlement by arbitration rules. The violating party must take all necessary measures to promptly comply with the arbitral decision. In case of non-compliance, as in the WTO, the CPTPP and the EVFTA allow temporary remedies (compensation) at the request of the complaining party.

Enforcement of arbitral awards

The final arbitral award is binding and enforceable without any question from the local courts regarding its validity. This is an advantage for investors considering the fact that the percentage of annulled foreign arbitral awards in Vietnam remains relatively high for different reasons.

Conclusion

It is crucial that foreign investors take advantage of the requirements under the CPTPP and the EVFTA to enhance functionality of their PPP projects in Vietnam. Under these agreements, specific Vietnam Government entities and agencies when procuring goods/ services above certain thresholds must conduct public tender. In case these entities make wrongful tender decisions, foreign investors could take recourse to arbitration proceedings and have the arbitral awards fully enforced in Vietnam.

***
Please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Oliver Massmann under omassmann@duanemorris.com if you have any questions or want to know more details on the above. Oliver Massmann is the General Director of Duane Morris Vietnam LLC.
THANK YOU !

Lawyer in Vietnam Dr. Oliver Massmann – Public Private Partnerships – Enhancing Functionality – Making use of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership and the EU – Vietnam Free Trade Agreement for Better Functionality of the New PPP Decree

Decree No. 15/2015/ND-CP on public-private partnership (“PPP”) (“Decree 15”) when introduced in 2015 was highly praised by legal commentators to be well drafted and make the PPP Laws in Vietnam move closer towards bankable projects.
However, in implementation process, there have been conflicting legal issues that deter investors from choosing PPP as an investment method, leading to a humble number of PPP projects thus far. For example, Decree 15 made a progress in other previous PPP regulations in clearly allowing project contracts to be governed by foreign law, namely contracts involving a foreign party and government agency guarantee contracts. The issue only arises when it comes to real-estate related matters, which are not yet finally decided under the Land Law which law will be the governing law.
Moreover, as PPP laws are only at Decree level, regulatory framework for PPP projects mainly includes the Law on Enterprises, Law on Public Investment, Law on Bidding, etc. most of which regulate public investment instead of private one or investment cooperation between the Government and private investors. The investors are also concerned about the stability of PPP regulations, as they are mainly Decrees. While a PPP project could take years to complete, regulations at Decree level may change and cause investors confusion in implementation of the laws. The state agencies also face certain difficulties in managing these PPP projects. According to a real story shared by an officer at VCCI, after the Government signed a PPP contract with an investor, due to changes in policies, the Government amended its determination of the contract value. As a result, the land price increased by 14 times as much as previously agreed, leading to substantial loss for the investor.
According to the Ministry of Planning and Investment, during 2016-2020, it is expected that there will be 598 registered PPP projects with total investment amount of VND 250,000 billion. Given the shortcomings of Decree 15, it would be hard to achieve these numbers without its replacement by another Decree. In that context, Decree No. 63/2018/ND-CP (“Decree 63”) was issued on 04 May 2018 and takes effect from 19 June 2018 to eliminate bottlenecks in PPP implementation.
Decree 63 – What is new?
Capital contribution responsibility
The investor is responsible for contributing and mobilizing capital for the project implementation, in particular, the ratio of the investor’s capital in the owner’s equity is determined as follows:
– For projects with total investment amount of up to VND1,500 billion, the equity capital that the investor must maintain must be at least 20% of the total investment capital;
– For projects with total investment capital of more than VND1,500 billion:
o For investment portion of up to VND1,500 billion: the equity capital that the investor must maintain must be at least 20% of the total investment capital;
o For investment portion that exceeds VND1,500 billion: the equity capital that the investor must maintain must be at least 10% of the total investment capital.
There is no capital contribution requirement from the Government side.
Project approval authority
Decree 63 makes it clear the following authorities will approve PPP projects:
– The National Assembly decides the investment policy of important national projects;
– The Prime Minister decides the investment policy of the following projects:
o Projects Type A using state budget from 30% or above or below 30% but more than VND300 billion of the total investment capital of the project;
o Projects Type A using BT contracts.
– Ministers of relevant ministries decide investment policy of their own projects not falling within the approval authority of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister.
– Provincial People’s Councils decide investment policy of the following projects:
o Projects Type A not falling under the approval authority of the Prime Minister;
o Projects Type B using public investment budget; and
o Projects Type B using BT contracts.
– The provincial People’s Committee decides the investment policy of projects in their provinces not falling within the approval authority of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister and the provincial People’s Council.
Payment methods in BT projects
Practice shows that investors are very interested in well-located land when implementing BT projects. However, when such land fund gradually becomes exhausted, BT projects seem not to attract investors. Decree 63 has added another method in addition to the exchange of land for infrastructure, so that the investors will have more options in receiving payments. Specifically, the investor may also receive payment in the form of the transfer of right to conduct business, exploit works/ services, etc.
How to take advantage of the CPTPP and the EU-Vietnam FTA (EVFTA) in PPP projects to enhance the functionality of PPP projects in Vietnam
Covered government entities and agencies
According to Decree 63, tenders for the selection of PPP investors will follow the Law on Public Procurement. While the Vietnam’s Law on Public Procurement still shows some shortcomings, Vietnam will be bound by its commitments in the Government Procurement chapter in the CPTPP and the EVFTA, including the procedures to conduct a tender and in specific circumstances that the Government must conduct a public tender. The investors now have the opportunity to participate in procurement by Vietnam’s government entities and challenge the Government if it does not grant the investors the opportunity to do so in qualified circumstances.
The CPTPP and the EVFTA both make a list of government entities and agencies whose procurement of particular̉ goods and services at a particular amount must be subject to public tender. While the CPTPP only allows expansion of the list within 5 years upon the entry into force of the agreement, the EVFTA allows a longer period (i.e., 15 years).
Covered procurement
Government procurement of goods or services or any combination thereof that satisfy the following criteria falls within the scope of the EVFTA and CPTPP Government Procurement rules:
Criteria EVFTA CPTPP
Monetary values that determine whether procurement by central government is covered under an agreement 130,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) (US$191,000) from 15 years since the entry into force of the agreement

Initial transitional threshold: 1.5 million SDRs 130,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) (US$191,000) from 25 years since the entry into force of the agreement

Initial transitional threshold: 2 million SDRs
Procurement of construction services by central government entities Initial threshold: 65.2 million SDRs

After 15 years, 8.5 million SDRs Initial threshold: 40 million SDRs

After 15 years, 5 million SDRs
Entities covered 22 central government bodies (added the Ministry of Public Security)

42 other entities: added two state-owned enterprises (Vietnam Electricity and Vietnam Railways) and two universities (Vietnam National University – Hanoi and Vietnam National University – Ho Chi Minh City)

Sub-central government coverage: Adds 2 cities: Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh – expansion of the list within 15 years since the entry into force of the agreement 21 central government bodies

38 other entities

No sub-central government coverage – expansion of the list within 5 years since the entry into force of the agreement
Exclusion of preferences for SMEs Broad exclusion applies only to procurement of goods and services whose value is estimated at 260,000 SDRs or less and may not be applied to SMEs with more than 500 permanent full-time employees.
Application of offsets Based on value of a contract Based on the total value of covered procurement
How to appeal Government tender decision?
The CPTPP and the EVFTA make it possible that foreign investors could sue Vietnam Government for its tender decisions according to the dispute settlement by arbitration rules. The violating party must take all necessary measures to promptly comply with the arbitral decision. In case of non-compliance, as in the WTO, the CPTPP and the EVFTA allow temporary remedies (compensation) at the request of the complaining party.
Enforcement of arbitral awards
The final arbitral award is binding and enforceable without any question from the local courts regarding its validity. This is an advantage for investors considering the fact that the percentage of annulled foreign arbitral awards in Vietnam remains relatively high for different reasons.
Conclusion
It is crucial that foreign investors take advantage of the requirements under the CPTPP and the EVFTA to enhance functionality of their PPP projects in Vietnam. Under these agreements, specific Vietnam Government entities and agencies when procuring goods/ services above certain thresholds must conduct public tender. In case these entities make wrongful tender decisions, foreign investors could take recourse to arbitration proceedings and have the arbitral awards fully enforced in Vietnam.
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Please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Oliver Massmann under omassmann@duanemorris.com if you have any questions or want to know more details on the above. Oliver Massmann is the General Director of Duane Morris Vietnam LLC.
THANK YOU !

L’impact de l’initiative “La Nouvelle Route de la Soie” sur le développement de l’infrastructure au Vietnam

Peu abordé au Vietnam, “La Nouvelle Route de la Soie” est le sujet de ma présentation lors d’un colloque sur les PPP organisé par la Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie France-Vietnam et L’Association des Juristes en Coopération Economique et Affaires Internationales (AJCEAI) le 2 mai 2018 à l’Institut Français de Hanoi. OBOR-Vietnam Infrastructures-AJCEI-2018-05-02-S